[report] A Power Assessment of Japan – Toward Building the Japan of the Future

Intention and objectives of the Genron NPO Asia Symposium

Genron NPO Asian Strategy Committee

Japan is one of the major economic powers of the world, and yet has little international presence, no voice of its own. To the extent that it lacks international presence, Japan’s future remains in doubt. Could it be that we have so little faith in ourselves that we have failed to define our nation’s future? With the resolution of this problem in mind, Genron NPO has arranged debates with the theme “Japan’s Future”. In this symposium, we intend to present a debate with the cooperation of key figures from Japan and overseas.

The world is undergoing a major transformation, and there is a mountain of issues concerning Japan’s future that need to be discussed. Talk about politics almost always is strongly coupled to future plans, and yet with Japan such debate has stagnated domestically. We wanted to objectively analyze the possibilities for Japan and while doing so, to present options for building the kind of nation we truly desire. This is the reason why we made the topic “Japan’s Future”, and why we embarked on a three year plan for a series of debates two years ago.

The debate we began two years ago was established in conformity with a methodology of strategy formation. As the first step, we held debates to assess mid-term and long-term trends in Asia and the world at large that bear on Japan. Here we looked at what questions are being hurled at Japan by this great transformation that has begun all over the world. Step 2 was then for us to advance a debate to reevaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Japan. Having proceeded through these discussions, from April we can now proceed to Step 3, in which we would like to link them to new debates: “What kind of nation do we want to have?”, “When building our ideal Japan, what strengths should be leveraged?”, and finally, “How may we close the gap that remains between the future transformation of Asia and the world at large on the one hand, and the building of the nation we seek on the other?” By advancing these debates, we are presenting choices for Japan’s future.

We believe that in launching the next in this series of debates, the current symposium, “A Power Assessment of Japan – Toward Building the Japan of the Future,” will play a major role. To ensure its success, we asked experts to participate in a qualitative assessment on “Japan’s Strengths and Weaknesses” in 9 fields: Economy, Politics, Pop Culture, Society/Education, Science/Technology, Defence, Military, Resource (Energy/Food), Environment, and Speech/Thought. Based on this work we produced a mapping to “Japan’s Strengths and Weaknesses”, and will present in this symposium our hypothesis, a “Japan Power Assessment,” which we open to debate by key figures in Japan. “Japan Power Assessment” can represent our perception of Japan’s current situation as emerged from Genron NPO Asian Strategy Conference. Naturally, one can imagine there will be some disparity between this perception and the way we are seen from the outside series. Strengthening our own understanding of Japan is a very important step in this series of debates, but this must not fall into self-righteousness. In particular it is important to make efforts to deepen the exchange of views with people of Asia and the world, to close that gap, and to develop a commonly shared understanding. The upcoming symposium serves that purpose as well.

In this symposium, 3 sessions are planned. We have high hopes that we will be able to clarify and begin to close the gap between our own perception and the view from the outside. As coordinator we have invited Mr. Ryosei Kokubun, who heads the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies and serves as a member of our Asian Strategy Conference. In Session 2 we will debate “Japan’s Strengths and Weaknesses” in the light of structural changes called for Japan by leading academics and business executives in Japan and overseas. The last Session will follow up on these debates with a concluding discussion topic, “To what kind of a nation should Japan aspire?”. Representatives of Japan’s intelligentsia will lead this discussion by raising issues on the topic of “Japan’s Future Strategy” which we intend in the future to turn into a genuine debate of its own.

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Now I would like to attempt a simple explanation of the evaluation method we how used in “Japan’s Strengths and Weaknesses”. When national evaluations are normally conducted the basic indices are the relative scale of different items, and quantitative data focusing on growth rates. We too referred to quantitative data for this assessment, but in fact we ended up conducting an assessment on a more qualitative basis. The reason for this approach is that we doubted whether with a solely quantitative approach, it would even be possible to clearly portray Japan’s true strengths and weaknesses. We should remember that quantitative data, which appears objective, is often supported by definitive values. Moreover, even if quantitative logic should in theory be applicable to qualitative arguments and considerations of influence, in reality we cannot quantify these aspects. We decided that what is needed now, is in fact such qualitative assessment.

Standing on that decision, we undertook a qualitative assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses Japan has when compared with other nations. Specifically these comparisons were made over 9 major fields: (1) Economy, (2) Society and Education, (3) Pop Culture, (4) Science and Technology, (5) Defence and Military, (6) Politics, (7) Resource (Energy and Food), (8) Environment, and (9) Speech and Thought.

We then made an assessment of how Japan compared with other nations in each field, by assigning in each case one of three values: Dominant, Equal/Strong, or Weak. The basis for these judgements follows the points A, B, and C below.

A. “Leading Edge Level” (Degree of Progressiveness): How advanced Japan is in a given field, in view of development stage, level of refinement, diversity, and height and breadth.

B. “Toughness”: Whether Japan exhibits toughness in a given field considering thickness of layers, trial and error experience, self-rejuvenation, cultural mix, and ability to limit the impact of F.M. (Force Majeure, that is large-scale disasters such as caused by earthquakes and terrorism).

C. “Influence”: How much influence Japan has on the global stage when considering its brand power, degree of authority (when seen by the international community), and as a trend setter.

In the following qualitative assessment, we divided A, B, and C into subcategories for each field, and then further divided each of these into its defining characteristics, so that for each field we were able to devise relevant assessment criteria.

Some examples of this process are provided in the following. First, when we look at the “Development Stage” of the “Leading Edge Level” for the Economy field, we see that Japan’s economy clearly does not fit into the regime defined by developing countries’ hopes and works. Such a pattern was seen in many fields in the society of the 80s, but in the mid-90s in Japan after the bubble burst, Japan was seen to have clearly arrived at a defining point. Up until the 70s, Japan was absorbed with its own idea that it could do anything that the U.S. and other advanced countries could do. Now Japan has succeeded to the point that it produces people who meet global standards in many fields. That is, it has arrived at the level where it can afford to be particular when the situation demands it, and otherwise take things with a grain of salt. The Japanese now have abundant potential, and the freedom to go after any of the myriad challenges in virtually any field.

As for the “Thickness of Layer” seen in the “Toughness” subcategory of the field of Culture, one example is manga (Japanese comics) and anime (animated cartoons and films). Japan does not have a national strategy with regard to the field of Pop Culture. Therefore, it does not carry out policies as France or South Korea do, for example to create trade schools that might encourage the development of animated films. The animated film industry in these countries started to see the positive effects of the government support, while the Japanese counterpart increasingly feels anxiety over the future. But not everyone in this industry stays in this business, dreaming to become a millionaire. They derive pleasure directly from engaging in the creative effort and the “layer” (segment) of society that appreciates and supports this is extremely “thick” (broad). This is in part because Japan has ultra-specialized cultural niches populated by a huge number of people called Otaku, who when you stop to consider it are groups of experts with an extremely high level of understanding within their area of specialization.

Therefore if you only compare the peak of the mountain, so to say, Japan may be commensurate with Korea and France in anime. But if you look at the foot of the mountain, one can see that an extremely broad base supports the high point. In fact, that cultural niche represented by the base has sufficient energy to power new revolutions. The worlds of Japan’s manga and anime have such energetic bases. By recognizing both its visible and latent areas, Japan can be seen to be more than simply a nation with a large population, for its layers of creators and consumers are thick. And most of them enjoy abundant benefits of affluence extended to the entire class-free (middle class only) society. This can be said to be a unique Toughness of Japan’s.

If we consider an example of the “Authority” facet of the “Influence” subcategory in the field of Culture, the first market to which popular music groups from Peking go is Japan, and Tokyo in particular. Sales in Hong Kong are based on the success found there, and the next market targeted after that is Shanghai. Tokyo provides them with the official go-ahead. Not only in the field of Pop Culture, but also in consumer goods including cars, home appliances, electronic goods, and high quality fashion brands like Louis Vuitton, success in the Japanese market is starting to be used as a badge of quality. That Japanese consumers are particular about quality, and extremely hard to please, is by now general knowledge all over the world. Foreign manufacturers are sensitive to complaints from Japanese consumers, and in the automotive market there are more and more manufacturers that use their success in Japan when advertising their products. This is thought to be Japan’s “Authority”.

This kind of technique was used in assessments of the 9 major fields, and from the debates that served to fill in the cells in Chart 1, we developed our “Japan Power Assessment”.

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When conducting such an assessment of strengths and weaknesses, one must not forget to conduct an assessment of how important specific elements within each field are to Japan’s future overall strategy. We created a two-dimensional “Japan Strategic Map” which on the vertical axis indicates Japan’s strength in various fields, and on the horizontal axis indicates strategic importance. At the March 16 symposium we presented this as one hypothesis, and now would like to invite debate on it.

By looking at this kind of “Strategic Map”, one becomes aware of where Japan’s strengths are and whether they can truly be used within the framework of Japan’s Asia strategy. From that point, we believe that you will begin to see namely that a solution exists, that is, the solution space in which Japan can realistically aspire to having a “theoretically unlimited, but realistically grounded” identity of its own, will grow visible.

So now the problem we have to solve is, how to decide on the strategic importance of each field using some kind of a common basis. Some fixed value assumption becomes necessary here. To answer this point, we made the assumption that “Japan must become a nation which engages the world, especially Asia, through its attractiveness”.

In the first place, what the nation ultimately seeks is prosperity and security for all. In other words, the individual’s pursuit of happiness (vigor, peace of mind, purpose in life) is common to all countries, and the problem is what path a nation should take to best realize these desires for its citizens. At the symposium last March, we presented potential ideologies including that of a strong U.S.-Japan alliance (English style), a union with China (as with the France-Germany union), and pursuing an independent path (Swiss style), and had a lively debate on this topic. At the following Asian Strategy Conference we also arrived at a common understanding. Regardless of the path Japan is going to take, most important would be for Japan to build a stranger base in Asia, and pursue a more unified Asia, with deeper mutual understanding, with broadened and deepened networking within Asia across the board in order to prosper.

To achieve this, Japan must first truly open up its society and its people’s sense of nation. Then Japan must utilize inflow of resources expanded overseas vested interests in Japan to pursue its prosperity and security. In this context, last March we issued a “New Declaration to Open the Nation to the World”.

In order to realize this path, we think it is important to increase “Japan’s attractiveness.” In other words, people of Asia and the world as a whole must change Japan into “a country where I’d like to go”, “a country where I’d like to succeed”, “a country where I’d like to work”, or “a country where I’d like to set down my roots”. To achieve this, we must contemplate what kind of identity the nation needs to in order to improve “Japan’s attractiveness”. Our study to understand mid-term and long-term world trends and what they demand of Japan, and to ultimately reevaluate of Japan’s real strengths and weaknesses, based on our strategic formation methodology, is the prerequisite for generating this kind of debate on identity formation.

Given the tentative value assumption of the need to generate “an attractive Japan” we obtained the result presented in chart 2, arranged the strategic importance of each field’s (A) “Leading Edge Level”, (B) “Toughness”, and (C) “Influence”, according to the results of the previous strength/weakness assessment.

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What is crucial in building a strategy is to leverage fields and elements which are strategically important, and concurrently evaluate “Strong”. For example even if it is strategically important, a great deal of energy and time is still necessary to boost a weak field and turn it into a strong one. Such activity might even negatively affect the entire the strategy. In this sense, the best strategy would be to further strengthen the fields in the upper right corner of the chart (Dominant / High Strategic Importance) and extend that benefit to the weak fields.

As seen in Chart 2, the results found from our research indicate that “Dominant” fields / facets of great strategic importance for Japan include the following three areas: the “Influence of Pop Culture”, the “Advanced Level of Science and Technology”, and the “Toughness of the Economy”. In addition “Equal/Strong” fields / facets with high strategic importance include: the “Advanced Level of the Economy”, the “Toughness of Science and Technology”, the “Advanced Level of the Military”, and the “Toughness of Speech and Thought”. These are shown to be the areas in which Japan can achieve strategic leverage.

Here our team developed a split opinion as to whether or not to list Military as strategically important. The argument went, “If the Military is given importance, would this not mean an ideology of hegemony, and would this not just cause Asian countries to turn their backs on Japan?” Furthermore, the question arose as to whether Military was then a field that contradicts the stated strategic objective of “making Japan attractive”. On the other hand, if one considers that as far as Asia is concerned Japan is a difficult country to understand, then the question of how to position Japan’s self defense capabilities within the development of a pan-Asian security structure takes on great importance within Japan’s overall strategy. These divergent opinions were reflected in our Assessment, which includes both points of view.

Also “Speech and Thought” mentioned above, covers thought and ideas that are expressed through language. Most of the Pop Culture distributed from Japan is said to be in the non-language area, and some people point out that the Japanese often share and value nonverbal understanding and communication. We opted to include the expressing of such a language of the mind, under the single field of “Speech and Thought”.

Thinking along another direction, “Weak” fields / facets with high strategic importance include: the “Influence of Society and Education”, the “Influence of Science and Technology”, the “Influence of Politics”, the “Toughness of the Military”, the “Advanced Level of Speech and Thought”, and the “Influence of Speech and Thought”.

The “Strategic Map” represents, as discussed earlier, our own perception of Japan, based on a certain value assumption. By strong thewing this perception though, it becomes possible to begin a debate on strategic policy formation. Of course there will be some disparity between our perception and the way others see Japan, but we believe that while making efforts to close this gap, we can open it to a constructive debate.

We are openly presenting the methodology behind this debate, and promoting a debate designed so that the process used to arrive at a certain conclusions will be easily understood. We might have to revise various assumptions and judgements in the course of the debate arising from the “Strategic Map”. We believe that constant feedback is necessary to devise a valid strategy.

The “Strategic Map” we propose this time is merely a starting-point for the discussion. We hope that by presenting it in this open symposium various debates will be called forth, and that this will then initiate a serious debate that will explore the Japanese identity.