[paper] What do Americans expect from Japan in the fight agaisnt terrorists?

Bruce Stronach: Provost and Chief Operating Officer of Becker College
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Provost and Chief Operating Officer of Becker College
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Certainly the United States already has received from the Koizumi government what it did not expect, direct and unambiguous support that will take the form of direct military action. The entire pattern of Japanese decision-making, leadership, and foreign policy over the past four decades have led to the assumption in America that this type of swift decision-making and decisive action would not be forthcoming from Japan. In particular, the events of the Gulf War confirmed that in such a crisis the United States could expect from Japan only slow deliberation and offers of passive support. Thus, recent actions by the Koizumi government have come as a pleasant and welcomed surprise.
It is, however, this kind of swift and decisive action that raises questions at home and abroad. There is no doubt that the increased actions of the Japanese military are in apparent conflict with the Constitution, but on the other hand, that has always been the case since the inception of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. Although the debate over the relationship of Japan's postwar military, or Self-Defense Forces, to the Constitution is very complex and has filled millions of pages of text, in fact the real debate has always been about how far is the government allowed itself to stray from the ideals of peace as expressed in the Constitution. In English we say that "it is a ill wind that blows no one some good" meaning that any event, no matter how disastrous, can have some positive result. The case of the terrorist bombings allows Koizumi to demonstrate to the Japanese public that it is not only a good thing to increase the role and the boundaries of the Japanese military but that it is absolutely necessary to do so for the good of world peace and security.
Since the time of the Gulf War the Japanese military has been incrementally expanding its role through the broadened security agreement with the United States, the posting of the Japanese military abroad in peacekeeping operations, and other more minor events. The lesson to be learned from these events is that Japan is now a stable democratic country whose political institutions are in firm control of the military and whose military leaders are committed to the ideals and institutions of democracy. It is time for the military to be recognized as a legitimate element of the Japanese state and to be awarded that status on a "tatemae" as well as "honne" level. Interestingly enough, of all the people in East Asia, or anywhere else in the world, those who are most suspicious of a higher profile role for the Japanese military are the Japanese themselves. Perhaps it is the case they do not trust themselves to be able to control their own military. This is a misplaced concern as Japanese institutions of democracy are now so deep, and democratic political culture is so pervasive, that the evil specter of the military taking control over the government, as happened in the prewar years, will not happen again. The events of September 1931 and February 1936 are history and history does not necessarily repeat itself.
The reforms of the Koizumi government are also about taking responsibility, and it is time that the Japanese government realized the need to take responsibility for its own actions. That is to say that the Constitution has for many years allowed the Japanese to have their cake and eat it too. Japan could call itself the peace country while spending more than most other countries in the world on its military. It also allowed it to rely on the United States for its protection when times were bad. The point here is that Japan has to continue to work in harness with the United States but in a more active role. It also has to continue to keep the military in the subordinate position that the military has in all democratic countries, but with a higher political profile. It is important that the Japanese realize their own maturity when it comes to these matters.
In the past the United States has had a frustratingly bi-polar attitude toward a stronger role and higher profile for the Japanese military. Recent administrations, Democratic and Republican, have all called for a greater burden sharing on the part of the Japanese military in the context of a continued security alliance. On the other hand many politicians and the public in general have been less sanguine about an increased presence for the Japanese military and WWII metaphors are always at the ready. This crisis has changed that. What Americans would like to see from its allies is direct action that can help to eradicate the al-Qaeda terrorists and if that means a boost for the Japanese military and a further move away from the Constitution, so be it.
Along with domestic concerns, and the Japanese-American relationship, relations with Japan's Asian neighbors must also be considered, especially China and South Korea. As far as Japan's relations with those two states are concerned, this is, frankly, the best time for Japan to demonstrate its ability to exerted its military in a positive and beneficial manner, without any threat to its East Asian neighbors. Because this action is in support of a cause that most states claim (at least on a "tatemae" level) is just and worthy, they can hardly chastise Japan for stepping up and taking direct action in support of the United States and against terrorism. The responsible actions of the Japanese military in this case will set a precedent for future action until the fears of other Asian states begin to fade away.
The immediate effect of the events of September 11 has been to bond Japan more closely to the United States. This, in and of itself, demonstrates the continuing strength of the post-cold war alliance between Japan and the United States as the support of Japan, as in the case with other American allies, was sincere and unhesitating. But perhaps even more important is the effect it will have in the long-term. These events and the reality of terrorist activities on this scale, not just those of al-Qaeda but terrorism in general, make a very good argument for the continuing need for a security treat and a close, supportive alliance between the United States and Japan. This time it was Japan coming to the aid of the United States. The next time it might be the other way around.
In addition, it should make clear to Japan that the greatest thing it can do to support the United States in this crisis, and in the future, is to get its economic house in order. The United States expects to see, and will see, direct military action by Japan in its support, but even more important is direct economic action that will ensure Japan remains a stable and economically secure ally. Although support through economic stability is not as "sexy" at this moment in time, when the world is focused on military retaliation, in reality it is very much more important.
Finally, I would like to conclude with a few words about the effect of these events on America's relations with its allies and the world in general. I believe that, up until September 11, the Bush administration was far too complacent about the United State's role in world affairs. On any number of issues, e.g., the Kyoto treaty, one sensed an attitude that if the rest of the world did not see it America's way, America would go it alone. Now that attitude is gone. Unfortunately, it takes events like this to demonstrate that we are linked together and that no matter what the power of the United States, unilateralism is a thing of the past, if it ever really existed. These events have not humbled the United States, they have perhaps made it stronger. These events have, however, reinforced America's need for friends and allies, and Japan remains close on both counts.
October 10, 2001 08:39 PM
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