

The Genron NPO

Poll 2017

Annual Public Opinion Report

The Future of Northeast Asia and the State of Democracy



Northeast Asian and American public opinion
— on peace and future of the region

Asian public opinion — on democracy

Preface

In 2017, The Genron NPO conducted the Japan-U.S. opinion poll, the Japan-South Korea poll and the Japan-China poll, which pertain to the issues of peace in Northeast Asia, where tensions are mounting over North Korea's nuclear weapons development program, in addition to the Japan-China survey and the Japan-South Korea survey regarding national sentiments toward each other's country and mutual understanding, and one regarding the challenges facing democracy in the world today.

As regards the opinion surveys in Northeast Asia, The Genron NPO has been carrying out a joint poll annually with our counterpart think tanks in China and South Korea, respectively. The joint poll with China has been conducted continuously for 13 years since 2005 while that with South Korea for five years since 2012.

In particular, the findings of the joint polls with China provide valuable data as there is no other comparative survey in the world that regularly follows Chinese people's mind-sets and views about China's policy issues.

In addition, The Genron NPO conducted a Japan-U.S. opinion survey in 2017 jointly with the University of Maryland, focusing on the attitude of Japanese and American people toward the issue of North Korea's nuclear development.

In Japan, The Genron NPO carried out its own opinion poll on Japanese people's views of Japan-U.S. relations, on the occasion of the half-year anniversary of the Trump administration.

These opinion surveys are not conducted in isolation but in tandem with the "Track 1.5" dialogue that The Genron NPO hosts with a broad range of officials, executives and scholars from concerned countries.

Specifically, The Genron NPO has been organizing the Tokyo-Beijing Forum, our annual dialogue with China, since 2005, by using the findings of the annual Japan-China joint opinion poll as key references for discussions at the forum. In the same fashion, we have been holding the annual Japan-Korea Future Dialogue since 2012.

The Tokyo-Beijing Forum has been held without interruption, even when Japan-China intergovernmental diplomacy was at a standoff. Today, the bilateral forum has become an all-important venue for private-sector diplomacy between Japan and China, and is having a profound impact on the policymaking processes in both countries.

We have been conducting private-sector dialogues based on the findings of these opinion surveys as we attach particular importance to public opinion in the countries concerned in attempting to solve cross-border or global issues. In Northeast Asia, the spread of nationalistic sentiments is becoming a major obstacle to solving issues through intergovernmental channels of negotiations, resulting in frequent vacuums in dialogue between governments. The attempt to address challenges on the basis of public opinion and with the backing of many ordinary people is commensurate with the approach of citizen participation in a political democracy.

Now that the findings of the opinion surveys covering Japan, China, South Korea and the United States have been made available, the Genron NPO carried out in 2017 a Japan-U.S. expert dialogue, and a four-nation dialogue covering Japan, the United States, China and South Korea in an attempt to address the issues of peace in Northeast Asia where tensions are mounting due to North Korea's nuclear program.

We are addressing the issues of peace in Northeast Asia against the backdrop of what we called the "No-War Pledge," which was adopted at the Tokyo-Beijing Forum in 2013. At that time, we proposed spreading the motivation behind the pledge to the whole of Northeast Asia. To this end, we considered it necessary to track public opinion trends regarding peace in neighboring countries.

Aside from those surveys, we again conducted in 2017 an opinion poll regarding the issues facing "democracy," the reinforcement of which is another Genron mission, jointly with our counterpart think tanks in India and Indonesia by adding a new partner in Malaysia.

This report incorporates the findings of the two-nation opinion surveys between Japan and China, between Japan and South Korea, and between Japan and the United States, of the poll in Japan regarding Japan-U.S. relations upon the six-month anniversary of the Trump administration, and of the four-nation survey on democracy, covering Japan, India, Indonesia and Malaysia. We sincerely hope that this report will be a useful source of information for the advancement of peace and democracy in the Asian region.



Yasushi Kudo
President, The Genron NPO
March 1, 2018

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Japanese Public Opinion on U.S. Leadership

US Leadership and the Role of Japan

– How do Japanese people view the Trump administration’s half year?

The Genron NPO undertook an emergency opinion poll in July, 2017 on the Trump administration which began January 20th 2017, and Japan-US relations ahead of the Trump administration’s half year milestone.




Half of Japanese have declining trust in the United States

We looked at the words and actions of President Trump this past half year and asked if and how trust in the alliance with the United States had changed. The most frequent response by over half (50.8%) was that their “trust has decreased.” Only 22.5% responded that there has been no change in their trust of the United States.

The most frequent responses that their “trust has decreased” came from women in their 50s (50-59), at 65.3%.

By contrast, only 2.0% replied that their “trust has increased” (Fig. 1-1).

Fig 1-1: After the Trump administration’s inauguration, has your trust in our American ally changed?




60% Japanese are concerned about the future of Japan-US relations

Nearly 60% of Japanese responded that their concern over future Japan-US relations is increasing. Compared to this, 13.5% said there “will be no impact on Japan-US relations,” and only 7.4% said “it is a chance to build stronger future Japan-US relations.” However, 22.0% responded that they “don’t know”, or to a certain extent were as yet undecided. (Fig.1-2).

Similar to the previous question, concerns about the future of Japan-US relations are relatively high in the demographics of women in their 40s (40-49) and 50s (50-59). Those respondents whose “concern for the future of Japan-US relations is increasing” were

most particularly women in their 40s (40-49), at 63.5%, and men in their 50s (50-59) at 63%.

Fig 1-2: What kind of effect do you think the Trump administration will have on Japan-US relations in the future?




60% worry about the declining US influence in the International Society

44.1% thought that the Trump administration could destroy the American-led international order. A smaller share of 14.4% thought that Trump would “weaken American influence”, thus in total nearly 60% worried about the United States’ declining influence in the international community.

Meanwhile more than a fifth of respondents again said they “don’t know” or have not yet decided how the Trump administration will change the influence of America on the world stage. As can be seen, many respondents were undecided (Fig. 1-3).

Fig 1-3: How do you think President Trump’s actions will change the U.S. influence on establishing an international order?



American leadership – 60% have “no expectations” in 6 out of 8 criteria

The most frequent response where there were “high expectations” or “some expectations” for American leadership in global issues was for “combating international terrorism”; yet even then it was only 41.8%. The next biggest expectation was for “strengthening the US’ military alliances around the world,” with 35.8% expecting it, though the higher share of 43.5% said that they had “few expectations” or “no expectations.”

For the other 6 criteria, over 60% responded that they had few or no expectations for American leadership, especially on “correcting international disparities and wealth inequality” (75.3%) and “combating climate change” (73.5%) (Fig. 1-4).

More than half doubt the future of Japan-US relations

On the question of future of Japan-US relations, 41.3% of respondents said that “although the Japan-US relations are important, it is dangerous to focus on only the US.” 10.3% of respondents even thought that “American behavior is problematic and I think we should proceed with caution.” Thus in total, over half the Japanese surveyed expressed their concern on the future of Japan-US relations, only 22.0% placed importance on the development of Japan-US relations in the future (Fig.1-5).

Among those who approve of the Abe administration’s foreign policy, there were many respondents who anticipate the future strengthening of Japan-US relations, but even looking at those respondents who approve of Abe’s foreign policy, 37.4% answered that “it is dangerous to focus on only the US.”

Fig 1-4: What level of expectation do you have for American leadership in the following fields under the Trump administration?





Fig 1-5. Out of the following, which best represents your thoughts on Japan-US relations after President Trump’s election?




The Abe's foreign policy – over half respondents undecided

The Abe administration's diplomacy has emphasized the importance of the Japan-US relationship and actively responded to issues around the world. The response to this diplomacy was more positive than negative, with 25.4% saying they "approve" against 16.2% who "disapprove".

That being said, when considering the number of "neither approve nor disapprove" (39.7%) and "not sure" (18.5%) responses, well over half in fact refrained from making any judgement (Fig. 1-6).

Fig 1-6: Do you approve of the Abe administration's current diplomatic efforts in the international community?



There is growing support for Japan taking on a more active role and leadership in the international community


The biggest response is a wake-up call to those pushing for Japan to follow America's leadership closely, as 38.1% said that "Japan should not stick to the US alliance, but rather consider normalization and cooperation with other major powers, including China."

What is also interesting is 30% of respondents said that amidst this situation of instability in the international order, Japan should take on a leadership role to develop the norms and mechanisms that have supported the post-WW2 world such as international cooperation based on freedom and multilateralism.

Constituting this trend, 17.0% responded that "under this unstable international order, Japan should observe the norms that led the post-WW2 world, including international cooperation based on freedom, democracy, multilateralism, and demonstrate leadership among advanced democracies." 9.7% responded that "under this circumstance, Japan should strengthen their relations with developed democracies other than America and demonstrate joint leadership under a multilateral framework."

In contrast to above, only 12.3% of respondents thought that Japan should "strengthen international cooperation with the United States, and develop international leadership between the two countries with America as the center" (Fig. 1-7).

Fig 1-7: Which best describes your thoughts on Japanese leadership and roles in the international community?



U.S.-Japan Joint Public Opinion Survey 2017

American and Japanese attitudes toward North Korea Issues and the Regional Security

The Japan-U.S. joint public opinion survey asked the Japanese and American people about their views on solutions and effective measures regarding North Korea's nuclear missile development, as well as thoughts on possible U.S. military action, and the course of action by the U.S. and Japanese governments. The survey in Japan was conducted between Oct. 21 and Nov. 5 by a door-to-door home-visit method targeting men and women aged 18 and over. The number of valid responses was 1,000.

What became apparent in this survey is that while a certain number of Japanese and American people do express support for U.S. military action against North Korea, as seen in the 33% of Americans who support such action, they, nevertheless, see diplomacy as the best course and military action as a last resort. Furthermore, the American and Japanese people do not believe the situation on the Korean Peninsula will improve in the next few years. Such skepticism is found in over 30% of the American people who say North Korea should be allowed to possess nuclear weapons, and that Japan and South Korea should arm themselves with nuclear weapons. This view is contrary to what the Japanese people believe.



First, 63% of the Japanese and 59% of the Americans see U.S. President Donald Trump’s handling of the North Korean situation “unfavorably” (total of “somewhat unfavorably” and “Very unfavorably”).

The Americans appear to be more dissatisfied with Trump’s approach to Pyongyang, with 41% see President’s handling of the issue “very unfavorably,” while 51% of the Japanese see it “somewhat” unfavorable. At the same time, 40% of the Americans and 37% of the Japanese see Trump’s actions “favorably” (total of “very favorably” and “somewhat favorably”), indicating that the people are very divided about the issue (Fig. 1-8).

Opinions also split on military action by the United States

Meanwhile 48% of the Japanese and 44% of the Americans say they are against U.S. military action against North Korea, the response ranking first for both countries. But 33% of the Americans do favor U.S. military action, while 23% said they do not know. The positive response is equally mixed in Japan, with 21% of the Japanese in favor of military action and 31% saying they did not know (Fig. 1-9).

Fig 1-8: How do you view the way President Trump has handled the North Korean nuclear issue?





Fig 1-9: Do you support or oppose the United States initiating military action against North Korea in an attempt to stop its nuclear program?




Most effective measure should be diplomacy with military action as a last resort

Asked what would be the most effective way to halt North Korea’s nuclear missile development, “multi-party negotiations such as ongoing six-party talks” ranked the highest, with 35% of the American people selecting this answer. This is followed by 22% who selected “China taking a stronger stance against North Korea.” Only 11% chose U.S. military action as the best choice, indicating that Americans feel military action should only be used as a last resort.

Meanwhile, the Japanese express a more pessimistic outlook, with 27% selecting “I don’t believe North Korea’s nuclear program can be stopped.” This is followed by 21% who say “direct talks between North Korea and the United States,” 17% who say “China taking a stronger stance against North Korea” and 16% who say “multi-party negotiations such as ongoing six-party talks.” The results indicate that nearly half of the Japanese respondents are also in favor of diplomatic measures to resolve the crisis. Only 8% of the Japanese say they believe U.S. military action is the most effective measure (Fig. 1-10).

Fig 1-10: Which is the most effective way to stop North Korea’s nuclear program?




People don’t expect early solution to the North Korean crisis

Asked whether the North Korean nuclear crisis can be resolved, 42% of the Americans say they do not know. This is followed by 33% who say “it won’t be resolved,” meaning more than 70% of the Americans are pessimistic about the future of the North Korean situation. Merely 10% of them say the situation would likely see a resolution in a year or two, while 16% see a resolution in the next five years.

In Japan, 67% say “it won’t be resolved,” and together with the 22% who say they “don’t know,” nearly 90% of the Japanese are unconvinced that some solution will be found (Fig. 1-11).


Fig 1-11: Will North Korea’s nuclear program be resolved and, if so, when?



Furthermore, the respondents are pessimistic about the situation on the Korean Peninsula 10 years from now. Over 70% of the Japanese do not expect any improvement, with 47% responding “don’t know” and 28% responding “the instability will remain the same.”

The top answer among the Americans is “instability and chain of violence due to war and North Korea’s collapse” (45%), followed by “this unstable situation will remain unchanged” (32%). The results show that nearly half of the American people feel that even 10 years from now, it is unlikely that the situation will be more stable and that confusion on the Korean Peninsula will continue for a long time (Fig. 1-12).

Fig 1-12: How do you foresee the likely outcome of the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the next 10 years?




About 40% of Americans recognize N. Korea as nuclear state

The difficulty in resolving the North Korean crisis is creating a serious gap in views on national security

between the Japanese and American people. Asked if North Korea should be acknowledged as a nuclear power, 70% of the Japanese say no. But in the United States, 38% supported recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, while 37% opposed and 25% say not sure (Fig. 1-13).

Fig 1-13: Do you support or oppose recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state?



Over 30% of Americans support Japan & S. Korea's nuclear armament

Views on the nuclear armament of Japan and South Korea in the event North Korea refuses to halt its nuclear missile development program are also split between the United States and Japan. Only 12% of the Japanese are in favor of Japan arming itself with nuclear weapons, in contrast to 69% who are against it. The Japanese are equally against South Korea's

nuclear armament, with only 9% in favor, while 68% are against it.

Meanwhile, 33% of the Americans are in favor of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, with the 40% against it. Furthermore, 27% of the Americans responded they do not know. There are also 33% of the Americans in favor of South Korea possessing nuclear weapons, with 41% against it and 26% saying they do not know (Fig. 1-14) (Fig. 1-15).

Fig 1-14: Do you support or oppose Japan acquiring nuclear weapons if North Korea doesn't give up its own?






Fig 1-15: Do you support or oppose South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons if North Korea doesn't give up its own?



Views on whether the United States should bring its nuclear weapons to Japan or South Korea in the event North Korea refuses to get rid of its nuclear arms are also divided. In Japan, 51% of the Japanese people are against the United States bringing in

nuclear weapons, in contrast to the 21% who are in favor, and 28% saying they are unsure. The American people, meanwhile, voiced contrasting views, with 52% in favor, 21% against and 27% saying they did not know (Fig. 1-16).

Fig 1-16 : If North Korea doesn't give up its nuclear weapons, do you support the placement of American nuclear warheads in South Korea and/or Japan?



20% of Americans feel North Korean crisis rather weakened U.S.-Japan ties

Asked what kind of impact the North Korean nuclear crisis is having on the U.S.-Japan relationship, the top response from both countries is it has “strengthened” U.S.-Japan relations, with 46% of the Japanese and 42% of the Americans selecting this answer.

But 20% of the Americans feel the situation has weakened the relationship. Pyongyang’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland, and the lack of any feasible resolution to the North Korean situation have made many Americans look inward and prioritize domestic issues, casting a shadow over U.S.-Japan relations (Fig. 1-17).

However, there are 49% of the Americans who believe the United States should maintain its current military strength in Asia in the future. Together with the 29% who believe “the U.S. should maintain its current level of military power,” nearly 80% of the American respondents support the U.S. military presence in Asia at current or increased levels for the region’s security.

In Japan, 42% feel “the U.S. should maintain its current level of military power,” but 33% say they do not know, indicating that many Japanese are unable to determine the future security environment of Asia as well as the necessity of the U.S. military presence in the region (Fig. 1-18).

Fig 1-17: How do you think the North Korea crisis has affected Japan's relations with the United States?





Fig 1-18: What level of military power should the United States maintain in Asia?




North Korea’s nuclear development is to protect Kim regime and its authority

Asked why North Korea continues its nuclear development program, the top answer from people of both countries is “driven by the need to maintain the current regime and its power.” Some 46% of the American respondents and 35% of the Japanese

selected this response. This response is followed by mostly driven by North Korea’s ambition and aggression, selected by 25% of the Americans. Among Japanese respondents, 24% also selected this answer, but the second-largest response is it is driven “by the desire to be fully recognized as a legitimate country and as a member of the international community,” with 25%. Only 12% of the Americans agreed to this explanation (Fig. 1-19).


Fig 1-19: Which of the following is closer to your view: North Korea’s reason for continuing the nuclear development



Effective Multilateral Security Framework for Northeast Asia

Last, the respondents were asked what nations should be involved should there be a multinational dialogue mechanism that would serve to realize stability in the Northeast Asian region. The largest response is a five-nation framework consisting of Japan, China, the United States, South Korea and Russia, with 35% of the Americans and 36% of the Japanese selecting this response. The second-largest response among the Americans is a four-nation framework of Japan, China, the United States and South Korea (26%), while the second-largest response among the Japanese is “don’t know” (30%). The third-largest response for Japanese respondents is a three-nation framework of Japan, China and the United States (12%), but this choice is selected by only 5% of the Americans (Fig. 1-20).


Fig 1-20: As a multilateral security framework for Northeast Asian security, which of the following framework would be the most effective?



The 13th Japan-China Joint Public Opinion Survey

The Japan-China joint survey shows improved sentiment among citizens

The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group conducted joint opinion polls targeting the citizens of Japan and China between October and November 2017. This survey has been administered annually since 2005, when Japan-China relations were at its worst. This year marks the 13th year that this poll has been conducted.



Perhaps the most significant finding of this year's Japan-China joint survey is that sentiment among citizens of the two countries toward each other is showing signs of improvement. But the 13th annual opinion poll conducted by The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group also shows that they feel the two countries have lingering issues that prevent the bilateral relationship from improving fundamentally.

The number of Japanese respondents who feel Japan-China relations are "bad" dropped below the 50% mark to 44.9%, almost 30 points down on the 71.9% from the previous year's survey. This improvement in sentiment among the Japanese becomes clearer when one looks at the trend of the past 13 years. Sentiment worsened after 2012 when the Japanese government nationalized the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in China) in the East China Sea. But this year's figure has returned to the level before this period. In fact, it is the third-lowest figure since the survey started 13 years ago. Meanwhile, 64.2% of the Chinese surveyed feel the relationship with Japan is "bad," although this has fallen from last year's 78.2%.

This does not, however, imply that the people of Japan and China judged the bilateral relationship to be "good," as there are only 6.7% Japanese and 22.8% Chinese who feel the relationship between the two countries is "good" (Fig. 2-1).

The reason why fewer Japanese are pessimistic about the Japan-China relationship is most likely

because there were no open conflicts between the two countries this year, and also because of the increased number of meetings this year between senior government officials of the two countries. With these meetings, the general public has been exposed to media coverage that shows that the relationship between the two governments is improving.

Furthermore, the heightening North Korean nuclear threat is actually making the Japan-China relationship appear to be more stable. But the Chinese do not feel as threatened by North Korea, which seems to account for the difference in the degree of pessimism between Japanese and Chinese respondents.

Impression of Japan rapidly improving among Chinese people

Another notable characteristic of this year's survey is the rapid improvement of Chinese people's perceptions of Japan, contrary to the Japanese, whose perceptions of China do not show major improvement. For example, fewer Chinese responded that they "do not have a good impression of Japan" (66.8%, 76.7% in 2016) and more Chinese are saying they "have a good impression of Japan" (31.5%, 21.7% in 2016). This is in contrast to the Japanese surveyed, a large percentage of whom say they have a bad impression of China (88.3%, 91.6% in 2016) (Fig. 2-2).

Fig 2-1: Current Japan-China Relations






Fig 2-2: Impression of the Other Country




One reason the impression of Japan among Chinese is improving is because of the increased number of Chinese visitors to Japan. Some 1.3 million Chinese visited Japan in 2013, and the figure continued to rise, with 6.37 million -- nearly five times as many -- Chinese visiting Japan in 2016. This trend is reflected in the survey as well, with 15.7% of Chinese surveyed having visited Japan in the past, compared to last year's 13.5%. When the Chinese who have visited Japan in the past were asked the same question, 59.8% said they have a good impression of Japan, compared to the 26.2% who have never visited Japan (Fig. 2-3). Those who have visited Japan say Japanese people are "polite, respect manners and are civilized," or that "the Japanese are serious-minded, diligent and hardworking." This is contributing to the overall improved sentiment of the Chinese toward Japan.

Fig 2-3: Impression of Japan by experience of visiting Japan



Another trend is that the younger generation in China appears to have a better impression of Japan. While 61.9% of under 20 have a good impression of Japan, the figure drops to 40.6% among those in their 20s and to 16.2% among those aged over 60 (Fig 2-4). There are no such demographic differences among Japanese.


Fig 2-4: Impressions of Japan by generations



The reason for the favorable impression among the younger generation of Chinese appears to lie in how they obtain news about Japan. In China, the younger generation turns to news Web sites and smartphone applications to obtain information about Japan-China relations as well as Japan in general. The survey shows that 42.2% of Chinese who rely on mobile devices to obtain information have a good impression of Japan, compared to 25.4% who watch television and 20% who read newspapers (Fig. 2-5).

In Japan, people obtain information primarily from the television, regardless of age. Even among Japanese who use mobile devices to read news, only 14% have a good impression of China. The result is not much different from the 10.9% who watch television for news.

Fig 2-5: Impressions of Japan by source of information



This indicates that direct interaction through travel and the diversification of news sources contribute to improving Chinese people's perceptions of Japan, while that does not seem to be the case for Japan.

Furthermore, the number of Chinese wanting to visit Japan continues to increase, with 44.2% of respondents saying so compared to last year's 40.9%. That should also contribute to improving the


impression of Japan among Chinese people. But unfortunately, over 70% of the Japanese respondents say they do not want to visit China.

Issues hindering better relations and sentiment

When asked what hinders the development of bilateral relations between Japan and China, the majority of respondents in the two countries cite territorial disputes. Another popular response is the "lack of trust between the governments and citizens of both countries."

Asked what would be effective in improving Japan-China relations, about 40% of Chinese respondents say "resolve territorial issues with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands" and "resolve historical perception issues," while 40.7% of Japanese and 30.2% of Chinese cite "strengthen trust between the two governments." These results show that if current efforts by the two governments to improve bilateral relations continue, the perceptions of the citizens of both countries about each other will also likely improve (Fig. 2-6).

Fig 2-6: Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations



Mutual understanding on a deeper level needs more work

This year's survey shows that while there are fewer people with negative images of each other, there are many obstacles that need to be overcome for the people of both nations to have a truly positive image of each other. The first matter to be addressed is the basic understanding of each other's

country. A majority of Japanese view China as a "socialist communist country" and over 30% see China as a "totalitarian state" with "single-party rule." Meanwhile, the Chinese view Japan as a democratic country, but nearly 40% also see Japan as a "militaristic" and "hegemonic" state. Only 9.7% of Chinese feel Japan is a truly democratic state, a further drop from last year's 18.2% (Fig. 2-7).

Fig 2-7-1: Perceptions of the Social/Political Systems of China





Fig 2-7-2: Perceptions of the Social/Political Systems of Japan



If one feels that the perceptions of the opposite party are wrong, then one must make the effort to explain what exactly is wrong. The media must be particularly careful as they play a part in creating impressions of each other, and could wrongly encourage their audiences to build negative impressions of each other.


The historical issues remain key issue for the Chinese

Many Chinese feel the so-called "history problem," or the continued resentment among Chinese over what is seen as Japan's unwillingness to confront its history of aggression in World War II, to be a major obstacle to improving Japan-China relations. Asked if

this issue remains an obstacle, the number of Japanese respondents who believe so is basically unchanged from last year, but 56.3% of Chinese respond that it is a major issue with no signs of resolution, a further increase from last year's 47.8%. Add the 30.9% of Chinese who believe some progress may have been made in solving the history issue, although it remains a major issue, and the result is that over 80% of Chinese people strongly believe that this decades-long controversy continues to be a bone of contention between the two nations(Fig. 2-8).

Furthermore, 51% of Chinese say the relationship between the two countries will not improve without resolving this problem.

Fig 2-8: Are Historical Issues an Obstacle to Japan-China Relations?



Different perceptions on security, but bright signs for the island dispute

The number of Japanese who feel threatened by North Korea has increased to nearly 90% over the past year, following the repeated missile launches near Japanese waters and underground nuclear tests by North Korea. As a result, the interest of Japanese people has shifted from China's military threat to that posed by North Korea, with 20% fewer people feeling threatened by China's military buildup compared to last year.

What is puzzling is Chinese people's low sense of urgency over Pyongyang's actions, with only 13.1% saying they feel threatened militarily by North Korea. Rather, 25.6% say they feel threatened by South Korea (Fig.2-9). The fact that there appears to be no effective way for Japan and China to cooperate in addressing the North Korean threat as well as maintaining peace in Asia also contributes to widening the perception gap over security issues. But there is a glimmer of hope, with 55.4% of Chinese calling for the two countries to swiftly resolve the territorial dispute and work for a peaceful solution -- the first time such views constituted a majority (Fig. 2-10).

Fig 2-9: Countries/ Regions That Pose a Military Threat to Your Country





Fig 2-10: Solutions to Tensions Over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands



Passive attitude toward economic relations among Japanese

With regard to the economic relationship between Japan and China, the responses of Japanese people remained largely negative, with 41% saying it is difficult for the two countries to build a win-win relationship, up from last year's 37.5%. Furthermore, only 10.7% of Japanese respondents said they expect economic exchanges and trade between the two countries to expand.

There are signs that the relationship between the two governments is improving, people believe there are issues from the past that need to be resolved before Japan and China can move forward. Asked if they believed Japan-China relations are important, 71.8% of Japanese answer "yes," while 68.7% of Chinese people say "yes," (Fig. 2-11).

These figures have not changed much since the survey started in 2005, but when asked which country is most important to one's own, the ranking of the two countries improved from the previous year in both cases. For the Chinese, Japan moved up two ranks to third after Russia and the United States, and for the Japanese, China moved up one rank to second behind the United States. (2-12)

Why is Japan-China relationship important?

Fig 2-11: Importance of Current Japan-China Relations





Fig 2-12: Most Important Foreign Country or Region to Your Country




This slight progress is most likely a reflection of the improved sentiment toward each other's country. But people also appear to be unable to work out why exactly this bilateral relationship is so important. Asked why good relations between Japan and China are necessary, the most common answer from Japanese respondents is "bilateral cooperation is necessary for the peace and prosperity of Asia" (57%), while the Chinese answer is "because Japan is an important neighbor" (75.4%). Both are vague responses with no concrete ideas as to why exactly the bilateral relationship is so important. As to the future of the two countries, a majority of respondents in Japan and China hope for the peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity of both nations, but they add that they are unsure if that will actually be realized. While acknowledging that the bilateral relationship is important, the people of the two countries do not understand why, or what kind of future to build together. That is the current state of the relationship between Japan and China.

Strong expectations for a new Japan-China relationship

Despite the skepticism, it is also true that the survey provides evidence that the two countries are making an effort to move forward. With the global order showing signs of instability and with heightened concern for the peace of Northeast Asia, the respondents were asked for the first time in this year's survey whether Japan and China should work to strengthen their cooperative relationship. In response, 59.2% of Japanese and 73.5% of Chinese answered "yes" (Fig. 2-13). This strong expectation for a better bilateral relationship, not only between governments but also on a private-sector level, has become apparent in the findings of this year's survey. Which direction the sentiment of the citizens of both nations will take from here will depend on whether we can pick up on the general public's sentiment and shape a cooperative framework for the two nations.

Fig 2-13: Should a New Cooperating Relationship be Established for a Stable and Peaceful Order?



The 5th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll

**Worrisome signs of schism seen
in public sentiments over Japan-South Korea relations**


How can Japanese and South Koreans cooperate in future for the sake of peace in Northeast Asia against the backdrop of North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the unpredictable new U.S. administration? Although impressions of South Korea deteriorated somewhat among Japanese people, Korean public opinion regarding Japan showed signs of improving. While sharing concerns about the threat of North Korea and the policies of the new U.S. administration, for the sake of Northeast Asia as a whole both countries have to identify areas in which they can cooperate.



The most notable characteristic of the 5th Japan-South Korea joint survey is how the difference in the impressions of the Japanese and South Korean people about each other's countries has become even more prominent. While the South Korean impression of Japan continues to improve, the Japanese impression of South Korea has deteriorated since last year. The Genron NPO started the joint public survey with South Korea in 2013, and this trend becomes more apparent when

we review the results of the past five years. In 2013, the 76.6% of South Koreans had a "bad impression" (including "somewhat bad impression") of Japan. But the figure started to improve in subsequent years, and by 2017, it had dropped as low as 56.1% (61.0% in 2016). In contrast, only 37.3% of Japanese had a "bad impression" of South Korea in 2013, but this figure has not improved much over the years, and in fact worsened this year to 48.6% (44.6% in 2016) (Fig 3-1).

Fig 3-1: Impressions on one another's countries



The most frequent reasons why South Koreans have a bad impression of Japan in the past were how Japan shows no remorse over its past wartime aggression and the territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo Island in the Sea of Japan. The results were the same this year, with 80.6% of South Koreans citing the history issue and 70.7% citing the territorial dispute as reasons for their negative impression of their neighbor.

The Japanese, on the other hand, feel offended by the continued Korean criticism of its wartime past, with 76.5% (75.3% in 2016) citing "because South Korea continues to criticize Japan on historical issues" as the top reason for their negative impression of South Korea.

In December 2015, the governments of Japan and South Korea reached an agreement over the issue of South Korean "comfort women," a euphemism for Japan's wartime use of Korean women as sex slaves. But since then, moves in South Korea to renegotiate the deal and the impeachment of South Korean President Park Geun-hye in 2016 have been repeatedly reported in the Japanese media. The results of the most recent survey have also been affected by such political moves. A new option as a reason for a negative impression of South Korea was added to this year's survey, and 8.4% of Japanese chose this response: "because of disturbance in South Korean politics, like to president's corruption impeachment" (Fig. 3-2).

In contrast, the improvement in South Koreans' impressions of Japan indicates that such political development between the two governments has not affected the sentiment of South Koreans. Rather, the newest survey shows that the diversification of

sources for information on Japan and the increasing number of South Korean visitors to Japan, have contributed to the improved sentiment of South Koreans about their neighbor .

Fig 3-2: What are the reasons behind your unfavorable impression?





Fig 3-3: What are the reasons behind your favorable impression?




70% believe in the need to improve current sentiment

The second notable finding that emerged from the newest survey is that 60% of Japanese and South Koreans feel the current Japan-South Korea relationship is “bad” (including “relatively bad”). This is worse than the results from 2016.

Furthermore, when asked about the future of the

Japan-South Korea relations, the response, it “will not change,” comes top for both countries. But with the inauguration of a new government, 27.8% of South Koreans selected “will improve” (including “will probably improve”) as answers to the outlook for Japan-South Korea relations, a slight improvement from the 23.3% in the previous survey. In contrast, only 18.9% of Japanese expect the relationship between the two neighbors to improve, down further from the 22.7% in the previous survey (Fig. 3-4).

Fig 3-4: How do you see the future of Japan-South Korea relations?



At the same time, nearly 70% of Japanese and South Koreans do not believe that such negative sentiment is inevitable. Rather they are worried and believe there is a need to improve the situation.

Among Japanese respondents, 29.7% feel this negative sentiment is “undesirable and worrisome,” up slightly from the 26.3% in 2016. Furthermore, 36.5% feel that “it’s a problem and needs to be fixed,” mostly unchanged from the 36.8% of the previous year, so in total, 66.2% of Japanese find the current situation to be problematic.

Meanwhile, 44.6% of South Koreans feel that the problem with the public sentiment toward each other “needs to be fixed,” a substantial rise from the

37.0% in 2016. Furthermore, 23.3% (up from 21.8% in 2016) feel the current situation is “undesirable and worrisome” (Fig. 3-5).

Japanese and South Koreans also show some understanding on the importance of bilateral relations. For example, 89.9% (86.9% in 2016) of South Koreans believe Japan-South Korea relations are “important,” while 64.3% of Japanese (62.7% in 2016) believe the same. But one must also note the 19.9% of Japanese responded “not sure” (Fig. 3-6).

Fig 3-5: What do you think about current state of public sentiment for other country?






Fig 3-6: Is the Japan-Korea relationship important now?



The most recent survey also asks which country in the world is most important to your country. The United States is selected as the most important nation by 63.5% of Japanese and 45.1% of South Koreans (39.8% in 2016). At the same time, China is chosen by 42.0% (47.1% in 2016) of South Koreans, indicating that expectations toward China among South Koreans have somewhat declined.

Meanwhile, merely 2.6% of Japanese (1.7% in 2016) find South Korea to be the most important nation for their country, while 3.6% (2.6% in 2016) of South Koreans find Japan to be the most important (Fig. 3-7).

Fig 3-7: Regarding the future of your country, which of the following countries or regions do you think is the most important?



The “comfort women” agreement by the governments

The 2017 survey also asks about the various hot topics the two countries face.

Regarding the “comfort women” issue, the two governments agreed during the foreign ministers’ meeting in December 2015 that Japan would contribute 1 billion yen to set up a foundation under the South Korean government to support the living victims, and that this agreement would be “a final and irreversible resolution” of the issue.

Asked whether they approve of the agreement, 41.8% of Japanese responded, “approve” (total of “strongly approve” and “approve to a certain degree”), far exceeding the 25.4% who responded “disapprove” (total of “strongly disapprove” and “somewhat disapprove”).

In contrast, 55.5% of South Koreans responded, “disapprove” (total of “strongly disapprove” and “somewhat disapprove”), far more than the 21.3% who responded “approve” (total of “strongly approve” and “approve to a certain degree”) (Fig. 3-8).

Only South Koreans were asked in the survey why they did not approve of the agreement. The largest number responded because “the agreement did not reflect the opinions of the comfort women themselves” (77.7%), followed by “legal responsibility is not clear and the apology is also insufficient” (49.6%), and they “tried to solve this issue with money” (49.6%) (Fig.3-9).

Fig 3-8: On December 28, 2015, the Japanese government allocated funding and established an organization to provide the comfort women with restitution funds via the South Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement. What do you think of this agreement?





Fig 3-9: What is the reason for your disapproval?



The Japanese respondents were asked what they thought about the South Koreans' public disapproval of the "comfort women" agreement. Nearly half (49.3%) responded, "not understandable. Both Japan and South Korea should respect and follow

the agreement" (Fig. 3-10).

Nevertheless, more than 50% of Japanese and 70% of South Koreans believe that the comfort women issue "has not been resolved" despite the 2015 agreement (Fig. 3-11).

Fig 3-10: Many people in South Korea are not happy with the Japan-South Korea agreement on "comfort woman." How do you see the situation?





Fig 3-11: Has the comfort women issue been resolved?



North Korea and the nuclear threat

Next, the survey asked about North Korea’s nuclear missile development. Respondents of both countries feel there is no easy resolution to this issue, with 68.9% of Japanese and 71.3% of South Koreans responding, “resolution would be difficult” (Fig. 3-12).

The top response to the question if U.S. military action is likely to occur in response to the North Korean nuclear development is the 42.7% of Japanese who responded, “it will occur,” in contrast to the 43.1% of South Koreans who responded, it

won’t. However, nearly the same number (38.6%) of South Koreans responded that military action “will occur” (Fig. 3-13).

When asked about measures to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear missile development, “China must take a more active role” comes top among Japanese respondents, with 25.6%, while the top response among South Koreans is “continue diplomatic efforts such as the Six-Party Talks,” with 35.8%, followed by “strengthen sanctions against North Korea” (26.1%).

Only 9.6% of Japanese and 4.9% of South Koreans believe military action would be the most effective way of resolving the crisis (Fig. 3-14).

Fig 3-12: When do you think the North Korean nuclear issues will be resolved?




Fig 3-13: Will military action occur in response to North Korea’s nuclear development?





Fig 3-14: Effective measure to stop North Korean nuclear development




70% of South Koreans support their country’s nuclear armament

About 80% of Japanese and South Koreans feel North Korea poses a military threat (Japanese: 79.5%, South Koreans: 83.4%). Other military threats named by the Japanese are China (46.2%) and Russia (32.8%).

50.3% of South Koreans see China as a military threat, up from 36.0% in 2016. Next on the list among South Koreans is Japan with 33.6% see the nation as threat, while merely 10.5% of Japanese see South Korea in the same light (Fig. 3-15).

Fig 3-15: Countries to pose a military threat to your country



The survey asked about the possibility of military conflict between Japan and South Korea.

Some 63.4% of Japanese believe military conflict between the two neighbors “will not occur” and less than 10% believe there will be a military conflict. A majority (50.7%) of South Koreans also believe military conflict will not occur, but we must remain cautious about the 28.8% who responded that there may be a military conflict in the future.

The survey also asked about the support for nuclear armament of Japan and South Korea. Some 74.7% of Japanese are against Japan’s nuclear armament, only 9.0% are in favor, and 78.8% are also against South Korea’s nuclear armament.

In contrast, although 75.8% of South Koreans are against Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, 67.2% are in favor of their country possessing nuclear weapons, a further rise compared to the 59% who supported the option in 2016 (Fig. 3-16,17).

Fig 3-16: Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons?





Fig 3-17: Should South Korea acquire nuclear weapons?



Asia Democracy Survey 2017

The Japan-Indonesia-India-Malaysia-South Korea Joint Opinion Poll on Democracy

— Asian people uncertain about course of their democracy

The opinion poll has revealed that people in five major Asian countries are increasingly uncertain about how their democracy should develop. At a time when democratic values are being threatened in major Western countries, it appears that confidence in democracy itself is being maintained in the Asian countries surveyed, but an increasing number of people were doubtful about whether the democratic system is working in their countries, according to the results of the opinion poll. Nearly half of those polled in Japan were pessimistic about the future of their country while about 60% of them replied that Japan's political parties cannot be trusted to solve the challenges facing the country.

The surveys, carried out in Japan, Indonesia, India, Malaysia and South Korea from June to August, covered men and women aged 18 or older through face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews or online survey. The number of samples for each survey ranged from 1,000 to 2,600.



Democracy around the world

When the **Japanese** people were asked how they see the current state of democracy in the world, 9.2% said that it is “very strong in most parts of the world” while 28.8% said that “there are many issues in democracy around the world, but they are not serious enough to deny democracy itself,” showing that a total of 38% of the Japanese people hold optimistic views on democracy.

On the other hand, a total of 26.6% of the Japanese expressed pessimistic views that “democracy is in crisis with the rise of populism and xenophobia” (10.7%) and “since democracy has suffered from too many challenges, it will not be able to recover from this crisis” (15.9%). 35.4% is unsure about current state of democracy around the world.

In **Indonesia**, 21.1% said that “democracy is strong” and 32.1% said that “the issues with democracy are not serious enough to deny democracy itself.” In total, over half of the Indonesians expressed optimistic views on the state of democracy in the


world.

However, nearly 40% expressed pessimistic views that “democracy is in crisis” (15.5%) and that it will not be able to recover (21.3%).

Among **Malaysians**, the most popular response was that “democracy has suffered from too many challenges and that it will be difficult to recover from this crisis,” at 26.0%. Added to the 15.3% who see “democracy in a state of crisis,” 41.3% of Malaysians hold pessimistic views on the state of democracy in the world (Fig. 4-1).

In **India**, a slightly different question was posed on how democracy in the world has changed over the past year. Nearly half (47%) replied that “democracy in the world had made progress.” Thus, while democracy has suffered from many challenges, a large number of people in each of the countries view its progress optimistically.

Fig 4-1: How do you see the state of democracy in the world?




Is Democracy better than any other political system?

The view that democracy is better than any other political system was supported by the largest percentage of people polled in the five countries: 45.7% in Japan, 60.0% in Indonesia and 61.6% in South Korea. But some people think that “non-

democratic systems can be partially accepted” or that “any kind of political system is acceptable,” and the percentage of people who selected these two options grew from last year. These two options were chosen by 44.9% of Indians. It was 22.0% in Japan, 30% in South Korea, 40.5% in Malaysia and 31.7% in Indonesia (Fig. 4-2).

Fig 4-2 : . What is your view about democracy?



Is Democracy functioning?


Only about 40% of people in Japan and Malaysia think that democracy is working in their countries. Those who didn't think so came to 36.2% in Japan and 28.7% in Malaysia.

On the other hand, majority of the Indians and Indonesians replied that democracy is functioning in their own countries; 69.3% of Indonesians and

59.3% of Indians trust that democracy is functioning in their own countries (Fig. 4-3).

When those who feel that democracy is not functioning were asked about their reasons why, the two most popular responses were that "elections wins became the primary concern for politicians and politics do not squarely face their tasks" as well as "rampant corruption in the bureaucracy and administration."

Fig 4-3: Do you think democracy is functioning well in your country?



Trust in institution


According to the survey, people in the Asian countries more strongly trust the ability of enforcement institutions, notably the military and police, than the parliament and political parties which are established through democratic processes, or the media organizations which should play a key role in building sound public opinion for strong democracy.

In **Japan**, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the police force as well as the court was favored by more than half of the Japanese respondents, but trust in political parties and the Diet, Japan's parliament, came to only about 20%.


The most trusted institution among the **Indians** and **Malaysians** was the military, which earned the trust of 71.4% and 64.9% of the people in the respective countries. In **Indonesia**, this trust in the military surpasses 90%.

While trust in the President was high in **South Korea** due to the fact that the fielding period came just before the presidential election, the rest of the basic structure remained the same as with the other countries. Over half, or 54.9% of South Koreans, expressed trust in the military and police. In contrast, the most distrusted institution was the parliament, with 83.7% of South Koreans replying that they do not trust the institution. At the same time, 82.4% also expressed distrust in political parties (Fig. 4-4).


Fig 4-4: How much trust do you have in the following institutions?




Indian



Malaysian



South Korean




Expectations on political parties

58.7% of **Japanese** see that “political parties cannot be trusted to solve the challenges facing the country.” This was far higher than the distrusts in political parties in other countries surveyed. Those who believe that political parties in Japan can be trusted came only to 22.5%, compared to 46.8% in South Korea, 86.3% in Malaysia, 71.1% in Indonesia and 51.8% in India .

In **India**, just over half of the respondents (51.8%) responded that political parties can be trusted for good, however, there was a 34 point decrease as compared to last year’s 85.9%. At the same time, there was a 30 point increase in those who feel that they cannot expect political parties to solve issues and attain growth, from 8.3% in 2016 to 38.4% in 2017 (Fig. 4-5).

Fig 4-5: Do you expect the political parties to solve the problems facing your country?

* For the other respondents except Japanese: Do you expect the political parties to solve the problems facing your country now or to steer economic development?



Views on the future of the country


As many as 48% of people polled in Japan expressed pessimistic view about the future of their country. Conversely, optimistic views were aired by 89.2% of people in Indonesia, 60.1% of those in India and 50.7% of those in Malaysia (Fig.4-6).

Asked about reasons for the pessimistic views, 91% of those polled in Japan replied that there are no effective measures to deal with the country’s fast-aging society and shrinking population. The figure grew from 84.7% a year earlier.

Apart from this, 37.9% of the Japanese cited the rise of China and the Korean peninsula issues as their reasons – a 7 point increase from last year’s 30.4%.

In India, the most popular response for the people’s pessimistic views was that politicians care more about votes and populism than solving real domestic and international problems, at 46.7% (compared to last year’s 27.4%). This was followed by the reason that social and economic policies are unable to tackle large-scale poverty and inequality, at 41.1% (compared to last year’s 44.3%).

Fig 4-6: How do you feel about the future of your country?



The need for strong political leadership

People around the world tend to seek a strong political leader amidst the escalating globalization and growing instability in the international order. But over half of those polled in Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia said that “political leaders should show leadership within the scope of democratic

institution.”

In contrast, in India, over half of respondents said showing signs of acceptance to non-democratic political leadership. 36.0% said that undemocratic leadership is acceptable if this brings growth and solutions to the problems and 17.6% said “a strong leadership is important, and it does not matter whether it is democratic or not” (Fig.4-7).

Fig 4-7: What is your view about the desired modality of leadership by political leaders of your country?

- Political leaders should show strong leadership within the scope of democratic institution
- To some extent, I don't mind their strong leadership in a non-democratic manner, if that will help develop the economy and society of my country further.
- A strong leadership is important, and it does not matter much whether it is democratic or not
- Don't know/No response





Fig 4-8: Do you expect that the US will exert a leadership for liberal order and democracy in the world?



Global leadership

In Japan, India and Indonesia, we asked about their expectations on which country will take the lead in protecting democracy and the liberal international order in the world. 66.5% of Indians shows expectations on the United States. 56.3% of Japanese and 53.3% of Indonesians agreed (Fig. 4-8).

Over 60% of those in Japan and India replied that they could not pin expectations on **China** maintaining the global order. Those who see China as trustworthy and those who see it differently both came to about 40% among people polled in Indonesia.

Russia was favored as a global leader by about 10% of those polled in Japan. This compared to about 60% in India and about 50% in Indonesia.

Britain was seen untrustworthy as a global leader by 51.5% of those in India, but the country was favored by 52.3% of those polled in Indonesia.

Of those polled in Japan, 43.8% favored **Germany**, as against 29.5% for those with different views.

Many of the people polled in the three countries in question replied that they could trust their country as a world leader. Specifically, the figure came to 48.6% in Japan, but this was far below the 71.3% in India and 90.3% in Indonesia.

Survey Methods

	Japanese Public Opinion Poll	U.S. Public Opinion Poll	Chinese Public Opinion Poll
Conducted by	①②The Genron NPO	University of Maryland	China International Publishing Group
Fielded by	①② Public Opinion Research Center	Nielsen Scarborough	Horizon Research Consultancy Group
Survey area	①②Japan	The United States of America	China (Urban)
Target population	①②18 years of age or older	18 years of age or older	18 years of age or older
Sampling method	①②Quota sampling: The survey was fielded in 50 regions of Japan, with 20 samples from each region collected based on a quota sampling method at the individual level	The survey utilized the nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough's probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International.	PPS(Probability-to-proportional-to-size) sampling
Fielding method	①②Placement Method	Online Survey	Face-to-face interview
Fielding period	①June 17-July 2, 2017 ②October 21-November 5, 2017	November 1-6, 2017	October 20-November 1, 2017
Sample size	①②1000 samples	2000 samples (including a down-weighted oversample of 1,042 among 18-34 year olds)	1564 samples

	South Korean Public Opinion Poll	Indonesian Public Opinion Poll	Indian Public Opinion Poll	Malaysian Public Opinion Poll
Conducted by	East Asia Institute	Centre for Strategic and International Studies	Observer Research Foundation	Merdeka Center for Opinion Research
Fielded by	Hankook Research Co. Ltd	Centre for Strategic and International Studies	Observer Research Foundation	Merdeka Center for Opinion Research
Survey area	South Korea	Indonesia	India (Urban)	Malaysia
Target population	19 years of age or older	18 years of age or older	19 years of age or older	21 years of age or older
Sampling method	Quota sampling based on region, gender, and age	Multistage random sampling in all 34 regions of Indonesia	Multistage sampling and purposive sampling was utilized with an objective to cover cities and towns in all 5 regions, and to achieve balanced sample close to the national ratio of gender and age group based on 2011 senses.	Quota sampling: All of the parliament constituencies (14 states and 222 constituencies) were surveyed and the selection of the respondents is proportional with respect to the adult population in each parliament constituency.
Fielding method	Face-to-face interview	Face-to-face interview	Email survey and online web portal survey	Computer-aided telephone interview
Fielding period	June 11-29, 2017	August 22-28, 2017	July 1 - August 25, 2017	July 18–30, 2017
Sample size	1003 samples	1000 samples	2636 samples	1204 samples

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About The Genron NPO

The Genron NPO is a non-profit, independent think tank based in Japan. Established in 2001 as the only venue in the country for responsible and future-oriented debate, The Genron NPO has sought to strengthen democracy in Japan, promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and develop solutions for pressing global issues. The institution was founded by Yasushi Kudo, the former editor-in-chief of a political journal titled “Ronso Toyo Keizai.” The advisory board of The Genron NPO consists of 13 prominent Japanese leaders from various fields. The institution is representative of the Japanese intellectual network, with over 7000 registered experts and more than 500 Japanese opinion leaders involved in its activities. The Genron NPO is a member institution of an international think tank network, the Council of Councils, since its establishment in 2012.

Our Missions:

Strengthen Democracy with the Power of Debate

The Genron NPO is the only institution that has taken such initiative to conduct research and the evaluations of party pledges made in every general election, and evaluate each administration’s performance in 12 policy areas annually to monitor their progress.

Conduct Civil Diplomacy to Promote Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia

Concerned about the absence of effective inter-governmental diplomacy in Northeast Asia, The Genron NPO established the “Tokyo-Beijing Forum” as a platform for civil diplomacy amid heightened Japan-China tensions in 2005. Each year, over 3000 people attend the forum, which has served as a unique bilateral platform for substantive intra-regional discussion for the past 13 years, and the forum has been widely covered by media outlets. President Xi Jinping has acknowledged our Track II diplomacy, calling it “non-governmental diplomacy”.

The Genron NPO also established the “Japan-Korea Future Dialogue” in 2013, and the “Japan-U.S.-China-ROK dialogue” on Northeast Asian security and public opinion in 2015. Recognizing the importance of public attitudes towards regional affairs for the implementation of pragmatic solutions, we also conduct annual multinational opinion polls in Japan, China, and South Korea. The Japan-China public opinion poll in particular is the only periodical dataset existing that analyzes public opinion in China over the past 13 years.

Organize Cross-Cutting Platforms to Discuss Pressing Global Agenda

The Genron NPO continuously strives to facilitate responsible domestic and international dialogue to tackle pertinent challenges facing the international community. In March 2017, we launched the “Tokyo Conference,” the first discussion platform in Japan that addresses global agenda with top international think tanks representing 10 major countries. With the intention to protect common international norms such as democracy and individual freedom as the basis of international cooperation, the results of the debates at the Tokyo Conference were synthesized into a proposal that was submitted to the Japanese government and the Italian government as the 2017 G7 host.

Our initiatives



The Tokyo Conference

The Tokyo Conference is to discuss the solution to the issues the world faces today from the stand point of fostering the norms and principles such as individual freedom, democracy and multilateralism as the basis for the international cooperation and global order.



Tokyo-Beijing Forum and The Japan-Korea Future Dialogue

A prime Track 2 dialogue between Japan and China, and between Japan and ROK for problem -solving and discussing the future of bilateral relationship and peace building in Northeast Asia region.



World Democracy Dialogue

The Genron NPO has initiated the debate over the state of democracy in Asia and around the world. The discussion aims at analyzing the challenges to democracy, and mapping and clarifying the future direction of Asian and global democracy.

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