[talk] The Role of Bureaucrats in the Politician Led System

Participants:
Ministry of Finance (MOF), Division Director
Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI), Vice-Minister for bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Division Director

Moderator:
Kudo Yasushi, Genron NPO

Kasumigaseki bureaucrats had played such an important role as the "brains" of Japan in the past. As reforms contain pain, the bureaucrats are facing a big change, including the relation to politics, and loss of direction in the turmoil. Career bureaucrats from various ministries gathered and gave frank discussion on what challenges Japan and/or bureaucrats are facing, particularly prime minister-initiated political reform, bill screening by the ruling party, and scandals.

MOF: The role of Kasumigaseki had played a roll to resolve conflict of interest in the past where no leadership is responsible for the crisis. When the overall Japanese economy came to the point where it no longer functioned properly, the remedies that involved a pain to the nations could no longer be solely discussed in Kasumigaseki or politics. This is where we have come to the phase of trial and error.

The relationship between the Prime Minister and the ruling party is an issue of policy-making process, rather than dual power structure. The policy-making system in both the ruling parties and the rest of the parties is weak compared to other nations. Japanese democracy is based on what everybody-agrees where the leader is not the winner of policy discussions but is assigned by the seniority system. Therefore, even if we abolish the bill screening by the ruling party, I don't know if it really works in Japan. If conflict of interest adjustment/coordination is required to be resolved for a bill to pass, it is just a matter of who is going to do it whether the party or the Diet. In other words, it is basically a political matter.

The MOF situation is still in turmoil, trying to recover confidence from a series of scandals, and adjust to the change in environment. We need enhancement of morale and environment where bureaucrats can think of national interests. If Kasumigaseki becomes the worst place to work, nobody (especially younger people) will go to work there.

MOFA: How we understand the Prime Minister-led initiative is that we follow what the state ministers assigned by the Cabinet where the prime minister is democratically elected in the Diet does. A private study group in the ruling party does not have legal status at all. The current situation is called dual power structure. The focus of power should rest with the Prime Minister's office. It is easier for us to do the work if the Prime Minister's office hosts the center of administrative branch. We are wasting our time if we don't take action quickly and decide with clear responsibility under the current situation. I think bureaucrats should provide several non-subjective policy options for politicians so that they are required to decide with clear responsibility.

In the case of MOFA, I accept criticisms because there are some people who committed crimes. However, I think it is unfortunate that people think that all MOFA employees are against reform, and are stubbornly protecting their own interests in the fight against Foreign Minister Tanaka. The world is moving, and it won't wait for us. I sincerely hope that the Foreign Minister focuses 100% on her job as Foreign Minister.

METI: The bureaucrats can not force people to accept a pain by themselves. The constituency will not be satisfied if political responsibility is not taken. I think it has come to the point where politicians have to make the decisions. However, since the policy-evaluating method is not yet established, political debate is still heavily focused on resolving conflict of interest. For example, evaluation of public works has just started, and priorities cannot be discussed without having an objective mechanism. Hence, we can not say that this is a matter of policy-making.

Some of us, the bureaucrats, want to leave the ministries and try working for private institutions. However, we also have desire to return and work in the policy-making field. In that sense, we the bureaucrats and the bureaucracy could not survive if we don’t make a mechanism that allows the bureaucracy to enhance expertise.

Participants:
Ministry of Finance (MOF), Division Director
Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI), Bureau Vice-Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA:), Division Director
Moderator: Kudo Yasushi, Genron NPO

Kudo: There are many members requesting discussions about the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats, since continuous criticism towards bureaucrats exists, claiming they are only seeking their interests or benefits of ministries/agencies they represent. Some of us question whether bureaucrats who have been committed to resolve political conflict of interest function well under the Koizumi-led reform framework. To begin our discussion, what do you think about the current criticism of bureaucrats?

[Criticism towards bureaucrats]

MOFA: In the case of MOFA:, I understand the criticism the Ministry has received,since there are some people from the 5,000 employed by the MOFA who have committed felonies. However, it is very unfortunate that the media reports as if all 5,000 employees had committed felonies. I understand restructuring the MOFA is important and has to be done with a considerable effort; however, our primary job (diplomacy) will not go away . During 2000 to 2001, Japan had a very difficult time with Korea and China. Also, the world is changing quickly after September 11th. Therefore, we have to respond to those changes. The reality is that the media only focuses on things like the fight between the MOFA bureaucrats versus Minister Tanaka reluctance to restructure by MOFA bureaucrats. I sincerely hope the media will give objective observations.

I don't mind having many criticisms, but they should be based on facts. If everything we bureaucrats do is bad, then it really affects our morale, and ultimately our diplomacy.

Kudo: Is Minister Tanaka the problem?

MOFA: To be honest, I would recommend the Minister of Foreign Affairs to study about diplomacy and focus 100% on it. It's no more than that and no less than that.

Kudo: If we look at the current economy and the fiscal situation, the MOF should have more sense of "crisis" and should appeal to the public. After a series of scandals, it seems that the MOF has remained quiet.How is the MOF like now?

MOF: We're doing usual things like the annual budgeting, but I feel that it is a time of soul-searching. Not only because of scandals but after the bubble burst, the situation of the MOF has changed a lot. Although there were many criticisms, the bureaucracy as a system was working well until the bubble burst. With high-quality bureaucrats in Japan, the system worked well under the Kasumigaseki (=bureaucrats) leadership. However, after the bubble burst, there was criticism towards arrogant bureaucrats who could not revive the economy.

We the bureaucrats don't have complete visions of how to revive the economy. Therefore, we're experiencing trial and errors along with soul-searching. Up to the burst of the bubble, the MOF was the top ministry and had a overall vision for the nation. After the bubble the MOF was [forced to be] separated into a smaller MOF and FSA, and had its name change from Okura to Zaimu. The Council of Economic & Fiscal Policy (CEFP) is now in charge of budgeting. In addition, the Prime Minister's power is strengthened with regard to budgeting,which we are, told to follow. This all just started in 2001, and we are still thinking about what is the best way for us to be a part of this process.

Budgeting is a process of resolving conflicts among various interests. It does not mean that the MOF has the leadership in budget policies. What we need is to slowly rebuild trust of others step by step. There were some MOF bureaucrats who did wrong things during the bubble era, and therefore, we have been trying to recover wounded trust. Of course, it does not mean that we won't talk to interest groups, but we are gradually returning to "normal" relations. I see the current situation as a transition era.

Kudo: Industrial policy is also important under the current economic situation. Japan had industrial policies during the financial panic in 1929 and the U.S. had a strategy to revive the economy in the 1980s. I don't see a clear role for the METI. Today, Japan has less competitive advantage due to the economic structural shift. Do we need industrial policies or should we rely on the market mechanism?

METI: When we joined ministries, the Japanese economy was growing rapidly and various systems were functioning well. The life-long employment system provided a sense of loyalty and accumulated know-how within companies. The main bank system provided governance, low-cost information, and mechanisms for mutual help. This was a market supplement system that perfectly fit into the catch-up system until the early 1990s. 10% of Japanese industry had competitive advantage in the global economy. The system re-distributed the profit earned by 10% of industry to benefit the whole economy. That system functioned.

However, in the 1990s, Japan caught up with the West, and the catch-up system became outdated. Issues of aging, pension, and health care emerged and the nation could not go forward if it continued to have an outdated system.

At that time, an extreme debate of let market mechanism decide emerged. There are winners and losers in the same industry, and life-long employment has shifted to capability-based contracts where labor mobility is achieved. Under such a situation, no industry-oriented policy but mechanism as a whole, i.e., employment, pension, and fiscal systems, need to be considered. It was the Hashimoto administration that started the economic structural reform on high-cost structure, employment, and the commercial code. Now it seems the reform is in progress.

On the other hand, due to China's rising competitiveness and rising domestic unemployment, questions have been raised as to whether or not we can really manage the Japanese economy in the future where we rely on the market mechanism of free competition. There is an emerging debate as to whether the government should support Japanese industries in order to compete in the global market. Discussion on intellectual property rights, R&D strategies, and public works that would improve productivity and industrial competitiveness are getting a lot more attention.

[Do bureaucrats have policy-making abilities?]

Kudo: What I want to know is the policy-making abilities of the bureaucrats. Can the current bureaucrats think of scenarios to solve the current economic and fiscal problems? If not, why not? There are some views that the bureaucracy does not function under the current situation.

METI: To be honest, I have an answer. The world is moving faster and faster.Because of this politically-led initiative, we have to prepare policy plans within a month, and modify them within a short time. I wonder if we can really think about long-term strategy. We're always tackling plans as needed every day. This is the problem we are facing.Recently, bureaucrats could not have dinner with corporate executives because of scandal-measures. As a result, we cannot gather valuable industry information. We are expected to use information on the internet; however, we're in a transition period and we have a concrete idea of how we can develop long-term policy effectively using information technology. Since the economic situation is severe, we're expected to tackle Non-performing loan (NPL) problems that are well-exposed. As a result, the real job of constructing a financial system that takes middle-risk-return is delayed.

Kudo: The MOF used to be so powerful and even controlled politicians from behind the scenes. Rather than controlling politicians, the important job is to increase GDP growth and stabilize the market environment. In other words, a combination of economic policies can solve fiscal problems. CEFP will conduct such policy-making. What kind of role will the MOF play?

MOF: Rather than weakening of MOF, the situation has changed. Now banks have to swallow bitter medicines. During the high growth era, there were some bitter medicines, but there were also sweet juices to go with and banks became healthy again. In Kasumigaseki, we had that know-how of let the banks take bitter medicine with sweet juice.

However, we never experienced such a consensus-building situation where only bitter medicine exists. Under such a situation, political leadership is required. Up to now, what Kasumigaseki played was resolving conflict of interest where no real crisis was present and no leadership was required. Fortunately, the model of the catch up system already had been placed. That model was full of know-how and because of that, Japan was able to grow to the present level. However, we did not inherit any know-how from our predecessors on how to swallow bitter medicine when the whole economy is in bad shape. This, we cannot decide on our own, and politicians cannot decide on their own. We’re rather lost as to what to do. As I said before, we at least have started doing trial & error and policy evaluations.

MOFA: Diplomacy was consistently conducted by political initiative since the end of WWII. For example, the most important decisions were taken by: 1) Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida for the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; 2) Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi for revision of the Security Treaty; 3) Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama for rapprochement with the Soviet Union; and 4) Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for normalization with China. A combination of political leadership and support from the bureaucrats enabled this to happen. This is the nature of diplomacy, we bureaucrats cannot deal with the Secretary of State or the President of the United States even if we wish to. Therefore, we hand it over to the political level to make decisions. Even if a bureaucrat has exceptional skills and abilities, his/her face is invisible. We need an appropriate position in order to be recognized.This is a disadvantage for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as compared to other ministries/agencies where an able person can stick out.

In the area of diplomacy, Japanese politicians have to convey their own messages to their counterparts. If they just need what bureaucrats prepared, the counterparts will recognize this immediately.Secretary Powell or President Bush also read what bureaucrats have prepared and give them guidance and directions. Then the bureaucrats add content after their intense discussions. Unlike what many Japanese politicians used to do,just sitting on a position does not help. A leader must show direction or a framework before the bureaucrats add the content, otherwise, he/she will fail if faced with unexpected challenges outside of Japan.

[How do you see the Koizumi initiative?]

Kudo: The public seems to support political initiative and the Koizumi reform. However, decision-making is still based on the old mechanism of resolving conflicts of various interests in the private study groups. If no agreement is reached at those groups, the bill is virtually blocked. There are always fights between Prime Minister Koizumi and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) because of this old way of doing things. It is still the case that the bureaucrats are connected to both sides. How do bureaucrats see the current situation?

MOFA: Our understanding of the Prime Minister-led initiative is that we follow what the state ministers appointed by the Cabinet where the Prime Minister is [democratically] elected in the Diet does. A private study group in the ruling party does not have legal status at all and accordingly,neither legal responsibility or debate rules exist. I feel that the process of formality in those private study groups has gotten much tighter than in the past. For example, in these private study groups, the policies of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, can be easily turned down resulting in a dual power structure [where non-Cabinet members with no clear responsibility have greater power than the actual Cabinet members].

MOF: I think it is wrong to simply say that it is because of a dual power structure. For example, England [which also employs the Parliament system] does not have systems like in Japan. In Japan’s case, a policy-making body in the ruling party, such as committees and the general secretarial committee, exists separately from the government. The system varies from nation to nation. In the case of England, election-campaign pledges are made by the parties, and not by individual politicians who also cannot have supporters' associations. The bureaucrats cannot contact politicians. Under such situations, the party leader has power in pursuing foreign or economic policies that are consistent within the party. If your party did not win the election, you can become a member of the Shadow Cabinet where you can participate in the policy-making process. The competition between the ruling government and the Shadow Cabinet creates more discussions.

In the case of Japan, veto power is used in the committees. However, this mechanism does not create consistent economic or foreign policies. There are policies that are partly consistent; however, we don’t know whether or not the treaty will be agreed on. If there is a clear direction from the ruling party's perspective, then there will be discussions. However, in most of the cases, the arguments are very vague. Rather than a problem of dual power structure, Japan is weak in the policy-making arena both in the ruling parties and the rest of the parties as compared to other nations. In that sense, Japan is in transition.

[What do you think about abolishing the bill screening by the ruling party?]

Kudo: There is a discussion to abolish the bill screening by the ruling party, and shift the policy-making body to the government.

MOF: It is such a big issue in the political debate. This must be discussed in a process of creating new leadership. This point was, I think as a result of discussions, whether the system should be changed or whether a new leadership should be established.

However, Japanese democracy is based on an everybody-agrees system where the leader is not the winner of policy discussions but is assigned by the seniority system. Therefore, even if we abolish the bill screening by the ruling party, I don't know if it will really work in Japan. In the case of England, the Prime Minister has absolute power over personnel matters and policies. Another important condition is the stable status of the Prime Minister. In Japan, the party presidential election is held every two years. England went through intense discussions on the Parliament system at the end of nineteenth century. In general, the Parliament system will lose leadership because each parliament member plays an intermediary role representing an interest group. The British model has been established through these discussions which is a model for those who advocate the Prime Minister-led initiative. While England is defined as the Prime Minister-governing system, the U.S. is defined as the congress-governing system.
The American President also has four full years of stable status, and has power over personnel matters. Although the Congress has strong power, the President has a two-thirds veto power. Even if we abolish various committees, [we cannot soon be like the British system because] Britain has a long history to establish such strong leadership of the prime minister. We cannot simply bring the British system into Japan, because there is no basis.

The bill screening process by the ruling party started because the Diet did not have confidence in the proposal made by the government. I personally think that strong leadership by the Prime Minister will not be established unless the public monitors how tax revenue is used and votes politicians out based on the monitoring results. If the Constituency is only expecting to receive administrative services, bills won't pass without resolving conflicts of interest coordination among elected politicians. Ultimately, it is an issue of whether the party or the Diet will do the interest coordination. Actually there are almost no past Prime Ministers who had leadership in the policy-making arena like Mr. Koizumi. Mr. Koizumi is a new type of prime minister, possibly because he has such a high support rate. In any case, this discussion rests on the legislative branch rather than the administrative branch where I belong. Therefore, people like me should not discuss issues of the legislative branch.

Kudo: So, Kasumigaseki will just wait and see where this discussion is going?

MOF: Basically I think it is a political matter.

Kudo: However, if we look at debates in the political parties, politicians linked with special interest groups would discuss how to allocate public works spending rather than discussing policies. Are there any changes from Kasumigaseki perspective?

MOF: It all depends on what you see. The creation of CEFP obviously changed the many perspectives. In other words, issues like the “overall portion of public works spending should be reconsidered” is discussed in the Cabinet office. This is an unprecedented case. On the other hand, politicians who want to develop highways in their districts still act the same way as in the past. In other words, their styles of asking for subsidies have not changed.

METI: The bureaucrats by themselves can not force people to accept a pain. The constituency will not be satisfied if political responsibility is not taken. I think it has come to the point where politicians have to make the decisions when frictions become like rural areas versus cities or generational differences. Since the policy-evaluating method is not yet completely established, political debate is still heavily focused on interest-coordination. For example, we just started to discuss how to evaluate the public works how to resolve conflict of, and priorities cannot be discussed without having an objective mechanism.

The introduction of the Single-district electoral system [in the early 1990s] has relatively weakened the power of the policy tribe in the Diet(zoku giin). Politicians often know much more than the bureaucrats about economic situations in the local areas. We only get processed information that no longer has value. I wonder if we (bureaucrats and politicians) could cooperate in pursuing reform. However, even in the same ruling parties, there are disagreement in reforming the systems. I saw a chairman of one of these private study groups who had a sense of responsibility, while participating Diet members did not take issues seriously. To be honest, I don’t know how to deal with those unwilling Diet members.

[Do bureaucrats prefer the Koizumi initiative or the Party (LDP) initiative?]

Kudo: In the Koizumi administration, CEFP is getting more power and the system seems to be significantly changing. With emerging friction between CEFP and the LDP, which side are the bureaucrats taking?

MOFA: From our standpoint, the ruling parties are not equal to the administrative branch because they have different functions. Therefore, I believe the Prime Minister's office must have the main of power. It does not mean that no discussions are allowed if the central power rests on the Prime Minister's office. Discussions should be active. However, the final decision should be made by the Prime Minister’s office when it rests on the center of the administrative branch, and I think it is easier for us to do the job from our perspective as the administrative branch.

MOF: How politics should be is not the issue for us to decide. I don't agree with him. The Japanese model is different from the British model. Japan has been giving a great respect to the policy-making process of the ruling parties. Under such situations, it is not always the case that the Prime Minister's policy should be carried out. We know what the reality is. We have been doing well coordinating and negotiating with Diet members who possess the supreme national power, and we are different from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that sense. In the area of foreign policy, I agree that the Minister or the Prime Minister should pursue policies with responsibility. However, in the case of the MOF [Okurasho,the old MOF], we did not borrow our way from the British model. We, the Ministry of Finance, have always been thinking how to best resolve conflicts in various interests and formulate "best-optimized "policies. However, the Koizumi administration is taking British approaches. In that sense, I am again saying that we're in a transition period.

METI: We bureaucrats have contacts with politicians and at the same time, we also monitor real economic situations. Facing both fronts, as the government,we are expected to prioritize policies and provide quick and better ideas as the government. We feel very helpful if the ruling party members support us. In that sense, we are aiming to provide ideas and build a system under Prime Minister Koizumi's leadership.

MOFA: Up to now, we were functioning well by competing how quickly each of us can run where Japan's direction was already set. Today, Japan needs to decide which way to go. The decision would not be difficult if 90% of the Japanese people would like to go right while the remaining 10% would like to go left. However, discussion will not lead to the conclusion if 50% are looking at the right while the other 50% are looking at the left. Only time will go by in vain if we are just discussing and discussing, unless someone has to make a decision with a clear mandate. If the person fails, then we should go for the next person. In other words, make his/her responsibility very clear and give him/her the power to pursue the job. In the case of foreign policy or risk management, we are no longer in the happy era where we had enough time to discuss, agree, coordinate, and pursue the job with 90% of people sharing the same ideas. If we do it today, it is too late and does not work. Therefore, Japan needs to create a system where an individual can make decision quickly enough to deal with crisis situations based on a clear responsibility. In order to make this system work, we should make discussions transparent.

For the bureaucracy, I think it is required to provide objective policy options with merits and demerits, so that the politicians can use those materials to make decisions.

Kudo: There is a 30 trillion-yen ceiling for the bond issuance for the budget. With the economic situation worsening, some LDP members say it is crazy [limiting the government spending]. What is the position of the MOF?

MOF: What we, the MOF, are concerned about is that the fiscal balance has reached the limit and the MOF is losing the wherewithal in maintaining fiscal balance. Japan's national fiscal debt balance is the largest among OECD countries surpassing Italy. If that fiscal balance is still within the morale, then the interest rates will remain low. However, once the market sees the loss of morale, then the interest rates will dramatically rise. Up to now, the economic situation was not directly affected by the fiscal debts; however, it maybe close to the point where fiscal debts start worsening the economic situation. That 30 trillion-yen ceiling is what Prime Minister Koizumi pledged to the public, and it is like a borderline of protection. Nevertheless, when the economic situation gets much worse, that ceiling has no meaning.

Kudo: I agree that it has gotten to a sensitive phase of the fiscal morale you mentioned. The market thinks that Japan cannot recover if there is no clear policy. I agree with you that we're already in that dangerous phase; however, I feel there is a big discrepancy in recognizing the economic situation between us and the Party (LDP) level.

MOF: Other nations have experienced economic crashes and fiscal default as well as recoveries they were from. Thatcher's Britain is a typical example. Thatcher achieved fiscal balance when the unemployment rate was high. President Bush Senior increased taxes when the U.S. had not only an economic down turn but also twin deficits of fiscal and trade in the 1980s. Eventually the U.S. achieved the fiscal balance.

In the case of Japan, fortunate or unfortunate, it has not yet hit the bottom. In the 1990s, real national income did increase although it went flat in the end of 90s. Even now, employees at the big corporations are not suffering while employees from mid-small corporations are suffering from bankruptcies and severe job cuts. Nevertheless, there are many people who hope to achieve fiscal balance and avoid the crash of the Japanese economy.

[How do you envision the bureaucrats' reform?]

Kudo: This is also related to public employees' reform, what is expected of the bureaucrats?

METI: We have been working at the ministries for twenty some years and I think of many things. There has been an introduction of contracted employment at the bureaucracy, i.e., lawyers and accountants, and we also have exchange programs with private corporations for a limited number of years. I sincerely hope that there will be a system where a bureaucrat can improve his/her expertise by doing part-time jobs. Young bureaucrats don't think about working at the bureaucracy all their lives. I talked to one of the head-hunting people, and he said that young people who worked three years at the bureaucracy with overseas advanced degrees are very marketable. I think the bureaucrats in their twenties have the highest market value and in fact, I saw that some bureaucrats in their thirties established their own businesses. Therefore, today's bureaucrats would like to try many things, i.e., to utilize MBA degrees for policy-making or launch their own businesses. If you look around, there is Carlos Ghosn who revived Nissan, and he is doing an impressive thing. Why can't the Japanese do the management? Maybe American ways of management are also demanded in Japan. In that sense, we the bureaucrats and the bureaucracy can not survive if we don’t create a mechanism that allows the bureaucracy to enhance expertise.

MOF: We (the MOF) once thought of having exchange programs with private corporations for the purpose of experiencing private sense. We are concerned of those who would not come back after they worked for a private company. I know we need to make the organization more flexible by accepting outsiders; however, the public servants should have superior morale such that they think about the national interest when they join. For example,political appointees occupy a position above the division director level in the U.S. In Washington, 20,000 people would move from one position to another with a new administration change. On the other hand, young Japanese bureaucrats are not taking holidays but not working hard and only to things others do. If we continue this that system, we cannot give maximum policy-making support to the political leadership. In a high-growth era, nobody questioned and everybody followed the path. I strongly believe that we need to nurture the bureaucrats who have superior morale and think about national interests for the sake of maximizing the effectiveness of the political leadership.

Kudo: Your argument addresses "what is an elite in Japanese society? "Is elite status determined if one continues to be in power even offer the refinement by parachuting various organizations(Amakudari), or if one serves the public?

MOF: It is not a matter of the bureaucrats, but it is how the Japanese society uses an elite. I myself studied in the U.S., and the Dean of that school said that the U.S. lacks good management resources. We thought that we did not need good management but we need a goo system or good organization. Encouraging competitions within the organization or the system made Japan profitable during the high growth era an it still continues. Now that we have to think which way we are going to,I realized there is a shortage of leaders.

MOFA: The Political appointee system in the U.S. does create labor mobilization between the private and public sectors. If 1,000 bureaucrat positions exist, this means that 5,000 potential bureaucrats candidates exist. People other than these 1,000 bureaucrats are working outside the bureaucracy, in places such as think tanks, Congressional offices, media, financial institutions, or private corporations. In the U.S., there is a pool of people who are seeking a power elite path, and those people are continuously moving around. In that sense, we can develop a system flexible enough for us bureaucrats to spend time in think tanks or universities and come back. Since Japan needs a group of experts for certain fields, the bureaucracy can play the role of think tank. In order to do that, a clear distinction between the political role and the bureaucratic role needs to be shown, and then we need to be treated as ‘something important’ to maintain our pride. If the person seeks financial benefit, he/she won’t come join the bureaucracy, There are people who have great aspirations. We should create a system where we can make use of those people with great aspirations in journalism, politics, and the bureaucracy.

MOF: Of course there are no people with financial aspirations joining the bureaucracy, but I am afraid the quality of bureaucrats will be deteriorated if we cannot earn a certain level of salary. Life is eighty years long, and we cannot live when retirement comes at age sixty, especially when Amakudari is banned. Nobody would come join the bureaucracy if you had to start a new career at age sixty from scratch. Normally bureaucrats would work with a low-level salary in the developing nations, because they can get bribes as a supplement for their salary.

METI: A typical nation is Singapore.

MOFA: Without creating alternatives, it would be the worst case just lowering the quality of the bureaucracy.

MOF: If there were a clear future prospect for the bureaucracy, I would feel less anxious. However, I don't see it now. I feel that we, all the bureaucrats, have to get together and build the system again.

Kudo: Thank you very much.