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Third Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll ( PDF )
Like the past two surveys, the purpose of the recent poll was to shed light on Chinese people's overall image of Japan, and basic perceptions about current China-Japan relations and their future, as comprehensively and objectively as possible to understand Chinese people's patterns of thought regarding China-Japan relations, perceptions of Japan, and changing trends to pursue accurate academic research in depth. The surveys also target observing movements in China-Japan relations from a unified perspective and to provide materials to help promote the healthy development of China-Japan relations.
The last survey was the first in which respondents in both China and Japan used basically the same questionnaire sheets. Questions in the survey were developed considering three factors: concordance with past surveys, issues that have recently been getting a lot of attention, and use of neutral language.
In the 2007 opinion poll of urban residents, usable responses were returned from 1,609 people spread almost equally among five cities: 455 in Beijing, 310 in Shanghai, 313 in Xian, 319 in Chengdu, and 323 in Shenyang. People surveyed were mainly men and women aged 20 and 60. There were 796 men, accounting for 49.5%, and 813 women, or 50.5%. As for educational background, about 90% were at least junior high school graduates but not university graduates (not including university graduates). Their monthly income was less than 3,000 yuan, and mainly around 1,000 to 2,000 yuan. As for political party affiliation, the Communist Party accounted for about 9%, various democratic parties 1%, and no particular party affiliation 81%. When looking at occupations, the distribution covered a wide range from senior management, freelance workers, physical laborers, retirees, laid-off workers, and unemployed persons. The top five categories were: regular workers at various companies and offices at 22.7%, retirees at 12%, self-employed at 11.9%, clerical workers at 11.5%, sole proprietors at 11.4% and service workers at 10.5%. Considering the above factors, people surveyed in the last poll are mostly citizens of lower to middle class in urban cities, with ages, vocations, and regional distributions covering a relatively wide range, so they are a good representation of the overall Chinese demographic.
The 2007 survey of students had 1,099 usable responses. Undergraduate students accounted for 55.3% and graduate students 44.7%, with 62.3% being males and 37.7% females. Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Renmin University of China each accounted for about 27%, and China Foreign Affairs University and the School of International Studies each accounted for about 9%. Of the respondents, 38/7% were Communist Party members. The students surveyed represent the overall demographic of Chinese students in terms of school year, specialty, sex, and background.
In the last student survey, "good" and "relatively good" impressions of Japan were 4.2% and 31.1% respectively, or a combined 35.3%. Favorable impressions surged compared to a year earlier. In the survey of the general public, "good" or "relatively good" answers accounted for 24.4%, and "average" was 36.9%. "Not very good" and "very bad" answers combined for 36.5%. Again, this shows that favorable impressions of Japan are clearly on the rise compared to the previous two years.
As for the question of "What first comes to mind when you think of Japan?" there was a slight change in answers compared to previous surveys. In both 2005 and 2006, the top answer in all surveys was the "Nanjing Massacre." In 2007, the top five answers in the student survey were: cherry blossoms (51%), Nanjing Massacre (41.9%), Yasukuni Shrine (36.6%), Imperial Japanese Army invaded China (31.6%), and electronic products (27.7%). Meanwhile, for the general public the responses were: electronic products (51.8%), Nanjing Massacre (45.3%), cherry blossoms (44.1%), Mt. Fuji (26.4%), and Imperial Japanese Army invaded China (20.4%). Cultural and economic keywords outranked some historical events for the first time in this survey.
Regarding current China-Japan relations, students who consider them to be "very good" or "relatively good" accounted for 8.2%, a noticeable increase from 2005 and 2006 results. Students who thought they were "not very good" and "very bad" accounted for 38.9% and 5.5% respectively, dropping significantly from 2005 and 2006. Among the general public, people who answered that current China-Japan relations were "good" or "relatively good" accounted for 24.9% or up 14.5 points, and "not very good" or "very bad" 24.7% or down 16.5 points. The surveys showed that 58.9% of the Chinese general public and 49.9% of students think that China-Japan relations have made some progress over the last year.
While overall impressions of China-Japan relations are clearly improving, attitudes toward specific issues have not changed.
Among students, history issues (87.2%), territorial disputes (73.5%), and negative public sentiment (32.4%) still came to the top as specific issues in China-Japan relations, and remain major obstacles to the advancement of current China-Japan relations. Among the general public, as in the past two years, history issues (77.6%), territorial disputes (44.6%), and trade disputes (31.6%) were the top three. Japan becoming a major military power (31.1% of the general public and 31.2% of students) and other issues were also picked as major concerns.
As for history issues, students identified school textbook issues (56.1%), a lack of remorseful attitudes toward historical events (50.1%), visits to Yasukuni Shrine (48.9%), the Nanjing Massacre (44.2%), and other subjects as top concerns. The general public ranked the Nanjing Massacre at the top (66.7%), followed by visits to Yasukuni Shrine (49.1%), school textbook issues (48.8%), and a lack of remorse or sincerity (41.6%). While 52.1% of the general public and 34.9% of students believe "history issues will settle down between China and Japan as relations develop," 42.9% of the general public and 61.6% students think "history issues won't be settled." There are no common views as for how to settle history issues.
In terms of the economy, far more respondents (55.7% of students, 40.4% of the general public) think economic relations between the two countries are "favorable, mutually beneficial economic ties," compared to ones who considered them to be competitive (19.7% of students, 19.1% of the general public). As for people's evaluation of the Japanese economy and its international status, 29.2% of the general public think "it has grown out of a crisis and will continue playing a role as a world economic leader into the future," while 28.2% think "prospects of a Japanese economic recovery are unclear, and its economic influence will weaken." Among students, "Japan will maintain its influence as an economic powerhouse" and "its international status will take a downturn" accounted for 28.9% and 26% respectively.
When considering political and security topics, an overwhelming percentage of students (71.8%) and the general public (60.8%) consider the Japan-U.S. alliance works "To keep the rise of China in check and to interfere with Taiwan issues." That reflects concerns about the Japan-U.S. alliance that are widely found in China as in the last two surveys. Students felt Japan was the military threat at 76.4%, followed by the U.S., India, and Russia at 69.8%, 51.9%, and 20.8%, respectively. The general public recognizes the U.S. (55.6%) and Japan (41.2%) as the largest military threats, while no other country accounts for more than 10%. Some of the reasons as to why people feel Japan is a threat are "Japan conducted wars of aggression in the past, and some Japanese are promoting the revival of militarism" (61.8% of the general public and 68.9% of students), "Japan's military capabilities are already powerful" (39.1% of students and 40.3% of the general public), "Japan is trying to reinforce its military capabilities to become a military superpower" (32.1% of the general public and 53.5% of students), and "Japan will follow a U.S. strategy" (39.4% of the general public and 34.7% of students).
As for Japan actively trying to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, students who thought China should "support" or "support with conditions" accounted for 1.4% and 23.6% respectively. Meanwhile, students who thought their government should oppose the move totaled 69.7%. Among the general public, 43.8% thought the Chinese government "should support" (11.1%) or "should support with conditions" (32.7%), while 35.8% thought their government "should oppose" it. If Japan wants to play a much larger role in international society, many Chinese think Japan "should win further understanding and support from neighboring countries" (40.8% of the general public and 65.3% of students), followed by "should contribute as a pacifistic nation" (37.7% of the general public and 39.3% of students).
Regarding summit meetings and private-sector exchanges, 77.9% of students "expect" or "somewhat expect" summit meetings to contribute to improved bilateral relations. In addition, 76.5% view private-sector exchanges as "important" or "somewhat important." As for the general public, 63.8% answered that they have certain expectations for summit meetings. Both students and the general public think "Japanese ways of doing things and ways of thinking" and "China's rising nationalism and anti-Japan sentiment" are major obstacles to private-sector exchanges.
In this year's survey, 49.2% of students and 54.2% of the general public thought Chinese nationalism has grown for the last several years, while 44.7% of students and 39.4% of the general public answered that it has not changed much. As for the Chinese government's foreign policy principles, "mutual respect, nonintervention in internal affairs" won the most support (35.4% of students and 44.2% of the general public).
In the 2007 student survey, "rising nationalism" (66.2%) was considered the most serious issue in Japan today. Meanwhile, the general public thought the "aging society" and "rebuilding of Asia relations" (34.6% and 23.1% respectively) were the top issues.
In regard to Japan's major political inclinations, nationalism, militarism, and great-power ambition still came to the top, and expressions often used in Japan such as pacifism, liberalism, and international cooperation are not recognized much in China. When looking at events in Japanese modern history, the general public and students most recognize the "Manchurian Incident (Liutiaogou Incident), the “Second Sino-Japanese War" and "atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S."
Of all the respondents, 96.2% of students and 98.8% of the general public had never visited Japan, and 62.3% of students and 92.4% of the general public had never interacted with Japanese. Only a small number of students and the general public have close relations with Japanese friends. The Chinese news media is still the major means of learning about Japan and China-Japan relations (90.2% of students and 87.8% of the general public). The highest percentage of students get information on the Internet (64%) compared to the general public that relies on television (84.9%).
(1) Positive changes
The percentage of students who answered that their impressions of Japan were "very good" or "somewhat good" grew by 27.5 points from last year (35.3% / 7.8%). Among the general public, the percentage of people who said their impressions of Japan were "very good" and "somewhat good" rose by 9.9 points from last year (24.4% / 14.5%). Overall, 21.5% of students and 50.5% of the general public said their impressions of Japan had improved over the past year.
As for current China-Japan relations, "very good" and "somewhat good" answers accounted for a combined 8.2%, with a positive outlook growing from 1.5% in 2005 and 2.9% in 2006. "Not very good" and "very bad" responses accounted for a combined 44.4%, a clear drop from 78.2% in 2005 and 70% in 2006. A total of 49.9% of students and 58.9% of the general public answered that China-Japan relations had improved to some extent over the past year.
People's views on the future of China-Japan relations tended to be generally pessimistic in the past, but have become optimistic as 65.9% of students and 73.1% of the general public look at future China-Japanese relations "optimistically" or "somewhat optimistically." In 2005 and 2006, more than 70% of students had pessimistic views. In 2006, only 41.4% of the general public was optimistic about the future of bilateral relations.
(2) Continuity and stability
However, the views among the general public have not changed dramatically on many specific issues. For example, results for major obstacles to China-Japan relations, recognition of settling history issues, economic relations between China and Japan, the Japan-U.S. alliance, cooperation between China and Japan in Asia, summit diplomacy and private-sector exchanges, and other issues have not changed much over the three polls, maintaining relative stability and continuity.
Generally speaking, the survey results indicate that there is no major progress on issues involving China and Japan.
China and Japan joining hands to promote regional development (60.1% of students and 65.2% of the general public) and economic and social development in each country (62.4% of students and 57.3% of the general public) gain wide support from both students and people at large. Many students and the general public also expect heads of state to work on strengthening economic ties at summit meetings (41.6% of students and 31.7% of the general public). Many students (55.7%) consider economic relations as a tool that each country can develop, however when considering that people look at Japan as the greatest military threat to China, Chinese views of Japan are far from Japan’s pacifistic self-image. The Chinese public is reserving judgment on Japan becoming a military superpower and its role in the Japan-U.S. alliance. In regard to natural resources, the percentage of students who think that "if there is a dispute, China should protect its own rights and interests" (38.7%) exceeds those who call for "cooperation through dialog" (26.3%). The poll results reflect "cold political and hot economic relations" between China and Japan to some extent.
Changes in the overall image of Japan illustrated in the 2007 survey are believed to stem from the three following aspects.
(1)Influence of incidents. In 2004 through 2005, China-Japan relations experienced several negative incidents. In 2006 through 2007, there were not any incidents that could have been a major blow to bilateral relations, and positive events (national leaders visiting each other) were widely publicized, contributing to a positive effect on some survey results.
(2)Influence by media. Polls in the past three years show that news media are an important source of information about Japan and China-Japan relations. In particular, around the time of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to China and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan, positive reporting increased in Chinese media and negative items diminished.
(3)Influence by governments. Governments of both countries have tried to improve chilly relations over the past two years. Governments taking aggressive action or restraining themselves in regard to issues that the two countries have differences in opinion have become another factor that changed the public's overall impression of the other nation.
]]>Third Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll ( PDF )
This article reports on the Japanese survey results. As with the previous two surveys, intellectuals in Japan completed a questionnaire at the same time as the opinion poll was held this year.
[Note: The opinion poll included men and women aged 18 or older throughout the country, excluding senior high school students. The poll was conducted by delivering questions by hand to individual homes and collecting them later, and there were 1,000 valid responses. Details on the 1,000 respondents are as follows. Sex: men 48.5%, women 51.5%. Age group: 18 and 19 years old, 2.2%; 20-29 years old, 14.8%; 30-39 years old, 17.0%; 40-49 years old, 15.0%; 50-59 years old, 18.5%; and 60 and older, 32.5%.
When it came to the questionnaires for intellectuals, we picked 2,000 people from all who had participated in previous Genron NPO discussions and surveys. The questionnaires were mailed out, and responses were received from 300 individuals. As for educational background, 74.0% had undergraduate degrees and 19.6% had graduate degrees for a combined total of 93.6%. This illustrates the average academic background among intellectuals working in Japanese society, and our intention was to add their responses to supplement the opinion poll.]
Genron NPO, China Daily, and the Peking University School of International Studies not only publish the survey results every year, but also agree to reflect upon the results in discussions during the "Beijin-Tokyo Forum" to help narrow communication and recognition gaps between people in the two countries, and contribute to mutual understanding.
The last survey was the first opinion poll since Japan-China summit meetings resumed in October and the heads of both countries visited each other, so it is the only evidence at this time to learn how much mutual understanding has deepened and how perceptions have changed since the summit meeting last year.
The questions in the opinion poll were jointly drawn up by Genron NPO and the Peking University School of International Studies after detailed discussions.
Among all respondents to the poll, only a little over 10% (13.5%) have visited China. Meanwhile, 80% of the intellectuals (81.9%) have visited China, and the figure has been gradually increasing over the last three years.
In the opinion poll, over 80% (84.3%) answered that they "don't know anyone in China." Among the intellectuals, when combining "have close acquaintances or friends" and "have acquaintances or friends to talk with to some degree," the figure was 71.0%.
The general public's perception of China is formed through indirect experience, or in other words depends on information in the media in their own country. In the poll, about 90% (91.3%) answered "Japanese news media" was their source of information for understanding China and Japan-China relations. The main source of information among intellectuals was also primarily Japanese news media (84.7%) though their sources of information are more diverse than among the general public. Television was the most popular Japanese news media among the general public at 78.1%, and newspapers for intellectuals at 55.9%. A minority of people rely on the Internet for such information.
However, the poll showed that less than 30% of people (29.3%) consider Japanese news media reporting on China and Japan-China relations to be objective. When combining "subjective reporting from Japan's standpoint" (18.3%) and "reporting emphasizing conflicts between the two countries" (17.6%), more than 30% of people questioned the objectivity of the media. Such suspicions are even stronger among intellectuals: when combining "subjective" (22.0%) and "emphasizing conflicts" (33.0%), the percentage is over half at 55.0%.
The average Japanese person's understanding of China comes only from things that arise during everyday life, and understanding of the Chinese political system including socialism remains basic. Impressions still remain regarding the anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005 and other incidents that dominated Japanese news headlines. All opinion polls over the last three years show the same situation.
Meanwhile, when intellectuals think about China the top-ranked topic is "economic growth, overheating economy" at 52.3%. "Asia's core, major future power" was also high at 22.7%, illustrating that people are interested in recent economic developments in China.
As for current dominant political concepts about China, "socialism, communism" comes first among the general public at 75.2%, followed by "militarism" at 35.5%, "great-power ambition" at 33.3%, and "totalitarianism (one-party dictatorship)" at 27.4%. There have not been any major changes in the last three polls. "Pacifism," "international cooperation" and "democracy" rank much lower at around 5% each.
"Great-power ambition" comes first among intellectuals at 65.3%, followed by "totalitarianism (one-party dictatorship)" at 51.0%, and surpassing "socialism, communism" at 45.7%.
Among Japanese impressions of Chinese people's characteristics, those that stood out were diligent, aggressive, stubborn, untrustworthy, insincere, non-creative, nonconformist, and selfish, with such answers commanding much higher percentages than positive ones.
Japan-China relations have turned around and improved over the past year since summit meetings resumed when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited China in October 2006, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April this year. Relations between the two governments have begun to advance. The recent poll surveyed this trend.
The results show that more than half of Japanese today still have negative images about both "impressions of China" and "Japan-China relations." A declining trend that continued until last year finally stopped, but it has yet to turn better.
Intellectuals who interact heavily with Chinese have dramatically improved their impressions not only of China but in particular Japan-China relations over the last year, and improved relations between the two governments are thought to have influenced their impressions.
However, when looking only at the opinion poll, there was no visible effect regarding any improvement in perceptions of China or any result from the recent visits by the respective heads of states.
Nearly 70% of Japanese public have a negative impression of China.
Meanwhile, 54.3% of intellectuals have a positive impression of China, nearly balancing those with a negative image at 45.6%, indicating a split view.
As for reasons why Japanese people have a negative impression of China, "It often criticizes Japan in regard to history and other issues" comes first at 61.7%, followed by "It appears to be self-centered in gaining access to resources, energy, and food" at 42.4%, "Different way of thinking and culture" at 38.0%, "It is building up military capabilities" at 32.6%, and "The future of Chinese politics and its economy are unclear" at 29.1%.
When polling current Japan-China relations, even if "very good" (0.2%) and "relatively good" (6.3%) are combined, that is only 6.5%. Meanwhile, negative views account more than half when "not very good" (47.9%) and "not good at all" (5.2%) are combined. When looking at opinion polls for the last three years, evaluations of Japan-China relations are slightly improving but people with "negative" views still largely surpass ones with "positive" outlooks.
Among intellectuals, respondents who thought Japan-China relations are "not very good" accounted for 41.3%, down more than 20 points, yet that was still the most common answer.
The next question in the opinion poll was whether impressions of China have improved or deteriorated over the last year. The percentage of people who answered "slightly improved" grew about 10 points, showing signs of progress. Nevertheless, even if "considerably improved" at 1.7% is added, that totals only 18.8%. Meanwhile, though the percentage of people whose impressions deteriorated over the last year declined from the previous poll, the total still reaches 27.1% when combining "slightly deteriorated" at 21.7% and "considerably deteriorated" at 5.4%.
In contrast, there was marked improvement among intellectuals with improving impressions over the last year accounting for 24.3%, outstripping worse impressions at 15.0%
As for whether their evaluation of Japan-China relations had changed over the last year, "not particularly changed" was the top answer in the poll at 61.6%.
Among intellectuals, people who saw "improved" relations over the last year soared to 64.3%, a markedly positive response compared to the general public.
Regarding the importance of Japan-China relations, 73.8% of people think they are “important” or "somewhat important" in the opinion poll (72.6% last year). Meanwhile, 98.7% of intellectual consider them to be important (97% last year).
Nearly half, or 47.2%, of the general public thinks that Japan-China relations are as important as Japan-U.S. relations (23.4%) or second-most important next to Japan-U.S. relations (23.8%), and the corresponding combined figure for intellectuals is 74.4%.
In regard to Abe's visit to China last year and Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan this year, only 36.2% of the general public "expect" such summit meetings to contribute to improvements in bilateral relations even when combined with "somewhat expect." On the other hand, 32.9% of people "don't expect" or "somewhat don't expect" it. Results among intellectuals were in sharp contrast at 77.7% when "expect" and "somewhat expect" were combined.
The top three issues that the general public wants to have discussed at summit meetings are "North Korean issues including nuclear development and abductions" at 35.1%, followed by "strengthening cooperation for energy conservation and environmental issues" at 17.5%, and "history issues" at 9.9%. Among intellectuals, "strengthening cooperation for energy conservation and environmental issues" topped the list at 38.7%, followed by "strengthening economic relations" at 13.3%, and "North Korean issues including nuclear development and abductions" at 11.0%.
This section sheds light on how Japanese people look at three topics common to Japan and China. The first is "Will China’s economic and political influence grow in the future?" In response, 57.4% of the general public and 81% of intellectuals think it will, with both figures higher than last year.
The second question was "Are current economic relations between Japan and China friendly ones benefiting both countries, or competing ones that threaten each other?" People in the poll who viewed them as "threatening each other" accounted for 43.2%, or nearly half, and people who thought they are "friendly ones benefiting both" accounted for only 28.9%. In contrast, intellectuals who viewed them as "friendly ones benefiting both" made up 71.4%.
As for the last issue of China strongly pushing to get control of resources and energy, people who thought "efforts should be made to solve the issue through dialog" accounted for 64.7% among the general public, and 80.7% among intellectuals, with both showing strong majorities. Meanwhile, the percentage people who thought "Japan should secure its national interests to compete with China" totaled only 16.9% among the general public, and 16.6% among intellectuals.
Regarding Japan's aspirations to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, 46.7% of the general public thought "Japan should become a permanent member along with China," along with an overwhelming 77.3% of intellectuals.
As for Japan-China relations and the issue of perceptions of history, "Even if Japan-China relations develop, it would be difficult to solve history issues" was the top answer at 33.2%, which is the same result in the last two opinion polls.
This year, however, "As relations between Japan and China develop, history issues will also be gradually settled" rose 4.6 points from last year to 30.2% among the general public. Such an optimistic view is more prevalent among intellectuals at 56.3%, rising from 52.3% last year.
Regarding what historical issues should be settled, "Japanese prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine" ranked top among the public, just like last year.
As for prime ministerial visits to the shrine, only 20.9% of the public think "he should not visit either officially or privately," 29.3% said "he can visit as prime minister," and 34.4% feel "he can visit privately." In contrast, "he should not visit either officially or privately" came first at 62.3%.
North Korea is the viewed by the general public as the primary military threat at 81.4%, followed by China at 35.4%. However, while responses for North Korea rose from last year, China dropped 7.4 points. Russia came third at 16.9%.
As for why they feel China is a threat, "Chinese military will likely continue growing in the future, becoming a threat in the near future" accounted for the most responses at 56.2%, followed by "China often trespasses in Japanese waters" at 46.0% and "China has nuclear weapons" at 44.9%.
People who thought that Japan-China relations it will "improve" or "somewhat improve" in the future accounted for 40.9%, substantially higher than those who thought they would deteriorate. Much of the general public is optimistic about the future of Japan-China relations, and the same thing can be said for intellectuals.
As for goals for relations, "cooperate for economic development in Asia" accounted for the most at 51.0%, followed by "both contribute to the world as representatives of Asia" at 48.3%, and "Japan and China take a leading role to develop Northeast Asian security to combat North Korean and other issues" at 38.7%. Regarding what values Japan should promote in Asia, "nuclear-free, pacifism" was highest among both the general public and intellectuals at 39.0% and 28.0% respectively, followed by "respect for people to live humanely" at 21.0% among the general public and 25.3% among intellectuals.
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2007/08/17 Kunlun Hall
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Part 4: By Encouraging Reforms, the Government is not Advocating Socialism.
The situation Japan faces today is very similar to the New Economy phase that took place in the United States ten years ago. New Economy occurred around the mid-nineties. Until then, general consensus held that the US’s productivity growth was about 2%. However, one section of the population argued that the US’s productivity growth should be higher than 3%.
There were two reasons: one was peace dividends, and the other was the revolution taking place in the IT industry- both of which were contributing to the increase in productivity. Those who objected argued that such projections wouldn’t go according to plan, and that productivity growth wouldn’t increase so simply. However, what actually happened was the debate came to an end around 1997 and the US’s official productivity growth rate currently ranges from 3.2% to 3.3%, according to the US government. In other words, the proponents of New Economy were correct.
Turning to Japan, though the present growth potential is said to be somewhat lower than 2%, the same situation that faced the US also seems possible in Japan. There aren’t any peace dividends, but reform dividends could be possible. Another point worth mentioning is the IT revolution; Japan has developed a broadband infrastructure that is not only the lowest priced but also the fastest, giving it an edge over the US. And presently, we see that systems are progressively changing. With such possibilities kept in mind, we should be pursuing that growth potential.
As was the case when debated in the United States, this is a very difficult issue. I don’t think it is something that can be resolved simply. Furthermore, Japan is dealing with public finance issues. However, if, in the future, the nominal productivity growth rate increases to 3, 4%, a natural increase in revenue will clearly result, making it much easier to balance the economy and public finances. Some of that is already apparent, as the natural increase in revenue is exceeding expectations. Under these circumstances, such economic growth will become increasingly possible.
With regards to the disparity issue – I think it’s mainly those with a vested interest in maintaining their current status that are running an opposition campaign against reforms. However, from a political standpoint, I do think there is one thing we must do: examine the poverty issue. Disparity is an issue of higher and lower income brackets, and solving it becomes an issue of how and whether to deal with those in the higher income brackets. However, to do so would be socialism. As Thatcher said, it is no t a question of making the poor rich by making the rich poor. What we need is for hardworking people to do their best.
The issue is poverty. A proper study of poverty should be conducted and the results used to create appropriate measures to tackle the issue. Rather than calling it an issue of disparity, I think we should see it as an issue of poverty. Even the government should just state, “We are not socialistic”. This would be a strategic way to set the agenda.
With the House of Councilors elections approaching, you may be wondering what issues will be focused on. I think one issue will be countermeasures to poverty, and another issue will be the Gateway Initiative plans. Plans for the Gateway Initiative will be released in May, and will be focusing on the House of Councilor elections in July. Therefore, I think it would be wise to produce forward looking policy issues.
In addition, one political measure I would really like to see implemented is reformation of the labor market. Prime Minister Abe’s guidelines in that respect are very relevant, as he is trying to include part-time employees in insurance plans. And he should endeavor to do so. What does including part-time workers in insurance plans entail? It means losing the distinction between formal employment and temporary employment. At the moment, the disparity between formal and temporary employment is quite large. Though the employees may be doing the same work, one is being overpaid for their productivity, while the other, in order to compensate for the overpayment of the first employee, is working at a much lower wage.
We can’t ignore these kinds of disparities. However, labor unions are opposed to changes. On top of that, business managers are opposed to including part-time employees into insurance plans. Business managers should be looking to reform themselves.
Therefore, the Abe administration should take a strict stance towards both the labor unions and the economy. It’s also said that corporation taxes are favorable only on businesses. The government should be stricter with businesses. I believe it is a twofold issue. One issue is insurance, and the other is minimum wage. The minimum wage should be increased. If the government firmly resolves to increase it, the Prime Minister will feel the nation’s support. We needn’t be lenient with businesses; we should make them cry in areas in which they should be crying. We are in the situation we are in today because the only pressures on the government are from those who want relaxed restrictions and those who call for white-collar exemptions. White-collar exemption is both a freedom and responsibility. Management should have freedom. But in exchange, they should also take responsibility in implementing a safety net. White-collar exemption currently refers only to the freedom.
The Abe Administration needs a strategic approach in setting the agenda. With the upcoming House of Councilors election, I am looking forward to constructive policy oriented debate.
Translator: LAURA KUMATAKA
Part 3: The Political Administration Should be Comprised of only Those who Demonstrate Their Abilities.
Another area in the evaluation of Shinzo Abe’s administration I would like to draw attention to is its policy-making process. I think it’s important to evaluate the extent of support given by those surrounding Prime Minister Abe.
As far as the Prime Minister’s aides are concerned, some say that by law these positions do not officially exist and so the system will not function. Although that is one side of the truth, if you look at the United States then you find, that there are no provisions for those positions in the law there either. In the United States they are also called assistants. Americans aren’t hobbled when a legal precedent doesn’t exist. A risk needs to be taken and the role of the aids needs to be made more prominent. Becoming an aid should also be made a more competitive process. They should compete, and only those who produce results should stay. Those who don’t should be replaced. In other words, more than structure competence and competition are more important.
The reason the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) became the control tower during the Koizumi administration was because they set their agenda, decided on their basic stance, debated the organizational design, and finally sent it to be approved by the Prime Minister. It became the control tower because all those stages were processed there. It wouldn’t have become the control tower if it hadn’t carried out all those processes. The CEFP hadn’t initially been delegated such a role, but were able to assume such a role because they took the initiative.
Even before the Koizumi Cabinet there was a CEFP, but it never functioned in such a capacity. The organization surrounding the Prime Minister exists in America as well – the roles of the CEA (President’s Council of Economic Advisors) or the CEA Chairman vastly varies according to the President or the administration at the time. When I asked Michael Boskin, the former CEA chairman, what his job entailed, he replied that his role was completely different according to the relationship between the CEA chairman and the President and the administration at the time. As I expected, that is really what it boils down to. The system will take form from the personalities and capabilities of its leaders and the members and within this environment there should be healthy competition.
If the Prime Minister’s present aides were to stick their necks out and take a risk, I have faith in their abilities. There are obviously some legal limitations. For example, even if they were to try to make a statement at a press conference, the opposition parties would challenge their statements and argue for them to state their opinions in front of the National Diet instead. Because of such tactics used by the opposition parties to prevent aides from accomplishing anything, it hasn’t been possible to make statements at a press conference till now. However, one doesn’t have to listen to them. I think it is fine to stay politically active in the public sphere.
A large number of committees have been created within the current administration. The organization of the government has become incredibly vast, and if it increases through further superfluous committees this will only make things more unwieldy. Without first setting a clear agenda of issues you wish to address, you will always find yourself trying to escape the aforementioned problem.
In truth, we are feeling reverberations of issues remaining from the last year of Koizumi’s administration. The agenda isn’t clearly defined because it wasn’t sufficiently discussed at the CEFP meeting that took place the year before. That is why the Abe Administration didn’t have a clearly defined agenda at the time of transition and also why efforts should have been quickly made to draw up an agenda.
During the Koizumi administration, issues were first discussed in the CEFP, which resulted in a quickly produced agenda as the stoutly framed policies were written. First public projects were decreased, and a large scale agenda to manage both financial restructuring and economic growth was pushed forth. After that, a tax reform agenda was proposed, the Trinity agenda was put forth, and the reform of the postal system agenda was proposed. Agendas were being proposed without interruption.
When I wrote my book ,‘The Realities of Structural Reform’ (Kouzo Kaikaku no Shinjitsu), the thing that shocked me the most from reading my journal was the sheer number of ongoing projects we had simultaneously going on. For that reason reading my journal was very difficult. At a time when financial revitalization was undergoing such turmoil, it’s hard to believe we tackled this Trinity agenda. However, during the last year of the administration, when the management of the CEFP was entrusted to the bureaucracy, no agendas were produced.
Therefore “early small successes” are necessary. First quickly draw up an achievable agenda and then you should go about accomplishing it. “Open and Innovation” is fine, and no one will argue with that. “Assertive diplomacy” is also good, and no one has any qualms with that either. However, debate that reaches beyond these issues is also necessary.
Translator: LAURA KUMATAKA
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Part 2: Historic Tasks Being Asked of the Abe Administration.
Next I’d like to point out the historic tasks that are being asked of the Abe administration. The more I ponder it, the more I think that, in many ways, the Abe administration has a rather similar mission to that of the Blair administration in England.
One of these is educational reform. Another is the escape from “British sickness” and creation of a strong economy – in particular, the “rising tide policy”. In addition, Britain has also pushed policies to strengthen soft powers as well. In terms of Japan, this would be equivalent to the Asian Gateway Initiative. This shows that the issues the Abe administration is attempting to deal with overlap greatly with those of the Blair administration.
In this historic role, I would like to see the Abe administration strengthen economic growth, increase soft power, and tackle education, the very power of the people and foundation upon which these developments all depend. This means that since the start of the Abe administration, those buds are all starting to sprout. If you ask whether the path to fruition of these buds has been sufficiently paved though, I would say that happens from here on forward.
We understand that, as Mr. Abe has stated from the beginning, the intent is there to promote strengthened economic growth. The problem, however, is that an agenda to achieve this has not been established. There isn’t anyone opposed to even the idea of “open and innovation” for the sake of economic growth. So, what should be done? Clearly an agenda is being called for.
Also with education reform, a 17-person committee is too large. With such a large committee, eventually it becomes necessary for government officials to step in and bring things to a conclusion. A 5 or 6 member committee would be fine. In addition, as it stands currently, from start to finish the Education Rebuilding Council revolves around discussions of the present situation. I would like to see them discuss from a more long-term perspective what kind of human resources need to be trained and what is needed for the country of Japan to survive as a global player.
Politicians are currently preoccupied with talk of bullying problems, mental issues, and other current matters. Talk of current issues is important and greatly appreciated, but there is no meaning to having the Education Rebuilding Council unless we can look past these things.
As far as the Asia Gateway Initiative is concerned, regardless of what the Prime Minister said in his policy position speech at the end of September last year, there has hardly been any movement whatsoever on the matter. I think it’s good that Mr. Abe stated this plan again in his policy speech the other day, saying that they would form a plan by May. The problem is the strategy lies in the details, so it’s a matter of whether or not we can keep the bureaucrats from taking hold of the open seams so they can’t take over. It is important in a growth strategy that an agenda is firmly established, and that in working out the details to that end all the functions of the control tower are firmly within possession of the administration.
The cabinet reached a decision on a budget plan the day before the National Diet. If you read objectively based on the numbers presented in the plan, there is no need to raise consumption tax in order to restore the primary balance in the beginning of the 2010’s. I think this is something that should be clarified. In reality, however, it seems the government has started to say this and then suddenly clammed up. However, surely by saying this it would demonstrate an effort to avoid arguments in the National Diet.
To put things in economic terms, it is an issue of maximizing earnings or minimizing expenses. What I’d really like to see is for the advisory council to try their best to maximize earnings in their reforms. To reach this end, it will be necessary to haggle and debate. These debates will be of the utmost importance and will have two results.
The first is that the right argument will become clear in the course of the debates and the path to the appropriate policy will become visible. The second thing, depending on the debates, is public support of the reforming administration. The merits of debating are extremely important both politically and economically. As such, it would be great if there were debate about maximizing earnings, but as it stands now, in an attempt to avoid debate, that is to say minimize expenses, they are refraining form making any clear statements.
Recently, the number of proposal papers produced by civilian members of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy and distributed are decreasing. Released proposal papers generate debate, but it looks like there is a movement to avoid that at this time.
Translator: DOUG DURGEE
Part 1: The Issue of Creating an Agenda.
If we restrict ourselves to the first 100 days of Shinzo Abe’s administration, I believe the biggest demand posed was how to bring about “early small successes”.
The Cabinet has many quite difficult administration issues, with some political issues being easily answerable and others not so. It is, however, essential for the administration to provide some examples of early small successes in the period following inauguration, however small they may be.
Well, as for the results, I think that there have been some more than small, but rather some early medium or even early large successes in foreign policy. These were the first to come after inauguration. However, I believe that because these successes came first, efforts to produce early small successes in economic and domestic policies have been neglected. In other words, I think there were no early small successes in terms of economic policy.
Another issue is whether or not the Abe administration is continuing political reformation. I believe it is. The media severely criticized Abe’s budget, but I believe his budget for the 2007 fiscal year was rather good. Thus Abe is not straying from the most important of his main points. This is one thing I think we must give him proper credit for. They are making a budget following a stricter scenario than that created in the days of policy chief Nakakawa which cuts annual expenditure in order to create a smaller government. This in particular should be commended.
In addition to these comments, in order that political policies reach fruition, one must go through 4 specific processes. The first of these is the formation of a well-organized agenda. It is absolutely imperative to know what will be carried out both economically and politically, and, on top of this, it is also essential to know when it will happen. The second is to have a basic outline on how to put this agenda into practice, and the third is an actual system plan. This includes writing up the legislative bills themselves. The fourth is the reaching of consensus at various instances. Assessment must occur while looking at these four points.
As is depicted in the opinion poll conducted by Genron NPO, the reason we don’t know what the Abe administration wants to do is because they actually have not formed a sufficiently organized agenda. I may be repeating myself, but the Abe administration is not straying from their main points. However, in a way this is a problem that is connected with the issue of early small successes. As to whose role it was to form an agenda, it has to be the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP).
Besides that, the Prime Minister’s passion in heading towards political reform is sufficiently felt. That is to say, there will be constitutional reform. I think the impact of this will be sizeable. They are also making changes in foreign policy. Of course Koizumi and Abe both have different ways of showing their passion, and there is no real need for them to be the same. They exhibit different points of interest as well, which is also a given.
The problem is, the strategy lies in the details. Policies are made of many finer points stacked one upon the other, meaning that if you don’t pay close attention to these finer points you won’t be able to determine the efficacy of the policy itself. Because bureaucrats are the ones who know the ins and outs of these finer points best, they always look to water down the policies. We try not to let them do this. This is one point.
During the period I was trying to deal with the issue of defaulted loans, I received help from a number of different people and developed an extreme attention for details. It’s because of this that the bad loans went away. The postal privatization period was also a situation in which we manipulated the bureaucrats’ methods by means of some of the finer details in order to implement the reforms. To give one example, the opponents of privatization continuously demanded to keep the post offices across the board, nationwide. They were quite particular about the wording of “across the board, nationwide.” However, wording it like that would maintain the status-quo, meaning new managers wouldn’t be able to exhibit their own discretion in matters. In the end, what is written in the bill is “being able to make use of post offices across the board, nationwide will be a central focus.” “Kept across the board nationwide” is not written. It says people will be able to “make use of” the post offices across the board, nationwide, and moreover this will be “a central focus.” This is actually our ideal strategy – taking what bureaucrats do and turning the tables on them.
Unfortunately, our control in these situations under current circumstances isn’t always adequate. The important people are the aides and responsible cabinet ministers, as the Prime Minister can’t take such detailed looks into such matters. So the Abe administration isn’t straying from its main points, but there are slightly open seams. On top of that, the current assessment is that the advisory council wasn’t able to establish an agenda.
One final assessment by the public is that the only ones capable of continuing the reformation process are the Abe administration. While this is an unspoken opinion, I do think it exists among the public. If looked at from another angle, the fact that the Abe administration is looked upon harshly is also an assertion of expectation. Since the economy itself is acceptable, even if there are open seams it won’t fall apart immediately. If these open seams are allowed to accumulate over the course of three or five years however, the potential for growth will begin to fall off. The question of how exactly to grasp these open seams is an important issue to address from here on after the 100-day period.
Translator: DOUG DURGEE
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Part 4: The Duality in the Relationship With Koizumi’s Government.
It is said that the team currently leading Shinzo Abe’s government is inviting a lot of confusion. I also think that things will not go well the way they are. However, since I haven’t seen things first hand, I do not know what the situation is really like. This may be out of place, but, the Prime Minister included, none of the main members of the leadership team for the government have ever been ministers. That is to say, they have no experience of how the Japanese government mechanism functions. This is very worrying.
Shinzo Abe, who has only been the chief cabinet secretary, the finance minister and the minister of public affairs, so to speak, a group of people, who have never headed a governmental office responsible for carrying out political policy, constitute the core of the government in the Prime Minister’s office. It is not possible to view this fact itself as either a bad thing or a good thing. However, I think it will be a tremendous task for such a team to really get this country’s government moving.
Moreover, the fact that the government is yet to be elected by the people is becoming a handicap. It will be essentially very difficult to compensate for this.
Also, since there was no strong command post to begin with, whenever the question, “what should be done?” arises, there is a difficult problem of keeping resistance and other reactions from the ministries in check. In Koizumi’s government there was a Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, and with this the government managed to make a breakthrough. Indeed, there were many debates concerning that approach, but one could say that, during the transition period it acted as a mechanism to help the cabinet become functional.
A decision was made there, then an agreement was reached on it in a cabinet meeting, and finally the policy was implemented. So in a certain sense, one could say, in order to bring about this weakening of the cabinet’s functions, a section of the ministers were put in this council, along with citizens, although there were various discussions about how much authority they had, and they contributed to enlivening the activities of the cabinet.
It became very clear that, as a command post, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy functioned well, so, after a certain period, it was possible to use that council to focus on all issues.
When Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet was inaugurated, I at first thought that, “This is going to be a ‘cabinet, that wears itself out quickly.’ The government is creating various councils and committees within the cabinet and appointing aids for the people in charge of them. Yet, within each ministry similar kinds of bodies already exist. There are committees and councils for educational reform, Revitalization Committee and Central Education Council on Educational Reform, but whatever the government ministry or office, similar bodies already exist. This sort of heavily stratified structure is complicating the matter.
Who has authority and where does that authority end? Who is assigned to what and to what extent? Nobody knows the answer. Although work is being done, the issues that have been decided on are not being followed through with. Compared to how hard they are working it is proving not to be very enjoyable, and therefore it has reached a stage where several signs of dissatisfaction and irregular comments have been allowed to slip out.
There are five government aids and each wants to work, but for some reason things aren’t functioning well and the decision making system is becoming extremely scattered.
Whether it is an individual’s abilities or their authority, there are limits to both. When there are limits then you must conduct yourself accordingly or else you will tire yourself out. First, you have to judge whether you can manage something directly by yourself and what your limits are. Even though the foundations have been laid, whether you can really complete the job with care could ultimately depend on the number of jobs you are dealing with. If numbers increase too high then you may not be able to achieve anything. So, in this sense, as far as the decision making system was concerned, Shinzo Abe’s government was lacking in preparation.
Moreover, rather than solving the problem, Shinzo Abe’s government has made various comments about the issues and then simply created more committees. This pattern seems to be repeating itself. People who speak bad of the government say it is simply creating committees for the sake of it. Other people view the situation in an extremely cold manner and say that, rather than thinking about the results of the committees, the government wants to create an image so that in a glance it looks as though things are happening. Therefore, the moment the committee is set-up nobody has any interest in it any more. I think this is an extremely exhausting and bad situation that the government is starting to fall into.
I also have my doubts whether a single Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy is a good thing or not. However, if you really want to implement policies, then in effect you have to focus power in one place. You also have to prioritize various things. Monitoring is also important. If you are dealing with just one discussion then everyone has to focus attention on that and if it turns out to be inappropriate, state so. However, if you try to carry out four or five discussions simultaneously then no-one will pay attention at all.
The Committee for Educational Revitalization will act as a test, since it has been saying it will convert the various proposals that it has been making into a bill in March. If they cannot keep this promise what will happen? If a bill is not drawn up by the deadline then what will they do? In a certain sense it will become an issue of responsibility taking. For example the minister for science and education has been speaking as if he is not necessarily going to adopt each and every one of the suggestions that the Committee for Educational Revitalization has been making.
It cannot be claimed that aids have been assigned politicians. The point at issue is what is hoped by appointing these politicians? The desire to deal directly with the various problems that surround the Prime Minister is understandable, but it is unknown whether they have thought about what they will do after they have dealt with these problems.
To a certain degree I do not wish to say that I can’t understand how the government can fall into such a situation. I think the matters, that Koizumi’s government did not deal with during its time have caught the eye of Shinzo Abe’s government. I think it wants to continue to distinguish itself from Koizumi’s government and deal with the various issues that Mr. Koizumi did not deal with. In order to get the government aids involved, it has set up various committees. I understand well the government’s intention.
However, it is not good that it appears to be a group of friends gathered together. It is necessary to create a team that can do the job. That is to say a team is different from a group of friends and so far the team has not functioned effectively and with results.
Observing this state of affairs I feel that in many respects, Shinzo Abe’s government has Koizumi’s government on its mind. The government wants to distinguish itself from Koizumi’s government but it is concerned with people saying, “Koizumi did this, but I thought you were different from Koizumi’s government.” If Koizumi’s government had not existed then perhaps it would not have been necessary for the present government to deal with so many issues.
Therefore, in that sense, I think either directly or indirectly the government is being overshadowed by Koizumi’s cabinet’s image.
In that sense, Koizumi’s influence is a great one.
This government is a closely-knit one, or in other words a democratic group, however, since last year talk has been of a personnel change that needs to be made in that team. The view is that the team needs to be changed into a group that can more effectively perform the job at hand.
This year the problems have amplified and irregular comments have been made and I think that if things continue this way it will be difficult to reverse the negative tendency in the government’s rate of support.
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Part 3: Shinzo Abe’s Government Needs to Deal with the Design of a New Way of Working and a New Way of Life for the Japanese People.
The situation that I mentioned from the very beginning and one, which Japan has to “overcome”, is the fact that the citizens of Japan are beginning to feel a big change in their way of life. This also includes the increase in social inequalities. The reason why I raised this issue is, because no answers seem to have been provided to directly address it. The issue of social inequalities is, in a certain sense, a result of other factors and so it can not be solved by simple emergency policies.
In order to keep citizens’ sacrifices as low as possible, one idea is that the government should devise a system to provide necessary minimum support for the people. There after, the citizens should look out for themselves. A real discussion has materialized whereby, for example, the government should offer support for a certain area of social problems but not for all. In making this firm promise, the government would be allowing a sort of exit to take form, through which people could escape social difficulty. Shinzo Abe’s government is yet to provide such an explanation.
Perhaps, what will become a core issue is whether the present economic system will be able to cope with changes in how people work and the way in which people live their lives, or whether it will have to be drawn up afresh if it is not compatible with these changes. How will people’s lives change? How will people’s working trends change? What should people study? How should education be changed? These questions are all part of a connected debate.
So in a sense it is not possible to return to how things used to be. We must say good-bye to those times and move on to the next stage.
So how should we go about creating this “Beautiful Country, Japan”? We have no reason to oppose the idea of a “Beautiful Country” itself, but it must not be one of a past era. Instead the pressing question is how to create a “Beautiful Country” from now on.
If Shinzo Abe wants to positively forge a new role for the government, then besides obviously dealing with social inequalities, he should make the intention to tackle this issue clear. If he does not wish to deal with any other issues then that is fine, but I think a trend of dealing with whatever comes along is not a good one.
It is important that the successor to Koizumi’s government makes efforts to become the cause of stability within society. Therefore it should use taxes to address certain areas of social security. Whilst doing this on the one hand, it should steadily demand individuals to make their own efforts too. I think it is important that the government create this sort of device to help individuals free themselves from the prevailing social situations.
In other words, what I mean when I say “the situation Japan has to overcome” is nothing more than the fact that the government has to start a debate face to face with the people about the broader infrastructural design of their lives.
There is talk of a society that can spur itself on to make fresh challenges but if there is no plan for how this will take shape as a whole, then talk of it will just seem banal and repetitive. I think that the most difficult problem in Japan at the moment is ultimately,
How people will live their lives? How working trends will change and, how to create a system to support this?
Koizumi was destructive in his approach. No matter how long it lasted he did it with the same ethos that saw the way things were in the past as being rosy. However, I now believe that we are at a stage where we need to review this policy.
Personally, last year I became the chairman for civil servants’ basic labour rights.
In fact I think that this is a core problem that needs to be drawn up again. How should civil servants’ work ethic be changed. Are things fine the way they are? If not, then it is time for our way of thinking to change? Then is it important to apply the same rules to dealing with central government civil servants as to civil servants, who belong to self governed regional systems? I am starting to think that, at the moment, this is the most important basic question.
I think moving Japan from the twentieth century and adapting it to the twenty-first century, in this area, is one of the core issues. In doing this, a corresponding order should be brought to several of the present systems. Then, necessary finances should be invested. Whether these investments will mature or not will not be known until it is tried, but until they do, in the meantime, the government will have to try to pull through. Perhaps there is no promise that a result will come of this. However, if the government does not attempt to go this far, then it will not be able to envisage how to draw up the next phase.
If we think about the way in which Japanese people work, indeed changes that affect civil servants have quite a large impact on the private sector as well. If the public sector changes, then this will perhaps induce an even greater change on the private sector. Social inequalities, other various problems and ultimately questions about future changes, job opportunities and options and the infrastructure of a society to support these changes are all interrelated issues. To put it in other words, in order to create a new structure for society the government is being asked to find solutions to how the public sector will be structured.
So for the time being, debating the pros and cons of a “Beautiful Country” should be put aside. Such a grand-scale aim will probably take 50 or 100 years to achieve. Until that time I think that we should organize the situation in our minds by setting mid-term aims, highlighting the core problems and the various surrounding issues connected with them.
The debate may turn to the educational reform, which is also part of the above mentioned issues. Now, I think bullying is a bad thing, but if it becomes overemphasized then we risk creating a debate about weeding out bullying, and although this is not a bad aim, the logical connection with the core issues will be lost.
I don’t think it is a negative thing that the government wants to distinguish itself from Koizumi’s government. However, in doing so, the question is what group of issues will the government seek to take on?
Shinzo Abe is probably noticing various branching issues. There does not necessarily have to be one issue alone, however, I don’t think that he is viewing these problems and then trying to grasp the root cause of them by looking at our daily lives.
This is not an easy task. However, the Prime Minister must discern what the core issues to this problem are.
It is important that the government looks at the problems, that are lined up and then, acknowledging that in fact these are one group of issues, it needs to sort them and explain them to the people.
Is a “Beautiful County, Japan” or are amendments to the constitution the core issues? Are these the aims? What are the central themes of the political issues? The government must offer people answers after narrowing down these questions. If it fails to do this, the government will not be able to shake off its intermissive and lethargic image. In other words, the feeling that its grip on politics is not working.
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