[talk] What should be questioned in the realization of the Prime Minister's Leadership

Michio Muramatsu: Professor at Kyoto University

Born in 1940. Graduated from the Legal Department of Kyoto University in 1962. Professor of the Legal Department of Kyoto University in 1976. Book authorship includes Postwar Japanese Bureaucracy (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1981) for which he received the Suntory Award, Regional automy (Tokyo University Publishing 1988) for which he was awarded the Fujita Prize, Japanese public Administration (Chuko Shinsho, 1994) and Text for Study of Public Administration (Yuhikaku, 2001)

Why can't Japanese politics break the doldrums in which Japan finds itself in today? Prime Minister Koizumi who is trying to proceed with reforms under his own leadership is facing the resistance within the LDP and is forced to compromise. There are also arguments on abolition of so-called majority party investigation. However, more importantly, there is progress in the direction of reforms in the system of personnel within the executive branch has been proposed. It is necessary to conduct serious discussions in this direction. We spoke with Professor Michio Muramatsu concerning the way of the legislative branch and the direction of reforms of the bureaucracy.

Concerning why the Prime Minister cannot execute leadership, the thinking which ties it to the debate of abolition of majority party investigation is correct. This issue pertains to the relationship between the ruling party and the majority party, the relationship between the executive branch and politicians, the type of debate carried out in the Diet and the total of how parties should be, and unless the design looking at this total, we cannot proceed with the debate. This is how central this issue is. In the postwar economic growth, there was space for allocation according to the individual benefits. At that time, the LDP could take the social needs and attach them to the various organs of the government, and majority party investigation might have been efficient. However, the present issue is to bear new policies by the execution of leadership by the Prime Minister. Majority party investigation has become a burden. Within majority party investigation, the executive branch could coordinate interests in place of politics, and politics would penetrate into the administration, and this made unclear the responsibility of politics and the administration.

Another aspect of majority party investigation goes to the relationship between government officials and politics. The bureaucracy is at present committed to negotiate what should be done by the politicians, and but it should remove itself from a world where it takes upon the duties of politicians, and consider the range of action and formation of policy from the viewpoint of how the administration should be.

Bureaucratic institutions have until now been able to upkeep political neutrality, but it did not develop specialists. Rather than nurturing policy specialists, their policy was to negotiate with politicians and to write long sentences. It is now a good opportunity to argue what is the knowledge necessary for new bureaucrats. In the reforms of government officials, the most important theme is the retention of political neutrality in their hiring and promotion. One proposal for reforms was determined by the Cabinet without widespread debate or absorption of the majority, but in the execution of the reforms, all related parties should participate and think over the issues at hand.

Kudo: There are now debates over the abolition of the pre-investigation by the majority party concerning the leadership system of the Prime Minister. What do you think of this?

Muramatsu: Because such debates occurred, I think that it provides a good opportunity to consider the relationship of politicians and bureaucrats in the formation of policy and legislation. I think it was beneficial for such debates to occur, and have thought that it was an issue which should be argued. If we are to change the policy formation and structure of Japan, it started with the administrative reforms in the 1990's, and the judicial system was put under scrutiny. As such, the legislative process was bound to be put into view, and I think that in this sense a basic argument has begun. However, for this debate also, it is necessary to have an objective recognition of the relationship between politics and administration. For instance, there is the issue of bureaucratic sectionalism, and in the background there are groups of Diet members who have supported proposed statutes and budgets through the process of majority party investigation.

The recognition of administrative reform conferences from 1996 to 1997 was also incorrect. It stated that the ministry bureaucratic system determined all aspects and that Cabinet meetings had no power, so that with no influence from politicians, it was bound to end in only administrative reforms. However, if we debate the pros and cons of the majority party investigations, we are back on the right road.

There is very little experience in Japan of giving power to one person. Toshimichi Okubo in the Meiji era could be said as one of those people, but in the postwar period there have been no such examples. Within this experience, we have to think of what type of leadership should be given to the prime minister. Should we make a framework where it is especially costly to represent individual interests, or should we conduct strict adherence to party lines under the prime minister's leadership? Can we develop the politicians morals to support the prime minister and the party president that they have chosen? This is an issue of the legislative process within the Diet, but it is also a question of the party's institutions. Therefore, it is not as if we can just abolish majority party investigation in a simple manner.

We must consider the influence of such a position. Without a total design of the relationship between the ruling party and the government, the relationship between public officials and politicians, the method of debate within the Diet, the way of political parties and the relationship of the Cabinet and the minority parties, we can not proceed. In other words, the debates should not be limited to that of majority party investigation. Especially important is the intra-party opinion consisting of general party members within the parties.

Kudo: Whether or not majority party investigation is to be abolished is the question of whether the coordination of opinions is done within the party or in the Diet. Considering the political situation in Japan today, is this a necessary evil? It has become an obstacle for Prime Minister leadership and become separate from the senses of the people.

Muramatsu: I think there was a period when majority party investigation was a necessary evil in postwar Japanese politics. Especially during the Cold War, Japan had to have a system whereby policies could be created in an efficient manner. The pre-investigation by the majority party began since the Ikeda Cabinet, and up till then there was no such investigation, but there were strict criticisms from the majority party representatives in the Budget committees, and I believe that the custom of consulting in advance of the voting in the subcommittee of the Policy Research Council was developed gradually. The fact that the ruling party Policy group or its subcommittee could not determine the public interest in a rational manner can be seen in the situation whereby the allocation of public works is fixed and doesn't change at all. Policies which should be dynamic are in a situation where everything is fixed, however, in reality, there is only movement between warring parties.

Within the background of ever continuing economic growth in the postwar period, there was an annual allotment of new funds to be distributed to individual interests. It was correct for the consideration of everybody to how such new funds would be allotted, and to grasp social needs, there was a long period in which the majority party investigation was effective. However, at present, the issue is not the coordination of interests, but how new policies should be created. As long as the basic structure of the era has changed, I believe that we must change the ways of the legislative process and political parties as an obvious result.

Presently, Prime Minister Koizumi is trying to take a leadership position based on his popularity with the people. I do not deny the importance of structural reforms, but I think that there should be a more flexible combination with policies to revitalize the economy. However, this is a difficult task within the coordination of power relationships which are fixed. It is an age when the majority party investigation may become a bottleneck, and the new issue is whether or not we can create a framework for flexible implementation of leadership. Even with the new Prime Minister, there is extremely little room for leadership to be taken, and it is difficult to create new policies. This structure must be changed.

Kudo: In other words, within the systems under the postwar growth era which are being reconsidered, we must also take to issue the legislative process and the political parties themselves?

Muramatsu: Yes. I consider the question of non-performing assets to be the most important issue today in Japan. Why can't such issues be solved under present politics? These individual problems are the questions we must ask today. There is no model of democracy, which should be taken as an example for Japan and in the US and the UK, there are democracies which match the circumstances of their respective countries. In these countries, the leadership institutions of the parties are not as deeply involved in policies as they are in Japan. As long as they are chosen, the Prime Minister or the president should create their policies flexibly, and take the responsibility for explaining their policies afterwards. It is not only a framework whence the strong involvement of the ruling party into the political process cannot break the deadlock but also makes the responsibility of the prime minister unclear.

In the question of the Japanese Foreign Ministry also, the reason that the Ministry can battle Minister Makiko Tanaka is because politicians stood behind them and it now has the support of the prime minister. Unless we argue from the assumption that the ruling party controls Japan today, we cannot get to the heart of the problem. This is the issue of how the actions of the ruling party can be restricted. Normally, the expectations would be for the minority parties, but we can't expect anything from them, and the bureaucrats cannot expect anything by sticking to their respective representatives in the Diet. The only way out is to change the framework of the parties. Can a structure whereby the opinion of the general party members can influence the processes? In other words, the framework that Japan must consider from now on is not whether the British model or the American model can be applied, but what framework can solve Japanese problems.

Kudo: The Koizumi administration is challenging the status quo for reforms albeit slowly under the leadership of the Prime Minister. However, there are still many forces resisting this within the LDP. I believe that there is a basic paradox in this circumstance. What do you think we can solve this issue?

Muramatsu: Looking from the viewpoint of leadership, it appears that Prime Minister Koizumi is doing well. I think that this is because he has the qualities to be a leader. Although there are yet to be details, there is the impression that he is acting in a strong and immobile manner. At times, he does compromise. However, there are some aspects where he has lost confidence because he compromised when he didn’t have to. However, in toto, he has informed the Japanese people what the issues are. He also has his own direction. In particular, from the viewpoint of leadership by the Prime Minister, it is a fact that he has progressed greatly. Although it is of little use to state ideals, the number of secretaries to the prime minister has increased, and the support system is being built in reality within the Cabinet Office.

There is a possibility that the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy will play a large role in the future. In fact, we don't know whether what has been decided there will all be realized, but the reason for such a strong presence is because the prime minister himself supports the committee and there is the sense that it is a policy partner for the prime minister. In the future, to strengthen such committees as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy will be a method for brushing up the Prime Minister's policies.

If the Prime Minister consider the issues long and hard, his leadership should be implemented in a natural manner. What is interesting is the results of opinion polls such as the one taken by NHK and reported in the December 9th, 2001 news, whereby there were many opponents of individual reforms such as the reform of medical insurance, but the total support percentage has risen. Individually the opinions were opposed, but that Mr. Koizumi is doing well overall was evaluated, and as long as this occurs, Prime Minister Koizumi will continue to be in power.

I believe that there are methods of structural reform while stimulating the economy, but there are many issues which must be revised the structural reforms that the prime minister is undertaking. However, on this point, regardless of the fact that the prime minister is trying to take leadership, the way of thinking of the "zoku" representatives of partial interests and the individual institutions is to pull him back using arguments of responsibility and examples of hiding past mistakes, and this is occurring in both the public and private sector.

Concerning the recent debates on the majority party investigation, there are arguments that if there are pre-investigations or strict adherence to the party line are not determined in advance, what kind of procedures for session of the main Diet session and the budget committees are required, such as prolonging the time limit for consideration in advance, on implementing the party line under the leadership of the party president.

Prescription of the term of the party presidency to be four years, which is equivalent to that of the Diet members should be effective to increase the power of the president. I also believe that the revision of the official nomination procedures of the candidates for Diet membership is one solution. In the regulations within the LDP concerning procedures for session of the Diet, it will become necessary for the creation of regulations which raise the status of the top leadership in a continuous manner.

To change the systems which do not fit the present situation, it is important that the debates continue, and it should not only cover the administrative and the judicial branch, but also delve into the legislative process. The legislative process determines the contents of policy.

Kudo: How should the role of bureaucracy, in other words the issue of public officials, be handled under the debates up to now?

Muramatsu: The direction of reforms of the public officials has been determined within the Cabinet, but for changes in the Statute concerning Public Officials, the debates from now on will be more important. I believe it a shame that the interest of public opinion concerning the reforms of the public official system is low. I think that the procedures up to determination of the Cabinet leave much to be desired.

The majority of people have not participated in the debates. I believe that in administrative reforms such as the restructuring of the ministries and agencies should be left to the leadership of the prime minister, but the system of public officials is an issue that changes the patterns of job choice among the Japanese youth, and it is characterized by the long term which cannot be restored for a long time.

The political power is changed by whom considered this system, and I do not believe it is beneficial that the contents are determined and publicized by the Cabinet. I think that the issue should be taken up with more clarity.

There are many weak aspects to the proposed reforms submitted at present, but I think that the most serious issue is that of the examinations and hiring of new recruits. The next proposal reform assumes the maintenance of the past career level system and the number of those hired from those passing the career examinations are proposed to increase fourfold. Next, the people who are hired are to be chosen under the jurisdiction of each ministry. However, the issue here is the maintenance of political neutrality in the hiring of public officials. There is a rule concerning the interests of politics which occur where there is discretion. If there are people who pass the examination among the fourfold increase, those who have the support of politicians must be hired. Furthermore, the fourfold increase is the bottom line of the determination of the evaluation of the quality of public officials. It is not difficult to come within the fourfold increase.

Another point which received my attention is that, specialists among the administration were not nurtured, which became clear, for example in the financial administration. How could the career officials learn about the actual positions and receive the most recent knowledge? In finance, medical insurance and other such areas, the job of specialists in each area should not be done by generalists, but by specialists who hold authority and responsibility and can receive good positions. Within the job of specialists, there are many who should receive the best treatment according to their importance. In other words, while the ministries hire high quality people, they did not nurture specialists, and their capabilities were used to negotiate with politicians and write long sentences. If these people do the coordination of interests which should be carried out by politicians, the circumstance whereby public officials leave the realm of bureaucracy. I think that this is a good opportunity to debate what should be the necessary knowledge for new bureaucrats. If we are to maintain career status, there should be a special moral code for these people and good treatment should be given.

At the same time, I think that there is a unique noblesse oblige among such officials, and we should return to the prewar and the period just after the war in the necessity of recognizing the position of these people once more.

There are the arguments that the chosen people have been picked through a competitive process, but competition in the public sector should be carried out according to the specification of results, and wouldn't this just cause the maintenance of the majority party investigations? In these cases also, unless good people are hired in the beginning, the pride of the public officials cannot be maintained. If the entrance is wide, these people would be evaluated at the bottom line of those passed the examination conducted?

Kudo: What type of bureaucrat do you think is necessary for Japan in the future?

Muramatsu: In a book I wrote a long time ago, I have said that the ideal bureaucrat was a technocrat which does not cause technocracy. Technocracy indicates the control of politics by bureaucrats through specialization, but I think that it is possible for specialist abilities to be high but not controlling, the control being the responsibility of the political parties.

In contrast, for example, the Ministry of Finance has gone too far into politics. The bureaucrats have a huge influence on the contents of policies. I think that this is true. However, there is the aspect of bureaucrats not working as bureaucrats in fear of politicians. There is no use in listing all the examples, but during the Obuchi Cabinet, there was a sea accident by the JCO, and the secretary of the prime minister did not want to interrupt a luncheon by the prime minister and did not inform the information of the Science and Technology Agency to him. During the Murayama administration, there were no bureaucrats who pressed him to utilize all his authority. The people who are in responsible positions within the administration should conduct its manner with the responsibility of the executive branch. In relation to the majority party investigation stated earlier, the coordination of political interests should be left by the bureaucracy to the politicians, and should be left alone, even if there is the possibility of a vacuum occurring.

Unless the bureaucracy stays out, the bureaucrats will hold the responsibility of muddy coordination of the politicians, and they will become tired in their individual lines. If the bureaucrats feel that work makes their life worth living, the bureaucrat himself will take time away for his subordinates and ignore the nurturing of these subordinates, which might result in the self-destruction of the bureaucracy.

The system of top ranking bureaucrats in Great Britain is not of the decision maker, but they have continued to work in a steady manner. The top ranking appointments in the American government do important work. The present proposals for reform of the public official system takes as its model the American case in increasing the mobility of the officials, but the US has its own history. Both countries have developed their systems through hardship. The US has a pool of political appointees from think tanks and universities, and high ranking government officials retire into universities and think tanks and international organizations. There are such prospective officials in both the Democratic and the Republican parties, so that they are appointed with each change in administration. Japan does not haven that luxury. Therefore, the bureaucrats have nowhere to escape, and must follow the commands of the politicians.

Returning to the subject of new ideas for those officials retiring from their ministry posts to the private or semipublic sector, I believe frankly that the regulations are too lax. This is because there are no a priori regulations of these practices. There is the argument that if there are problems, they should be solved after the fact, but what happens if there are an unlimited number of problems? Wouldn't the dignity of the Japanese bureaucracy which is already endangered drop? Public officials have the power to implement a certain amount of authority. Therefore, we must firstly consider that their pay is obviously lower than that of the private sector counterparts.

Another question is the self control of the execution of authority, but there is the issue of whether the former bureaucrat can control himself after he leaves his ministry post. Here too there should be some sort of rule in advance, and there should be control by a committee which oversees such matters. I don’t believe that it has to be the Personnel Agency at present, but I do think that there should be some a priori regulations of the jobs taken by former ministry officials.

I shall repeat that the reforms of public officials has been determined by the Cabinet without widespread debate, but the present situation is tenuous.

Kudo: Thank you very much.