[etc.] Conference Proceeding: 3rd Asian Strategy Committee -page2-

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TT I will raise another question that is a follow-up of the first question of mine. I understand that we have to isolate North Korea by telling them that there has to be a clear red line. But I am still puzzled whether or not the five parties have enough bargaining tool in order for North Koreans to get convinced that they have to obey to these requests. What kind of bargaining chips do we have?

KQ I think that this is one of the positive aspects of the Six Party Talks. It prevents North Korea from doing its traditional running around using one country against the other. That's why it is so important in the case of the red line that we present a united front. There cannot be any cracks or different perspectives or anything.

There has to be one simple statement issued by China. Why China? China is the host of the Six Party Talks and also is the largest economic supporter of North Korea. Then, immediately afterward, all the other capitals should come out and say that they support the Chinese initiative. There would be no way for Pyongyang to reject it. If the US takes the lead, right away Moscow and Beijing will hear Pyongyang wining that the United States is threatening it. If the Chinese are really sincere about this process, and if they really want to perform an international service, then they need to play the international diplomacy game according to international rules. This means that you sit down, stop talking quietly to North Korea via a back channel. Instead, you publicly tell them where the line has been drawn. China can say to North Korea that this is a diplomatic process, here we have drawn the red line and if you go outside the line, you have broken the rules of diplomacy and you lose.

TT Are you still carrying the State DepartmentsÙ

KQ No, I assure you I don't work for the State Department. I have been invited to Seoul by some of my former colleagues in the South Korean government, some people who are still there. They said, look would you come talk to us about US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Why me? Because I used to be a college professor and I have gray hair.

TK You mentioned that Kim Jong II is an insecure person. He is similar to the President Bush in some respect. My question is how can he sell these ideas to the military of North Korea? That is tough sell.

KQ That is a very good question. North Korea does have politics, it has bureaucratic politics. It is not just one simple decision. Kim Jong II must convince his seniors the generals that his decision is the right course. He has to have convincing reasons for his decisions. Like I said earlier, he cannot appear to be bowing to US pressure or bowing to President Bush. Bush cannot bow to Kim Jong II either. We have to have a carefully designed, face saving device here.

I think this is a benefit of the Six Party Talks. If Kim Jong II faces the international community, and all the countries are telling him the same thing, he can then do what his father did which is adjust his position. Actually President Carter did not accomplish any negotiations. He was not authorized to negotiate anything. I was with Ambassador Galluchi when he emphasized this to Carter. At the time, Clinton was in France in early June, 1994. Clinton told Carter that he was not to negotiation, that he was a messenger. Carter agreed.

What happened? Carter gave Kim II Sung the opportunity not to bow to Washington, but instead to tell his generals that the Americans have sent me respect. They have sent me their former president. I must show some response. It was a very Asian, traditional type of exchange, almost like the Japanese concept of Omiyage. I really think that Washington needs to understand that when dealing with North Korea, we are dealing in an Asian society.

Kim Jong II is going to have to give his bureaucracy, his party and army, a good reason for cooperating with Washington. For North Korea, this means, security assurances. That's exactly what the North Koreans wanted in June 1993. The North Korean Foreign Ministry at that time told us to provide security assurances so that they could then tell the North Korean army to relax. This is what we need to do now. I think Secretary of State Powell, as a former general, can fully understand this. Also as a bureaucrat now, he knows that he has to have a good reason to sell President Bush.

It's very important that international press begin viewing the context of all of this in a more Asian setting. Its not a tennis match, its not a case of which country lost the most, which country won the most, this is not a game. This is a very dangerous situation. It's not 5 against 1 or what have you. Let's look at this in terms of whether we moving towards peace or towards war? What will move us towards peace? What in Pyongyang will help the moderates increase their leverage so that they can move Kim Jong II.

So far, the Bush Administration, especially Mr. Bolton, has been very helpful to the hard line generals in Pyongyang. Every time Mr. Bolton says something nasty, I can see the North Korean generals saying, Hello Mr. Kim Jong Il! The Americans are threatening you and did you see what they said?” What can Kim Jong II say? He cannot deny it. Security assurances are what he needs, not Washington's criticism.

TK If I were North Korean general, I must say that security assurances are just an agreement on paper. It would be much better for us to develop our own nuclear capabilities, delivering missiles and so on. That makes North Korea uninvadable.

KQ Already, at this time, the US government has provided security guarantees to Pyongyang since August 27th. There are 30 American soldiers in North Korea now, in the northeast corner of the country, looking for the remains of American marines who died during the Korean War. That has been going on since 1996. I helped to start this program, and spent two summers with the US recovery teams. Whenever US soldiers are in North Korea, the North Korean army officers say, Ah, security guarantees, the American imperialists will not attack us when their soldiers are here.” All of this is very low profile. It is done under a humanitarian label, but it is very successful.

When Secretary Powell and the five parties are ready to present a joint declaration of security guarantees, it has to be in writing. There is already discussion about whether it should be in the form of a Congressional resolution or some other form.

I think the important thing is that there are Americans inside North Korea. This is where humanitarian organizations come in. This is why, after I retired from State Department, I worked with humanitarian organizations because I knew that if we had Americans living in North Korea, the North Koreans would feel much more secure. We need to back security guarantees with humanitarian aid and that would put Americans back into North Korea. We need to get the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, back into North Korea. The North Koreans recognized that we could see through the IAEA and our humanitarian organizations what was happening in their society because we had our eyes in their society. They said that this is fine. In this way, both we and they could know that neither side was preparing a surprise attack on the other side.

TT As a matter of accuracy, the number of Americans in North Korea is 30?

KQ That you had better check, I think it is 30. There are 2 groups now, one working in Unsan and another group working near the Chosen Reservoir. These teams will come out on September 27th and a second pair of teams will go in and remain there until October 27th. During this 60 day window, we have the opportunity for Six Party Talks. If you noticed, the Six Party Talks started the same day that the US soldiers arrived in Pyongyang, on August 27th. The expectation is that the second round of Six Party Talks will conclude just before the last team of US soldiers leave. You will not find this written anywhere. All I can say is that it is from reliable sources. Actions do speak louder than words and we have to back our words with some kind of action.

TT In your opinion, maybe comes from the impression of the President Roh Moo Hyun, how he was elected? How do you think he can manage?

KQ I was in Seoul three weeks ago. I was very surprised that President Roh Moo Hyun`s popularity was so low. I thought that public support for engagement with North Korea would also be low, but I was amazed to find out that even the most conservative journalists and government officials support the engagement policy towards North Korea. According to South Korean polls, support for engagement stands between 70-80%. A reason for Roh Moo Hyun's low popularity is, I think, are the inflated expectations on the part of the young people who were responsible for electing him. Korea is a maturing democracy. It is not yet at the level of sophistication that Japan has achieved. So in South Korea, they still experience wild swings in the popularity of their presidents. Some of these young Koreans thought that all they had to do was to elect one guy and South Korea's problems would be solved. I think that now these young Koreans are going through a process of adjusting their idealistic expectations to more realistic ones.

Meanwhile, President Roh has to improve his performance. He failed in his summit with Bush. You could see this would happen during his trip to Washington, D.C. He left his footsteps in the New York Times and Washington Times, by saying in press interview that, I`m going to be tough with Bush, I`m going to tell Bush Ù” But when he got to Washington, it was a completely different story. During the brief Bush-Roh summit at the White House about 20 journalists, mostly from Japan and Korea, were present. All of them later agreed that Roh kept bowing to Bush during their meeting in the President Bush's office. The reporters claimed that they could see this through the window. The Korean embassy later explained that Roh was just showing respect.” But if you are the president of an Asian country, you don't go to Washington and bow. So when Roh got back home, there was a huge protest. The people asked why he bowed to Bush. Roh's performance is lacking, but I think there is still some hope for his presidency.

There is another fundamental problem in South Korea right now. Like I was saying before, we went from fearing and hating the big red Chinese dragon to falling in love with China and everything Chinese. I think South Koreans are now going through a similar phase. Until 1998, in South Korea you could not watch North Korean TV. You couldn't say anything good about North Korea. Then after Kim Dae Jung came to power, the situation underwent a complete reversal. Now, as soon as a South Korea goes to North Korea, they immediately become a Korean specialists. They immediately claim that they can achieve peace. They have false expectations about what is possible with North Korea. Korean emotions are out of balance and I think we need to appreciate that, and understand why this is so.

At the same time, when you talk to their government officials, they understand that the current South Korean views of North Korea present a political management problem. They hope that the Six Party Talks will help stabilize the Korean public's mood and make expectations more realistic. South Korea officials say we will tell the public that South Korea's policy needs to be coordinated with Tokyo and Washington, which they hope will help them manage and calm Koreans' expectations regarding North Korea. Otherwise, if we have an agreement among four nations (Tokyo, Washington, Beijing and Moscow) regarding the red line, but then Seoul comes out and says no to the idea, this will cause very serious damage to the diplomatic process. That's what they need to understand in Seoul.

I have recently had several hours of discussions with South Korean officials them. I am impressed at how , over the past three weeks, South Korea's diplomats have flown to Moscow and Washington twice regarding the next round of Six Party Talks. Also, the South Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs is here now in Tokyo and there is very intense coordination of activities going on regarding the Six Party Talks..

I will go tomorrow to Seoul, and I was there three weeks ago. As you know, the political situation there is chaotic. The number of scandals involving former government officials and politicians is shocking. This has really shaken the country. Voters had put their faith into the party that Kim Dae-jung formed and that Roh Moo-hyon now heads. They promised to end corruption, but now their party is consumed by corruption. On my previous visit to Seoul, I had attempted to make appointments with several politicians, and I hope I will be able to meet some politicians while I am there this time. This may not be possible because the political situation is so chaotic.

It appears to me that the Korean government is trying to focus the public's attention away from the internal onto the international situation. While in Seoul, I will have several quiet seminars with young government officials to try to help them understand the reality of North Korea. They need to see that this it is not a paradise and, if you spent two days in Pyongyang, you don't become a Korea specialist. You have to get out of the capital to see the people's suffering.

TT We have been having this sort of discussions in order for us to come up with a set of long-term strategies for Japan's future. Japan is going to have to deal with other Asian countries. That's why it is called the Asian Strategy Committee. Could I ask you to tell us what your scenarios are going to be, looking at the surrounding parameters of Japan in the time frame of 25 years perhaps, or a little shorter, at 10-20 years. Korean peninsular has always in history been a ground where interested parties, Russian, China, Japan, the US, are coming to confuse the situation. What kind of scenario should Japan have based upon your long experiences in these countries, Japan, Korea, China and other Asian countries?

KQ That's a profound challenge and I will cautiously endeavor to respond. Maybe the best way to respond is to offer you the best and worst case scenarios.

I am not good at predictions. Let me go back to December 1963 when I first came to Japan. I didn't know anything about Japan except that during World War II my father had been a prisoner in a Japanese prison camp in the South Pacific. I had been raised not to appreciate Japanese. I spent 2 weeks traveling in Japan in 1964 and I was fascinated. I could never have envisioned then that Japan could become a world power, but now Japan is a world power. I went on to Korea, Christmas eve 1963, I got off the plane near Seoul. At the time, I was a US army soldier. A sign at the airport read, Welcome to freedom's frontier.” I thought it should have read, Welcome to the end of the world.” I never could have envisioned South Korea as a dynamic commercial international player, but that is what it has become.

The best case scenario that I might come up with now is that we do achieve, hopefully in the next 5 years, peace in Northeast Asia. The absolute essential requirement for this would be a united Korean peninsular. Maybe we will not have a united Korean government, but at least we could have peaceful coexistence. It also would mean that we would have to have a change in the balance of power in Northeast Asia. China is on the rise. Japan has already risen from the ashes of World War II. Maybe Japan's economic bubble has burst, and maybe Japan will continue to have some economic problems, but I think the world perception of Japan is that it is a steady, reliable and mature world leader. I don't see Japan rising much further, nor declining. I think Japan is in a very stable situation. On the Korean Peninsula, imbalances persist between South and North Korea, both politically and economically. This is why the situation is so unstable. If we can first create a stable and equal economic situation between the two Korea's, that will tend to foster a reduction in military tension. This is a prerequisite for stable co-existence between the two Koreas.

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TT What about the US?

KQ Frankly, I don't think that US power is declining that much in East Asia. Actually, the US has been profoundly successful in this region. Again, when I arrived here, the US dominated Asia, militarily and economically, technologically and so forth. Then Japan exploded technologically and commercially. Now it is China that is doing the same. I think the new balance of power that is emerging will be a healthy one in which the US will play less a dominating role and more a subdued partnership. This will require that the Bush Administration recognize the benefits of such a situation and allow for a true partnership to develop with Japan. This will be better for the long term.

The US should not intend to preserve its perceived military or economic domination of the region. A little bit of humility will go a long way. Once a true partnership has developed between the US and Japan, and I think we are moving in that direction, then it will be possible to place greater confidence in our relationship with China.

By the way, I don't think ultimately that the Six Party Talks will be completely successful, but I think they can be a stepping stone to a durable peace. Before this can be realized, the region must undergo significantly more change.

I would hope that in 5 to 10 years we will have a new balance of power in East Asia. No longer will the United States dominate the region. Instead, the US-Japan partnership will share influence in the region with China, and coexistence between the two Koreas will stabilize the Korean peninsula. Only diplomatic and commercial engagement can nurture this new order.

The new order will require the equivalent of a new Marshall Plan” to for North Korea to draw it into the international community and promote North Korea's prosperity so that it no longer wishes to risk war. Give North Korea more economic benefits and they will no longer resist being drawn into becoming a responsible member of the international community. So lets give ourselves another 5 to 10 years to accomplish this. This is the best case scenario.

The worst case scenario could come much sooner. If diplomacy fails in the next 6-8 months and we do not see a diplomatic solution, and we do see North Korea test nuclear weapons, the balance of power in Northeast Asia will shift abruptly in a negative manner. North Korea will become a very arrogant enemy because it has a nuclear capability. We can either have a horrendous nuclear arms race in which Japan has to face the dilemma of whether to become a nuclear power or remain non-nuclear. We could have very serious strains in the US-South Korea relationship as South Korea attempts to decide whether to lean towards Pyongyang or Tokyo and Washington. Given the current situation, I think Seoul could very well lean away from the US. It is already leaning towards Beijing.

Old patterns are re-emerging. I think China's ambition for hegemony over East Asia has to be restrained, especially if North Korea goes nuclear, I think we should not put our trust in China alone to manage North Korea. This could restore the old alignment in East Asia that once pitted Beijing and Moscow against Washington and Tokyo. If Tokyo were to go nuclear out of self defense, again we will have strains in all the relationships in the region. A chaotic situation could ensue in East Asia.

These changes could materialize as early as next summer. That's why I think its imperative to face these possibilities now, to realize their potential consequences and then focus on trying to pursue the best case scenario.

Reflecting further on the Six Party Talks, I am uncertain about China. If China really wants a nuclear free Korean peninsular, it should be acting now. It should not be so cautious and gentle with Pyongyang. Nor should Beijing try to use the US and Japan as the bad guys in its dealings with Pyongyang. China, it seems to me, in the Six Party Talks is playing what we call the good cop and bad cop” game. While they are telling Pyongyang that they are the good cop, they warn Pyongyang that if it does not cooperate with Beijing, Pyongyang will have to deal with the bad cops,” in Washington and Tokyo. That kind of game has to stop and the Chinese need to say either they are with Washington and Tokyo, or not. I am not alone in this regard. Rather, I am reflecting the views I have acquired from friends in your government and in Washington there is a shared concern about China.

TT If you can possibly try to see the situation from Beijing's perspective, what sort of problems does North Korea really pose to Beijing? They are talking about problems such as the number of the population that is about 100,000 escaping from North Korea illegally living in China. That is exacerbating the job opportunities in China. But other than that, strategically speaking, what worries Beijing most, what concerns does it have?

KQ I have been to the China-Korean border four times, and have spent at least fours months there working with NGOs beginning in 1998. I last went there with Japanese friends in the summer of 2001. I did a lot of talking to Chinese government officials.

China strikes me as very much preoccupied right now with getting rich. I am not saying this in a negative way. Economic development is priority one. South Korea contributes technology and investment to China, so China is very comfortable with South Korea. However, the problem, of course, is North Korea. It is an irritant. The Chinese are very uncomfortable with this neighbor. People in China say that Kim Jong II is rattling his neighbors and trying to get Washington's attention using nuclear weapons.

I think Pyongyang has a problem with Beijing. Beijing has been preoccupied with its own economic development and its trade with South Korea and Japan. I don't think the Chinese know how to deal with North Korea or want to deal with it unilaterally. Only very reluctantly did China step in to the current nuclear impasse on behalf of the international community.

Some years ago, I met a Chinese delegation at the Pyongyang airport when I was with one of the first US army officers to go back into North Korea since the Korean War. The Chinese official came up to me and said You! You brought the US army back into North Korea, Don't do that. You don't understand. In one forest there can only be one tiger. South Korea is your forest so you Americans can stay there. North Korea is China's forest, so you stay out.” I asked if this involved military strategy, but he said no, it is a matter of pride. He said that the Chinese had seen the Americans come closer and closer. Drawing an imaginary line on the table, he said this is our border, stay out.

According to China's official Xinhua news service, Beijing published a letter that China's leader reportedly sent to Kim Jong Il. The Chinese leader told his North Korean counterpart that China wishes to help Pyongyang because it does not want the Americans in its forest,” in other words in North Korea. This is very traditional thinking. But there must be something else here. I think the Chinese are trying to use the US and Japan to influence North Korea. This is fine, but they should not just expect us to do all the work. If North Korea in fact has a nuclear weapon, and if Beijing believes that it's interests are best served by leaning towards Pyongyang, then the US and Japan could find themselves in a very difficult and confrontational mode with China. I don't completely trust the Chinese, not yet. Trust is developing, but we have not yet achieved full mutual trust.

AI You mention that Bush comes to Tokyo next month and not just for sightseeing. What will be his expectations?

KQ I can see the policy papers now being written because we already wrote them before. I think that every time the American President comes to Japan, the agenda is always the same. You Japan are a good ally. We the United States want to maintain our alliance, etcÙ But, by the way, the burden is very hard on us and we need your help! I see Bush coming because there is a great misunderstanding in Washington that the Japanese economic bubble really didn't burst. It is amazing that there are still people in Washington, especially on the conservative side, who think that all they have to do is come and embarrass the Japanese into giving the US government support in the form of money. Or, before I came to Tokyo this time, in Washington we had a lot of discussion about Japan's role in Iraq. I was arguing with some Americans, based upon my visit to Tokyo in July, that the US should not push Japan for more money for Iraq. Prime Minister Koizumi visited Bush in Texas earlier this year. There he had a Texas barbeque with Bush who gave him a cowboy hat and boots. Koizumi pledged to help the US in Iraq.

I think Bush is coming to Tokyo this time with probably two pairs of boots and two cowboy hats for Koizumi. He wants Japan to send several thousand combat troops to Iraq. Not just combat troops, but also engineers and medical personnel because this will enable Bush to turn to Europe and show what Japan is contributing. Bush can then say to France and Germany, We Americans are sorry about having insulted you regarding Iraq, but look, Japan is helping us. Shouldn't you help us too?” This, in my view, is an unrealistic expectation by Washington that will take years to erase.

TK In Japan, according to media, the Self Defense Agency is thinking of sending army engineers up to 1,000?

KQ I have heard very severe criticism from some Japanese officials regarding the sending of Japanese forces to Iraq. I was surprised because they are saying that Japan's Self Defense Forces' first responsibility is to defend Japan, not to help Bush get out of political trouble. So I think that Bush should be very aware of the political climate here. Of course Koizumi will maintain the presidency of his party, but then you have the Diet's Lower House election. Bush should not ask for too much. He must be sensitive to Japan's domestic politics because you don't want to be burned by the Tony Blair problems. Koizumi must really be cautious. So I am urging my Japanese friends to be very frank with the Americans. Don't let them keep believing that Japan is a bottomless pocket full of cash.

AI May I go back to the red line issue? Is there any advice, most we can do is the economic sanctions?

KQ Regarding North Korea, I think my concern is that the next phase will not be economic sanctions but PSI which means Proliferation Security Initiative. Already that initiative is fully accepted by the Japanese government. Japan is the first country to implement it, primarily in the form of inspecting North Korean ships coming into Japanese ports. The next phase, which is already fully planned, will be for Japan to essentially disrupt North Korean trade. This is an intermediary step between the diplomacy of the Six Party Talks and possible future economic sanctions.

Consultations regarding this are well under way, not only within your own government but also between Washington, Australia and other participating nations. My concern with this approach is that, if we are negotiating with North Korea, and at the same time there is an escalation of PSI, the hardliners in Pyongyang will use this to claim that we are being two faced.” While claiming to be engaged in diplomacy, we simultaneously are threatening to disrupt their commercial trade. Pyongyang's hard liners will argue that they cannot trust us, and call for an end of dialogue.

In July, I asked some friends here in Tokyo what would happen in the event that a North Korean navel vessel fired on the Japanese while implementing PSI, where do we go from there? That's when we shift abruptly. I think the Bush Administration is using economic sanctions to deflect attention away from PSI because I don't think the UN will approve of economic sanctions. Secondly, economic sanctions for 50 years have failed to influence North Korea. Thirdly, the North Koreans have already said that they will consider such steps as an act of war. We need to be concerned about the possible consequences of PSI, not only its implementation.

AI If the war was taking place in Iraq, we have some reasons to believe that the US is not willing to nor is capable of invading North Korea right way.

KQ I worry because I think Kim Jong II is not thinking that US military is overextended, or that the prospects for a surprise attack are declining. My concern is the possibility of an accident. When you put a million and a half highly armed and hostile soldiers opposite each other on the small Korean peninsular, then add the inflammatory remarks of Mr. Bolton or some North Korean outrageous remark, the situation is already set to explode. There would be no warning, nor a slow burning process. That's the problem, and that's why I asked the Japan Defense Agency if it would risk an accidental conflict.

The US and North Korea both are engaging in provocative moves. The US is doing this using intelligence flights that go right up to the North Korean air space. We saw in March that the North Koreans attempted to force a US airplane to land. This was provocative. Fortunately nothing happened, but if you work inside the US government, you know that many of these incidents don't get reported and that the odds are that, when political tensions are high, even though nobody wants a war, you can have an accidental war.

That's why PSI, although highly reasoned, is potentially dangerous. When you are sitting in your capital thinking about it, it is not dangerous. But when you get out there on the ocean or on the ground, men can lose control of their machines. In December 1994, we thought relations with North Korea were perfect, but then bang! A US army helicopter flew into North Korean air space and a North Korean soldier, under orders, shot it down. We immediately had a very dangerous situation. In July 1996, I was in Pyongyang and a fellow from the North Korean Foreign Ministry came to me -- this was not reported in the press -- and he said that there was a serious exchange of fire between North and South Koreans over the de-militarized zone. He asked me to please call the US embassy in Seoul. I asked how can you call Seoul from Pyongyang? So what I literally did was call Washington's State Department operations center. They then connected me to the US embassy in Seoul, but unbelievably the US embassy hung up. They thought I was some crazy guy. I finally was able to make the telephone call and to deliver the message that the North Koreans would stop if the South Koreans would do the same. Fortunately the North Koreans then backed down. I wrote a very detailed report and faxed it to the State Department, but never got a response.

These kinds of things happen routinely on the Korean Peninsula. Right now, if there is such an incident, the British or the Swedes would be the channel of communication because they have diplomatic missions in Pyongyang. But if they are out of the office or if their telephone doesn't work, who knows what could happen. I just don't like the odds. The odds now just don't favor rational action. Instead, they favor irrational accidents.

AI Is it true that North Korea believes the assurance for not being invaded by the US?

KQ I don't think so, I think the North Korean generals believe, just like the American generals have long believed, that the best policy is deterrence. But I think that politicians everywhere do not put full trust in deterrence. That's why we have had, in recent years, movement away from deterrence beginning with the Soviet Union and the US, and then China and so forth. Deterrence is a very dangerous game. The North Koreans, I think, don't understand the full potential of a nuclear explosion.

In South Korea, no one was allowed to see a picture, even on television, of a nuclear explosion until 1986 when the US embassy brought into Korea a movie from the US and showed it in the US Cultural Center library. The South Korean government was outraged. The US purpose was to show young Korean college students what could happen in the event of a nuclear explosion. The South Korean government banned the film out of fear of the public reaction. They did not want the South Korean people to know the possible consequences of a nuclear war. At the time, the US was maintaining nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsular. President Bush in 1991 withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from around the world, including Korea. That is why Kim Il Sung responded to South Korea's invitation to jointly declare the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

I think that the North Korean military now has put too much faith in technology, especially nuclear technology. They don't know the danger this technology poses. You here in Japan, of course, know about that nuclear weapons are not the solution to anything. They are only the road to grief.

TT But what is important is not necessarily what the generals think, it is what Kim Jong II himself thinks.

KQ I go back to my earlier comment about Kim Jong Il being uncertain of himself. Whenever you see Kim Jong Il, there is a general with him. These generals are older than him. They are his fathers oldest colleagues. So he puts great faith in listening to what they say. Every time I talked to North Korean military officers, they convinced me that they really believe their own propaganda. They believe they defeated the Japanese imperial army single handedly. They do not claim that they did it. Rather, they claimed that Kim II Sung did it. They also think that they can single handedly defeat the American imperialists”.

Of course, inside the North Korean system, if you disagree you are a bad boy. There is no gray area. Either you are with or against them. You don't see anybody disagree with the North Korean army.

The US and North Korean armies have had terrible arguments. If you want to get in an argument, take a US army officer to North Korea and sit down and try to have a calm sensible discussion. It's impossible. The American soldiers get angry and the North Koreans get angry. Before you know it, they are ready to go to war.

I really think that the North Korean generals believe their own propaganda, that if they have nuclear weapons, they believe that they have found an ultimate solution to their security problem. This is why they keep coming back to building nuclear weapons. For 15 years, the world has been telling them no, give up such weapons. Kim II Sung overruled his generals. I think he understood that there was more benefit from international commerce than from nuclear power. But his generals still do not think this way.

TT I have another question, if I may, that's about Japan's policy towards North Korea. It looks as if Japan is pursuing its policy towards North Korea totally separately from Japan's policy towards the UN. But seen from Washington, I think the two are intertwined in terms of proliferation. North Korea is selling to Pakistan and so on, and Mr. Bolton is very much concerned about this, not necessarily about North Korea's nuclear built up only. In that sense, I think Japan's scope has to be broadened to include these intertwining elements overriding North Korea and Iraq. Could you tell us how the picture looks like in the eyes of people like Mr. Bolton?

KQ What I can do is try to go inside the American bureaucracy and look out because the politics of oil is something that we in the US bureaucracy have really never understood. I learned about it more and more when I came here to Japan because you don't have oil here. South Korea has the same problem, We in the US do have oil, domestic as well as access to imports.

In the US, the priority is always in terms of power. We have rivalry between concerns about non-proliferation versus regional sensitivity. The US State Department and the National Security Council are designed to continuously compliment and clash over these issues. One reason for this is to restrain the influence of those officials who are in the so-called Chrysanthemum club,” or pro-Japan club as they call it. They understand Japan's needs and priorities.

You have to do business and, to do business, you need to get oil. For oil, Japan needs to go to the Middle East. You cannot buy it all from where the US wants you to go and get it. On the other hand, the non-proliferation experts, like Mr. Bolton who is from Texas and is a lawyer, has absolutely no background but he is a friend of President Bush's presidential campaign money raiser James Baker, is reluctant to recognize the realities that Japan faces despite the fact that it is an ally. In the US government, the regional experts continuously clash with the non-proliferation experts. One very positive thing about Ambassador Galluchi was that, although a Republican and a non-proliferation expert, when he began the US-North Korea nuclear negotiations in 1993, he quickly realized that dealing with Asians is different than dealing with Europeans. He began to visit and to understand that the nations of East Asia have your own priorities. He learned to incorporate these into his thinking about how to deal with the North Koreans.

We are still going through a similar process now in the American bureaucracy. The so-called neo-conservatives of the Bush Administration are beginning to realize that there is reality beyond Texas. Clinton went through this too. He came to Washington as governor of Arkansas and his early priorities were gays in the military and the White House travel office. Meanwhile, diplomats down in Foggy Bottom, where the State Department is located, worried about nuclear war in Northeast Asia. Now, years later, along comes Bolton and Bush and what are their concerns? At first they were preoccupied with Texas, education and other domestic issues. It sounds cynical, but that was the immediate perception of this Bush Administration. Most of my friends in the bureaucracy, many of whom have now resigned, were so frustrated at the beginning of the Bush Administration. They thought, Oh no, here we go again.” Just as with the Clinton Administration, once again they had to train a whole new group of people. This time, instead of Arkansas they were from Texas. If you look back, America has been ruled by governors ever since President Carter. The American bureaucracy has had to educate these people that Sacramento, Little Rock and Houston are not the center of the universe.

Please understand that, in Washington, we are still educating our government. You are lucky, you have people like Koizumi, they have traveled around the world. If you turn on television here, its fascinating to me. If you turn on the television in Washington, all you are going to hear about is that the traffic in Washington is bad or what Bush did yesterday. In Japan, you get Russian television, North Korean television, plus CNN. In Washington, we don't get the international version of CNN.

TT But it is also true isn't it that the Bush Administration has also had many seasoned veteran officials like Dick Cheney and Ramsfeld and behind the scene George Shultz has been very much instrumental in shaping Bush's Administration so I think you are exaggerating a little bit.

KQ Of course its possible. George Shultz I respect a great deal, I think he was an excellent Secretary of State. However, when you have Condoleezza Rice running the National Security Council, you do not have an assertive manager of the foreign policy team. This is because Bush is a very authoritarian manager. His style is action first, discussion later. Cheney is very confident and assertive. People who rank lower than Bush, Cheney, Ramsfeld have many more years of experience in government, but they prefer not to speak up. Nevertheless, Washington lacks a consistent, clear policy toward North Korea. This is because President Bush is apparently reluctant to pick between Ramsfeld's hard line” or Powell's moderate” line. Instead, us policy and strategy swing back and forth. This is not conducive to productive diplomacy.

TT Thank you very much.