[etc.] Conference Proceeding: 3rd Asian Strategy Committee -page1-

War or Engagement – Options for Dealing with North Korea
Remarks to Genron NPO

Tokyo, Japan September 12, 2003

Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones: Former State Departmnt Official in Change of North Korea

Introduction

I very much appreciate your coming early in the morning, and for the invitation to speak to you today. Also, I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my personal views. In Tokyo this week I had several meetings with government officials to compare my experiences dealing with the North Koreans from 1992 until very recently, both as a US diplomat as well a member of Mercy Corps, the American humanitarian organization.

Let me begin by saying I had the pleasure of having a very frank exchange with Mr. Tamaguchi in July just after I had been involved in a discussion with unnamed US official sources. These sources made it very clear that North Korea appears to be very close to assembling and quite possibly testing a nuclear weapon. This was somewhat shocking news.

I would like to emphasize, first of all, that Ambassador Galluchi and the rest of us who negotiated with North Korea in 1993 and in 1994 did not create the present problem. In Washington, the Bush Administration is always blaming the negotiations of 1993 and 1994 for today's problems with North Korea. I would say actually that, by negotiating with North Korea, by maintaining the support of Japan and South Korea, we did succeed, at least briefly, in halting the North Korean nuclear program. Our success was not complete. However, I would suggest that the effort certainly did not increase tensions nor did it lead to war. Instead, it prevented war.

Unfortunately now, and I still believe that despite the Six Party Talks recently held in Beijing, we remain in one of the most dangerous situations since 1950 to 1953 when we had the first Korean war. Why would I say this? I am not trying to be outrageous or dramatic, but I think that if North Korea proceeds with developing nuclear weapons and successfully testing them, they will change the balance of power in Northeast Asia. They will be in the position to single handedly threaten peace, not only in this region but elsewhere in the world.

Source of the Problem

Thus it is in our common interest to halt their ambition for a nuclear program. It is in our common interest to preserve peace, not just the status quo, but peace in North East Asia. The problem is not whether we should punish North Korea. Rather, it is how do we build peace. When I look at the situation, I said don't blame me and the others who negotiated the Agreed Framework. I place the responsibility for the current situation on the sons of two very prominent, previously powerful politicians, Kim II Sung`s son Kim Jong II and former President Bush`s son, President Bush.

Both these men belong to the post-Korean war generation. They represent a new generation of leaders who have not suffered from war, and they do not fully appreciate the consequences of not pursuing diplomacy. I would also suggest that both have a political weakness. As you know, the only reason that Kim Jong II has power is because he inherited it from his father. He accomplished nothing significant by himself. He was a playboy and had no real experience in international affairs. He therefore must prove, not to us but to the powerful North Korean generals such as Jo Myong Rok, that he can stand up to the American imperialists”. His father stood up to the Japanese and established his reputation based upon his anti-imperialism campaign.

I think we now see Kim Jong II pursuing a similar anti-imperialism campaign to preserve his kingdom. This means we have to understand that this fellow is not incompetent. Instead, he is very insecure and this potentially could make him dangerous as to how far he will go to maintain the support of his generals. If he appears to bow to Washington or to President Bush, it is conceivable that he would risk loosing the support of his generals. Therefore, at all costs, he must maintain a rigid, hard, and consistent stance toward the United States.

Unfortunately, President Bush has some similar patterns in his behavior. As you know, the only reason he became president was because the US Supreme Court, not the American people, put him in power. The popular vote clearly was not in his favor. And I think that ever since, he has been trying to prove to the American people not only that he should be president, but also that he is just as good as his father. This too makes him defensive. I think what appears to be arrogance is actually insecurity. If you look behind Bush's smile, the confident look and so forth, again we see an insecure man who is attempting to use power as a way to assert his priorities. This too makes him potentially dangerous because if he senses that his position is threatened next year in the presidential elections, he too may take some drastic measures contrary to the interest of US allies in East Asia and Europe.

Washington's Adjusted Posture

am pleased to say that there appears to have been a positive shift in Washington last week on September 5. First I would like to describe that and then explain the characteristics of this shift. Just before I left Washington, there was a so-called background briefing by a high ranking State Department official. Fortunately that transcript has been released. The ranking official spoke at length with several newspapers, Asahi, Yomiuri and so forth. I think his remarks have been accurately reported here in your press.

The day after this briefing, Secretary of State Powell confirmed that there has been an important shift in US policy regarding North Korea. Instead of emphasizing punishment of North Korea, refusing to negotiate, or refusing concessions, Secretary of State Powell expressed confidence that now the Bush administration will adopt a more flexible, moderate posture that emphasizes a step by step, diplomatic process aimed at bringing North Korea in line with the international community. Also fortunately, in my view, the Secretary of State has confirmed that the US is willing to work with Tokyo and Seoul, possibly Beijing, to design security assurances. That's a very substantial change. The Secretary of State said that the United States is willing to give North Korea the kind of assurances that it wants, and that will make it feel comfortable.

When I saw these reports, at first I thought, Oh, good!,” but then I thought, Oh, let's step back a bit. Is this a temporary tactical shift or is this a long-term strategic shift?” I decided it is a temporary tactical shift. Basically, I think Bush has decided, at least temporarily, to put diplomacy in front of his military option. Looking down the road into the future, when might he shift back to his previous strategy? How long will he allow diplomacy the opportunity to deal with the North Korean situation? How long does Secretary of State Powell, State Deputy Secretary Armitage, Assistant Secretary Kelly, have to solve the North Korea problem? I would suggest six months, at most, much less time if North Korea tests a nuclear weapon. But at least we have maybe six to eight months.

Then I asked myself why the Bush administration made such a shift. Is it because of the Six Party Talks? Is it because of pressure from Beijing, or fear of North Korea? Here, as you might expect, the answer is complicated. Everyday, if you sit in Washington and watch your television or open a newspaper, in the past four weeks there has been a complete reversal in terms of the pubic attitude toward President Bush. The shift from positive to negative has been stunning.

Bush's Blunders

I will give you an example. My wife is very unhappy with Mr. Bush because our youngest daughter made a serious mistake. As a graduate student, she joined the US army reserve to receive a scholarship. Then she was called to active duty this past April. Her mother told her not to go to the army. My daughter is a law respecting citizen and, since April, she has been in very intensive training to prepare to be a civil affairs specialist to co-ordinate humanitarian activities, possibly between Japanese and Americans, in Iraq. Right now, fortunately, she is in Fort Lewis in Washington state waiting for boots. She is a small woman (her mother is Korean). But the US army does not have boots that fit her. The US army suggested she put some paper in the toes of the boots and go. I jokingly suggested that she not worry. Once in Iraq, if you still don't have boots, look for the Japanese self-defense forces. They can loan you some boots. I was joking, of course, but our daughter will soon be in Iraq.

My daughter is just one of thousands of young Americans who have been called to active duty in the US Army to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like my daughter, their education, work and family life have been disrupted. Sadly, the number of casualties, both wounded and dead, among US soldiers in Iraq, continues to increase. These developments are angering thousands of Americans, especially since they do not understand the reasons for this situation. Nor do they have any idea how long it will be before their lives can return to normal.

What Bush has done, I think, is make a series of serious political errors. It began early this summer with the credibility problem regarding the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq invasion allegations of weapons of mass destruction. For the American people, this was not so serious. This is a problem that concerns primarily the journalist community, not most Americans, so I think this problem will gradually go away. But when the American casualty figures in Iraq continue to climb, and when the American people find out that the Bush Administration has not been revealing how many American soldiers are being wounded, this creates a very serious credibility problem.

In addition, as you know, the US economy continues to encounter difficult problems. Yet the Bush administration has refused to reveal how much it thinks it would cost to accomplish the reconstruction of Iraq. This is a pocket book issue that concerns all Americans. On Sunday night (September 8), just before I left Washington D.C., I think President Bush made yet another blunder. In his speech to the American people on national television, he estimated for the first time that it will cost another eighty six billion dollars to rebuild Iraq. Before his speech, we had expected to hear sixty five billion dollars. The additional amount was not explained.

What happened the next day created an even bigger political problem. The defense department announced that all tours of duty for US military personnel in Iraq would be extended. That outraged tens of thousands of American mothers, fathers, husbands and the wives. So he has now created for himself a political fire storm that he has to put out.

President Bush does not need another crisis. For him, his first priority is Iraq. However, the US economy has forced him to pay increasing attention to that problem. He is trying to put North Korea on the back burner, that is make it a lower priority issue for his administration. Therefore, it is better for him to shift from the rigid stances embodied in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and military option to a diplomatic, moderate stance. This will, at least temporarily, give him time to deal with and possibly solve the other priority political issues of Iraq and the US economy.

If, however, after 4-6 months or after 2 or 3 more rounds of the Six Party Talks, there is no positive sign from North Korea that it will end its nuclear programs, then I think we could see a return to an assertive US strategy that accents PSI and the so-called military option. At that time, President Bush will most likely be attempting to use the Korean situation to promote his own presidency. In American politics, it is always very popular to be the commander in chief -- to have the American flag behind you. The American people will immediately jump up to support the president if they feel he is defending them. We saw this after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Draw A Red Line?

North Korean leader Kim Jong II, unfortunately, could convince President Bush to give up diplomacy and instead implement his military option by testing a nuclear weapon sometime in the next 4-6 months. The US intelligence community appears convinced of this possibility. Such an agreement among intelligence agencies is very unusual in Washington because the US intelligence community is very complicated. I have participated in such meetings while serving in the State Department. You have many agencies such as the CIA or Central Intelligence Agency, the DIA or Defense Intelligence Agency, etc. Despite their usually different views, they have essentially come to the conclusion that North Korea has acquired all the technology it needs, primarily from Pakistan, to conduct a nuclear test underground. My hope is that North Korea will not do so.

My recommendation, while I have been in Tokyo, is that the time has arrived for the five participants of the Six Party Talks (China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States) tell the sixth party, North Korea, that there is a red line it must not cross. It must not test a nuclear weapon while engaged in diplomatic negotiations. Failure to do this, I think, could lead Kim Jong II to assume that there is no red line. He has all the time he needs to make and to test nuclear weapons. I think this would create a very dangerous situation.

In 1994, frankly speaking, the Clinton Administration, urged by Secretary of Defense Perry and supported by Ambassador Galluchi, drew a red line. The US told Kang Sok Chu, North Korea's chief negotiator, in a letter, which I faxed to him, that North Korea must not remove the nuclear fuel rods from its reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. The next day, there was a cartoon in the New York Times with a caption that read, Clinton gets tough on North Korea and sends a fax”.

We did not reveal the content of the letter to the public, but essentially we told the North Koreans; If you start to reprocess the nuclear spent fuel rods, you could cause a war. We will go to the United Nations and seek economic sanctions.” Earlier, North Korea had declared that it would consider as an act of war any effort by the United States to win approval of UN sanctions. Quietly, China indicated that it would neither approve nor oppose UN sanctions. Rather it would abstain if the issue came before the UN Security Council for a vote. For the United States, this was a green light to seek UN sanctions, and the UN Security Council would have approved economic sanctions. Tokyo would have fully supported the implementation of such sanctions because the UN had approved them. North Korea responded publicly by declaring that this would lead to war.

The Clinton Administration answered fine, we are ready for war. While former President Carter was meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang in June 1994, the White House prepared a plan to send 260,000 more troops to Japan and to South Korea. The Clinton Administration really did have a red line, and it did prepare for a war against North Korea.

I believe that this red line,” more than President Carter's visit, prevented war on the Korean Peninsula in 1994. The red line convinced Kim Il Sung and his generals that North Korea had too much to loose from continuing his nuclear program. They knew they could not win a war against the United States. Only then did they decide to resume negotiations. President Carter's visit to Pyongyang was of value because it gave Kim Il Sung a face saving way out of this situation.

I think if diplomacy is going to work for the Bush Administration, it too must have its stick. We cannot only speak softly. But do not use the stick, and do not just wave it. Instead, just put it on the negotiating table and tell Kim Jong II not to test nuclear weapons. Why risk this? I think that once North Korea tests a nuclear weapon, and if it works, Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear capability.

Trust or Change North Korea?

I also say that we cannot trust North Korea. They have broken all their promises. What we have to do is change them. We have to begin changing them by first erasing the reasons why they want nuclear weapons. This means we should start with security assurances and aim for a peace treaty. In exchange for this, North Korea must dismantle its nuclear programs and allow inspections.

Ultimately, no matter what agreement we might make with North Korea, we are going to have to change North Korean society. A few days ago I was on the American television's Public Broadcast System news hour. They always put me on to argue with the neo-conservatives who support the Bush Administration. One fellow looked at me and said, You were one of the guys who was nice to the North Koreans. You always smiled and shook hands with them, and participated in making the Agreed Framework.” I answered, No, no! We made peace. We didn't make war.” He replied. But you failed.” I said, Let's be honest. North Korea is never going to surrender their weapons. No country in history has done that unless you defeat them in war.”

We don't want war. That is what President Bush's has told us. For America, war is relatively cheap. But war in Northeast Asia will have a terrible price, not only for the people on the Korean peninsular, but for all the people in the region, including Japan. In 1993 and 1994, North Korea did not have the ballistic capability that it now has. I am sure that if we have a war, all the communities near American bases in Japan and South Korea will be priority targets. This is the first problem.

Secondly, what will happen to the international economic situation? I remember in 1994 how many telephone calls I got everyday from businessmen and stock brokers who asked when we would have negotiations so there could be peace. The stock markets in the United States and East Asia declined until the US-North Korea negotiations resumed in July 1994.

Japan's economy is one of the most dynamic in the world. Just the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula could cause severe damage to all the economies of Northeast Asia. There would be profoundly negative economic implications around the world. The North Koreans know this. All they have to do is threaten to test their ballistic missiles and test their nuclear weapons in the hope of warning their foe and making them back off.

I am saying this in the hope that the situation does not get this bad. Let's not allow the North Koreans to have such an option. We need to draw a red line to tell them clearly not to escalate to the point of testing their nuclear weapons. Yes, we will negotiate, I believe. Yes, we can reach an agreement with North Korea, I believe. But we should not put our faith in North Korea's implementation of any agreement. Then what do we do?

Engagement's Promise

I would suggest that we pursue the models of our engagement with the Soviet Union and China. When I began studying Asia in the 1960s, China was the big, red, ugly, dangerous dragon. In the US, we were taught that it was spreading communism. Then came ping pong” diplomacy in 1972. All of a sudden, the American people fell in love with China. We turned 180 degrees in the exact opposite direction. Ever since, even though China remains a dictatorship with a horrendous human rights record and massive arsenal weapons of mass destruction, we, the United States and Japan have engaged it in commerce. Today, if you go to China, it is profoundly different than it was 10 years ago. The change began slowly, in a kind of silly way with McDonald's hamburger restaurants and so forth. I can remember when capitalism in Beijing in 1992 meant selling small items arranged on a piece of cloth spread out on a side walk. Now China's economy is a booming capitalist economy. China does not want war because it cannot afford war. It wants peace so it can continue to pursue prosperity.

The Soviet Union has had a similar experience. It was the conservative, anti-communist, pro-capitalist Reagan Administration that engaged the communist Soviets. The Reagan Administration had extensive disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. These eventually led Reagan's successor, the first President Bush, to begin providing Moscow large amounts of aid and financial compensation in exchange for Russia's destruction of its nuclear arsenal. As Russia destroyed its weapons of mass destruction, it reformed its economy by converting it from a military dominated communist to a civilian oriented capitalist system.

This kind of commercial and diplomatic engagement has radically altered communist societies. Ultimately, I suggest that we face similar options regarding North Korea. We can either forcefully disarm North Korea by making war, or we can engage North Korea the same way we did with the Soviet Union and China. I hope that the Six Party Talks have at least paused the escalation of tensions between the United States and North Korea. I hope they can shift the emphasis away from confrontation and towards negotiation. Given enough time, North Koreans and Americans can again sit down and quietly come to some reasonable understanding. Otherwise, I assure you, if Kim Jong II does test his nuclear weapons, we will be on an inevitable track to a second Korean war.

This is a rather pessimistic forecast, but I think we need to be realistic. If we continue to kick the can down the road,” as they say in Washington when delaying action regarding a problem, and ignore the possible outcome of doing nothing, we will sell ourselves short. North Koreans, meanwhile, will continue to have the initiative.

By the way, I must say that one thing the Bush Administration has finally learnt is to be sensitive to Japan's concerns. You know that Bush is coming to Tokyo soon. I can assure you that he is not coming to sightsee. He is coming to shop. On his wish list are money and soldiers for Iraq, so please be careful.

Questions and Answers

Participants:

Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones (KQ)

Takashi Anzai (TA)

Akira Iriyama (AI)

Takatoshi Kato(TK)

Manabu Matsuda (MM)

Tomohiko Taniguchi (TT)

TT You said that you have to draw a red line and convince Kim Jong II that there is a red line. The question can be how can you do that? Because you have already had the Six Party Talks, you have already had the negotiations between the US and North Korea, so there have been many opportunities for the US to tell them that there is a red line. But so far it seems that Kim Jong II has not listened to you. There were voices from the US and other parties. So how can you do that? That is one question. Also, after the Six Party Talks, Kim Jong II made it clear that he would not be interested in getting engaged in the Six Party Talks because it is attempted to contain the North Korean regime. That's what Kin Jong Il said after the talks. So the second question of mine is there going to be possible that the talk to be held again?

KQ I think it is actually essential that we use the Six Party Talks format as a way to draw the red line. We have time now until the next round of Six Party Talks for small diplomatic meetings. I am pleased to say that such meetings are already underway. You won't see them mentioned in the headlines, but that is where the real work is being done. In these meetings, China must take the lead and it must agree that there has to be a red line. We have to tell North Korea that there must not be any nuclear tests. The US, Japan, and South Korea should immediately support such a position, Moscow as well. I think that is one way. The US cannot unilaterally draw the red line.

It is time to isolate the North Koreans. Flexibility in the Bush Administration's position could prevent it from becoming isolated at the Six Party Talks. This almost happened during the Six Party Talks in August because of the Bush Administration's very strong, adamant posture. By shifting to a more flexible stance, China, Moscow, Tokyo and Seoul could align themselves with the US. Then it would be Pyongyang that must demonstrate flexibility and a positive response to the US offer to pursue a step by step process. This also gives the five parties the opportunity to tell the North Koreans, Yes, we will deal with you, but only if you don't cross this red line.”

Secondly, I don't know everything. I was meeting last night with a member of Japan's delegation to the Six Party Talks. We laughed that North Koreans don't know how to speak Korean. I don't know where they learnt their Korean, but they never write a sentence that anybody can understand.

It reminds me of the English that we used to write in the US government as instructions for a US negotiating team. The State Department and the Defense Department always contradicted each other. If the State Department wrote a very clear sentence, it then had to send it to the Defense Department for review. After many changes, it went to the White House. By the time you finished, you had mumble jumble, mah mah hooh hooh as you say in Chinese. Nobody could make sense out of the final version. But that is what you give to your chief delegate as instructions and tell him, Here read this, don't ask questions, don't change anything, just read it to the North Koreans.” I am sure that's the way that the North Korean bureaucracy works, don't think, here are your orders, just follow them.

In Beijing, North Korea's chief delegate confused everyone at the end of the Six Party Talks regarding North Korea's position about future talks by reading his instructions to the press at the airport just before he departed for Pyongyang. Unfortunately, the BBC, the first news service to publish the statement, missed the first clause of the first sentence. The first clause of the North Korean statement began, If the US does not give up its hostile policy, we will do blah blah blah and so forth. By the time you get to the end of the long, rambling sentence, you have forgotten the precondition. Since then, China's Xinhua news service has published a clarification. The North Koreans also have published a clarification.

I also believe North Korea's claim that it will not return to the Six Party Talks is a tactic. We used to describe this tactic as being, They want sugar.” Whenever you have a meeting with them, they want a cup of coffee -- not just one cup of coffee and not just hot coffee. They want it with lots of sugar. So you give them three sugars. But they can be very nasty and not even say thank you. Instead, they say, Why don't you give us more sugar?” That's what I think they are doing now. They are being nasty, they are telling South Korea and Beijing, Look, you want us to come to the next Six Party Talks, well first we want more sugar.” Very quietly, I am sure, there will be more Chinese oil and South Korean food aid quietly going to North Korea before the next Six Party Talk. It's one of their negotiation tactics.

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