[paper] Washington's First Impressions of Koizumi and Tanaka.

Bruce Stronach: Provost and Chief Operating Officer of Becker College

Provost and Chief Operating Officer of Becker College

Although it may be a bit early to draw any significant conclusions, Foreign Minister Tanaka's recent visit to Washington, and Prime Minister Koizumi's up-coming visit, inevitably prompt an examination of American's image of the new Japanese government and its relations with the United States.

the ability of Japanese and American leaders to communicate has been limited.

The ascension of Junichiro Koizumi and the impact of popular opinion on his choice as prime minister, as well as the appointment of Makiko Tanaka as foreign minister may remind Washington of the age-old curse, "Be careful of what you wish for, it may come true." Washington has long hoped for a strong Japanese leader with broad popular support for several reasons. The political style of elected officials in the United States is quite different from those in Japan because their professional development has been so different. American politicians rise through the ranks into prominence because they have a combination of charisma and strong stands on particular issues. Thus, they flaunt their power. They exude it, as anyone who has been in Washington will soon discover. Japanese politicians have in the past gained prominence through just the opposite behavior. By being flexible and having low-key personalities Japanese politicians have been able to rise quietly through the ranks by manipulating others and guiding through deals without attracting negative attention. The result has been that with rare exceptions, such as the equally forceful and outgoing "Ron" and "Yasu", the ability of Japanese and American leaders to communicate has been limited.

Compounding this inability to communicate has been a perception that Japanese prime ministers are superfluous. Interpersonal relations can make a real difference in both the tone and substance of the relations between two states. Leaders are often perceived as the embodiment of the countries they represent and personal warmth between two leaders does send a direct message to the people on their staffs who actually work on the details of the economic and political relationships. Given this crucial aspect of bilateral relations, consider these facts: since 1990 the United States has had three presidents with Clinton serving eight of those years. Great Britain has had two prime ministers and France has had two presidents, both roughly splitting the eleven years. Germany has had two chancellors, the longest serving eight of those years. Japan has had nine prime ministers with the longest tenure being about two years but the average tenure being a little over one year. This is not a recent trend. Since the end of the Sato regime in the early 1970s America has seen a virtual revolving door of Japanese prime ministers, again with Nakasone being the most obvious exception. Even if American presidents and their cabinets secretaries had the inclination to bond with their Japanese counterparts, there would be little time in which to do so.

This combination of factors means that American officials are predisposed to perceive Japanese prime ministers and cabinet ministers as being generally both ephemeral and ineffectual. It is believed that the bureaucrats are the real power holders, and it is more important to build relationships with the bureaucracy than with the politicians. This is another element of the relationship that makes communication difficult given the general distrust that many Americans, politicians or otherwise, have toward bureaucrats. The American analysis of Japan's contemporary economic problems is not dissimilar to the American analysis of Japan's problems during the occupation-too much centralization and a bureaucracy that is too strong. Fifty years after the occupation the mantra continues to be privatize, decentralize, globalize, and increase competition.

However, while American politicians may feel more comfortable dealing with Japanese politicians made in their own image, they may find that the tremendously positive continuity in Japanese-American relations is due to the influence of the Japanese bureaucracy over the volatile vagaries of politics. It has been over 40 years since Prime Minister Ikeda defused the inherently explosive nature of the relationship following the turmoil of the Kishi years, and the bureaucrats have done a good job of emphasizing the relatively benign economic aspects of the relationship while downplaying the potentially volatile political and military aspects.

From the attempts by Reagan to involve Japan in the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative to the strengthening of the security relationship in the 1990s, it has been the goal of successive American administrations to support the development of a "normal" Japan, to use the now somewhat passe Ozawa expression. The Koizumi government holds more promise than any other government since the security treaty was revised forty years ago to carrying out a wide range of reforms, including military reforms. Koizumi has challenged the constitution, the concept of not calling the Japanese military a "self-defense force", and is strongly supportive of Japan's strengthened role in the security alliance. The most incredible thing is that he has done all this while maintaining a high level of popular support, although it is still too soon to tell how stable that support is. Koizumi is a man that Americans think they can understand because they think that he is just like them-direct, outgoing, anti-bureaucratic. What they do not seem to consider, however, is whether they will be able to channel his energies into policies that will consistently match those of the United States. All will be well as long as he takes strong positions that coincide with American policies, but when there is disagreement it may lead to even greater antagonisms.

The early impressions of Koizumi and Tanaka

All Americans can be quite naive in their views of Japan and such is the case with Makiko Tanaka as foreign minister. The early perception of the new Japanese foreign minister was symbolized by the quite unprecedented reception she got in Washington by everyone up to and including President Bush. Tanaka has a high profile and a positive image in the United States on two counts. She is the first woman to hold the position of foreign minister, and that means that there is a good chance for her to become the first Japanese prime minister. She has the highest political profile of any woman in Japan since Takako Doi led the Socialists more than a decade ago. In addition, like Koizumi, she also is a non-traditionalist who is useful in confronting the bureaucrats that have tied Japan down for so many years and suppressed reform.

But Tanaka's positive attributes can turn to negative attributes in a relatively short period of time. It is well-known that Tanaka's personality can be very abrasive, and that in and of itself could be an important factor. The vigor with which she so forthrightly chastises Japanese bureaucrats may not have as much charm if it is turned against the Bush administration, the American embassy, corporations, and/or government representatives. Personality aside, there are some crucial issue areas that need to be examined. There is a distinct possibility that Japan may use the forceful energy generated by Koizumi and Tanaka to fuel alternative policies in some very crucial areas including, but not limited to, relations with China, the Kyoto Treaty and missile defense initiative.

Both Makiko Tanaka and her father have been known to have positive inclinations toward China, and given the current climate of economic growth and political assertiveness in the PRC it may not be a bad thing for Japan to have a government that can work well with its large and powerful neighbor. The fear, of course, is that a Koizumi-Tanaka government would play the China card against the United States in order to strengthen its own position. This would be a very dangerous game and it has a low probability, but the possibility remains and is something of which Washington is sure to be watchful. There is a greater possibility that the increasing assertiveness in defense matters would serve as an irritant in Sino-Japanese relations but that would, in its own way, be an equally severe problem for Washington. Managing the subtleties of American-Sino relations with respect to Taiwan is difficult enough; the addition of a serious Sino-Japanese conflict would make it well-neigh impossible.

Differences over the Kyoto Treaty and the Bush administrations plans for the missile defense initiative are not as complex, or even as important, as relations with China but they do serve as warnings for the confusion and conflict that could result from a Japan that consistently says "No" to American policy. Indeed, Koizumi's and Tanaka's outspoken opposition to the two early Bush policies of opposing the Kyoto Treaty and developing a missile defense initiative are in and of themselves confusing because Koizumi himself has been less than adamant in his support for the Kyoto Treaty, and one of the most important factors behind the missile defense policy is the North Korean threat to Japan. However, the possibility that anti-Tanaka bureaucrats were exaggerating the severity of her remarks cannot be overlooked. Indeed, if opposition to Japan's active participation in the missile defense initiative is based on the grounds that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution would not allow it, one assumes that if Koizumi can change the constitution that barrier would be removed.

Tanaka made an obvious effort to be positive during her Washington visit, and her remarks were more tempered than those she has reportedly made in Japan. It will be interesting to see Koizumi's posture when he visits the United States and whether he gets a reception as effusive as that received by Tanaka. The most important thing to remember is that both the Koizumi government and the Bush administration are still in their early days, and both face strong challenges in defining themselves to their respective domestic constituencies. Bush is still trying to assert the legitimacy of his administration after a very close and controversial election while simultaneously trying to reconcile his electoral platform of "compassionate conservatism" with his quite traditionally conservative policies. Koizumi, for his part, will at some point have to go beyond rhetoric and actually attempt deep structural reforms if he is to live up to the mandate that brought him to power. Thus, the perception that each has of the other, and their behavior toward each other, will be shaped as much by the image that each wants to project at home as it will be by the objective realities of the Japanese-American relationship as it currently exists.

whether Koizumi can present himself

Finally, when addressing the American perception of Japan it is important to add the caveat that most Americans only have a shallow and hazy image of Japan, and virtually no perception of any Japanese government, new or old. This article dealt with the perceptions of the American elite toward Japan, but the fact that the general population's images of Japan remain so shallow after 50 years of post-occupation relations in and of itself remains important. It is interesting to note that during those years when Japan was perceived to be at the apex of its economic power relative to the United States, there was more coverage of Japan (both positive and negative) and general interest in Japan than there is today. There is an unfortunate feeling in contemporary America that Japan has had its day and that in political and economic matters China deserves all the attention. This may not be true but the perception does exist. As a visiting foreign minister, Tanaka received relative scanty press coverage in the major media outlets no matter what the fanfare she received in Washington's corridors of power. Compare that with the overwhelming press coverage Ichiro, Nomo and the other Japanese professional baseball players in the United States have received in the past few months.

It will be interesting to see whether Koizumi commands greater coverage in the American press and whether he can use that coverage, or perhaps even stimulate it, by creating an image for himself. In a world of information technology and global, instant communication, it is incumbent upon Koizumi to present himself to the American public with as much panache and aplomb as he has presented himself to the Japanese public. If he does he will not only be well-received, he will also rekindle in both the American public and its political elite a realization of the importance of America's relationship to Japan. If he fails then he will be just another Japanese prime minister just passing through.