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May 20, 2003

[paper] Approach to Developing Japan's Asia Strategy

Yoshinori Yokoyama: Social System Designer

Yoshinori Yokoyama is a former director of McKinsey & Company. He now serves as a part-time instructor at Tohoku University and the graduate school of Hitotsubashi University. His published works include Seicho Soshutsu Kakumei (Growth Creation Revolution), McKinsey Gassho Renko Senryaku (McKinsey's Alliance Strategy), and many translations and reports. Mr. Yokoyama graduated from the Architectural Department at the Engineering Department of Tokyo University in 1966, worked for a Architectural Firm and received a Master of Urban Design degree from the Graduate School of Harvard University in 1972 and an MBA from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1975.

A nation's foreign strategy involves complicated, manifold aspects. Bearing that in mind, we are presently pressed to answer a question: what kind of presence should Japan establish in the world? In particular, it is an important issue to clarify Japan's stance toward neighboring countries that are under direct influence of one another. At the core of such neighboring countries are the countries generally referred to as Asian nations.

Japan is apparently at a time when it must review its national strategies, including its foreign strategy. This is because both the external environment and internal environment have started to change away from conventional conditions. We should promptly start reviewing the preconditions that Japan has long been taking into consideration, either implicitly or explicitly, in planning its strategies by conducting a systematic analysis.

In order for Japan to develop new superior national strategies, a basic framework for plotting the strategies must be established. Without sharing this framework, the discussions would lose focus amidst the collisions of diverse principles and views. Then, what kind of strategy-planning framework would attain such an end? It is a framework consisting of the following five steps: (1) insights into the world's medium- and long-term trends from Japan's perspective; (2) objective and analytical comprehension of Japan's strong and weak points; (3) identification of the gap between Japan's desire for identity and the major trends; (4) derivation of options for filling the gap through exhaustive use of Japan's strong points; and (5) evaluation of the options and determination of optimum plans from the viewpoint of achieving long-lasting superiority in Japan. If we accept these five steps as a common framework for the discussions, and develop multifaceted discussions, derive hypotheses, and analytically verify the hypotheses by each step, the discussions would settle into shape and we would at least be able to develop first-phase strategies and action guidelines. The subsequent step would be to continue the discussions, gain wide recognition, and improve quality based on these initial results.

Although the detailed deliberations and strategic options are left to be discussed in the main text, as long as we share the five steps of strategy planning, the discussions will not lose focus. Then, all we need to do is evaluate the derived options by a criterion of whether or not they will lead to achieving long-lasting superiority in Japan as in the fifth step. In this way, we will be able to derive optimum answers for Japan's Asia strategy and other national strategies.

投稿者 gnpo : 09:08 PM

[talk] What Does the Iraq War Mean for Japan?

Yasuhisa Shiozaki: House of Representatives member

Born 1950. B.A. from Tokyo University, Department of Liberal Arts. Master Degree from Graduate Program in Public Administration, Harvard University. Bank of Japan 1975- 1993. Elected to House of Representatives in 1993 from former Ehime Constituency, 1st District. Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Finance, Chairman of the Legal Committee of Liberal Democratic Party(LDP); Chairman of the Diplomacy Committee, LDP. Authored: "Found Japanese SEC" "Second Phase in Money Riot-Rebuild Assets Market" and more .

Keizo Takemi: House of Councilors member

Takemi is also an Executive Member of Committee on Health, Welfare and Labor, a Member of Committee on Budget and an Executive Member of Research Commission on the Constitution. He was State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Defense (1998-1999) . He graduated from Graduate School of Law of Keio University in 1980 and received his MD from Keio University in 1976. Now he is a Professor of Institute of Strategic Peace and International Affairs, Tokai University.

Yoshimasa Hayashi: House of Representatives member

Yoshimasa Hayashi was born in 1961 and graduated from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University in 1984. After working for Mitsui & Co., Ltd, he completed graduate studies in Harvard University. He was elected as a member of the Diet for the first time in 1995. He Worked for the Mansfield Bill in 1991, during his stay in the capital hill. He is now Secretary General of the Administrative Reform head quarter of the Liberal Democratic Party.

What was the cause of the War in Iraq? Three politicians of the ruling parties tried to solve this question by starting with the discussion of how to grasp this issue amid the current of substantial change in national security in the post–Cold War era and the concept of “threat”. Mr. Hayashi presented his perception of the war as being the first case in which the police took preemptive measures for punishing would-be criminals. Mr. Takemi stated that the world has been facing the emergence of various new types of menaces crossing national borders besides military powers since the end of the 1990s. He regarded the Iraqi War as the first challenge for the international community to deal with the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Then, Mr. Shiozaki considered the situation an opportunity for the world to come up with ways to handle the lack of governance in collapsed nations.

All three believed in the importance of the United Nations as a main body to acknowledge and police such nations, and that now is a good time for Japan to enunciate its views. “Deterrence” and “dialogue” are the main points of argument regarding the situation in North Korea. They concluded that the establishment of “deterrence” as a prerequisite for “dialogue” is a crucial issue for Japan. They contented that although an idea of independent policy is gaining support in Japan, on the basis of deterrence laid the acknowledgment of the notion that “an attack on Japan would invite U.S. retaliation”. Based on such sobering reality, Japan should formulate a blueprint of foreign policies concerning “dialogue”. According to Mr. Shiozaki, Japan needs politically initiated foreign strategies and establishment of a nation which is truly open to, for example, human resources. Mr. Takemi mentioned the following points: the pursuit of a balance of power in line with the geo-political situations of Japan, an indispensable reinforcement of regional economy in East Asia, and the necessity of multi-layered measures for the issues of the international community in the era of globalization. Speaking about models for national policies, Mr. Hayashi insisted that Japan should seek a “British style” in terms of national security and efforts should be made to realize the establishment of a common currency in pursuit of the “German style” in Asia. He also advocated a “Japanese Version of the Plaza Agreement”. In order to carry out such policies, much effort should go into the creation of highly technical diplomatic power, intellectual creativity and strategies. The discussion touched upon the Yasukuni Shrine issue and agricultural problems before the session ended, but importance was given to establishing various channels of dialogue with Asian countries involving politicians and NGOs. Three politicians equally stressed the necessity of realistically moving and the enforcement of the movement towards that goal.

投稿者 gnpo : 09:00 PM

[paper] Adaption or Stagnation- The Japanese Dilemma

T. J. Pempel: Director of Institute of East Asian Studies, and Professor of Political Science, University of California

T. J. Pempel is the Director of Institute of East Asian Studies, and a Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. His research and teaching focus on comparative politics, political economy, contemporary Japan, and Asian regionalism. Also he is the chairman of the American Advisory Committee of the Japan Foundation, and is on the editorial boards of several professional journals. His major works are “The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, Regime Shift: comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy”.

That Japan’s economy is in trouble is obvious. That Japanese are sick of hearing this truism reiterated on a daily basis, however, is even more obvious. And they become sicker still when they hear Americans repeat over and over that Japan’s problems would magically vanish if they just took the sage advice of knowledgeable Americans, abandoned their idiosyncratic practices and accepted the wisdom of market (i.e. American) principles. Too many Americans are quick to presume that what works well in the U.S. represents the ‘one right way’ and that the world would be a much better place if everyone in it would simply accept this obvious reality. Such American triumphalism in 2003 is as tedious to foreigners (and to many Americans) as was its Japanese counterpart in 1988 or 1990, particularly since American economic successes have become so much more problematic in 2003 than they were a few short years ago. So I begin with a promise: I will not suggest that Japan’s solutions rest on adopting American economic practices. Still, the American experience, as I will suggest, is not totally marginal to that of Japan.

THE STAKES ARE HIGH

Failure to revitalize the Japanese economy is not simply a matter of concern to today’s Japanese. It is not enough to assume that they are the only ones who are negatively affected. First of all, any serious long term loss of economic vitality on the part of Japan has profound effects on the global and regional economies. A strong Japanese economy has been central to the economic stability of the OECD countries, as well as to the rest of Asia. Japan has long used its economic and technological prowess as its major diplomatic tool. Any decline in that prowess reduces Japan’s capacity to influence global and regional events.

At a minimum Japan’s economic troubles have major impacts on the rest of the Asian region. Particularly during the latter half of the 1980s, large numbers of Japanese companies moved major portions of their operations abroad, including establishing many production networks in machine tools, electronic machinery and automobiles in the rest of Asia. The result was a substantial boost to growth across the entire East Asian region and one that was extremely positive for numerous Japanese companies as well. Asian growth also reconfirmed the image of the flying geese model, with Japan safely at the front of an Asian hierarchy, unchallenged by any other country in the region.

The economic crisis of 1997-98 saw a massive withdrawal of Japanese investment from Asia. From about $275 billion in outstanding loans to the region in 1997, Japanese banks cut their regional loans to $101.5 billion in mid-2001. Asia now accounts for 10.5 percent of total international lending by Japanese banks, compared to about 25 percent before the crisis. Further, it is not just the level of Japanese lending and investment to Asia that has declined, the share of Japan’s outward capital flows directed to Asia has also declined markedly.

To many in Japan that may appear irrelevant: why worry about the rest of the world when my job or my company is at stake? But loss of short-term competitiveness can have long term consequences, particularly as countries gain or loose valuable infrastructural leads with big ripple effects across a nation’s entire economy.

This is certainly seen with China which has begun to take the diplomatic, if not the economic, lead in many areas: agreement to negotiate a bilateral free trade pact between China and ASEAN; the key source of influence on matters of non-state terror; or as a major source of U.S. imports from Asia. In addition, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore have gained serious edges over Tokyo as financial hubs and service sectors. Similarly, deregulation in South Korea has made the country the world’s leader in broadband hookups to the internet, with roughly three times the per capita rate of penetration as Japan. Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong also lead Japan in broadband access. Japan remains by far the most economically powerful country in Asia, but it is no longer the universally acknowledged lead goose in a flying geese pattern. Many other sources of economic dynamism have sprung up in Asia to challenge Japan’s leadership in critical economic sectors and the longer it takes for Japan’s economy to recover, the more difficult it will be for the country to catch up.

The second point to consider is that the longer Japan delays in coming to grips with its current problems, the more the difficulties and costs of solving them will be passed on to Japan’s next generation. As the country’s national debt mounts, paying it off consumes an ever larger share of the national budget. Today some 20 percent of Japan’s national budget goes simply to service the nation’s mounting debt. As the country’s population ages the taxpaying workforce shrinks. And the longer current policies of public borrowing continue the more difficult it will be for the subsequent generations of Japanese citizens to escape the mounting debt.

Such high stakes make it even more vital that Japan’s problems be dealt with sooner rather than later. The longer it takes the country to come to grips with its economic troubles, the further behind its neighbors Japan will fall and the more difficult it will become for subsequent generations to catch up.

OLD WAYS WON’T WORK

A common definition of insanity is continuing to do the same things while expecting different results. Far too many of Japan’s leaders embody this definition of collective insanity. Despite thirteen years of anemic growth, ever falling stock and land prices, collective deflation and rising unemployment, massive bankruptcies, and the industrial world’s largest public debt they continue to pursue failed policy measures in the apparent belief that ‘this time’ will be different.

Without a doubt “the Japanese economic model” of the past brought amazingly successful results. Given such successes, many Japanese—whether political or business leaders or general citizens--must find it difficult to believe that what worked so well in the past is not still the key to success. However, what companies and national economies do well changes with time as conditions within a country and around the globe change. Much of what worked well for Japan twenty years ago can no longer achieve the same results because of changes within Japan, changes in Asia, changes in global finance, and changes in world politics. Certainly, Japan can no longer expect to devote huge portions of its domestic capital to manufacturing within a protected Japanese market and then to use the home markets as a base from which to export to the rest of the world. The most valuable component of any effective model is its ability to self-adjust to altered circumstances. And so far, Japan’s has not done that terribly well. What is now vital is for Japan’s leaders and its citizens to reexamine its past practices in light of the new conditions Japan faces at home and abroad, and to retain those elements of the model that are still suitable and to discard those which have now become impediments.

Changes within Japan are well known. The country’s population is much older with fewer younger, cheaper, taxpaying workers. Labor and land costs have become vastly higher than two decades ago. Much of the production of Japanese-owned companies has moved offshore. The Big Bang has made for major changes in the financial sector. These and other changes at home make it increasingly difficult for many traditional Japanese firms and industries to do well following their past business models.

Equally importantly, the world has become a vastly different place. It is no longer a world divided into two competing spheres by the Cold War. Hence, Japan is no longer as vital a strategic and economic partner to the U.S. as it once was. China has become an increasingly important global actor both to the United States and within East Asia changing both the strategic and the economic calculations by the U.S. China is just one country that can now out compete Japan on most products that depend on inexpensive labor costs. Furthermore, cross border movements of investments have become vastly more important than the movement of goods. International capital markets move much more quickly than in the past, with non-governmental actors playing a vastly larger role than central banks and national governments. Japanese-owned companies now produce a larger portion of Japan’s exports overseas than they do in Japan. Companies, in turn, including Japanese owned firms, are now far freer to raise capital, outsource production, and shift markets with vastly less deference to national governmental monetary or regulatory policies than they once showed. Governments, including the Japanese government, now find it vastly more difficult to conceptualize and carry out any “national” economic policies. In the famous phrase of Robert Reich, it is increasingly difficult to know “who is us?” The summary, although overused, term that encompasses these and other such changes is ‘globalization.’

GLOBALIZATION IS NOT A ONE WAY STREET

Two things about globalization deserve noting. First, despite the presumptions of many of its critics, globalization is not an integrated force of alien origins that must be accepted in toto or resisted on all fronts. Globalization is not like a fixed dinner course, but more like a smorgasbord or a Viking, made up of many diverse dishes from which one can choose based on one’s appetite, preferences, and also the suggestions of earlier dinners.

A second thing is that Honda Accords, Canon digital cameras, sushi, J pop, just-in-time management, and karaoke are as integral to globalization as Citibank, Coca Cola, Windows or rap music. Japan is a stimulator as well as a recipient of globalization. Globalization has its sources around the globe and the speed with which any particular product, process or fad spreads to other parts of the world is a function, not only of supply, i.e. the power of those who provide and market it, but also of demand, i.e. its inherent appeal and applicability to those who embrace it. Japan can be as much a source of global forces as its recipient. Globalization is thus a two way street allowing traffic to flow in both directions.

To date, however, Japan has been far better at exporting things that require changes in other parts of the world than it is in opening itself up to foreign things that might challenge Japan’s existing patterns. This is certainly clear in Japan’s pattern of exports. For forty years Japanese manufactured products have captured large shares of world market. Japan has been a far less ready recipient of manufactured goods from Europe or the U.S. Even more dramatically with foreign investment: while most of the other major industrial democracies have incoming foreign direct investments ranging between $1700-8000 per capita, foreign direct investments into Japan total barely above $200 per capita. It is time for Japan to adjust its presumptions about the dangers of foreign influences within the castle town.

A less macro-economic and more down-to-earth example can be found in tourism. Prime Minister Koizumi recently told a number of his advisors that he wanted them to make Japan a tourist attraction for the world. Without a doubt, Japan has much that should make it a logical destination for many foreign travelers. A huge number of historical and architecturally rich temples, shrines and gardens; the night life and corporate dynamism of many of its cities; photographic natural attractions in the mountains and the coasts; spas; technological sophistication in communication and transportation; high quality fashion goods and a ‘different’ culture with warm and helpful people are but a few of the possible attractions that would attract non-Japanese.

Yet, Japan suffers from a massive tourism imbalance. While sixteen million Japanese tourists departed in the last year for which statistics are readily available only five million foreigners visited Japan. Even more dramatically, Japanese spend some Y3.2 trillion abroad while foreign tourists spent only Y 402 billion in Japan—an even more dramatic 8:1 imbalance. Koizumi is right to be concerned and to suggest this as a target for correction.

But to a non-Japanese such as myself who reads and speaks Japanese and who has lived in Japan on and off for a total of perhaps six years since the early 1960s, I find the idea that Japan would attract huge numbers of tourists laughable. Despite its many “tourist attractions,” and despite the obvious personal generosity and warmth of almost all Japanese people toward foreigners, the country still presents major hurdles to any potential tourist not found in most other industrialized countries or even many non-industrialized spots. Anyone who has traveled in Europe, for example, could quickly make a long list of reasons why Japan is less hospitable to foreigners. For example, few Western tourists now carry travelers’ checks. Instead most take advantage of the fact that most North American and European ATMs are equipped to do so, and they use their home bank cards to withdraw cash in the local currency wherever they travel, twenty-four hours a day. Japanese banks barely connect to one another, let alone to foreign banks. Few are open all day, seven days a week. Foreigners, whether long term residents or tourists, can simply not rely on Japanese ATMs to access their home accounts.

Or consider the complexity of trying to navigate Japan’s complex trains in any language other than Japanese. I for one am still never quite sure about the distinctions among joshaken, tokyuken, jiyuseki, and shiteiseki. I recently bought a ticket on the shinkansen from Kyoto to Tokyo and sought to pay with my Visa Gold card. No, I was told, we only take JTB cards; I had to pay in cash. Such impediments may seem trivial to Japanese, who are familiar with them and who can adjust. But to a foreign visitor they are major impediments not faced in most other industrialized countries. Put such specific problems on top of the well-known difficulties of high cost lodgings, lack of romanization, sign, map and address difficulties, and it becomes much clearer why more foreigners do not pick Japan as a ready country to visit.

AMERICA’S ECONOMIC TURNAROUND

I promised that I would not suggest that Japan emulate U.S. economic policies. Nevertheless, there are certain powerful lessons to be learned from relatively recent American economic experiences that transcend specific policy choices. Less than fifteen years ago, the United States was in a collective funk. Throughout Washington and across the country, there was widespread trepidation that America had lost its collective ability to compete economically. Much of the industrial heartland had turned into a ‘rustbelt.’ Inflation was rampant; the budget deficit and trade deficit were ballooning out of sight; an underclass of welfare recipients had become a permanent part of numerous urban landscapes; job growth was minimal; government regulations, many argued, were stifling business ingenuity and profits. Meanwhile, Japan’s marvelous record of success, along with that of the Asian NICs, as well as many countries in Western Europe bolstered American fears that the greatest economic vigor lay elsewhere in the world. Yet, by the end of the 1990s the pessimism had given way to the realization that America once again led the world in economic vitality. What had happened?

To any Japanese leader looking at the American turnaround and wondering about the economic prospects for Japan three things are critical. First, despite the claims of political acolytes from both political parties, no single ‘key’ policy or ideological direction accounts for America’s turnaround. Rather, the reversal came from several seemingly diverse, but ultimately interlinked, actions in separate fields. Second, the reversal was not at all natural or easy. On the contrary, it required actions that were controversial politically and that necessitated fundamental and painful deviations from longstanding patterns. Third, and most critically, the changes required a redefinition of how America related to the world at large.

On the first point, America’s revitalization was the result of several seemingly separate but ultimately reinforcing policy changes during the Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton administrations. A major tightening of monetary policy from 1979 well into the 1990s curtailed longstanding inflation. Regulatory policies were loosened in numerous areas. Targeted tax cuts encouraged investments in new service sector businesses. The national labor supply expanded quickly as large numbers of women and immigrants entered the work force. The ballooning budget deficit was brought under control largely by program cuts in domestic discretionary programs as well as by certain tax hikes, but ultimately by enhanced economic vitality in new sectors. Extensive reforms in social welfare reduced national governmental expenditures while simultaneously breaking into the seemingly ceaseless cycle of poverty that had created a semi-permanent, and often economically hopeless, underclass.

Together, these changes transformed the U.S. economy from its earlier reliance on manufacturing and ushered in an economic renaissance based on services, with a particular boost from information technology. Despite the failure of many early start-ups and a drop off in many technology stock prices, there can be little doubt but that American companies now lead the world in most areas of IT, and that the United States has gone through a transformation from manufacturing to services that has been at least as dramatic as the change one hundred years earlier from a reliance on agriculture to manufacturing and that has been far more dramatic than the similar transformation in Japan or Western Europe.

A second point follows quickly from this. Even though the end results may be quite positive in macro-economic terms, the transformation process was viciously political and hardly linear. Numerous groups and geographical areas opposed all or part of these changes, demanding exceptions to policies that others were contending would be ‘good for the country.’ These included: organized labor, numerous business associations, hundreds of interest groups, welfare workers and welfare recipients, government officials both nationally and locally, tax lawyers, ethnic groups, and many others, not to mention male chauvinists, anti-migrant nativists, some religious fundamentalists, and not a few people opposed to any changes on general principles. Considerable political will by an ideologically diverse group of leaders was needed to press these changes, even though with hindsight they may look very ‘logical.’

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these changes required a rethinking of some fundamental ideas about America’s relationship to the broader world. For most of the postwar period the United States had been an unchallenged economic leader. It came out of World War II with a GNP that was six times larger than that of the number two country, Britain. U.S. exports and foreign direct investment spread throughout the world. Few American manufacturers faced serious competition in home markets from foreign products until at least the mid-1970s, and many were free from such competition for another decade or so. It was easy enough for Americans to conclude that what worked in the U.S. would ensure its continued global dominance economically. Clearly, that was not the case and American presumptions were dramatically altered by the oil shock, Japanese and European competition in a host of upscale and sophisticated products, changes in global finance and the like. Though it did not come easily or quickly, eventually American business leaders and politicians repositioned the country better to take advantage of contemporary, not past, American strengths and to enter into a more dynamic give and take with the rest of the world.

REASSESSING JAPAN’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Ultimately, Japan, just as America did with such pain, must rethink its interaction with the rest of the world. This means, not a complete discarding of what brought Japan its strengths in the past, and not the wholesale embrace of some perceived model of “globalization” emanating from the U.S. or elsewhere. Rather it demands a hard hearted and candid look at contemporary Japan’s assets and liabilities as well as the new world conditions. From such a perspective, it is clear that as a country, Japan has tremendous assets that can continue to be a source of strength: numerous highly competitive global companies; a well educated population; an extensive social and economic infrastructure and many other attributes. These must be retained and built upon.

The process of turning these raw assets into refocused strengths, however, requires fresh ideas and new perspectives. Where can such ideas come from? Clearly, Japanese government officials and senior executives should be expected to begin ‘thinking outside the box.’ But there are new sources of ideas that should also be considered. I see at least four that are not being well tapped in current debates—youth, women, foreigners, and NGOs. All are currently somewhat marginal to Japan’s power circles. But all have the potential to provide fresh new ideas.

Consider younger Japanese. Confucian traditions and Japanese culture certainly value age and experience. And now that I am sixty years of age, I can appreciate the value of wisdom and perspective. But I can also still remember how reluctant I was nearly twenty years ago to give up my trusted typewriter when my university required all of us to purchase personal computers. I had no intuitive grasp of this new technology and for the first few months, I was completely baffled. Even today, though I use the internet, email and electronic banking with some regularity, much of it is still somewhat alien and non-intuitive to me in ways that are incomprehensible to my much younger students.

One imaginative American CEO, aware of the ways that his company’s more senior managers were (like me) not relying quickly and easily on available IT introduced an inexpensive but revolutionary procedure within his company. All senior managers were required to take on a ‘junior technology apprentice.’ This younger employee, typically only a 20-25 year old, would meet with the senior person for an hour a day for several weeks to provide them with hands on training on the various uses of the computer such as email, internet, power point, B-to-B ordering, and spread sheets. To the younger workers all of these were as simple and familiar as preparing a packet of instant ramen would be to any Japanese housewife. But to most of the executives these were initially as frightening as swimming solo in a tank full of sharks. Yet, after a few weeks of work with their new apprentices, all of the senior executives had not only overcome their reluctance but they were enthusiastically using their new skills to great advantage at work. The result was a massive jump in the company’s overall productivity as well as in corporate morale.

Women are also potential sources of intellectual vitality and new perspectives. Some of Japan’s most creative women have started their own companies and proven to be top flight executives. Others have been dynamic voices for changes in social welfare and educational policy. Yet female parliamentarians remain relatively few and usually on the margins of power; female leaders in major corporations or government agencies also remain rare. Hence, services that would make it easier for women to become full participants in the modern work force are hard to find. Yet many Japanese men in power continue to wonder why so many Japanese women are reluctant to marry, have large families or actually emigrate abroad.

Foreign practices can also be major sources of new inspiration. This was proven in Detroit when American manufacturers were forced to confront the sudden loss of market share to Japanese and German auto imports in the 1970s. Only after studying the actual manufacturing successes of their competitors did American auto companies begin to change, adopting numerous practices from Toyota, Honda, Volkswagen, Saab and Volvo among others. The benefits from foreign competition became clear to Japanese firms that have been successful abroad. Virtually all have succeeded by making better products. In a similar way, almost all Japanese, despite their initial reluctance, are now united on the benefits to Nissan of having partnered with Renault and Ghosn. In contrast, companies that have been protected from such competition in the Japanese home market have often managed to avoid any serious adjustment and remain alive despite their lack of longstanding viability.

Finally, a word should be said about NPOs. These too are hardly at the heart of Japanese power circles but many of them are brimming with new ideas, some perhaps impractical, but many more that are likely to bring out greater Japanese creativity in problem solving. One of the more vibrant of these groups is Peace Winds, which has extensive experience in delivering humanitarian aid in to countries in need. Peace Winds sought inclusion at the January 2002 Tokyo conference on Afghanistan; Suzuki Muneo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs blocked them because they were seen as a challenge to their monopoly of Japan’s foreign assistance. In fact, however, groups such as Peace Winds can provide important catalysts to rethinking old patterns of official thinking. And given the recent track record of official Japanese thinking, such new ideas should be welcomed.

CONCLUSION

Japan’s politics, economics and society were tightly woven together in ways that were highly beneficial economically from the end of the war until the bursting of the bubble. Those tight connections today, however, serve as a barrier to creativity and change. In many ways, Japan’s current problems mirror many of those faced by the U.S. a decade or more ago—not so much in the specifics, but in the need for the country to go through a fundamental reorganization of many pieces of its former model so that the country can again return to a position of global and regional leadership. The United States made such a change; it is now Japan’s turn. Today’s leaders owe it not only to current citizens, but also to the next generation of Japanese to act quickly for if they do not, the country will fall further behind its neighbors, making the task of catching up ever more difficult. The ideas of how to change are certainly available in many circles. What is now critical is for the inner circles of Japanese power to become open to inputs that they have not traditionally welcomed.

投稿者 gnpo : 08:56 PM

[talk] Open Your Gates to Asia: A Chinese Perspective of Japan

Yan Hao, President & CEO of EPS Co., Ltd.

Mr.Yan was born in Jiangsu province, China, in 1962. He matriculated at TianJing University in 1979, and then, came to Japan in 1981, as a Chinese governmental scholar. After completion of master course majoring in computer science, he entered into Ph.D. course at University of Tokyo, to major in Medical Informatics and Biostatistics. In 1991 when he was still a graduated student at University of Tokyo, he established EPSCo., Ltd. as one of a few CRO (Contract Research Organization) in Japan at that time. EPS listed on IPO at JASDAQ in 2001, becoming the first public CRO company in Japan.

Di Liu: A university lecture of Research Institute for International Area Economies of Waseda University

Di Liu served as a correspondent in Japan for 12years. He received his B.A. from Heilongjiang Universityin in his native city of Harbin. Mr. Liu obtained his M.A. from the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and obtained his LLM andLLD.from Waseda University. He regulaly writes for "Huanqiu times (the People's Daily)" and other newspapers. He is the author of "Mass Media Law (Zhongguo fazhi Publishers, Peking,1998)" based on his researches in Waseda University.

Zhou Muzhi: Associate Professor of Tokyo Keizai UniversityBruce Stronach: Provost and Chief Operating Officer of Becker College

Zhou Muzhi is an associate professor of Tokyo Keizai University. After he worked as the Ministry of Machinery Industry of China (1985-88), he came to Japan to continue his studies. He earned his phD from the faculty of economics, Tokyo Keizai University in 1995. He worked as an senior economist in the International Development Center and participated in many research projects on drafting development policies for developing countries (1995-2002). His major publications include “Mechatronics Revolution and New International Specialization-Asia Industrializaiton in Today’s World Economy”.

While the stagnation of the Japanese economy persists, the economic growth of China is remarkable. Three men discussed the transition of Japan-China relations and the future course of Japan. They are Mr. Hao Yan (president and CEO of EPS Co.) who came to Japan as a student and has been active in Japan since then, Mr. Muzhi Zhou (associate professor of Tokyo Keizai University) and Mr. Di Liu (a university lecturer of Waseda University).

One can hardly discuss Chinese modernization without taking the relationship with Japan into account. Mr. Zhou looked back at the modernization projects which started in the form of “learning from Japan” including the Baoshan Steel Plant project in the late 1970s. However, because the Japanese policy was to export plants not to transfer technologies, China gradually strengthened its ties with western nations (Europe and the U.S.). Especially after the bubble economy ended in Japan, he pointed out that the Japanese model lost its sparkle, including the myth of the bureaucratic dominance of MITI. Mr. Liu, too, stressed that the assumption he had before coming to Japan as a student had completely changed by saying “high productivity is limited to a very few companies and administrative authorities have little efficiency”.

Nonetheless, Mr. Liu said that China did not necessarily make light of Japan. Mr. Zhou also acknowledged that the exchange of capital, people and information between the two countries was developing. He mentioned that one of the obstacles to such private exchange was the diplomatic disputes over so-called historical issues. Mr. Liu criticized Japan for not changing its ways of thinking and ideologies. Mr. Liu also stressed the necessity of changing the Japanese perception of being superior to other Asian countries, which has long taken root in Japan.

All three agreed on the direction of the future course that Japan should take. Japan needs to deepen its relationship with Asian countries through actively accepting capital and human resources from them. In order to do so, Japan needs to open its doors to them in terms of both systems and awareness. Mr. Liu made a specific request because “Japanese visa systems and perception are closed to foreigners and foreign students.” Although stagnated, the power of the Japanese economy is still at a high level with abundant financial resources. In order to utilize such resources, a proposition was made to establish a culturally rich society through accepting excellent manpower from around the world such as artists (Mr. Liu).

投稿者 gnpo : 08:55 PM

[etc.] Symposium 2 ―New Potential of NPOs―

The Capabilities of New NPOs

Kunio Hosaka: Mayor of the City of Shiki (Saitama pref.)

Kunio Hosaka was born in 1941. After working as as an official of the town of Adachi (latter the City of Shiki) and a member of a prefectural assembly of Saitama prefecture, he was elected Mayor of the City of Shiki in 2001. He also held the position of chairman of the city assembly, chairman of the prefectural assembly, and was the president of the Association of Physical Education of the City of Shiki. In 1977, He founded a medical school, and in 1981, established Jonan Chuo Hospital. Mayor Hosaka graduated from saitama university junior college of economics.

Mizue Tsukushi: President and CEO of the Good Bankers Co., Ltd

Mizue Tsukushi is the President and CEO of the Good Bankers Co., Ltd., Japan’s first and unique independent SRI advisory company. She is a Member of the special advisory committees of the Government of Japan for Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. She is a former Deputy General Manager of Institution Marketing Dept., UBS Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. in Tokyo. She received the language certificate of the French Civilization Course at the University of Paris in 1979.

Kiyoyuki Seguchi: director, Reformist Festina Lente

While serving as director of Secretariat of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, he established Reformist Festina Lente (RFL) in 2002. He was born in 1959. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics of the Toyko University in 1982.

Hideyuki Inoue: Managing Director, ETIC. Social Venture Center

After he worked for Andersen Consulting (present-Accenture), Strategic Service Group (99-), currently he is preparing for Social Venture Partners Tokyo Bay as Executive Director. He held a "STYLE 2002", Japan's first Social Venture Buisness Plan Compeptition (now under screening on STYLE 2003.) He finished BA 1996 in Economics at Keio University and MA at George Washington University (performance management in public sector) in 1998.

Fusao Ushiro: Chairman of Shimin Forum 21 NPO Centre; Professor, Graduate Schools of Law, Nagoya University

Fusao Ushiro was born in 1954. After working as an associate professor of Nagoya University, he studied in University of Rome (1989-1991). He became a member of 21st Century Rincho in 1996, and established Shimin Forum 21 NPO Centre in 1997.

The number of organizations registered as NPOs has exceeded 10,000, and the number is increasing by 300 a month. A great concern was expressed concerning whether the framework for NPOs would be firmly established as a system including the issue of development of law systems such as tax systems. It was pointed out that the larger the scope of NPO activities became, the greater their influence on the public and private sectors grew. Thus, in this session, discussion was made on how NPOs would change administration or business as a “new potential of NPOs”.

“Ninety percent of the work of the city government will be handed over to NPOs.” Such bold statement came from Mayor Hosaka of Shiki City, Saitama Prefecture. As the aging society with low-birth rate progresses, most municipal governments will not be able to avoid financial crisis unless new measures are taken. Therefore, Mayor Hosaka asserted that they must rely on NPOs in order to achieve both a low-cost municipal administration and to maintain the level of administrative services. Ms. Tsukushi (president and CEO of the Good Bankers Co., Ltd.), who introduced SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) financial products for the first time in Japan, said, “We are spiritually an NPO although the organizational framework is in the form of a joint-stock corporation.” Ms. Tsukushi became interested in SRI in a sense that society would be reformed through money from each individual. She said that she did not have any other choice but to form a company in order to realize SRI. She stated that the limitations of a joint-stock corporation whose purpose is to return profit to share holders could be overcome when one’s ambition was strong enough. She made a point that public activities could be conducted even by non-NPOs.

Messrs. Seguchi and Inoue, both from NPOs, agreed with the opinion of Ms. Tsukushi. Mr. Seguchi works for the Bank of Japan, and Mr. Inoue has valuable experience in business as a consultant. Both agreed about the impact of the aspiration and strong experience in the early childhood of each individual on empathy of other people. And from there, activities are able to expand. Irrespective of whether you belong to NPOs or joint-stock corporations, the objective is to fulfill needs (Mr. Inoue). An NPO is a suitable gathering place for people with ambitions to achieve their shared objectives (Mr. Seguchi).

投稿者 gnpo : 08:27 PM

[etc.]Genron NPO Conference on Asia Strategy Symposium 3 ―How to Proceed with Creating a More Open Japan―

Masakazu Yamazaki: Writer, Critic, Advisory Board Member, Genron NPO

Born in 1934. Graduated in 1956 from Kyoto University, where he studied Philosophy at the Department of Literature. Finished Ph. D at Kyoto University’s Post-Graduate School, majoring in esthetics and history of arts. After assuming professorships at Kansai University and Osaka University, he is currently President of Toa University. His activities range widely from play-writing, literary criticism to social criticism. His main works are "Birth of soft individualism" ,"Era of big schism", "Truth of History and Justice of Politics" etc.

Yotaro Kobayashi: Chairman of the Board, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.Advisory Board Member, Genron NPO

Born in London in 1933. Joined Fuji Film Co., Ltd in 1958, from where he was assigned to Fuji Xerox in 1963. After working in the marketing planning departments, he became President and CEO in 1978, Chairman & CEO in 1992 and was appointed as Chairman of the Board in 1999. He holds posts as a member of the Council for Science and Technology of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports Science and Technology and Japanese National Commission for UNESCO. He is also a Life-time Trustee of Keizai Doyukai(Japan association of Corporate Executives), Pacific Asia Chairman of the Trilateral Commission, a member of the Board of Trustees of Keio University and President of the International University of Japan.

Shinji Fukukawa: Adviser to the Dentsu Inc.

Born in 1932, he graduated in 1955 from the Law Department, the University of Tokyo. In 1955 he entered the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (currently the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and became the administrative vice-minister. In the meantime, he served as a Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. In 1988 he left MITI and in 1994 took the present position via Vice President and Vice-Chairman of Kobe Steel Co, Ltd. Concurrently, served as together with the adviser to the Dentsu Inc. Currently, he is a member of the Research Committee of Resources and Energy (the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and a member of the govemment's deliberative council. His works include 21 Century: Japan's Choice and Age of Information Technology: Idea of Successes.

A roundtable discussion started with Mr. Shinji Fukukawa’s proposition to Messrs. Yotaro Kobayashi and Masakazu Yamazaki to sum up the previous symposium and to launch a broad-based discussion. The following three points of discussion were presented: how Japan perceives Asia; how Japan should make progress in efforts to open the country to the world; and in what way a relationship with Asia should be designed.

Mr. Yamazaki argued that a commonly shared civilization or culture did not exist in Asia, and the concept of Asia as a block of nations emerged only in the process of modernization after the Second World War. He stressed the importance of the perception that each one of us is an individual constituting the world in the age of globalization. Mr. Kobayashi’s perception of post-war Japan was that Japan had placed too much emphasis on the economy, thus damaging its legitimacy as a representative information source of Asia. He then indicated the significance of meaningful communication and dialogue with Asian countries.

As for the issue of whether Japan can change, Mr. Kobayashi pointed out an importance of making an effort to address the advantages of making changes now. He also asserted that it is important for the Japanese people to be aware of the unconscious closed nature and exclusiveness of Japan. On the other hand, Mr. Yamazaki contended that the peculiarities and closed nature of Japanese people were neither the attributes of the national character nor cultural traditions; instead, they were mere characteristics of the industrial society formed in the past 100 years and were the result of an “era of divided nations”. Therefore, “it is possible to change Japan”, he said. He also pointed out that although Japan had not reaped the benefits of the post-war system, it introduced popular culture to the world and substantially boosted the national prestige.

As for the modality of future business management, Mr. Kobayashi mentioned that social and human aspects of business rather than economic ones should be taken more into consideration, and that companies should proceed towards social responsibility. He stated that such efforts would assist Japan in gaining the trust of Asian countries and the world, and it would eventually lead to a major breakthrough for Japan. In addition to the necessity for the soft power to be loved and respected and for the creativity to attain such love and respect, Mr. Yamazaki insisted that Japan needed to take the initiative in establishing an international consensus on various issues of the world. In order to do so, he pointed to the necessity of settling the past.

Issues regarding the importance of education were raised at the end. Mr. Kobayashi stated that the fundamental direction of the present educational reform policies should be continuously supported.

投稿者 gnpo : 08:24 PM

[etc.]Genron NPO Conference on Asia Strategy Symposium 2 ―The Revitalization of Japan through Opening Up―

How Should Japan Establish Relationships with Asian Countries?

Taichi Sakaiya: Author, Economist

Born in 1935. He has been the Special Adviser to The Prime Minister since 2000. He joined the ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and directed the 1970 World Exposition in Osaka, 1975 Okinawa International Ocean Exposition. After leaving MITI to concentrate on writing and lecturing, he worked as the chairman of the Event and Project Committee for the Osaka 21st Century Plan, the president of the Asian Club Foundation, the member of the committee for Ten Year Support for Regions Stricken by Hanshin Awaji, Kobe Earthquake, and the Appointed Minister of State for Economic Planning. Graduated from the Faculty of Economics, Tokyo University. His published works include "Chika Kakumei (The Knowledge Value Revolution)" and "Toudai Kougiroku (The Lectures at University of Tokyo)" etc.

Kang, Bong-Kyun: Member of National Assembly The Republic of Korea

Kang, Bong-Kyun is a Member of National Assembly The Republic of Korea. He has held the posts of Minister of Finance and Economy, President of the Korea Development Institute (KDI). He has also served as Senior Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs and Policy Planning, and thus has been closely involved in Korea's economic reforms since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. He has a Ph.D. in Economics from Hanyang University, Korea, and an MA in Development Economics from Williams College, Massachusetts, US.

Sopiee Noordin: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia

Sopiee Noordin started his career as a lead writer at the New Straits Times Press where he became Group Managing Editor (1981) and Chief Executive of New Fleetprint Press- London. In 1984, he joined the Institute of Strategic Studies (I.S.I.S) as Director-General. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank and the National Economic Action Council (NEAC). He is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Sciences (1967-1972) where he obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science/ International Relations.

Du Ping: Director-General, The Department of Spatial Planning and Regional Economy of The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China

Mr. DU PING was born in August 30, 1956 and titled with president and professor. From August of 1982 as a civil servant in The Department of Spatial Planning and Regional Economy of The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and as a director responsible for spatial planning, regional economy development and environment management successively. From August of 1998 up to now as a director-general in The Institute of Spatial Planning and Regional Economy of NDRC for making research-work in the fields of spatial development, sustainable development and regional economy including Chinese western development and cross-national or sub-regional economic co-operation with a lot of study-reports and articles or books. In his long-term duty he has been known as a strategist and policy-designer.

Yukiko Fukagawa: Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo

She also works as a faculty fellow of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). She has specialized into East Asian economic development and published "Kankoku senshinkoku keizairon("Korea's economic development: a micro analysis on the maturity process") , "Chugoku no WTO kamei to NiChuKan boueki no mirai"("China's membership in the WTO and the future of Japan-China-Korea trade"). She received her B.A. in Economics from Waseda University, M.A. in International Economics from Yale University and finished PhD in Business History from Waseda University.

Tomohiko Taniguchi: Chief Senior Writer of “Nikkei Business”, a weekly magazine.

Tomohiko Taniguchi is the Chief Senior Writer of “Nikkei Business,” a Tokyo, Japan based weekly magazine. Formerly the magazine's London bureau chief, he was President of The Foreign Press Association in London (1999-2000, the first from Asia including Japan in its 111-year history). His English publications include “Japan’s Banks and the ‘Bubble Economy’ of the Late 1980s,” and the articles that appeared in "Central Banking" and "insight Japan". He was a Fulbright visiting fellow at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1991-92). He received BA in Law from University of Tokyo.

Jesper Koll: Managing Director Chief Economist Japan Research Department of Merrill Lynch Japan Securities

Before becoming the Chief Economist for Merrill Lynch in 1999 he was a Managing Director of Tiger Management L.L.C. and he was the Chief Economistand Head of Economic and Market Research for J.P. Morgan in Tokyo. He has been serving on several Japanese government advisory councils, including the MITI committee on "Big Bang 2001" Japan's financial system reform." Currently, he serves as a member ofthe MoF task force on global capital flows. Jesper Koll holds a master's degree from the Johns Hopkins University, SAISand graduated fromthe Lester B Pearson College of the Pacific in 1980. He has published manyarticles in Japanese, English and European publications as well as one book,"Towards a New Japanese Golden Age." He has been living in Japan since 1986and is a German national.

Ryosei Kokubun: Professor, Faculty of Law and Politics, Director of Center for Area Studies, Keio University

Ryosei Kokubun was born in 1953. After working as an assistant professor and associate professor of Keio University since 1981, he became a professor of Keio University in 1992. He has also been the director of Center for Asia Studies, Keio University. He studied and graduated from Keio University (BA, MA, Ph.D.). His major publications include "People's Republic of China," "Examination of the Asian Era: From China's View," "Documentary History of Contemporary China: Politics (eds.)," and "Challenges for China-Japan-US Cooperation (ed.)."

The Revitalization of Japan through Opening Up

What was discussed in this session was how to establish relationships between Japan and Asia. The first task would be to sort out our common views concerning the dynamic phenomenon in Asia centered around the axis of rising China. Next, we needed to ask ourselves, what could Japan do? In other words, we wanted to shed light on the tasks that Japan is required to do. Not only Asian countries, but the whole world faces a growing Chinese economy. Compared to such drastic changes in Asia, the process of reform and economic revitalization in Japan is still trailing behind.

Considering the present situation of Japan, we do not have the luxury of taking too much time. Therefore, we have no other way but to make use of the vigor of Asian countries. It is true that the slogan “reform and opening” was voiced loudly in China, but in reality they could not accomplish reform. Instead, they achieved reform through “opening” the country. Japan, too, must survive the changes in Asia and in the world through opening the country. Unless something is done, the world’s second largest economy might be led to self-destruction while no one notices. There is no other way but to open Japan in a real sense to find its relative position in Asia and in the world.

The theme we first took up for discussion was the threat of China being a gaining economic power. A panelist made a rather bold statement, saying “Those who do not feel threatened by China had better go to a mental clinic.” The degree of “threat” felt by Japan, Korea, and South-East Asia is somewhat different. Although Korea feels a potential threat, they try to minimize the threat by differentiating themselves and by strengthening the advantageous areas in which they have relative superiority at the moment. Southeast Asian countries have many areas where they must compete with China and they feel the most threatened. Under such circumstances, what China and ASEAN countries have chosen is an FTA, and this indicates that there is no other way but to cooperate to survive.

On the contrary, the public sense of crisis in Japan is that we might lose everything we have strived for. It is therefore inevitable that many people comment on the seriousness of the issues stemming from domestic factors. Those perception gaps have been made clear by the statements of panelists from Asian countries. The important issue in the end is what the role of Japan in Asia is. In the actual discussion some stated that Japan was being asked to commit itself to a miracle for Asia not a miracle for Japan. Behind such statements lies a perception that the economic power of Japan has not contributed fully to Asia, and the Japanese people are feeling pity for themselves to see themselves fall. To be more specific, the fact that the strategies of Japan as a whole are hardly discernible to the world is causing the relative decline in Japan’s overall role and status.

For example, the 10 ASEAN countries are in different economic development stages and the risk of widening disparities is high when they pursue cooperation with China. We have already heard some discord among them. When I go to China, I perceive that the growing number of Chinese is demanding more cooperation and economic support for the regional development in inland China. China itself is saddled with many unsolved problems, and the fact of the matter is that the current economic development relies heavily on foreign capital. In other words, each Asian country has unstable factors.

Japan should not pity itself in such situation; instead, it has to seek what role it can play for Asia and how it can contribute to the overall equality and establishment of the system of division of labor. It seems that Japan should exercise its leadership in that respect. Japan must have a conceptual channel or scenario that the leadership in Asia would lead to the revival of Japan itself. To my regret, present day Japan is rather isolated and appears to be lagging behind other Asian countries. It may sound harsh, but Japan is now to decide whether to take action now or to give up because it will be too late if nothing is done. Everything depends on whether Japan is able to transform what is discussed into action.

Another big issue is the North Korean crisis. Due to time constraints, the discussion was not enough at the session. In any case, Japan has to decide on what to do concerning the North Korean crisis soon or later. At the same time, how Japan should be involved in the future of the Korean Peninsula would become a crucial issue depending on how the Korean Peninsula would come about.

Actions that North Korea takes are quite accidental, and the purpose of these actions is to maintain its system. We must avoid being led astray by such contingent actions and losing the bird’s eye view. The first prerequisite that we need to bear in mind is how to solve problems in a peaceful manner by taking the whole Korean Peninsula into perspective. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasize that China pays special attention to South Korea in effect on the issue of the Northeast Asian Economic Zone including Japan, China and South Korea. There is an influence of top-level meetings between North and South Korea as a background. North Korea has been isolated since the meetings, and China has started to distance itself from the north due to problems arising from defectors from North Korea and development of nuclear weapons.

In this sense, the concept of a Northeast Asian Economic Zone can be considered as a part of the issues concerning stabilization of the Korean Peninsula; however, no such strategic concept has been developed yet.

Reviewer: Ryosei Kokubun

投稿者 gnpo : 08:23 PM

[etc.]Genron NPO Conference on Asia Strategy Symposium 1 ―How Should Japan Face a Changing Asia?―

Takashi Anzai: President I.Y. Bank

Born 1941. B.A. from Department of Law - Tohoku University in 1963 and joined the Bank of Japan. Worked as: Director of the Niigata Branch, Assistant Director - Operations Department, Director - Bank Examination and Surveillance Dept. and Executive Director. President - The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan in 1998. In 2000, Executive Advisor - Ito Yokado Inc. Current job since 2001.

Donald P.Kanak: President and CEO of AIG Companies, Japan & Korea

Donald P. Kanak is a President and CEO of AIG Companies, Japan & Korea. He joined American International Group, Inc. (AIG) in 1992, elected Executive Vice President and appointed to member of the Office of the Chairman in 2002. He holds a B.A. degree in Economics from University of North Carolina, a Juris Doctor degree from Harvard Law School, and a Master's degree in Management Studies from Oxford University, England.

Eisuke Sakakibara: Professor of Keio University, Director of the Global Security Research Center

Eisuke Sakakibara is now a professor at Keio University and serves as director of the Global Security Research Center, being engaged in an analysis of global markets including Asia. Sakakibara graduated from the Economics Department of Tokyo University in 1964 and received his Ph.D. in economics from Michigan University in 1969.

Tadashi Yanai: Chairman & CEO of: Fast Retailing Co., Ltd.

Tadashi Yanai is the Chairman and CEO of Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. After graduated from Political Science and Economics Department of Waseda University in 1971, he entered JUSCO Co., Ltd. He joined Ogori Shoji Co., Ltd. in 1972, and established “UNIQLO” brand in 1984. The Company’s name changed from Ogori Shoji Co., Ltd to Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. In 1991.

Takatoshi Kato: Advisor to the President of The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.

Takatoshi Kato is an Advisor to the President of The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Most of KatoÅfs professional career was rooted in the Ministry of Finance, Japanese Government, culminating in his assignment as Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs (1995-97). After retirement from government service, he spent a year at his alma mater Princeton University. He holds a BA degree in law of The University of Tokyo (1964) and earned a MPA degree of Princeton University (1968) on the Japanese Government Scholarship Program.

Zhou Muzhi: associate professor of Tokyo Keizai University

Zhou Muzhi is an associate professor of Tokyo Keizai University. After he worked as the Ministry of Machinery Industry of China (1985-88), he came to Japan to continue his studies. He earned his phD from the faculty of economics, Tokyo Keizai University in 1995. He worked as an senior economist in the International Development Center and participated in many research projects on drafting development policies for developing countries (1995-2002). His major publications include “Mechatronics Revolution and New International Specialization-Asia Industrializaiton in Today’s World Economy”.

No Need to Face Others: Asia Has Already Been United

The results of questionnaire responses from 51 of the symposium participants as to how Japan should face a changing Asia appeal for more efforts to be taken in Japan toward opening under its own volition. An overwhelming majority of 87% responded that Japan should open its doors to the world “even more”.

What then does it take to “open the country” in substance? Why must Japan open? These are the very questions we sought answers for at the first session titled “How Japan Should Face a Changing Asia” comprised of four panelists and three coordinators. The discussion came to the conclusion that the questions themselves have already become obsolete. The perception based on the question assumes that the other parties facing Japan are different from Japan, but in reality, the Japanese economy has already been assimilated into Asia inseparably.

The characteristics of manufacturing industries in recent years are the subdivision of production processes and the transfer of modules. Each module is allocated in a single place in an attempt to attain the optimal efficiency. As made clear in the discussion, China has been developed by participating in such new system of division of labor. The Japanese economy, too, has incorporated itself deeply into the network of division of labor and physical distribution systems that have spread widely in Asia. Therefore, the separation between Japan and Asian countries no longer exists.

A view was presented that the era of when a country took a core role as an axis of a vehicle and other countries were connected through the core had gone with the end of the cold war. If that is the case, it becomes crucial for corporations and countries to utilize the effect of existing network systems. Three lines connect only three stations, but adding two more participants increases the number of network lines up to 10 by connecting five stations. This effect must be utilized.

The question that should be asked instead is whether Japan is attractive enough for other countries to desire extending their networks here. At the session everyone except one person expressed pessimistic views. The higher the expectations of Japan are, the more pessimistic their views might have to be.

Japanese companies and the boardrooms among others close their doors firmly to foreigners. As long as Tokyo is the most uncomfortable city for foreigners among the major developed countries, Japan can never hope to participate in the networks expanding in Asia. Some suggested that Japanese people should start with opening their minds and this idea was supported by many participants. Also, the impressive term “cabin fever” was introduced. The term refers to the situation where people always speak ill of each other in a closed linguistic space. It might reflect the very fact that the voice of Japan is hardly ever heard in Asian countries.

This space looks to some ambitious entrepreneurs like an entrepreneurship that rests peacefully in sound doldrums, evading intense challenges and thus a decline of the entrepreneurship. Asia is a place where both chances and risks are high. “Entrepreneurs must train themselves in those circumstances,” commented a panelist and he asserted strongly that Japan had declined to become a complete petit bourgeois society where nobody cares for others. Even American observers who tend to view changes in Japan as positive signs could not refute this point. “First of all, a strong willpower is necessary, and then comes boldness and decisiveness,” was the American panelist’s remark. This shows the spirit of the American people who survived severe restructuring in the past. The same spirit exists in the Chinese people. A Chinese participant explained making an analogy of the Japanese situation with that of the Chinese at the end of China dynasty and caught participants’ attention. China then had the largest GDP and was the world’s largest exporter. But the country lost its wars with Western nations. Once it was on a downhill course, the accumulated economic stocks disappeared in a very short period of time. The Chinese are making strenuous efforts now in order to avoid having history repeat itself. “Japan, do you intend to repeat the folly of China?” was his hearty remark.

If the first thing the Japanese people need to realize may be the fact that ties between Japan and Asian countries are already too strong to be cut off, the next question arising is how to utilize more efficiently the networks that have already been developed.

There is no doubt about European countries being our predecessors. A participant from Europe advised, “Establish an Asian vision through working together in common projects, or, if possible, those projects in which people can pursue shared dreams,” and it gained a lot of support. Maybe something like the Airbus project would be good, or we could perhaps cooperate in environmental issues. Here, a conceptual ability to form visions comes into question and then the linguistic ability to describe dreams becomes an issue. Unfortunately, Japan has yet to possess these abilities, however, the notion that there is no other time but now to start was agreed upon by many participants.

Those who answered “It is indispensable for Japan to exercise its leadership while integrating itself in Asia in order to cut its way toward the future, and Japan has the potential power to do so.” account for 45% of all the people who answered the questionnaires. The number seems to indicate people’s wish for it to be like that. It is now clear that we have not yet reached a point of black despair, and that is the fruit of this symposium together with active discussions developed at the session.

Reviewer: Tomohiko Taniguchi

投稿者 gnpo : 08:20 PM

[etc.] Symposium 1 ―Transformation to an Independent Society and NPOs―

NPOs and the Shift toward a Self-Sustaining Society

Masayasu Kitagawa: Professor of The Okuma School of Public management of Waseda University , Advisory Board Member, Genron NPO

Born in 1944. After being a member of the Mie Prefecture Congress, he was elected his first time as a member of the House of Representatives in 1983. In 1990, he worked as Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Culture and Education. He worked as Governor of Mie Prefecture since 1995. He introduced “an office work evaluation system” to proceed reforms by means of zero-base evaluation of the projects. He also draws up and promoted "The Declaration of Mie Development", an all-around plan targeting 2010. He actively tackles reforms of the prefecture politics through these activities, using Start from average lives as a key concept and Information open to public as a key word. He has been a professor of The Okuma School of Public management of Waseda University since 2003. Graduated from Commerce Department of Waseda University in 1967.

Michio Matsui: President, Chief Executive Officer, Matsui Securities Co., Board of Trustees, Genron NPO

Michio Matsui was born in 1995. He started his carrier at Nihon Usen, and entered Matsui Securities Co. in 1987. He also held the Representative Director of the Industrial Leaders Associationa, manager of the Association of Tokyo Stock Exchange Regular Members, and director of International Foundation for Information Technology. He has authored "O Yannasaiyo demo Tsumannnaiyo (Do It, but It Won't Be Interesting)." Graduated from the Economics Department of Hitotsubashi University in 1976.

The relationship between politicians and their supporters has long been one of “politicians being patrons and supporters being clients” in post-war Japan. Politicians have worked to benefit their supporters through various approaches to the administration. As the steadily growing economy ended, this pattern lost its function. Despite this fact, the patron-client relationship has not diminished, because it is comfortable for both parties, and is convenient for the bureaucracy, which always follows precedents. This exclusive relationship ignores taxpayers who are the recipients of administrative services. Saying farewell to the patron-client relationship will enable the whole society to be transparent under fair rules. Mr. Kitagawa indicated that the keys to this goal are decentralization and the formation of manifestoes.

Politicians and political parties should design manifestoes as contracts with voters. Once they have the majority in the parliament, the contract should be executed no matter how strong the voice of the opposition parties is. The concentration of power may occur in this case; however, without it, there can be no progress in reform, and the existing exclusive relations between “protective politicians” and “dependent citizens” will just linger on.

Mr. Matsui stated that the closed nature of Japan had taken root in the Japanese people’s mentality. The mentality is equivalent to a “society that does not recognize losers”. A society that does not recognize losers does not recognize winners either. It is necessary to protect the weak, but if one does not recognize losers, self-decision and self-responsibility will not emerge. Mr. Matsui expressed his great concern over this system, by arguing that unless a system is secured where losers can have a second chance and where winners and losers are discerned, the market would not function and there would be no way for the Japanese economy to revive.

Mr. Kitagawa, as a mayor in Mie Prefecture, has been working for the delegation of power from the central government to municipal governments. He insisted that the central bureaucracy prevented the delegation of power with the opinion in mind that things would fail once power was handed over to municipal governments. Mr. Kitagawa contended that municipal governments should have the “freedom to fail”. Once the decentralization is carried out, the choice as to whether municipal governments or NPOs should provide public services will be made on a case-by-case basis. He explained that a rich society was the one with a variety of choices.

投稿者 gnpo : 08:17 PM