ANALYSIS PAPER:
The 14th Joint Public Opinion Poll between Japan and China

Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2018

In Cooperation With:
Japan: Public Opinion Research Center
China: Horizon Research Consultancy Group

October, 2018
What is the Joint Japan-China Opinion Poll?
The Genron NPO has annually conducted opinion polls in Japan and China since 2005 prior to Tokyo-Beijing Forum, which is the most influential track II platform between the two countries. These surveys reveal the impressions held by each country’s citizens toward the other, as well as their views on specific problems. The surveys also reveal social structural issues, including how the perception of the respective country’s citizens is created.

About the Tokyo-Beijing Forum
When Japan-China relations were apparently at their worst in 2005, The Genron NPO launched the Tokyo-Beijing Forum” as a bilateral private-sector dialogue. This forum has met once a year uninterruptedly even amid various difficulties in Japan-China relations. Despite the Senkaku issue, in 2013 adopted a “No-War Pledge,” exemplifying the firm determination of Japan and China to solve issues under whatever conditions through dialogue.
<Survey Overview>

The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group conducted joint opinion polls targeting the citizens of Japan and China in September 2018. This survey has been administered annually since 2005, when Japan-China relations were at its worst. This year marks the 14th year that this poll has been conducted. The objective of the survey is to continuously monitor the state of mutual understanding and perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese public towards one another as well as the changes that ensue over time.

The opinion poll in Japan was administered through the placement method (in which the survey was hand-delivered to homes and then collected) between September 1 and September 22, targeting men and women above the age of 18. A total of 1,000 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.6% male and 51.4% female. The age range consisted of 2.5% under the age of 20, 11.8% between the ages of 20 and 29, 14.8% between the ages of 30 and 39, 17.4% between the ages of 40 and 49, 14.6% between the ages of 50 and 59 and 38.9% over the age of 60. The highest level of education among respondents were 6.8% junior high school diploma and under, 48.3% high school diploma, 20.8% junior/technical college diploma, 22% bachelor’s degree and 0.9% master’s degree.

The opinion poll in China was administered through individual interviews between August 27 and September 11, targeting men and women over the age of 18 in 10 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, Wuhan, Nanjing, Xi’an, Qingdao and Zhengzhou. A total of 1,548 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 49% male and 51% female. The age range consisted of 2.5% under the age of 20, 20.9% between the ages of 20 and 29, 21.6% between the ages of 30 and 39, 26.7% between the ages of 40 and 49, 21.3% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 6.6% above the age of 60. The highest level of education among respondents were 12% junior high school diploma and under, 32.8% high school/technical high school diploma, 31.3% technical college diploma, 21.9% bachelor’s degree, 0.8% double degree and 0.5% master’s degree.

Apart from this opinion poll, The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group also conducted the same survey targeting the intellectuals in both countries. The reason why this survey targeting intellectuals was administered together with the public opinion poll is in order to complement the general understanding of the Japanese and Chinese peoples by comparing expert/intellectual perspectives with the results obtained from the public opinion poll. Most intellectuals in both Japan and China do not depend solely upon domestic media or the internet as their means of obtaining information on one another’s countries. Rather, contrary to the general public, intellectuals obtain information by actually traveling abroad or through direct contact with friends and acquaintances in the other country.
In Japan, the same survey used for the public opinion poll was emailed between September 5 to October 6 to approximately 2,000 intellectuals consisting of domestic business managers, academics, press, and government employees who had previously participated in The Genron NPO’s discussions and surveys. A total of 404 responses were obtained. The highest level of education among respondents were 0% junior high school diploma and under, 3% high school diploma, 2% junior/technical college diploma, 59.9% bachelor’s degree, and 31.4% master’s degree.

In China, phone interviews were administered between August 27 and September 11 to 5,350 intellectuals from the Horizon Research Consultancy Group’s database, consisting of 45,000 people including business leaders, government officials, journalists, experts and public organization officials. A total of 614 responses were obtained. The highest level of education among respondents were 9.9% technical college diploma, 74.4% bachelor’s degree, 2.8% double degree, 10.6% master’s degree and 2.3% doctoral degree.

※ Percentages may not add up to 100% in some cases as the numbers here are rounded off to one decimal point and non-responses are not included.
1. Impressions of One Another’s Countries

**Impression of the Other Country**

The Chinese people’s impressions of Japan have improved, with 42.2% stating that they have a “favorable” impression of Japan. Up 11 points from last year, it is the highest it has been since the survey began in 2005. In comparison, those with an “unfavorable” impression of Japan decreased 11 points to 56.1%.

While there has been some improvement in the Japanese people’s impressions of China, 86.3% still have an “unfavorable” impression, showing results that contrast with those of the Chinese. Only 13.1% replied that they have a “favorable” impression of China.

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**Impression of the Other Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese public opinion: favorable /relatively favorable</th>
<th>Chinese public opinion: favorable /relatively favorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reasons Behind the Impression of the Other Country

Among the Japanese, the greatest reason for their “favorable” impression of China was the “increased familiarity of the Chinese due to greater numbers of Chinese visitors and private exchanges”; however, this response fell 15 points as compared to last year. The response with the greatest rise from last year was “China’s status now as a great international power,” up to 25.2% this year as compared to 10.4% last year.

Among the Chinese, the most popular reason for their “favorable” impression of Japan was the “remarkable growth of Japan’s economy and its high standards of living,” at 51.6%. While the response “Japanese politeness, good manners and high cultural standards” fell from 61.8% to 49.2%, nearly half of the Chinese still continue to select this response. “Japan’s beautiful environments, scenic landscapes and many sights, including hot springs” still remains a strongly popular response, at 45.3%. The “high quality of Japanese products,” however, fell from last year’s 53.5% to 44%, while “advanced Japanese technologies” also largely fell from last year’s 44.9% to 25%, showing a decreasing trend in those who cite Japan’s technological prowess as reasons for their favorable impressions of the country.

As for “unfavorable” impression of China among the Japanese, the greatest factor contributing to it was “continuing territorial issues over Senkaku Islands and Japanese waters/airspace,” at 58.6%. Following this was “actions that go against international rules” at 48%, up 8 points from last year.

Apart from this, other responses that topped last year’s results include the “aggressive acts by the Chinese as a world power in international society” at 36.6% (34.4% last year) and China’s “notable military reinforcement and non-transparency” at 33.5% (30.4% last year). Among the Chinese, most factors contributing to their “unfavorable” impression of Japan were cited by fewer respondents this year as compared to last year. While the most popular response was “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over its history of invasion into China,” selected by over half of the Chinese respondents, this result has fallen 13 points from last year. The percentage of those who cited “Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu Islands” and “Japan’s attempt to besiege China on military, economic and ideological fronts with the US and others” also fell 12 to 13 points each.
【Reasons for Unfavorable Impression】

【Japanese public opinion】

【Chinese public opinion】

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Changes in Public Sentiment from Last Year

When asked how public sentiments towards one another’s countries have changed from last year, most of the Japanese respondents replied “no change,” at 40.3%, followed by “not sure” at 37.6%. On the other hand, the percentage of Chinese respondents who replied that sentiments have “worsened” fell 23 points from 49.7% last year to 26.4%. At the same time, those who replied that sentiments have “improved” almost doubled from 20.4% last year to 40%, showing a significant trend towards improvement.

[Changes in Public Sentiment Among Both Countries Nationals Since Last Year]

[Japanese public opinion]

[Chinese public opinion]

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This year, there was significant improvement in how both countries’ respondents view current Japan-China relations. The response that relations are “bad” fell to under half of the responses given by respondents from both countries. Of the Japanese, 39% view current Japan-China relations as “bad”; this percentage dropped below 40% for the first time in 8 years. Among the Chinese, 45.1% view relations as “bad,” down 19 points from last year.

In terms of changes in Japan-China relations this year, the majority of both countries’ respondents replied that there has been “no special change.” However, the view that relations “have improved,” while it remains at around 10% for the Japanese, almost doubled from last year for the Chinese, at 30.2%.

For future Japan-China relations, 15.6% of the Japanese feel that relations “will improve,” while there has been a 10 point rise in this same view among the Chinese to 38.2% this year, showing a relatively optimistic perspective among the Chinese as compared to the Japanese.
Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations

While most respondents from both countries continued to cite “territorial issues” as the greatest obstacle to building Japan-China relations, this percentage dropped from last year for both countries. For the Chinese, this response is followed by “economic friction” and “lack of trust between the nationals,” among others. However, as compared to last year, less respondents cited the “lack of trust between governments.” Meanwhile more people considered the lack of trust between nationals to pose a greater obstacle. “Perception of history and history education in Japan,” the second most selected response last year, fell 10 percentage points this year from 34.8% to 25.2%.

Among the Japanese, the lack of trust “between nationals” and “between governments” were both cited by approximately 40% of respondents this year, surpassing the respective percentages from last year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations</th>
<th>Japanese public opinion</th>
<th>Chinese public opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust between the nationals</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes over marine resources</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial issues over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic frictions</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s national defense policy and reinforcement of military forces</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s reinforcement of military forces</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism and anti-Chinese sentiment</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of history and education in Japan</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of history and education in China</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate remarks on China made by Japanese politicians</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate remarks on Japan made by Chinese politicians</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-China broadcasts by Japanese media</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Japan broadcasts by Chinese media</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. Developing a New Cooperative Relationship

Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations

A 39.1% majority of the Japanese feel that “strengthening trust between the two governments” is the most effective measure for improving bilateral relations. Also considering the percentage of those who selected “increasing interaction between the two countries’ leaders,” 60% of the Japanese hope for strengthening relations on a governmental level. The same is true in China, where the sum of these two items is 57.1%, with an increasing level of expectations on the effect of summit diplomacy. Among the Japanese, “resolving territorial issues with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” constituted 28.7% of Japanese public opinion, showing an increasing trend from last year. This is followed by “resolving historical perception issues” at 25.5%. Among the Chinese, a 42.8% majority responded “resolving historical perception issues,” showing an increase from last year. In comparison, “territorial issues with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” was selected by 30.6% of Chinese respondents, down 11 points from last year. While only a tenth of both countries’ respondents believe that interaction in the private sector will be effective, there was a rise in expectations within this realm among the Chinese as compared to last year.
Should a New Cooperative Relationship be Established for the Stable Development of the World Economy and a Peaceful East Asia?

50% of the Japanese and 60% of the Chinese feel that a new, stronger cooperative relationship should be established for the stable development of the world economy and a peaceful East Asia. However, this percentage has decreased among both countries’ respondents as compared to last year.

【Should a New Cooperative Relationship be Established for a Stable and Peaceful Order?】

【Japanese Public Opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017 (N=1000)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

【Chinese Public Opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017 (N=1564)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1548)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4. Importance of Japan-China Relations and Affinity Towards the Other Country

Importance of Japan-China Relations

Over 70% of both countries’ respondents consider Japan-China relations to be “important.” There was an especially prominent rise in this response among Chinese respondents, showing a trend towards amelioration.

As for reasons why the relationship is “important,” over half of the Japanese respondents replied “necessity of Japan-China cooperation towards peace and development in Asia,” while the same response was selected by only about 30% of the Chinese. Among the Chinese, Japan’s status as an “important neighboring country” and “important trade partner to China” were the most popular responses.

[Importance of Current Japan-China Relations]
Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US / Sense of Affinity Towards the Respective Countries

When comparing Japan-China relations with relations with the US, approximately half of both Japanese and Chinese respondents replied that “both are equally important.” At the same time, there was also a decrease in those who feel that “relations with the US are more important” among both countries’ respondents. However, while the response “Japan-China relations are more important” increased among the Chinese as compared to last year, this percentage hangs at a low 4.5% for the Japanese.

Comparing the sense of affinity felt towards one another as opposed to the US, 46.9% of the Japanese still feel “more affinity towards the US.” This ratio has dropped from last year but still constitutes nearly half of opinions in Japan. Among the Chinese, nearly half of the respondents feel “no affinity towards either,” however, there has been a decrease in affinity towards the US and a slight increase in affinity towards Japan as compared to last year.

【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US】

【Japanese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>2017 (N=1000)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A  Japan-China relations are more important than relations with the US</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B  Relations with the US are more important than Japan-China relations</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C  Both are equally important</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D  Not sure</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E  No response</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

【Chinese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>2017 (N=1564)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1548)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A  Japan-China relations are more important than relations with the US</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B  Relations with the US are more important than Japan-China relations</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C  Both are equally important</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D  Not sure</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E  No response</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to the US】

【Japanese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017 (N=1000)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: More affinity towards the other country</td>
<td>A 3.9%</td>
<td>A 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: More affinity towards the US</td>
<td>B 50.5%</td>
<td>B 46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Equal sense of affinity towards both</td>
<td>C 12.4%</td>
<td>C 12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: No affinity towards either</td>
<td>D 18.7%</td>
<td>D 21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Not sure</td>
<td>E 14.0%</td>
<td>E 14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: No response</td>
<td>F 0.5%</td>
<td>F 0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

【Chinese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017 (N=1564)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1548)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: More affinity towards the other country</td>
<td>A 5.2%</td>
<td>A 9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: More affinity towards the US</td>
<td>B 25.1%</td>
<td>B 19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Equal sense of affinity towards both</td>
<td>C 14.1%</td>
<td>C 17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: No affinity towards either</td>
<td>D 46.7%</td>
<td>D 46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Not sure</td>
<td>E 7.8%</td>
<td>E 6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: No response</td>
<td>F 1.0%</td>
<td>F 0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea / Sense of Affinity Towards the Respective Countries

When comparing the importance of Japan-China relations with that of South Korea, nearly half of both countries’ respondents replied that “both are equally important,” in line with last year’s results. Among the Japanese, more people view Japan-China relations as more important than Japan-South Korea relations. For the Chinese however, there was a slight upturn in the percentage of those who selected China-South Korea relations, bringing the perceived importance of both Japan-China and China-South Korea relations to about 20% each among the Chinese.

In terms of the sense of affinity towards the respective countries, the majority of both countries’ respondents replied that they feel “no affinity towards either.” For both countries, this is followed by “more affinity towards South Korea” as opposed to Japan or China respectively, showing a further increase from last year’s trend.
【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea】

【Japanese public opinion】

A Japan-China relations are more important than relations with South Korea
B Relations with South Korea are more important than Japan-China relations
C Both are equally important
D Not sure
E No response

【Chinese public opinion】

A Japan-China relations are more important than relations with South Korea
B Relations with South Korea are more important than Japan-China relations
C Both are equally important
D Not sure
E No response

【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to South Korea】

【Japanese public opinion】

A More affinity towards the other country
B More affinity towards South Korea
C Equal sense of affinity towards both
D No sense of affinity towards either
E Not sure
F No response

【Chinese public opinion】

A More affinity towards the other country
B More affinity towards South Korea
C Equal sense of affinity towards both
D No sense of affinity towards either
E Not sure
F No response
Most Important Foreign Relations

In terms of the most important foreign relations considering the future of their own country, a strikingly large proportion of Japanese respondents replied the “United States,” at nearly 60%. This percentage, however, has dropped from last year. Among the Chinese, most respondents selected “Russia,” at 30.9%. This percentage surpassed those who selected the “United States,” at 23.3%, further widening this gap from last year. While only 8.2% of the Japanese selected “China,” the percentage of Chinese respondents who selected “Japan” increased from 12% last year to 18.2% this year.

[Diagram showing Japanese and Chinese public opinion on most important foreign relations]
5. The 40th Anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China

Evaluation of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship

This year marks the 40th anniversary since the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China was signed. This year’s survey therefore included questions regarding this Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Respondents were first asked about which articles in the treaty should be developed in the future.

In response to this question, over half of the Japanese respondents (51.8%) replied that they continue to support the development of perpetual peace and friendship as found in the first item of Article I stating that “the Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.”

This response was also selected by a 64.9% majority of the Chinese. However, there was also an almost equal percentage (64.2%) that voiced anti-war opinions in agreement with the second item in Article I stating that “the Contracting Parties ... shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use of threat of force.” Furthermore over half (53%) also supported the counter-hegemony clause in Article II stating that “the Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”

Among the Japanese under 40% (38.8%) selected this “anti-war” clause while 19.7% support antihegemonism.

Next, respondents were asked whether the principles in these various clauses of the peace and friendship treaty were actually being realized in Japan-China relations today.

In response to this question, over 40% (40.4%) of the Japanese replied that “it has not been realized,” while only 14.8% feel that “it has been realized.” “Not sure” also constituted 44.6% of Japanese responses. Among the Chinese, a 46.2% majority also believe that “it has not been realized.” However, 44.8% also believe that “it has been realized,” showing a conflicting evaluation.
【Has the Spirit of the Peace and Friendship Treat Been Realized?】

【Japanese public opinion】

2018 (N=1000)

- A 0.1%
- B 14.7%
- C 36.2%
- D 4.2%
- E 44.6%

【Chinese public opinion】

2018 (N=1548)

- A 4.2%
- B 40.6%
- C 38.6%
- D 7.6%
- E 9.0%
- F 0.1%

A  It has been fully realized
B  It has been partially realized
(Chinese survey response was “it has been largely realized”)
C  It has not really been realized
D  It has not been realized at all
E  Not sure
F  No response
6. Chinese Economic Reform and the Promotion of Bilateral Exchange

Did the Economic Reform Promote Bilateral Exchange?

This year also marks the 40th anniversary since the implementation of the Chinese economic reform. This year’s survey therefore also included questions on whether the reform and opening-up policy promoted the development of friendship between the two governments, economic relations, cultural exchange and private exchanges.

Among the Chinese, over 70% (71.4%) replied that the reform “promoted” such exchange. On the other hand, opinions were split among the Japanese; 25.2% selected that such exchanges were “promoted,” while 29.2% felt that they “were not promoted.” At the same time, over 40% (42.5%) replied that they were “not sure.”
7. Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries

Perceptions of the Social/Political Systems of the Other Country

A 49.4% majority of Japanese respondents continue to view China as a “socialist/communist” country, followed by 32.6% who see it as “totalitarian (one-party rule).” In China, a 48.9% majority recognizes Japan as a “capitalist” country, followed by 39.5% who see it as “hegemonic.” Both results have increased as compared to last year. In comparison, the view of Japan as “militaristic” fell 10 points from last year’s 36% to 25.7%, falling into the 20% mark for the first time since the survey began in 2005. Only 7.6% see Japan as “democratic” and a mere 3% see it as “pacifist.”
Name Recognition of the Other Country’s Politicians

The most well-known Chinese politician continues to be “Mao Zedong,” recognized by nearly 90% of the Japanese. “Xi Jinping,” however, was also selected by over 80% of Japanese respondents, putting it almost on par with Zedong. Only a tenth recognize “Li Keqiang.” Nearly 80% of the Chinese recognize “Shinzo Abe.”

【Politicians Recognized From the Other Country】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese public opinion</th>
<th>Chinese public opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Xi Jinping</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shinzo Abe</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
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<td>4.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hu Jintao               | Yukio Hatoyama         |
| 87.8%                   | 16.3%                  |
| 63.6%                   | 16.5%                  |
| 34.8%                   | 11.0%                  |
| 6.8%                    | 4.1%                   |
| 4.1%                    | 4.1%                   |

| Li Keqiang              | Yasuo Fukuda           |
| 55.5%                   | 17.6%                  |
| 59.1%                   | 18.7%                  |
| 34.8%                   | 11.0%                  |
| 16.6%                   | 4.1%                   |

| Wen Jiabao              | Junichiro Koizumi      |
| 58.2%                   | 58.2%                  |
| 5.1%                    | 11.0%                  |
| 6.8%                    | 6.7%                   |
| 4.1%                    | 4.1%                   |

| Jiang Zemin             | Masayoshi Ohira        |
| 58.2%                   | 4.1%                   |
| 53.3%                   | 4.1%                   |
| 49.0%                   | 4.1%                   |

| Deng Xiaoping           | Shigeru Yoshida        |
| 51.9%                   | 4.1%                   |
| 51.0%                   | 4.1%                   |

| Zhou Enlai              | Tomiichi Murayama      |
| 40.1%                   | 4.1%                   |

| Mao Zedong              | None recognized        |
| 82.0%                   | 4.4%                   |
| 78.7%                   | 4.4%                   |

| None recognized         | None recognized        |
| 0.1%                    | 4.4%                   |

| No response             | No response            |
| 0.3%                    | 4.4%                   |

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8. Interactions Among the General Public

Visit the Other Country

Only 29.2% of the Japanese expressed a desire to visit China, while 70% replied that they do not wish to visit China; this trend has not changed from last year. In comparison, 43.8% of the Chinese expressed a desire to visit Japan.

As for reasons for their desire to visit the other country, most of both national responded “visiting the sights and scenery of the country,” while over half of the Chinese respondents also replied “shopping,” in line with last year’s trend.

Perception of the Degree of Interaction Among the General Public

Over half of the Chinese respondents replied that there was active interaction among the general public between the two countries this year. Among the Japanese, over half replied that they are not sure. Both countries’ responses showed a decrease in those who feel such interaction was inactive this year.

Nearly 60% of the Japanese and over 70% of the Chinese feel that interaction among the general public is “important” in developing and improving Japan-China relations. However, approximately 30% of Japanese respondents also replied that they “cannot say.”

In terms of fields in which interaction among the general public should be promoted, the majority of Japanese respondents replied “dialogues among the general public,” “accepting exchange students from one another’s countries,” and “cultural exchange,” in this order. Most of the Chinese respondents selected “accepting exchange students from one another’s countries” and “interaction between the two countries’ journalists.” Only about 20% selected “dialogues among the general public.”
9. Historical Issues Between Japan and China

Japan-China Relations and the Influence of Historical Issues

60% of the Japanese and 90% of the Chinese continue to view historical issues as a large obstacle to Japan-China relations. However, among the Chinese, there was a 12-point increase in those who replied that historical issues, while still a large problem, have been “somewhat resolved.” As for historical issues that should be resolved, over 60% of the Japanese cited “anti-Japanese education and textbooks,” however, more than a few of the Japanese respondents saw problems in Japan itself, with 36.6% selecting “Japanese perception of its invasions of China.” Among the Chinese, although a 62.2% majority selected “Japanese perception of its invasions of China,” there was a decrease in this response as compared to last year. There was an especially significant decrease in Chinese respondents who cited the lack of a “sincere apology from Japan for the invasions in the past” from 59.9% last year to 26.5%. There was no change in the percentage of those who cited “Japan’s reparation for forced labor and comfort women.” On the other hand, there was an increase in those who view “broadcasts on China by the Japanese media” as problematic.

In terms of the influence of historical issues on Japan-China relations, the optimistic view that “historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China relations develop” and the pessimistic view that “it will be difficult to resolve historical issues regardless of the state of Japan-China relations” contended with one another among the Japanese, both comprising nearly 30% of Japanese public opinion. On the other hand, among the Chinese, the optimistic outlook that “historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China relations develop” increased 10 points from last year, constituting a 43.9% majority of Chinese public opinion. The view that “Japan-China relations will not improve unless historical issues are resolved,” which had formerly comprised the majority of Chinese public opinion, fell nearly 7 points from last year to 43.5%.
10. Security in East Asia

Perception of Military Threat

The percentage of Japanese who feel that certain countries pose a military threat to their country fell from 80.5% last year to 72.4%. The same percentage, however, rose dramatically among the Chinese from 59.1% to 68.7%. When asked about the specific countries that pose a military threat to their country, 80% of the Japanese continued to cite “North Korea.” This is followed by “China” at 57.5% and “Russia” at 34%, with both countries up 12 points from last year. In comparison, the percentage of Chinese respondents who selected “Japan” rose from 67.6% to 79.4%, nearing the 80% mark. This is followed by the “United States” at 67.7%. Only 8.4% of the Chinese feel that “North Korea” poses a military threat, down from 13.1% last year. The greatest reason why the Japanese perceive China as a military threat is “China’s intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters” cited by 67.8% of respondents, however nearly 60% also cite “conflict over marine resources and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” as well as “aggressive attitude regarding the South China Sea.” Regarding reasons why the Chinese view Japan as a military threat, a 70.1% majority cited “Japan’s attempt to besiege China ... in cooperation with the United States.”
Possibility of Military Conflict Over Territorial Issues

In regards to the possibility of military conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a 33.2% majority of Japanese respondents believe that it “will not occur.” In comparison, over half (56.1%) of Chinese respondents believe that it “will occur,” following last year’s trend. As for solutions regarding tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a 44.5% majority of the Japanese feels that “both countries should promptly start negotiating towards a peaceful agreement.” On the other hand, a 61.7% majority of the Chinese feel that “China should take further and actual control of the territories in order to protect them,” followed by “Japan should be made to recognize the existence of the territorial disputes through diplomatic negotiation” at 57.9%. In regards to the “Maritime and Air Liaison Mechanism,” which began its operation in June, 50% of the Chinese feel that it alone is sufficient for avoiding unintended military confrontations, while only 3.5% of the Japanese feel the same. Nearly 40% (36.7%) of the Japanese feel that it is insufficient, and 26% of the Chinese concur. Of the Japanese, 60% also replied that they are “not sure.”
【Nations that Should Participate in the Multilateral Framework for Security in Northeast Asia】

【Japanese public opinion】

【Chinese public opinion】
## 11. Economic Relations Between Japan and China

### Economic Relations Between Japan and China

In terms of economic relations between Japan and China, the majority of the Japanese continue to consider a win-win relationship to be difficult, showing a slight increase from last year. On the other hand, over 60% of the Chinese believe that a win-win relationship can be established; this opinion has increased among the Chinese as compared to last year. There was also a rise in optimistic views that future economic and trade relations between Japan and China “will increase,” up 26 points among the Japanese and 33 points among the Chinese. As for what is necessary in order to further develop economic/trade relations between Japan and China, the majority of both countries’ respondents cited “improvement in relations between the two countries’ governments,” showing a consensus between the people of both countries that this is a top-priority issue.

In terms of frameworks for free trade and economic partnerships for which Japan and China should cooperate in the future, the “Japan-China-South Korea FTA,” “One Belt, One Road” initiative, “TPP11,” “AIIB,” and “RCEP” were all selected by almost 40% range of Chinese respondents, in this order. However, among the Japanese, the most popular response was “not sure,” at a notably high 70.1%.
### 12. World Order and Economy / Opinions on Globalization

#### Opinions on Globalization

The percentage of Japanese who believe that globalization is good rose 11 points from last year, forming a 49.9% majority. While over 60% of the Chinese also feel that globalization is positive, this ratio has slightly decreased as compared to last year. Those who believe globalization is bad constitutes only 5.6% of the Japanese, while the same percentage among the Chinese rose from last year to 20.3%.

![Graph showing opinions on globalisation between Japanese and Chinese populations](chart.png)

**Legend:**
- **A:** Globalization is good
- **B:** Globalization is not good
- **C:** Not sure
- **D:** No response

*Note: Data from (N=1000) for 2017 and (N=1000) for 2018 for Japanese opinions; (N=1564) for 2017 and (N=1548) for 2018 for Chinese opinions.*
Free Trade and WTO Reform

Over 60% of the Japanese and 80% of the Chinese believe that international cooperation based on multilateralism such as global free trade and WTO is “important.” Regarding the WTO reform currently under way, 40% of the Japanese and 70% of the Chinese expressed their support. However, among the Japanese, over half of the respondents were undecided.

【International cooperation based on multilateralism】

【Japanese public opinion】

2018 (N=1000)

A  Very important
B  Somewhat important
C  Not very much important
D  Not important at all
E  Not sure
F  No response

【Chinese public opinion】

2018 (N=1548)

A  Very important
B  Somewhat important
C  Not very much important
D  Not important at all
E  Not sure
F  No response

【Do you support the WTO reform?】

【Japanese public opinion】

2018 (N=1000)

A  Support
B  Do not support
C  Not sure
D  No response

【Chinese public opinion】

2018 (N=1548)

A  Support
B  Do not support
C  Not sure
D  No response

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Countries and Regions that Should Lead the World

While over half of the Japanese respondents believe that the “US” should continue as the world’s leader, this percentage dropped from last year. In comparison, approximately 70% of the Chinese believe that “China” should lead the world. Although 30% of the Chinese selected the “US,” this percentage fell 10 points from last year, putting it on par with “Russia.”
13. The Future of Japan and China and a Cooperative Relationship in Asia

Most Important Values that East Asia Should Pursue

In terms of values that East Asia should pursue, 60% of the Japanese cite “peace” while nearly 40% cite “cooperative development.” Among the Chinese, “peace” and “cooperative development” were also selected by about 50% of respondents, putting the two countries in agreement that these two values are of the highest importance.
Can Japan and China Coexist and Co-prosper?

Over half of both Japanese and Chinese (56.6% of the Japanese and 53.7% of the Chinese) feel that “peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity are ideal, but may not be achieved.” However, among the Chinese, nearly 30% feel that “peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity are possible” between Japan and China. Although 12.6% of the Japanese and 9.4% of the Chinese feel that an antagonistic relationship will continue between the two countries, this percentage has dropped from last year.
Strengthening Cooperative Relationship to Resolve Bilateral Issues and Challenges in Asia

63.4% of the Japanese and 70.4% of the Chinese “agree” that cooperation between Japan and China should be strengthened as a means towards resolving bilateral issues and issues within Asia as a whole. Among the Chinese especially, this percentage increased 12 points from last year’s 58.3%. As for fields of cooperation, 74.6% of the Japanese cite “North Korea’s nuclear issue and complete denuclearization,” while 62.3% cite “environmental issues.” Among the Chinese, the most popular response was “North Korea’s nuclear issue” at 40.4%, showing an agreement between the two countries on this issue. Cooperation on the “establishment of stable peace in Northeast Asia” was selected by 35.3% of the Japanese and 22.2% of the Chinese.
14. Changes in the Influence of Various Countries in Asia Over the Next 10 Years

Changes in the Influence of Various Countries in Asia Over the Next 10 Years

While approximately half of both countries nationals feel that the influence of Japan in Asia over the next 10 years “will not change,” nearly 40% of Chinese respondents predict that it “will increase” as compared to 19.2% of the Japanese, showing that more Chinese respondents share a positive evaluation of Japan’s influence in the future.

In terms of the influence of China, 60% of the Japanese and nearly 90% of the Chinese believe that it “will increase.” The opinion that the influence of the US “will increase” was at par with the opinion that it “will not change” for both countries. As for South Korea, the majority of both countries’ respondents believe that its influence “will not change.” The views of the two countries differed in regards to the influence of Russia and India. While the majority of the Japanese feel that the Russian influence “will not change,” an over 50% majority of the Chinese believe that it “will increase.” As for Indian influence, “will increase” and “will not change” were equally popular among Japanese public opinion, while 55.9% of Chinese respondents replied that it “will not change.”
【Changes in the Influence of Various Countries in Asia Over the Next 10 Years】

【Japanese public opinion】

A. Japan (N=1000)
- A 19.2%
- B 49.1%
- C 15.0%
- D 15.6%
- E 1.1%

B. China (N=1000)
- A 60.9%
- B 17.2%
- C 4.2%
- D 16.5%
- E 1.2%

C. United States (N=1000)
- A 35.8%
- B 35.3%
- C 10.3%
- D 17.2%
- E 0.0%

D. South Korea (N=1000)
- A 11.9%
- B 45.1%
- C 21.3%
- D 20.1%
- E 0.0%

E. Russia (N=1000)
- A 21.9%
- B 42.2%
- C 9.8%
- D 24.9%
- E 0.0%

F. India (N=1000)
- A 36.8%
- B 34.9%
- C 2.9%
- D 24.0%
- E 0.0%

【Chinese public opinion】

A. Japan (N=1548)
- A 36.4%
- B 51.7%
- C 8.9%
- D 0.0%
- E 0.0%

B. China (N=1548)
- A 88.3%
- B 10.0%
- C 0.0%
- D 0.0%
- E 0.0%

C. United States (N=1548)
- A 42.4%
- B 41.3%
- C 14.5%
- D 0.0%
- E 0.0%

D. South Korea (N=1548)
- A 22.7%
- B 55.8%
- C 17.5%
- D 0.0%
- E 0.0%

E. Russia (N=1548)
- A 49.4%
- B 36.1%
- C 10.3%
- D 0.0%
- E 0.0%

F. India (N=1548)
- A 19.1%
- B 55.9%
- C 18.9%
- D 6.1%
- E 0.0%

A. Will increase   B. Will not change   C. Will decrease   D. Not sure   E. No response
15. Evaluation of Media Coverage and Public Opinion on the Internet

Influence of Media on Japan-China Relations

86.6% of the Chinese believe that the media “contributes” to the improvement of Japan-China relations and mutual understanding between the two countries’ people – a 9 point increase from last year’s 77.8%. On the other hand, only 30.2% of the Japanese see the media as contributory. At the same time, 80.6% of the Chinese feel that domestic media is “objective and fair” in regards to reports on Japan-China relations. On the other hand, less than 20% (16.4%) of the Japanese feel that domestic media reports are “objective and fair,” while 30.9% view domestic media as “not objective or fair.”

【Influence of Media on Japan-China Relations】

【Japanese public opinion】

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<th>2017 (N=1000)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1000)</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>9.0%</td>
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【Chinese public opinion】

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<td>A</td>
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<td>F</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
【Are Domestic Media Reports Objective and Fair?】

Japanese public opinion (Media reports are objective and fair)
- 2008: 72.3%
- 2009: 31.0%
- 2010: 31.2%
- 2011: 25.9%
- 2012: 25.4%
- 2013: 84.5%
- 2014: 73.9%
- 2015: 75.9%
- 2016: 71.3%
- 2017: 75.0%
- 2018: 80.6%

Japanese public opinion (Media reports are not objective and fair)
- 2008: 35.0%
- 2009: 24.6%
- 2010: 28.0%
- 2011: 25.4%
- 2012: 23.9%
- 2013: 25.4%
- 2014: 30.5%
- 2015: 30.1%
- 2016: 26.4%
- 2017: 26.4%
- 2018: 30.9%

Chinese public opinion (Media reports are objective and fair)
- 2008: 26.0%
- 2009: 20.2%
- 2010: 22.4%
- 2011: 25.1%
- 2012: 21.6%
- 2013: 13.3%
- 2014: 14.8%
- 2015: 20.2%
- 2016: 16.4%
- 2017: 16.4%
- 2018: 11.3%

Chinese public opinion (Media reports are not objective and fair)
- 2008: 7.1%
- 2009: 17.6%
- 2010: 17.4%
- 2011: 7.5%
- 2012: 13.3%
- 2013: 14.8%
- 2014: 20.2%
- 2015: 15.8%
- 2016: 11.3%
Does Public Opinion on the Internet Accurately Reflect the People’s Will?

Among the Japanese, 33.5% believe that the internet does not adequately reflect the will of the people, surpassing the 21.8% who believe that the Internet does capture public will. However, 44.4% replied “not sure.”

In comparison, nearly 90% (86.9%) of the Chinese feel that the internet to some extent reflects the people’s will.
16. Background of Mutual Understanding

Degree of Interaction Among the People

13.5% of the Japanese responded that they had visited China, showing no large change in Japanese responses over the past few years. On the other hand, the percentage of Chinese respondents who had visited Japan increased for the 7th year in a row to 18.6%.

As for reasons for their travels, sightseeing is the prominent reason for both countries’ respondents. When asked about when they made their travels, most of the Japanese replied “over 11 years ago,” and the percentage decreases over time down to the present day. Among the Chinese, over 90% replied that they traveled to Japan “within the past 5 years.”

Regarding acquaintances in the respective countries, 17.4% of the Japanese and 7% of the Chinese replied that they have acquaintances in the other country, showing no large change from last year.

【Have you been to China/Japan?】

- Japanese / those who have ever been to China
- Chinese / those who have ever been to Japan
【Friends/Acquaintances from the Other Country】

【Japanese public opinion】

2017 (N=1000) 2018 (N=1000)

A 3.5%  A 3.7%
B 16.7%  B 13.7%
C 79.6%  C 82.4%
D 0.2%  D 0.2%

A  I have close friends from the other country
B  I have acquaintances from the other country that I can sometimes talk to
C  I have never had any acquaintances from the other country
D  No response

【Chinese public opinion】

2017 (N=1564) 2018 (N=1548)

A 3.2%  A 2.9%
B 4.0%  B 4.1%
C 93.4%  C 91.1%
D 0.4%  D 1.9%
Sources of Information

An overwhelming number of Japanese obtain their information on China from Japanese news media sources and, like last year, television serves as an especially prominent source. Among the Chinese, nearly 90% likewise obtain their information on Japan through Chinese new media outlets. While nearly half also obtain information through “Chinese TV shows, informational programs and movies,” this percentage has decreased from last year. At the same time, over 20% also selected “conversations with family and friends, the internet and SNS” as a source. 60% of the Chinese cite television sources as their source of information in terms of domestic news media outlets, coinciding with Japanese results. However, nearly 30% Chinese respondents cite internet news sources on their cell phones, as compared to a mere 7.3% of the Japanese.