The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2015)
Analysis Report on Comparative Data

In Cooperation with:
Japan: Public Opinion Research Institute Corporation
South Korea: Hankook Research Co.Ltd

May 2015

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< Survey Overview>

From April to May 2015, The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted joint public opinion polls in Japan and South Korea. The objective of this annual survey is to monitor the state of mutual understanding and awareness of the Japanese and South Korean public, in order to contribute closing the gap in the perceptions of each other between the two societies, and promoting greater mutual understanding. The result of this survey will also be presented and utilized in a dialogue between Japan and South Korea, ‘Japan-Korea Future Dialogue’ on June 21, 2015. The dialogue and joint opinion polls have been conducted annually since 2013 aiming to improve the relationship between the two countries.

The opinion poll in Japan was fielded from April 9 to 30, through the door-to-door home-visit method targeting the men and women over the age of 18 (excluding high school students). The number of total valid responses obtained was 1,000. The final academic qualifications of respondents were as follows: elementary/middle school certificate 9.9%, high school certificate 45.5%, junior college/technical college certificate 18.3%, bachelor’s degree 23.2%, and master’s degree and above 2.1%.

The opinion poll in South Korea was fielded from April 17 to May 8, through face-to-face interview, targeting men and women over the age of 19. The number of total valid responses obtained was 1,010. The final academic qualifications of respondents were as follows: lower than elementary school certificate 7.8%, middle school certificate 7.1%, high school certificate 37.4%, university/college (currently studying and expulsion) 11.4%, bachelor’s degree 35.0%, and master’s degree and above 1.3%.

<Intellectual Survey>

From mid-April to early May 2015, the Genron NPO and EAI have conducted an additional survey targeting intellectuals in Japan and South Korea. In Japan, the questionnaire consisted of 19 questions which excerpted from the public opinion poll was sent to approximately 6,000 intellectuals who have previously participated in the discussions and surveys organized by The Genron NPO. Responses were obtained from 634 intellectuals. In South Korea, the same questionnaire was sent to approximately 5,000 intellectuals by email. Total response obtained was 310. Those respondents are considered as representative of well-informed intellectuals in Japan and South Korea. The intellectual survey is designed to complement the analysis of general public opinion poll.
1. Impression on One Another’s Countries

1-1. Impressions on One Another’s Country among the Japanese and South Korean Public

Impressions of South Korea among the Japanese public continues to be predominantly unfavorable despite the slight improvement from last year. South Koreans’ impression of Japan was further aggravated.

While over half of Japanese (52.4%) continue to have “unfavorable” impressions of South Korea (including “relatively unfavorable,” same applies below), this percentage has slightly improved from last year (54.4%). Those with “favorable” impressions (23.8%) also increased from last year’s 20.5%.

In South Korea, on the other hand, 72.5% continue to have “unfavorable” impressions of Japan (compared to 70.9% last year). The percentage with “favorable” impressions of Japan further decreased from last year’s 17.5% to 15.7%, showing that there has not been an end to the worsening of aggravated sentiments.

※ Among Japanese intellectuals, the percentage with “favorable” impressions (42.7% this year, 41.7% last year) continues to contend with “unfavorable” impressions (43.2% this year, 44.2% last year), following last year’s trend. For South Korean intellectuals, the percentage with “favorable” impressions increased to 55.2% from last year’s 51.7%, largely exceeding the 36.4% with “unfavorable” impressions (36.8% last year).

【Figure 1  Impression of One Another’s Countries】

※ The data for “Favorable” impression includes both “Favorable” and “Relatively favorable” responses. The data for “Unfavorable” impression includes both “Unfavorable” and “Relatively unfavorable” responses.
In both countries, “history” and the “territorial disputes” are the main causes that adversely affect the impressions of the two countries on one another.

The Japanese public's negative impressions of South Korea were found to mainly be due to “criticism of Japan over historical issues” (74.6%), in line with last year’s response (73.9%). This cause is followed by the “Continuing confrontation over Takeshima” (36.5%), which showed a slight decreased from last year (41.9%).

On the other hand, the South Korean public's negative impressions of Japan were found to be caused by “Japan's lack of remorse for historical invasions” (74.0%), which slightly decreased in percentage points from last year (76.8%) but largely remained the leading opinion. The second leading response was the “Continuing confrontation over Dokdo,” cited by 69.3% (71.6% last year) of South Koreans.

In terms of reasons for positive impressions of one another’s countries, the majority (51.7%) of Japanese cite their “interest in South Korean TV drama and music.” This percentage, however, has dropped from last year’s 59.0%. In contrast, a 63.9% majority of South Koreans (56.8% last year) cite their reason as “Japanese people are kind and earnest,” followed by “Japan is a developed country with a high living standard” (49.4% this year, 53.4% last year). “Both countries are democratic” constituted a mere 8.9% of opinions, showing a decrease from last year’s 14.8%.
【Figure 2  Reasons for Negative Impressions】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=524)

- Criticism of Japan over historical issues: 74.6%, 73.9%
- Continuing confrontation over Takeshima: 36.5%, 41.9%
- Incomprehensible nationalism in behavior and ideas: 13.0%, 17.5%
- South Korean people’s emotional attitude toward Japan: 19.1%, 14.2%
- Some South Korean people mix politics with sports: 28.1%, 30.0%
- The badwill expressed by some South Korean politicians toward Japan: 2.9%, 3.1%
- Others: 0.8%, 0.4%
- No particular reason: 2.2%
- No response: 0.0%

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=732)

- Japan’s lack of remorse for historical invasions of South Korea: 74.0%, 76.8%
- Continuing confrontation over Dokdo: 4.1%, 5.5%
- Japanese people discriminate against South Koreans living in Japan: 16.7%, 14.3%
- There are differences between Japanese people’s stated principles (tatemae) and their real intentions (hon’ne): 7.4%, 6.3%
- Japan’s conservative swing: 24.7%, 22.9%
- The badwill expressed by some Japanese politicians toward South Korea: 1.9%, 0.7%
- Others: 0.5%, 0.7%
- No particular reason: 0.0%, 0.7%
- No response: 0.7%
1-3. Awareness of Issues on Current National Sentiment between Japan and South Korea

| Approximately 70% of both Japanese and South Koreans consider the current worsening national sentiments as "undesirable" or a "problem." |

Nearly a third (29.0%) of Japanese recognize current worsening national sentiment between the two countries as “an undesirable situation” and express concerns. Furthermore, 38.8% feel that “there is a problem” that needs to be resolved – together, a total of nearly 70% of Japanese see the current state of national sentiments as a problem. On the other hand, 26.4% of South Koreans see the current state of national sentiments as “an undesirable situation,” while 40.8% feel that “there is a problem” that needs to be resolved. Together, nearly 70% of South Koreans likewise see the issue as a problem. The only difference is that, while less than 10% of Japanese see the situation as something “natural can be understood,” this number is a definitive 28.1% for South Koreans.
【Figure 3  Recognition of Current Situation between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000）

Public Opinion in South Korea（N=1010）

※This question was only asked to the respondents who answered that in the past year the “Changes in impressions of one another’s countries” was either “No substantial change”, “Relatively worsened” or had “Greatly worsened” in 2014.
2. Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries

2-1. Understanding of the Social/Political Systems of One Another’s Countries

Over half of the Japanese public consider current South Korean society to be “ethnicism,” while over half of the South Koreans public consider Japan as “militarism.”

In terms of the current social/political systems of one another’s countries, the majority of Japanese (55.7%) see the current state of South Korea as “ethnicistic,” up 10 percentage points from last year’s 44.8%. Following this, 38.6% see South Korea as “nationalistic,” also showing an increase from last year’s 32.4%. Only a mere 14.0% see South Korea as “democratic,” a large drop from last year’s 21.5%.

On the other hand, the majority of South Koreans (56.9%) see the current state of Japan as “militaristic,” (up from last year’s 53.1%), followed by “capitalistic” at 38.9% (35.2% last year). At the same time, 34.3% of South Koreans see Japan as “hegemonistic,” largely exceeding last year’s 26.8%. Following last year’s trend, only 20% or so see Japan as a “democratic” nation (22.2% this year, 24.9% last year).

Additionally, for both Japanese and South Koreans, less than 10% (6.6% and 4.2% respectively) see one another’s countries as “pacifistic.”

※ Like the popular opinion poll, a nearly 80% majority of Japanese intellectuals also see South Korea as “ethnicistic” (78.1%, 70.6% last year). The majority of South Korean intellectuals, on the other hand, see Japan as “nationalistic” (64.8% this year, showing an increase from last year’s 57.8%), followed by “ethnicistic” (46.8%, 53.5% last year) and “capitalistic” (41.0%, 34.0% last year).
【Figure 4 Understanding of Social/Political Systems in One Another's Countries】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
3. Present and Future Japan-South Korea Relations

3-1. How Current and Future Japan-South Korea Relations are Viewed

More than 60% Japanese and almost 80% South Koreans consider the current state of Japan-South Korea relations to be “bad”. On the other hand, the expectations on the bilateral relations to improve in the future are growing in both countries.

A high level of Japanese (65.4%) still see current Japan-South Korea relations as “bad” (including both “extremely bad” and “relatively bad,” same applies hereafter), with a slight improvement from last year (73.8%). On the other hand, 78.3% of South Koreans continue to see current Japan-South Korea relations as “bad,” following the trend from last year (77.8%).

In terms of future prospects for Japan-South Korea relations, the majority of both Japanese (41.4%, 32.9% last year) and South Koreans (45.9%, 38.1% last year) feel that the current state of difficult bilateral relations will not change — a view that has increased in both countries since last year. However, there was also an increase in both Japanese (21.9%, 15.6% last year) and South Koreans (19.0%, 13.8% last year) who feel that relations “will improve” (including “will probably improve”), and the percentage of those who feel conditions “will get worse” (including “will probably get worse”) dropped for both the Japanese (12.1%, 22.7% last year) and South Koreans (28.4%, 39.4% last year). More people thus see a brighter prospect for improving relations between Japan and South Korea.
【Figure 5  Current State of Japan-South Korea Relations】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)</th>
<th>Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely good / Relatively good</td>
<td>Extremely good / Relatively good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Good nor Bad</td>
<td>Neither Good nor Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely bad / Relatively bad</td>
<td>Extremely bad / Relatively bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

【Figure 6  Future of Japan-South Korea Relations】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)</th>
<th>Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Will improve&quot; / &quot;will probably improve&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Will improve&quot; / &quot;will probably improve&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will not change</td>
<td>Will not change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Will get worse&quot; / &quot;Will probably get worse&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Will get worse&quot; / &quot;Will probably get worse&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither / Don't know</td>
<td>Neither / Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3-2. What Hinders the Development of Bilateral Relations

Both Japanese and South Koreans consider the “Takeshima/Dokdo territorial disputes” and the “comfort women issue” to be the greatest barrier to the development of bilateral relations.

The majority of Japanese (62.0%) still see the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” as the greatest barrier to the development of bilateral relations, although a slight decrease can be seen from last year’s results (68.9%). Likewise, 88.3% of South Koreans (92.2% last year) also voice the same opinion. This year, the “comfort women issue” was also included as one of the answer choices, and this became the second leading response in both countries (58.5% for Japanese and 63.5% for South Koreans).

※ For this question, results differed between intellectuals of the two countries. In Japan, the majority of intellectuals (47.3%) see the “comfort women issue” as the greatest barrier, followed by “education and recognition of history in South Korea” (34.1%), “anti-Japanese coverage in South Korean news media” (33.0%) and “anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean people” (31.5%). For South Korean intellectuals, on the other hand, “education and recognition of history in Japan” was overwhelmingly the leading response, at 66.8%.

【Figure 7 Barriers to Bilateral Relations】
3-3. How the Importance of Japan-South Korea Relations is Viewed

Over 60% of Japanese and nearly 90% of South Koreans consider the Japan-South Korea relationship to be “important.”

A 65.3% majority of Japanese see Japan-South Korea relations as “important” (including “relatively important,” same applies hereafter), exceeding last year’s 60.0%, while 87.4% of South Koreans (73.4% last year) think the same. On the other hand, a mere 15.7% of Japanese (10.0% last year) and 9.1% of South Koreans (6.7% last year) see Japan-South Korea relations as “unimportant” (including “relatively unimportant”). This year’s results were influenced by the fact that “don’t know” was taken off the list of answer choices; the results show that the majority of people who responded they “don’t know” last year shifted their responses to “important.”

【Figure 8  Importance of Bilateral Relations Between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important or relatively important</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant or relatively unimportant</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3-4. “Importance” and “Affinity” of Japan-South Korea Relations Compared to China

South Koreans feel more affinity towards China in comparison to Japan, and the majority of South Koreans consider South Korea-China relations as “more important.” The percentage of Japanese public who consider Japan-China relations as “more important” is on the rise.

In terms of the importance of Japan-South Korea relations in comparison to Japan-China and South Korea-China relations, nearly half of Japanese (49.1%, 47.0% last year) feel that “both are of the same importance.” Likewise, nearly half of South Koreans (46.6%, 47.0% last year) also view both as “of the same importance.” In South Korea, however, an almost equivalent percentage (44.8%, 43.8% last year) feel that “South Korea-China relations are more important.” There was likewise a 10-point increase in Japanese (from 15.6% last year to 25.1% this year) who feel Japan-China relations are “more important.”

Regarding which country the Japanese feel more affinity to, most Japanese (34.5%, 31.8% last year) say that they feel no affinity toward either. While the majority of Japanese (37.2%) responded that they feel “more affinity to South Korea” last year, this response decreased this year to 31.0%. For South Koreans, a 41.0% majority (38.8% last year) feel “more affinity to China” while a mere 11.1% feel “more affinity to Japan” (12.3% last year).

【Figure 9 Importance of Japan-South Korea Relations and Relations with China】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) vs Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan-South Korea relations are more important</th>
<th>Relations with China are more important</th>
<th>Both relations are equally important</th>
<th>Neither / don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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【Figure 10  Affinity Toward One Another's Countries and Toward China】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

- More affinity felt toward Japan/South Korea: 37.2% in 2015, 31.0% in 2014
- More affinity felt toward China: 5.0% in 2015, 6.5% in 2014
- Equal affinity felt toward both: 10.2% in 2015, 11.3% in 2014
- No affinity felt toward either: 31.8% in 2015, 34.5% in 2014
- Neither / Don't know: 15.8% in 2015, 16.7% in 2014
- No response: 0.0% in 2015, 0.0% in 2014

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- More affinity felt toward Japan/South Korea: 12.3% in 2015, 11.1% in 2014
- More affinity felt toward China: 38.8% in 2015, 41.0% in 2014
- Equal affinity felt toward both: 12.1% in 2015, 12.0% in 2014
- No affinity felt toward either: 29.3% in 2015, 30.4% in 2014
- Neither / Don't know: 7.6% in 2015, 5.5% in 2014
- No response: 0.0% in 2015, 0.0% in 2014

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4. Diplomatic Relations and Private Exchanges

4-1. Necessity of a Japan-South Korea Summit and the Summit’s Agenda

Over 80% of both Japanese and South Korean consider a Japan-South Korea summit. However, in South Korea, approximately 70% say that “the need exists but there is no urgency.” In terms of summit’s agendas for bilateral talks, the majority in Japan consider a “broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations” to be the most important agenda, while, in South Korea, there is a strong tendency to focus on issues regarding “history” and “territory.”

A total of over 80% of both countries’ people feel the need for a Japan-South Korea summit. However, the majority of both Japanese (43.5%, 40.5% last year) and South Koreans (69.9%, 72.4% last year) say that “the need exists but there is no urgency.” In regards to the summit’s agenda, a 45.3% majority of Japanese consider a “broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between the two countries” to be the most important agenda, largely surpassing last year’s 35.6%. In contrast, a 77.7% majority of South Koreans (76.3% last year) view “issues on historical understanding and comfort women” to be the most important agenda, closely followed by the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” (69.3%, 70.3% last year), highlighting the high level of interest in issues regarding “history” and “territory” in South Korea.

※ On the other hand, a 53.5% majority of Japanese (50.2% last year) and 68.1% majority of South Korean intellectuals say that the most important agenda at a Japan-South Korea summit is a “broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between the two countries.”

Table: Necessity of Japan-South Korea Summit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Japan (%)</th>
<th>South Korea (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Yes, every effort should be made to achieve this</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Yes but it is not urgent</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C No, it is not necessary</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Don’t know</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E No response</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
4-2. Impression of One Another’s Political Leaders

The majority in both countries see one another’s political leaders as “unfavorable.” Over 80% of the South Korean public have an “unfavorable impression” of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Nearly half of Japanese (48.3%, 45.3% last year) have an “unfavorable impression” (including both “extremely unfavorable” and “relatively unfavorable,” same applies hereafter) of the South Korean president, while a mere 5.2% (7.0% last year) have a “favorable impression.” On the other hand, 80.5% of South Koreans have an “unfavorable” impression of the Japanese prime minister (exceeding last year’s 75.9%) and a mere 2.1% have a “favorable” impression (1.8% last year).
4-3. Views about Visits to Each Other’s Country

Over 40% of Japanese and nearly 60% of South Koreans hope to visit one another’s countries.

Like last year, both countries’ people were highly interested in visiting one another’s countries, with 40.7% of Japanese (41.6% last year) expressing interest in traveling to South Korea, and 59.2% of South Koreans (60.9% last year) expressing interest in traveling to Japan. On the other hand, 35.9% of Japanese (37.3% last year) and 31.0% of South Koreans (30.9% last year) were uninterested in visiting the respective countries.
5. Historical Issues between Japan and South Korea

5-1. Views of Japanese and South Korean Peoples about Historical Issues

In Japan, the majority see historical issues as difficult to resolve, while in South Korea, the majority say that "relations will not develop further if issues of historical understanding are not resolved." This infers a general perception in South Korea that the resolution of historical issues is a necessary premise for improving Japan-South Korea relations.

In regards to Japan-South Korea relations and historical issues, most Japanese (35.1%, 34.7% last year) feel that “even if relations develop further, it will be difficult to resolve issues of historical understanding.” On the other hand, the optimistic view that “as relations develop further, issues of historical understanding will be gradually resolved” remained at around 20% (19.3% this year, 20.0% last year). In contrast, 52.5% of South Koreans feel that “relations will not develop further if issues of historical understanding are not resolved,” largely exceeding last year’s 41.1%. At the same time, 24.8% of South Koreans feel that “even if relations develop further, it will be difficult to resolve issues of historical understanding” (30.6% last year), while 20.9% feel that “as relations develop, issues of historical understanding will be gradually resolved” (23.3% last year).

As for issues of historical understanding that need to be resolved, a 52.5% majority of Japanese say “anti-Japan education and the depictions of history in textbooks in South Korean schools,” closely followed by “South Koreans’ excessive anti-Japan acts of aggression over historical issues” (52.1%).

For South Koreans, 76.0% feel the need to resolve “the depiction of history in textbooks in Japanese schools,” a slightly lower percentage than last year’s 81.9%, but still the leading response. This is followed by the issues of “Japanese people’s perception of comfort women” (69.8%, 71.6% last year), “Japan’s perception of its invasions of South Korea” (60.9%, 70.6% last year) and the “Japanese lack of apology or remorse for historical events” (59.6%, 58.7% last year).

【Figure 15  Bilateral Relations and Historical Issues】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)</th>
<th>Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Relations will not develop further if issues of historical understanding are not resolved</td>
<td>A 52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B As relations develop further, issues of historical understanding will be gradually resolved</td>
<td>C 24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Even if relations develop further, it will be difficult to resolve issues of historical understanding</td>
<td>D 1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Don’t know</td>
<td>E 0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E No response</td>
<td>E 0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
【Figure 16  Challenges to Resolve First in Issues of Historical Understanding between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan （N=1000）

Public Opinion in South Korea （N=1010）
5-2. Views About Japanese Prime Minister’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine

While 70% of Japanese acknowledge and accept their prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, nearly 70% of South Koreans are against the visit, stating that it is “not acceptable even if the visit is as a private citizen.”

In terms of the Japanese prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, 41.3% of Japanese (43.0% last year) continue to acknowledge the visit as “not a problem.” Adding in the 29.1% (24.9% last year) who say that the visit is “not a problem if the visit is as a private citizen,” over 70% of Japanese accept and acknowledge the prime minister’s visit. On the other hand, 64.6% of South Koreans (66.5% last year) say that the visit is “not acceptable, whether [it] is made in an official capacity or as a private citizen.” Those who view the visit as “not a problem” constituted a mere 3.3% (3.1% last year) and, adding those who say that the visit is “not a problem if the visit is as a private citizen” (22.4%, 21.8% last year), a total of less than 30% accept the Japanese prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

【Figure 17 Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to Yasukuni】

Public Opinion in Japan （N=1000） Public Opinion in South Korea  （N=1010）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Not a problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Not a problem if the visit is as a private citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Not acceptable, whether [it] is made in an official capacity or as a private citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A 41.3% B 29.1% C 16.7% D 12.7% E 0.2%

A 3.3% B 22.4% C 64.6% D 9.8% E 0.0%
6. The Future of the Korean Peninsula

6-1. Korean Peninsula in a 10 Years’ Time

In regards to the state of the Korean Peninsula in 10 years, the view that the situation “will not change” increased among both countries’ respondents.

In regards to the state of the Korean Peninsula 10 years on, the view that it “will remain unchanged” largely increased among the Japanese, from 26.2% last year to 42.1% this year, exceeding the 33.9% who say that it “cannot be predicted” (50.6% last year).

The view that the current state “will remain unchanged” was also the leading opinion (35.0%) this year in South Korea, one of the countries in the Korean Peninsula, and the large rise from last year’s 23.2% pushed it above last year’s leading opinion that the situation “cannot be predicted” (26.3% this year, 36.9% last year). In South Korea, 27.6% also expressed the view that “will move toward reunification” (26.4% last year).

※ While the majority of Japanese intellectuals feel that the situation “cannot be predicted” (33.4%, 30.8% last year), nearly 30% also feel that “will move toward reunification” (27.8%, 30.3% last year). On the other hand, the view that “will move toward reunification” constituted a 46.1% majority of South Korean intellectuals’ opinions (50.9% last year).

【Figure 18  State of Korean Peninsula in 10 Years】

Public Opinion in Japan  (N=1000)  Public Opinion in South Korea   (N=1010)

A  Will remain unchanged
B South Korea-North Korea confrontation will be intensified
C Will move towards unification
D Others
E Can’t be predicted
F No response
7. Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea

7-1. Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea

In regards to economic relations between Japan and South Korea, the majorities in both countries consider that one another’s economic development will have a positive influence on their own countries.

Nearly half of the Japanese public (49.5%, 42.8% last year) express the view that “economic growth in South Korea is both beneficial and necessary to Japan” (including those that “tend to agree,” same applies hereafter), showing an increasing understanding that South Korea’s economic development is also beneficial to Japan.

This “beneficial” view of economic relations has also become prevalent among the South Korean public as well (46.6%, 43.3% last year), exceeding the view that “economic growth in Japan is a threat to South Korea” (37.0%, 37.5% last year).

【Figure 19 Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea】
8. The Territorial Dispute and Security in East Asia

8-1. Views on Military Threat and Dispute in East Asia

In South Korea, nearly 60% see “Japan” as a military threat. Furthermore, nearly 40% foresee a future military dispute between Japan and South Korea.

The majority of Japanese see “North Korea” as the largest military threat (71.6%, 72.5% last year), followed by “China” (64.3% this year, a decrease from last year’s 71.4%). The majority of South Koreans likewise cite “North Korea” as the largest military threat (83.4%, also 83.4% last year), but this is followed by “Japan” at 58.1% — a large increase from last year’s 46.3% — exceeding “China” at 36.8% (39.6% last year).

In regards to the possibility of military conflict between Japan and South Korea, 65.7% of Japanese say that it “will not occur,” showing a rise from last year’s 57.0%. Less than 10% of Japanese express concerns that military dispute between Japan and South Korea “will occur within a few years” (0.7%, 0.4% last year) or “will occur in the future” (8.6%, 8.8% last year). On the other hand, while a 48.2% majority of South Koreans likewise say that military conflict “will not occur” (47.9% last year), a total of nearly 40% of the South Korean public also foresee a future military dispute “within a few years” (5.3%, 6.7% last year) or “in the future” (32.5%, 34.1% last year).

In terms of resolving the territorial dispute in East Asia, the majority of Japanese (38.8%) believe that “the matter should be taken to the International Court of Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law,” followed by the view that “the matter should be resolved by the two countries involved by peaceful means” (21.5%). In South Korea, a 33.4% majority feel that “the matter should be resolved by the two countries involved by peaceful means,” followed by the view that “the matter should be taken to the International Court of Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law” (25.0%), and the opinion to “strengthen practical control and prevent intervention from other countries” (17.9%).

※ The majority of Japanese intellectuals feel that “the dispute should be shelved over the long term [to] prioritize the amelioration of bilateral relations and strengthening of friendly ties” (31.2%). In contrast, 37.1% of South Korean intellectuals feel the best solution is to “strengthen practical control and prevent intervention from other countries.”
【Figure 20  Countries and Areas Perceived as Military Threat】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

※Korean respondents were asked to identify up to two countries or areas. Japanese respondents were not restricted in the number of countries or areas they could choose.
**Figure 21 Will a Military Confrontation Occur Between Japan and South Korea?**

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)  
Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- **Will occur within a few years**
  - Japan: 0.7%  
  - South Korea: 5.3%
- **Will occur in the future**
  - Japan: 8.6%  
  - South Korea: 32.5%
- **Will not occur**
  - Japan: 65.7%  
  - South Korea: 48.2%
- **Don’t know**
  - Japan: 24.8%  
  - South Korea: 14.0%
- **No response**
  - Japan: 0.2%  
  - South Korea: 0.0%

**Figure 22 How to Resolve the Territorial Dispute**

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)  
Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- **A** The matter should be taken to the International Court of Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law
- **B** The matter should be resolved by the two countries involved by peaceful means
- **C** The matter should be resolved through dialogue involving neighboring countries
- **D** Strengthen practical control and prevent intervention from other countries
- **E** The dispute should be shelved over the long term and prioritize amelioration of bilateral relations and strengthening of friendly ties
- **F** Others
- **G** Don’t know
- **H** No response

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9. Media Coverage and Public Opinion on the Internet

9-1. Is Media Coverage in Japan and South Korea Objective and Impartial?

In regards to whether domestic media is “objective and impartial,” the majority of Japanese say that they “don’t know,” while the majority of South Koreans feel that their domestic media is “not objective nor impartial.”

In response to the question, “is media coverage in your own country objective and impartial?” the majority of Japanese say they “don’t know” (43.0%, 48.7% last year), while those who “think so” and those who “don’t think so” are at almost equal levels at 28.8% (27.0% last year) and 28.2% (24.2% last year) respectively. In comparison, a 51.7% majority of South Koreans don’t think domestic media is objective and impartial, while only 26.5% (22.7% last year) think of domestic media as objective and impartial.

[Figure 23 Is the Media Coverage in Your Own Country Objective and Impartial?]

9-2. Do Opinions on the Internet Appropriately Reflect People’s Views in Japan and South Korea?

The half of South Koreans and 40% of Japanese feel that the Internet “does not appropriately reflect the state of general public opinion.”

In regards to whether opinions on the internet appropriately reflect people’s views, the response that it does not reflect public opinion (including “not very appropriately”) increased from 34.1% last year to 42.9% this year among the Japanese, bringing it almost equal to the 45.3% majority who “don’t know.” The response that it appropriately reflects public opinion constituted a mere 11.5% of opinions in Japan (11.7% last year). On the
other hand, more than half of South Koreans (51.2%, 50.6% last year) think that the internet does not appropriately reflect public opinion, while a steady 35.2% (35.2% last year) think it appropriately reflects public opinion.

【Figure 24 Do Opinions on the Internet Reflect Public Opinion in Your Country?】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

- Think the Internet appropriately reflects public opinion
  - 2015: 11.5%
  - 2014: 11.7%
- Think the Internet less appropriately reflects public opinion
  - 2015: 31.0%
  - 2014: 25.4%
- Think the Internet does not appropriately reflect public opinion
  - 2015: 45.3%
  - 2014: 8.7%
- Don’t know
  - 2015: 0.3%
  - 2014: 0.2%

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- Think the Internet appropriately reflects public opinion
  - 2015: 35.2%
  - 2014: 35.2%
- Think the Internet less appropriately reflects public opinion
  - 2015: 34.8%
  - 2014: 39.5%
- Think the Internet does not appropriately reflect public opinion
  - 2015: 16.4%
  - 2014: 11.1%
- Don’t know
  - 2015: 13.6%
  - 2014: 14.2%
- No response
  - 2015: 0.0%
  - 2014: 0.0%
10-1. Degree of Direct Interaction between Japanese and South Koreans

Approximately 20% of both the Japanese and South Korean public have visited one another's countries. Over 70% of the Japanese public and over 80% of the South Koreans have no acquaintances in each other's country.

In Japan, 26.0% of respondents had visited South Korea (22.5% last year), while similarly, 26.0% of South Koreans (24.8% last year) had visited Japan. At the same time, 75.7% of Japanese (82.2% last year) and 88.2% of South Koreans (87.2% last year) say that they have never had acquaintances in the respective country, showing that direct contact between Japanese and South Koreans is extremely scarce.

【Figure 25 Have You Ever Visited Each Other's Country?】

【Figure 26 Do You Have Acquaintances in Each Other's Country?】
10.2. Information Sources on One Another’s Countries

In both countries, over 90% of the people obtain information on one another’s countries through “domestic news media,” with an especially strong dependence on “TV.”

Over 90% of both countries’ people (94.3% in Japan and 94.6% in South Korea) obtain information on one another’s countries through domestic news media, with an especially strong dependence on “TV” sources. 18.1% of Japanese and 58.1% of South Koreans cite “South Korean TV drama, documentaries and films” as their source of information. In South Korea, other information sources include “experience of family, friends and acquaintances” (44.0%) and “debate between leading figures in South Korea,” which rose over 20 percentage points from last year’s 3.2% to 23.5%.

【Figure 27: Source of News for One Another’s Country and Relations between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) | Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
--- | ---
100% | 100%
80% | 80%
60% | 60%
40% | 40%
20% | 20%
0% | 0%

- Conversation with South Korean people: 2.5% (Japan) vs. 6.6% (South Korea)
- Visits to South Korea: 3.8% (Japan) vs. 7.1% (South Korea)
- Japanese news media: 91.3% (Japan) vs. 91.1% (South Korea)
- Japanese books (including textbooks): 16.6% (Japan) vs. 5.2% (South Korea)
- Japanese TV drama, documentaries and films: 24.4% (Japan) vs. 55.1% (South Korea)
- South Korean news media: 10.8% (Japan) vs. 15.3% (South Korea)
- South Korean books: 1.0% (Japan) vs. 1.3% (South Korea)
- South Korean music: 1.1% (Japan) vs. 2.9% (South Korea)
- South Korean "anime": 6.8% (Japan) vs. 11.6% (South Korea)
- South Korean TV drama, documentaries and films: 14.4% (Japan) vs. 11.3% (South Korea)
- Debate between leading figures in Japan: 3.2% (Japan) vs. 23.5% (South Korea)
- Debate between leading figures in South Korea: 3.8% (Japan) vs. 38.7% (South Korea)
- Experience of family, friends and acquaintances: 4.4% (Japan) vs. 38.7% (South Korea)
- Other: 0.9% (Japan) vs. 0.0% (South Korea)
- No response: 0.0% (Japan) vs. 0.0% (South Korea)

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11. The Olympics/Paralympics and Japan-South Korea Relations

11-1. The Olympics/Paralympics and Japan-South Korea Relations

A majority of Japanese see the Pyeongchang 2018 and Tokyo 2020 Olympics/Paralympics as events that will help the development of Japan-South Korea ties, while 41.9% of South Koreans have not much expectations.

The Olympics/Paralympics will be held in Pyeongchang, South Korea and Tokyo, Japan in 2018 and 2020 respectively. In this year’s survey, new questions were posed concerning these sporting events. First, regarding the question of whether Japan and South Korea will be able to strengthen friendly ties through the Olympics and Paralympics in both countries, 41.6% of Japanese “think so” (including “somewhat think so,” same applies below), exceeding the 34.8% who “don’t think so.”

In contrast, most South Koreans do not believe the Olympics and Paralympics will play a major role in developing bilateral relations, and 41.9% of South Koreans answered they “don’t think so,” exceeding the 33.8% who “think so.”

The next question posed was whether the Paralympics could foster greater understanding of the elderly and disabled. To this, over half of both Japanese (57.4%) and South Koreans (53.4%) answered in the affirmative.

Lastly, in regards to how both Japan and South Korea should conduct dialogue, exchange and cooperation towards the Paralympics in both countries, over half of Japanese responded “dialogue and exchange on disabled people’s social participation” (53.0%) and “cooperation on the promotion of sport for disabled people” (50.3%).

In South Korea, the majority replied “dialogue and exchange on disabled people’s social participation” (45.5%), followed by “cooperation on the promotion of sport for disabled people” (33.7%)

【Figure 28: Can Japan and South Korea Strengthen Their Friendly Ties Through the Olympics and Paralympics?】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)  Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
【Figure 29: Can the Paralympics Foster Greater Understanding of the Elderly and Disabled?】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)  
Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

【Figure 30: Areas of Japan-South Korea Cooperation and Exchange for Paralympics】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)  
Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
<Please send any inquiries about this survey to the address below>

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