ANALYSIS PAPER:

The 15th Joint Public Opinion Poll

Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019

In Cooperation With:
Japan: Public Opinion Research Center
China: Horizon Research Consultancy Group

October, 2019
The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group conducted joint opinion polls targeting the citizens of Japan and China in September 2019. This survey has been administered annually since 2005, when Japan-China relations were at its worst. This year marks the 15th year that this poll has been conducted. The objective of the survey is to continuously monitor the state of mutual understanding and perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese public towards one another as well as the changes that ensue over time.

The opinion poll in Japan was administered through the placement method (in which the survey was hand-delivered to homes and then collected) between September 7 and September 28, targeting men and women above the age of 18. A total of 1,000 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.6% male and 51.4% female. The age range consisted of 2.4% under the age of 20, 11.9% between the ages of 20 and 29, 14.7% between the ages of 30 and 39, 17.5% between the ages of 40 and 49, 14.5% between the ages of 50 and 59 and 39% over the age of 60. The educational background of respondents were 5.7% junior high school diploma and under, 49.3% high school diploma, 20.6% junior/technical college diploma, 21.7% bachelor’s degree and 1.1% master’s degree or higher.

The opinion poll in China was administered through individual interviews between September 7 and September 20, targeting men and women over the age of 18 in 10 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, Wuhan, Nanjing, Xi’an, Qingdao and Zhengzhou. A total of 1,597 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.7% male and 51.3% female. The age range consisted of 2.8% under the age of 20, 20.2% between the ages of 20 and 29, 24.4% between the ages of 30 and 39, 26.2% between the ages of 40 and 49, 17.8% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 8.7% above the age of 60. The educational background of respondents were 9.2% junior high school diploma and under, 32% high school/technical high school diploma, 30.9% technical college diploma, 25.6% bachelor’s degree, 0.6% double degree and 1.2% master’s degree or higher.

Apart from this opinion poll, The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group also conducted the same survey targeting the intellectuals in both countries. This survey targeting intellectuals was administered together with the public opinion poll in order to complement the general understanding of the Japanese and Chinese peoples by comparing expert/intellectual perspectives with the results obtained from the public opinion poll. Most intellectuals in both Japan and China do not depend solely upon domestic media or the internet as their means of obtaining information on one another’s countries. Rather, contrary to the general public, intellectuals obtain information by actually traveling abroad or through direct contact with friends and acquaintances in the other country.

In Japan, the same survey used for the public opinion poll was emailed between September 12 and October 9 to approximately 2,000 intellectuals consisting of domestic business managers, academics, press, and government employees who had previously participated in The Genron NPO’s discussions and
surveys. A total of 404 responses were obtained. Respondents were 86.4% male and 11.6% female, and consisted of 1% under the age of 20, 2.2% between the ages of 20 and 29, 5.2% between the ages of 30 and 39, 11.6% between the ages of 40 and 49, 26% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 52.5% over the age of 60. The educational background of respondents were 0% junior high school diploma and under, 3% high school diploma, 2% junior/technical college diploma, 59.9% bachelor’s degree, and 31.4% master’s degree or higher.

In China, phone interviews were administered between September 7 and September 20 to 5,350 intellectuals from the Horizon Research Consultancy Group’s database, consisting of 45,000 people including business leaders, government officials, journalists, experts and public organization officials. A total of 600 responses were obtained. The educational background of respondents was 13.5% technical college diploma, 60.7% bachelor’s degree, 6.8% double degree, 17.2% master’s degree and 1.8% doctoral degree.

※ Percentages may not add up to 100% in some cases as the numbers here are rounded off to one decimal point and non-responses are not included.
1. Impressions of One Another’s Countries

Impression of the Other Country

The Chinese people’s impression of Japan has improved, with 45.9% stating that they have a “favorable” impression of Japan, recording the highest this percentage has been since the survey began in 2005.

By contrast, while there has been some improvement in the Japanese people’s impression of China, 84.7% still have an “unfavorable” impression, showing results that contrast with those of the Chinese. There was a slight increase in those with a “favorable” impression of China, but this percentage still only amounted to 15% of total responses.

【Impression of the Other Country】
**Reasons Behind the Impression of the Other Country**

The greatest reason for the “favorable” impression of China among the Japanese was the “increased familiarity of the Chinese due to greater numbers of Chinese visitors and private exchanges” at 40%, largely surpassing last year’s 32.8%. The overall scheme in which the increase of Chinese visitors and private exchanges contributed to a more favorable impression of China among the Japanese was the same as last year.

Among the Chinese, the most popular reason for the “favorable” impression of Japan was, in line with last year’s trend, the “remarkable growth of Japan’s economy and its high standards of living,” at 53.1%. Over 40% also cited reasons such as “Japan’s beautiful environments, scenic landscapes and many sights, including hot springs” (49.7%), “high quality of Japanese products” (49.4%), and “Japanese politeness, good manners and high cultural standards” (44.6%), showing a diverse set of reasons for the favorable impression, from tourism and Japanese products to national character.

On the other hand, the greatest factor contributing to the “unfavorable” impression of China among the Japanese was “continuing territorial issues over Senkaku Islands and Japanese waters/airspace,” at 51.4%. This percentage, however, has decreased from last year’s 58.6%. While most factors showed a decrease from last year’s results, uneasiness over China’s “different political system (one-party rule of the Communist Party)” rose 6 points from 37% last year to 43% this year, constituting the second most popular reason for the “unfavorable” impression of China among the Japanese public.

Among the Chinese public, two reasons stood out as contributing to the unfavorable impression of Japan, following last year’s trend – “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over its history of invasion into China” and “Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu Islands” at approximately 60% each.
【Reasons for Favorable Impression】

【Japanese public opinion】

2019 (N=150)  2018 (N=131)

China has begun to act as a great international power
Improved living standards in China due to significant economic development
Amicable bilateral relations & positive attitude towards bettering relations
Increased familiarity due to increase in Chinese visitors and exchanges
Interest in traditional Chinese culture and history
Interest in Chinese culture, recent and historical
Earned and hardworking character of the Chinese people
Increased and positive impression of the scale of the Chinese people's words and actions
Attractive cost and attractiveness of Chinese products
No particular reason

【Chinese public opinion】

2019 (N=733)  2018 (N=653)

Remarkable growth of Japan's economy and its high standards of living
Earned and hardworking character of the Japanese people
Japanese politeness, good manners and high cultural standards
High quality of Japanese products
Japan's beautiful environments, scenic landscapes and many sights, including hot springs
Advanced Japanese technologies
Attractiveness of Japanese food
Stability of Japanese society and well-developed infrastructure and legal systems
Japan's long term operation of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)
No particular reason

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【Reasons for Unfavorable Impression】

【Japanese public opinion】

【Chinese public opinion】
Among the Japanese, 65.4% responded that public sentiment towards China has not changed over the past year. Approximately 20%, however, say that it has worsened (percentage includes “relatively worsened”).

Half of the Chinese (53.7%) also responded that there has been no particular change in public sentiment towards Japan over the past year. However, contrary to Japanese responses, the opinion that it has improved (including “relatively improved”) constituted nearly 30% of all responses (at 29.6%).

【Changes in Public Sentiment Among Both Countries Nationals Since Last Year】

【Japanese public opinion】

【Chinese public opinion】
2. Current and Future Japan-China Relations

While last year’s survey results showed the percentage of Japanese who view current Japan-China relations as bad falling to under 40% for the first time in 8 years, this year showed a worsening of views. Up 6 points from last year, 44.8% of the Japanese view current Japan-China relations as bad. On the other hand, Chinese who view bilateral relations as bad decreased again, falling below 40% (35.6%) for the first time in 8 years. At the same time, over 30% (34.3%) of the Chinese see current relations as good.

In terms of changes in bilateral relations over the past year, most of both countries’ respondents (around 50% of both) replied that there has not been any change. The view that relations have worsened, however, increased 13 points among the Japanese to 31.8%, while for the Chinese, it dropped slightly from last year, showing differing understandings among the two countries’ peoples.

【Current Japan-China Relations】
Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations

While the majority most common answer choice of the respondents from both countries continues to be “territorial issues,” which they thought as the greatest obstacle to building Japan-China relations, but this percentage has dropped from last year for both countries. For the Chinese, it continues to be followed by “economic frictions,” “disputes over marine resources” and “lack of trust,” both “between governments” as well as “between nationals.” The percentage of those who selected “nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment,” however, rose 15 points from last year’s 5.4% to 20.4%. Among the Japanese, those who cite the “lack of trust between governments” rose to over 40%. Additionally, the responses “economic frictions” and “China’s reinforcement of military forces” also showed increases from last year. Meanwhile, the percentage of Japanese who cite the “lack of trust between nationals” fell to under 30%, down 8 points from last year.
3. Developing a New Cooperative Relationship

Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations

An outstanding 43.6% of the Japanese feel that “strengthen[ing] trust between the two governments” is the most effective measure for improving bilateral relations. Adding the percentage of those who selected “increase[ing] interaction between the two countries’ leaders,” 60% of the Japanese hope for strengthening relations on a governmental level.

The same trend can be seen in China, where the sum of these two items is 61.6%. Expectations towards “strengthen[ed] trust between the two governments” have especially grown, up 13 points from last year.

【Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations】

【Japanese public opinion】
Establishing a New Cooperating Relationship for the Stable Development of the Global Economy and Peace in East Asia

50% of the Japanese and 60% of the Chinese believe that a new, stronger cooperating relationship should be established in order to realize peace in East Asia and for the stable development of the global economy.
4. Importance of Japan-China Relations

How the Importance of Japan–China Relations is Viewed

Nearly 70% of both countries’ respondents consider Japan-China relations to be “important.” However, there was a 7 point decrease this year in the percentage of Chinese respondents who consider the relationship “important.”

As for reasons why the relationship is “important,” a 56.8% majority of Japanese respondents replied “because China is an important trade partner.” However, while the “necessity of Japan-China cooperation towards peace and development in Asia” was selected by 53.8% of the Japanese, this percentage fell below 30% for the Chinese (at 27.2%).

【Importance of Current Japan-China Relations】

- 76.5% Japanese public opinion: Important/ relatively important
- 72.8% Japanese public opinion: Unimportant/ relatively unimportant
- 73.8% Chinese public opinion: Important/ relatively important
- 67.2% Chinese public opinion: Unimportant/ relatively unimportant
Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US / Sense of Affinity Towards the Respective Countries

When comparing Japan-China relations to relations with the US, 48.2% of the Japanese and 39.2% of the Chinese replied that “both are equally important,” constituting the majority response for both. However, for the Chinese, “relations with the US are more important” also constituted 35.8% of responses, up from last year’s 31.5% and almost on par with the percentage of those who feel that “both are equally important.” Meanwhile, the response that “Japan-China relations are more important” constituted a mere 4.2% of Japanese and 15.7% of Chinese public opinion, showing no major change from last year’s results.

Comparing the sense of affinity felt towards one another as opposed to the US, nearly half (49.7%) of the Japanese feel “more affinity towards the US,” while nearly half of the Chinese feel “no affinity towards either.” Among the Japanese, 4.8% feel “more affinity towards China.” While this percentage rose for the Chinese as compared to last year, only 12.3% of the Chinese feel “more affinity towards Japan.”

【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US】
【Japanese public opinion】
【Chinese public opinion】
Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea / Sense of Affinity Towards the Respective Countries

When comparing the importance of Japan-China relations to that with South Korea, the majority of both countries’ respondents replied that “both are equally important.” This percentage, however, has fallen for both countries, down 10 points for the Japanese and approximately 6 points for the Chinese. Among the Japanese, there has been an increase in those who consider Japan-China relations as more important than Japan-South Korea relations over the past year. Those who consider Japan-China relations as more important increased 8 points from last year to 31%. For the Chinese, the perceived importance of Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations were equal at around 20% for each.

In terms of the sense of affinity towards the respective countries, an approximately 40% majority of both countries’ respondents replied that they feel “no affinity towards either.” However, among the Japanese, there has been a worsening of sentiments towards South Korea, with an 8 point decrease in those who feel “more affinity towards South Korea,” at 17.1% this year. At the same time, those who feel “more affinity towards China” increased close to twofold from last year to 13.2%.
【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea】

【Japanese public opinion】

- A Japan-China relations are more important than relations with South Korea: 23.2% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 31.0% in 2019 (N=1000)
- B Relations with South Korea are more important than Japan-China relations: 6.2% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 6.9% in 2019 (N=1000)
- C Both are equally important: 53.3% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 43.3% in 2019 (N=1000)
- D Not sure: 15.2% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 17.6% in 2019 (N=1000)
- E No response: 2.1% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 2.2% in 2019 (N=1000)

【Chinese public opinion】

- A Japan-China relations are more important than relations with South Korea: 22.4% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 24.3% in 2019 (N=1597)
- B Relations with South Korea are more important than Japan-China relations: 20.0% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 22.7% in 2019 (N=1597)
- C Both are equally important: 48.1% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 42.7% in 2019 (N=1597)
- D Not sure: 9.1% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 9.7% in 2019 (N=1597)
- E No response: 0.5% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 0.6% in 2019 (N=1597)

【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to South Korea】

【Japanese public opinion】

- A More affinity towards the other country: 6.9% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 13.2% in 2019 (N=1000)
- B More affinity towards South Korea: 25.8% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 17.1% in 2019 (N=1000)
- C Equal sense of affinity towards both: 15.4% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 14.1% in 2019 (N=1000)
- D No sense of affinity towards either: 36.2% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 41.9% in 2019 (N=1000)
- E Not sure: 14.5% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 12.9% in 2019 (N=1000)
- F No response: 1.2% in 2018 (N=1000) vs. 1.6% in 2019 (N=1000)

【Chinese public opinion】

- A More affinity towards the other country: 9.8% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 9.1% in 2019 (N=1597)
- B More affinity towards South Korea: 28.2% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 25.9% in 2019 (N=1597)
- C Equal sense of affinity towards both: 18.0% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 16.4% in 2019 (N=1597)
- D No sense of affinity towards either: 37.0% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 39.8% in 2019 (N=1597)
- E Not sure: 6.7% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 6.0% in 2019 (N=1597)
- F No response: 0.3% in 2018 (N=1548) vs. 0.6% in 2019 (N=1597)
In terms of the most important foreign relation considering the future of their own country, a strikingly large proportion of Japanese respondents replied the “United States,” at over 60%. For the Chinese, the percentage of those that selected the “United States” slightly surpassed that for “Russia,” last year’s majority response. Meanwhile, only 6.8% of the Japanese selected “China” and 14.7% of the Chinese selected “Japan,” both coming in third among the options presented, in line with last year’s trend.

**Most Important Foreign Relation**

[Diagram showing survey results for Japanese and Chinese public opinion on the most important foreign relations, with the United States being the top choice for both Japanese and Chinese respondents.]

**Japanese public opinion**

- United States: 62.5%
- China: 6.8%
- South Korea: 4.1%
- United Kingdom: 0.8%
- Russia: 0.7%
- Germany: 0.3%
- France: 0.2%
- EU: 0.1%
- ASEAN countries: 0.1%
- India: 0.0%
- Africa: 0.0%
- Middle East: 0.0%
- South America: 0.0%
- Other: 0.0%
- Not sure: 17.1%

**Chinese public opinion**

- United States: 28.9%
- Japan: 18.2%
- South Korea: 16.1%
- United Kingdom: 1.3%
- Russia: 1.1%
- Germany: 0.8%
- France: 0.8%
- EU: 0.8%
- ASEAN countries: 0.8%
- India: 0.8%
- Africa: 0.7%
- Middle East: 0.7%
- South America: 1.4%
- Other: 0.0%
- Not sure: 10.9%
5. Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries

Perceptions of the Social/Political Systems of the Other Country

A 52% majority of Japanese respondents continue to view China as a “socialist/communist” country, followed by 34.1% who see it as “totalitarian (one-party rule).” Both responses have increased slightly from last year.

Among the Chinese, a 32.3% majority recognize Japan as a “capitalist” country, however, this percentage has dropped 17 points from last year’s results. Additionally, the understanding of Japan as “militaristic” rose 6 points to 32% this year, on par with the view of Japan as “capitalist.” Meanwhile, views of Japan as “hegemonistic” and displaying “favorism towards great powers” were chosen by 18.5% (39.5% last year) and 5.8% (12.1% last year) of the Chinese respectively, both showing a large decrease from last year. On the other hand, there has been a 15 point increase in the percentage of those who view Japan as “nationalist,” up to 23.6% this year.

【Perceptions of the Social/Political Systems of the Other Country】
【Japanese public opinion】
【Chinese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2019 (N=1000)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1000)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitalist</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian (One-party rule)</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militaristic</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifist</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemonistic</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationally cooperative</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorism towards great powers</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
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<td>4.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>2.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2019 (N=1597)</th>
<th>2018 (N=1548)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
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<td>17.3%</td>
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<td>Capitalist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacifist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemonistic</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationally cooperative</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<td>Favorism towards great powers</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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The most well-known Chinese politician continues to be “Mao Zedong,” recognized by nearly 90% of the Japanese (87.8%). “Xi Jinping” was on par with Zedong at 84.9%, both significantly surpassing the remaining responses. Only a tenth recognize “Li Keqiang.” Over 70% of the Chinese recognize “Shinzo Abe.”
6. Interactions Among the General Public

Visiting the Other Country

While the percentage of Japanese who expressed a desire to visit China slightly increased this year at 32.3%, nearly 70% still responded that they do not wish to visit China. This trend has not changed from last year. Meanwhile, among the Chinese, although the percentage has fallen slightly from last year, 44.1% expressed a desire to visit Japan.

As for reasons for their desire to visit the other country, the majority of both nationals responded “visiting the sights and scenery of the country,” while over half of the Chinese respondents also replied “shopping,” in line with last year’s trend.
7. Historical Issues Between Japan and China

Japan-China Relations and the Influence of Historical Issues

60% of the Japanese and nearly 90% of the Chinese continue to view historical issues as a large obstacle to Japan-China relations. However, 35.7% of the Japanese and 39.8% of the Chinese replied that historical issues, while still a large problem, have been “somewhat resolved.”

In terms of the influence of historical issues on Japan-China relations, among the Japanese, the optimistic view that “historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China relations develop” and the pessimistic view that “it will be difficult to resolve historical issues regardless of the state of Japan-China relations” contended with one another, both comprising nearly 30% of Japanese public opinion.

Among the Chinese, the view that “Japan-China relations will not improve unless historical issues are resolved” constituted the majority public opinion at 43.6%. However, nearly 40% of the Chinese also expressed the optimistic view that “historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China relations develop.”

【Are Historical Issues an Obstacle to Japan-China Relations?】

【Japanese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018 (N=1000)</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 (N=1000)</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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【Chinese public opinion】

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018 (N=1548)</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 (N=1597)</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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【Historical Issues that Should be Resolved】

【Japanese public opinion】

【Chinese public opinion】
【Influence of Historical Issues on Japan-China Relations】

【Japanese public opinion】

2018 (N=1000)       2019 (N=1000)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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A Japan-China relations will not improve unless historical issues are resolved
B Historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China relations develop
C It will be difficult to resolve historical issues regardless of the state of Japan-China relations
D Not sure
E No response

【Chinese public opinion】

2018 (N=1548)       2019 (N=1597)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8. Security in East Asia

Military Threat

Of those who perceive that certain countries pose a military threat to their country, 84.6% of the Japanese continued to reply that “North Korea” poses the greatest military threat. Like last year, this is followed by “China” and “Russia,” however, there has been a significant rise in the percentage of those who view “South Korea” as a military threat – from 7.6% to 23.3%.

By contrast, a the largest 75.3% majority of Chinese respondents selected “Japan” as the greatest military threat to their country, followed by the “United States,” which rose from 67.7% to 74.2% this year. Only 10.3% of the Chinese feel that “North Korea” poses a military threat. At the same time, there has also been an increase in Chinese respondents who feel that “Vietnam” and “Russia” pose military threats. The greatest reason why the Chinese perceive Japan as a military threat is attributed to “Japan’s attempt to encircle China ... in cooperation with the United States,” at 65.5% of public opinion.

【Are There Certain Countries that Pose a Military Threat to Your Country?】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese public opinion</th>
<th>Chinese public opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 (N=1000)</td>
<td>2019 (N=1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Yes</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B No</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Not sure</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D No response</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Countries/Regions That Pose a Military Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Japanese Public Opinion</th>
<th>Chinese Public Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China/Japan</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Middle East</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2019 (N=747)  
2018 (N=724)  

---

### Japanese Public Opinion

- 57.8% China/Japan
- 23.3% South Korea
- 35.7% North Korea
- 84.6% Russia
- 34.0% India
- 1.1% Vietnam
- 0.1% The Middle East
- 0.1% The US
- 0.4% The EU
- 0.0% Other
- 0.0% No response

2019 (N=747)

### Chinese Public Opinion

- 75.3% China/Japan
- 21.9% South Korea
- 10.3% North Korea
- 16.4% Russia
- 16.7% India
- 10.5% Vietnam
- 6.6% The Middle East
- 13.0% The US
- 0.3% The EU
- 0.0% Other
- 0.3% No response

2019 (N=886)
Possibility of Military Conflict between Japan and China Over Territorial Issues

In regards to the possibility of military conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 38.6% of the Japanese believe that it “will not occur,” up 5 points from last year. While nearly half (48.3%) of the Chinese feel that it “will occur,” this percentage has fallen 8 points from last year, and the view that it “will not occur” has risen from 26.6% to 34.3% this year.

【Will Military Conflict Occur Between Japan and China?】

【Japanese public opinion】

2018 (N=1000) | 2019 (N=1000)
---|---
A | A | 1.3% | 1.3%
B | B | 26.3% | 21.5%
C | C | 33.2% | 38.6%
D | D | 38.5% | 38.5%
E | E | 0.6% | 0.1%

【Chinese public opinion】

2018 (N=1548) | 2019 (N=1597)
---|---
A | A | 11.9% | 10.5%
B | B | 44.2% | 37.8%
C | C | 26.6% | 34.3%
D | D | 17.1% | 16.8%
E | E | 0.3% | 0.6%
【Solutions to Tensions Over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands】

【Japanese public opinion】
- Japan should take further and actual control of the territories to protect them: 44.5%
- Both countries should promptly start negotiating towards a peaceful agreement: 41.0%
- Resolution should not be hurried, rather, arrangements should be made to prevent accidental military confrontations: 24.3%
- The issue should be shelved for the long-term, and both countries should work on joint ventures instead: 22.8%
- It should be taken to the International Court of Justice for a resolution based on international law: 24.1%
- Not sure: 19.4%
- No response: 0.2%

【Chinese public opinion】
- Japan should be made to recognize the existence of the territorial disputes through diplomatic negotiation: 55.2%
- China should take further and actual control of the territories in order to protect them: 60.1%
- Both countries should promptly start negotiating towards a peaceful agreement: 50.0%
- Resolution should not be hurried, rather, arrangements should be made to first prevent accidental military confrontations: 20.9%
- The issue should be shelved for the long-term, and both countries should work on joint ventures instead: 12.0%
- It should be taken to the International Court of Justice for a resolution based on international law: 7.9%
- Not sure: 2.9%
- No response: 0.0%

Survey conducted in 2019 (N=1597)
Survey conducted in 2018 (N=1000)
50% of the Japanese and 65.7% of the Chinese feel the need for a multilateral framework for discussing security in Northeast Asia.

In terms of nations that should participate in this multilateral framework, over 80% of the Japanese feel that Japan, China and South Korea should participate. While 62% of the Japanese selected the US, this percentage has fallen 13 points from last year. Among the Chinese, the US and Japan were chosen by approximately 60% each.

【Need for a Multilateral Framework for Security in Northeast Asia】
【Nations that Should Participate in the Multilateral Framework for Security in Northeast Asia】

【Japanese public opinion】

- Japan: 91.2% in 2019, 69.9% in 2018
- China: 92.2% in 2019, 85.3% in 2018
- South Korea: 80.0% in 2019, 80.7% in 2018
- North Korea: 79.6% in 2019
- The US: 62.0% in 2019, 69.2% in 2018
- Russia: 60.0% in 2019, 65.4% in 2018
- Mongolia: 26.6% in 2019
- India: 41.2% in 2019, 44.4% in 2018
- Indonesia: 26.0% in 2019, 31.0% in 2018
- Australia: 25.2% in 2019, 29.0% in 2018
- Other: 3.8% in 2019, 3.6% in 2018
- No response: 0.4% in 2019, 0.2% in 2018

【Chinese public opinion】

- Japan: 91.4% in 2019
- China: 92.5% in 2019
- South Korea: 80.1% in 2019
- North Korea: 86.1% in 2019
- The US: 75.2% in 2019
- Russia: 65.7% in 2019
- Mongolia: 41.2% in 2019
- India: 44.4% in 2019
- Indonesia: 33.4% in 2019
- Australia: 29.0% in 2019
- Other: 3.8% in 2019
- No response: 0.2% in 2019

2019 (N=500) 2018 (N=428)
In regards to the various diplomatic efforts taken towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by the nations concerned, half of the Japanese (52.4%) believe that these efforts are “insufficient.” Only 20% or so responded that “sufficient diplomatic efforts are being expended.” By contrast, Chinese public opinion is situated on the exact opposite pole of the Japanese, with 74.4% evaluating diplomatic efforts as “sufficient” and only 13.2% stating that “diplomatic efforts are insufficient.”
9. Economic Relations Between Japan and China

Economic Relations Between Japan and China

In terms of economic relations between Japan and China, the majority of the Japanese continue to consider a win-win relationship to be difficult, following last year’s trend. On the other hand, over 60% of the Chinese believe that a win-win relationship can be established.

In terms of free trade and economic partnership frameworks that Japan and China should cooperate on in the future, nearly 40% of the Chinese replied “Chinese participation in TPP11” and “early realization of a Japan-China FTA.” Nearly 40% of the Chinese also selected “early realization of a Japan-China-South Korea FTA,” however, this percentage has fallen 10 points from last year. Cooperation on the “One Belt, One Road” initiative fell 15 points from last year to 29.2%, while “quick conclusion of the RCEP” also fell 10 points. Meanwhile, among the Japanese, the most outstanding response was “not sure,” at 63.8%. While 19.4% of the Japanese cite “Chinese participation in TPP11” and 13.3% feel that a “quick conclusion of the RCEP” should be striven towards, these percentages remain in the tens. At the same time, only 8.4% feel the need to strive towards a “Japan-China-South Korea FTA,” down slightly from last year.
【The Future of Economic Relations Between Japan and China】

【Japanese popular opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018 (N=1000)</th>
<th>2019 (N=1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

【Chinese popular opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018 (N=1548)</th>
<th>2019 (N=1597)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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10. Issues on World Order and Trade

Free Trade, an Open Economic Order, Multilateralism and the WTO Reform

Approximately 70% of the Japanese and 80% of the Chinese feel that multilateralism, an open economic order and rule-based free trade are “important” for the future of the global economy. In terms of the WTO reform currently underway, 48.9% of the Japanese and 78.5% of the Chinese support the reform. However, nearly half of the Japanese replied “not sure,” indicating that they cannot decide whether to support it or not.

In terms of the future of the global economic order, 34.8% of the Japanese believe that a rule-based “free and open” order, even if limited in certain aspects, will continue to be key. However, 26.2% also expressed the pessimistic view that the “US-centered economic sphere and China-centered economic sphere will come to oppose one another and divide the world in two.” Meanwhile 38.3% replied “not sure.”

On the other hand, among the Chinese, over 70% of respondents believe that a rule-based free trade system and free economic order will continue to develop or, even if partially limited, a “free and open” system will continue to be key.

---

**Japanese public opinion**

- A: Important (70.5%)
- B: Unimportant (2.0%)
- C: Not sure (27.0%)
- D: No response (0.5%)

**Chinese public opinion**

- A: Extremely important (65.2%)
- B: Important (16.4%)
- C: Relatively unimportant (10.0%)
- D: Completely unimportant (7.1%)
- E: Not sure (10.0%)
- F: No response (0.3%)
【Support for the WTO Reform】

【Japanese popular opinion】

2018 (N=1000) 2019 (N=1000)

39.7% 48.9%

3.9% 4.9%

56.3% 48.0%

0% 0%

【Chinese popular opinion】

2018 (N=1548) 2019 (N=1597)

75.6% 78.5%

11.4% 9.1%

12.5% 13.5%

0.9% 0.9%

【The Future of Global Economic Order】

- **Rule-based free trade system and free economic order will continue to develop**
  - 2019: 9.8%, 2018: 9.8%
- **While free trade and openness will be partially limited, the current open and free system will basically continue to exist**
  - 2019: 33.2%, 2018: 25.0%
  - 2019: 40.1%, 2018: 40.1%
- **US-based economic sphere and China-based economic sphere will come to oppose one another and divide the world in two**
  - 2019: 26.2%
  - 2018: 16.4%
- **Not sure**
  - 2019: 38.3%
  - 2018: 10.2%
- **No response**
  - 2019: 0.7%
  - 2018: 0.0%
Influence of US-China Trade War on Japan-China Relations

Tensions between the United States and China are currently intensifying in regards to trade and digital technologies, and 50.2% of the Japanese are concerned that it will “adversely affect” Japan-China relations. A 45.7% majority of the Chinese also express a concern over adverse effects on the bilateral relationship. However, nearly 20% of the Chinese also believe that it will benefit the relationship.

【Influence of the US-China Trade War on Japan-China Relations】

2019 (N=1000)

- A Will benefit the relationship: 0.8%
- B Will adversely affect the relationship: 50.2%
- C Will have no influence on the relationship: 38.2%
- D Not sure: 8.1%
- E No response: 2.7%

2019 (N=1597)

- A Will benefit the relationship: 17.8%
- B Will adversely affect the relationship: 45.7%
- C Will have no influence on the relationship: 26.2%
- D Not sure: 10.0%
- E No response: 0.3%
11. The Future of Japan and China and a Cooperative Relationship in Asia

Most Important Values that East Asia Should Pursue

In terms of values that East Asia should pursue, 60% of the Japanese cite “peace” while nearly 40% cite “cooperative development.” While showing a slight decrease from last year’s results, 40% of the Chinese also responded “peace” and “cooperative development.” The two countries were thus in agreement in terms of attaching the highest importance to these two values.

At the same time, compared to last year’s results, there has also been an increase in Chinese respondents who view “fundamental human rights” and the “rule of law” as important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Most Important Values that East Asia Should Pursue]</th>
<th>[Japanese public opinion]</th>
<th>[Chinese public opinion]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>59.4% (60.9%)</td>
<td>43.6% (53.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative development</td>
<td>38.7% (36.4%)</td>
<td>42.5% (49.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>9.9% (13.1%)</td>
<td>24.9% (25.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>6.3% (5.1%)</td>
<td>21.0% (18.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>17.6% (16.5%)</td>
<td>12.2% (14.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>5.3% (4.1%)</td>
<td>11.1% (14.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental human rights</td>
<td>18.4% (15.6%)</td>
<td>17.1% (17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for diversity</td>
<td>14.4% (15.3%)</td>
<td>14.8% (11.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.1% (0.3%)</td>
<td>0.0% (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>9.8% (10.4%)</td>
<td>0.8% (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.4% (0.4%)</td>
<td>0.1% (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Strengthening Cooperative Relationship to Resolve Bilateral Issues and Challenges in Asia

Regarding fields that Japan and China should strengthen cooperation on, 70.2% of the Japanese cite “North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” while 66.8% cite “environmental issues like air and water pollution.” These were the two most prominent responses among the Japanese, in line with last year’s results. Among the Chinese, the majority responded “strengthen[ing] cooperative relationship regarding trade and investment,” such as the Japan-China-South Korea and Japan-China FTAs and RCEP, at 28.4%. The “North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was almost on par at 28.2%, however, this response has fallen 12 points from last year’s 40.4%. The most significant increase could be seen in the percentage that cited “environmental issues like air and water pollution,” up 12 points to 20.6% this year.

As for global issues of the highest concern, 56.1% of the Japanese and 39% of the Chinese selected “environmental pollution and climate change.” At the same time, there was a relative increase in Chinese respondents who expressed concern over “world poverty” and the “widening wealth gap,” as compared to the Japanese.

【Strengthening Japan-China Cooperation in Order to Resolve Bilateral Issues and Issues Within Asia】

【Japanese public opinion】

【Chinese public opinion】

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【Bilateral Issues and Issues Within Asia that China and Japan Should Cooperate On】

【Japanese public opinion】

- North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula: 70.2%
- Environmental issues like air and water pollution: 66.8%
- Food safety: 40.6%
- Establishing peaceful order in Northeast Asia: 40.0%
- Protection of intellectual property: 28.8%
- Peacebuilding on Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s economic development: 24.3%
- Increase private exchanges such as those between youth: 23.9%
- Cooperation and exchange in military and security fields: 23.8%
- Strengthen cooperation on trade and investment such as FTA and RCEP: 23.3%
- Public health and disease measures: 22.8%
- Resource development in the East China Sea: 22.4%
- Renewable energy such as eco-friendly technologies and wind & solar power: 22.0%
- Infrastructure development in other developing nations in Asia: 18.4%
- Tourism: 15.7%
- Founding East Asian Community and regional cooperation in East Asia: 14.5%
- Safety issues regarding nuclear power: 13.7%
- Further strengthen maritime and air liaison mechanism: 10.1%
- Shrinking & aging population: 10.1%
- Not sure: 1.6%
- Other: 0.8%
- No response: 0.3%

【Chinese public opinion】

- Strengthen cooperation on trade and investment such as FTA and RCEP: 28.4%
- North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula: 28.2%
- Renewable energy such as eco-friendly technologies and wind & solar power: 26.5%
- Establishing peaceful order in Northeast Asia: 23.4%
- Peacebuilding on Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s economic development: 22.1%
- Safety issues regarding nuclear power: 22.0%
- Environmental issues like air and water pollution: 20.6%
- Resource development in the East China Sea: 19.2%
- Food safety: 14.1%
- Increase private exchanges such as those between youth: 13.9%
- Protection of intellectual property: 11.6%
- Founding East Asian Community and regional cooperation in East Asia: 9.7%
- Infrastructure development in other developing nations in Asia: 9.4%
- Cooperation and exchange in military and security fields: 9.3%
- Tourism: 8.6%
- Public health and disease measures: 7.8%
- Further strengthen maritime and air liaison mechanism: 6.8%
- Shrinking & aging population: 4.2%
- No response: 0.8%
- Not sure: 0.4%
- Other: 0.0%
【Global Issues of Special Concern】

Japanese public opinion (N=1000)
Chinese public opinion (N=1597)

- World poverty: 24.2%
- Epidemics/Communicable diseases: 11.6%
- Refugee crisis: 13.9%
- Environmental pollution and climate change: 21.3%
- Wars & conflict between nations: 23.9%
- Terrorism: 19.0%
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: 12.5%
- Cyber attacks: 5.6%
- Influence of technological innovations & AI: 5.2%
- Widening wealth gap: 23.8%
- Management of international finance: 5.3%
- Tax issues such as tax evasion by multinational enterprises: 1.4%
- Future of free trade: 1.4%
- Other: 4.7%
- Not sure: 1.8%
- No response: 3.5%
- Not sure: 1.8%
- No response: 3.5%
12. Changes in the Influence over the Next 10 Years and Countries that Should Lead the World

While approximately half of both countries’ nationals feel that the influence of Japan in Asia over the next 10 years “will not change,” 31.7% of Chinese respondents predict that it “will increase,” showing that, as compared to the Japanese (19.5%), a larger proportion of the Chinese estimate Japan’s future influence at a higher level.

In terms of the influence of China within Asia, 60% of the Japanese and nearly 90% of the Chinese believe that it “will increase.” The opinion that the influence of the US “will increase” was at par with the opinion that it “will not change,” both at a little over 30% among Japanese respondents. For the Chinese, the view that US influence “will not change” has increased from last year to 46.9%.

As for South Korea, the view that its influence “will decrease” rose 18 points among the Japanese to 39.1%, presenting a harsher view of South Korea’s influence.

【Changes in the Influence of Various Countries in Asia Over the Next 10 Years】

【Japanese public opinion】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>A 19.5%</th>
<th>B 46.1%</th>
<th>C 17.0%</th>
<th>D 16.3%</th>
<th>E 1.1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Japan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. China</td>
<td>A 58.7%</td>
<td>B 16.6%</td>
<td>C 6.0%</td>
<td>D 17.8%</td>
<td>E 0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1000)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. United States</td>
<td>A 36.2%</td>
<td>B 37.0%</td>
<td>C 8.7%</td>
<td>D 17.0%</td>
<td>E 1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. South Korea</td>
<td>A 8.8%</td>
<td>B 30.1%</td>
<td>C 39.1%</td>
<td>D 20.7%</td>
<td>E 1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Russia</td>
<td>A 15.5%</td>
<td>B 46.0%</td>
<td>C 10.1%</td>
<td>D 27.2%</td>
<td>E 1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1000)</td>
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<td>F. India</td>
<td>A 39.6%</td>
<td>B 29.0%</td>
<td>C 9.9%</td>
<td>D 26.4%</td>
<td>E 1.1%</td>
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【Chinese public opinion】

A. Japan (N=1597)
- A 31.7%
- B 54.7%
- C 11.7%
- D 9.0%
- E 0.0%

B. China (N=1597)
- A 66.5%
- B 10.2%
- C 2.1%
- D 1.0%
- E 0.0%

C. United States (N=1597)
- A 34.4%
- B 46.9%
- C 16.2%
- D 0.0%
- E 0.0%

D. South Korea (N=1597)
- A 20.0%
- B 51.3%
- C 25.2%
- D 1.9%
- E 0.0%

E. Russia (N=1597)
- A 44.3%
- B 39.1%
- C 12.2%
- D 3.6%
- E 0.0%

F. India (N=1597)
- A 20.0%
- B 53.2%
- C 21.2%
- D 5.7%
- E 0.0%

A. Will increase  B. Will no change  C. Will decrease  D. Not sure  E. No response
Approximately 60% of the Japanese believe that the “US” should continue as the world’s leader. Meanwhile, approximately 70% of the Chinese believe that “China” should lead the world.

Influence of Media on Japan-China Relations

84.6% of the Chinese believe that the media “contributes” to the improvement of Japan-China relations and mutual understanding between the two countries’ people. On the other hand, only 26.9% of the Japanese see the media as contributory.

At the same time, a high 80.4% of the Chinese feel that domestic media is “objective and fair” in regards to reports on Japan-China relations. On the other hand, only 14.9% of the Japanese feel that domestic media reports are “objective and fair,” while 30.5% view domestic media as “not objective or fair.”
【Objectivity and Fairness of Domestic Media Reports】

Japanese public opinion (Media reports are objective and fair)  
Japanese public opinion (Media reports are not objective or fair)  
Chinese public opinion (Media reports are objective and fair)  
Chinese public opinion (Media reports are not objective or fair)
Among the Japanese, 36.1% believe that the internet does not adequately reflect the will of the people, surpassing the 24.7% who believe that the internet does reflect public will. 40%, however, replied “not sure.”

In comparison, 80.3% of the Chinese feel that the internet accurately reflects the people’s will, although this percentage has decreased from last year’s 86.9%.
14. Background to Mutual Understanding

Degree of Interaction Among the People

Of the Chinese, 20.2% replied that they have visited Japan, showing an increase for the 8th year in a row. For both countries’ nationals, the reason for their visit was predominantly for “tourism.” Among the Chinese, 97.5% replied that they have traveled to Japan “recently within the last 5 years.”

Regarding acquaintances in the respective countries, 19.5% of the Japanese and 8.1% of the Chinese replied that they have acquaintances in the other country, with a slight increase in both percentages from last year’s results.

【Prior Travel Experience to the Other Country】
【Friends/Acquaintances from the Other Country】

【Japanese public opinion】

A  I have close friends from the other country
B  I have acquaintances from the other country that I can sometimes talk to
C  I don't have (never have had) any acquaintances from the other country
D  No response

2018 (N=1000) 2019 (N=1000)

A 3.7% 4.1%
B 13.7% 15.4%
C 82.4% 80.3%
D 0.2% 0.2%

【Chinese public opinion】

A 2.9% 2.7%
B 4.1% 5.4%
C 91.1% 75.5%
D 1.9% 16.3%

2018 (N=1548) 2019 (N=1597)
An overwhelming number of Japanese obtain their information on China from Japanese news media sources and, like last year, television serves as an especially prominent source. Among the Chinese, over 80% likewise obtain their information on Japan through Chinese news media outlets. However, sources of information for the Chinese are diversifying, with many people citing “Chinese TV shows, informational programs and movies” and “Chinese books,” as well as a certain number also stating that they obtain information through outlets such as Japanese news media. At the same time, nearly 40% obtain information through internet news sources on cell phones, signifying a trend different from Japan, where this percentage is a mere 10.8%.

**Sources of Information on Japan-China Relations and Information on the Other Country**

**Japanese public opinion**

- Conversations with Chinese people: 4.9%
- Visits to China: 1.4%
- Japanese news media: 29.7%
- Japanese books (including textbooks): 14.0%
- Japanese TV shows, news programs and movies: 33.2%
- Chinese news media: 6.1%
- Chinese books: 0.4%
- Chinese music: 0.1%
- Chinese anime: 0.1%
- Japanese TV shows, news programs and movies: 10.6%
- Discussions by other Japanese people: 5.6%
- Conversations with family & friends, internet and social media: 18.7%
- Other: 1.1%
- No response: 0.2%

**Chinese public opinion**

- Conversations with Japanese people: 3.6%
- Visits to Japan: 3.3%
- Chinese news media: 87.0%
- Chinese books (including textbooks): 28.9%
- Chinese TV shows, news programs and movies: 49.5%
- Japanese news media: 21.2%
- Japanese books: 5.5%
- Japanese music: 5.4%
- Japanese anime: 4.6%
- Japanese TV shows, news programs and movies: 16.9%
- Discussions by other Chinese people: 0.5%
- Conversations with family & friends, internet and social media: 23.1%
- Other: 0.4%
- No response: 0.6%

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<Please send all inquiries about this survey to the address below>

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