The 4th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2016)
Analysis Report on Comparative Data

In Cooperation with:
Japan: Public Opinion Research Center
South Korea: Hankook Research Co.Ltd

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< Survey Overview>

From June to July 2016, The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted joint public opinion polls in Japan and South Korea. The purpose of this annual survey is to grasp the state of mutual understanding and perception of each other between the Japanese and South Korean public and to monitor the changes over time, in order to contribute to reducing various misunderstandings among the two countries, and to promoting greater mutual understanding for them. The result of this survey will be presented and utilized in a dialogue between Japan and South Korea, at ‘Japan-Korea Future Dialogue’ on September 2nd, 2016.

The opinion poll in Japan was conducted between June 18 and July 3rd by door-to-door home-visit method targeting men and women at the age of 18 and over. 48.8% of the respondents were men and 51.2% of them were women. The number of total valid responses was 1,000. The final academic qualifications of the respondents were as follows; elementary/middle school graduates: 8.0%, high school graduates: 47.0%, junior college/technical college graduates: 19.9%, four-year university graduates: 22.3% and graduate school graduates: 1.5%. Age distribution of the respondents were as follows; under 20: 3.0%, between 20 and 29: 11.7%, between 30 and 39: 15.1%, between 40 and 49, 16.9%, between 50 and 59, 14.4%, and 60 and above: 38.9%.

The opinion poll in South Korea was conducted between June 16th and July 5th by face-to-face interview method, targeting men and women at the age of 19 and over. 49.5% of the respondents were men and 50.5% of them were women. The number of total valid responses was 1,010. The final academic qualifications of respondents were as follows: elementary school graduates or below: 7.5%, middle school graduates: 10.2%, high school graduates: 37.5%, current university/technical college students (including the ones who did not finish the degree): 12.1%, four-year university graduates: 31.8%, and graduate school graduates: 0.8%. Age distribution of the respondents were as follows; under 20: 1.8%, between 20 and 29: 16.1%, between 30 and 39: 17.8%, between 40 and 49, 20.9%, between 50 and 59, 20.0%, and 60 and above: 38.9%.
1. Impression on One Another’s Countries

1-1. Impressions of Japan on South Koreans and Impressions of South Korea on the Japanese

Both Japanese and Korean respondents still have unfavorable impressions of the other country, but there is an improvement.

In 2016, 44.6% of Japanese respondents said that they had “Unfavorable” (or “Relatively unfavorable,” same definition applies below) impressions of South Korea. In the past surveys, the percentage of those who had “Unfavorable” impressions of South Korea has shifted from 37.3% in 2013, 54.4 % in 2014 and to 52.4 % in 2015, which means that impressions of South Korea are steadily getting better since 2014. At the same time, those who had “Favorable” impressions (or “relatively favorable,” same definition applies below) was 29.1% of the respondents this year, which also shows improvements since 20.5% responded “Favorable” in 2014 and 23.8% in 2015.

On the other hand, 61.0% of South Korean respondents said that they had “Unfavorable” impressions of Japan although the result was much lower in percentage compared to last year’s result of 72.5%. Those answered “Favorable” was 21.3% of them this year, which also showed an improvement since it was 15.7% last year. It seems that impressions of both countries are getting better for both sides overall.

【Figure 1  Impressions on One Another’s Countries】

※The data for “Favorable” impression includes both “Favorable” and “Relatively favorable” responses. The data for “Unfavorable” impression includes both “Unfavorable” and “Relatively unfavorable” responses.
1-2. Reasons Behind the Each Other’s Impressions

“Historical and territorial disputes” are the causes of bad impressions on both nationals, but they have less bad impressions of the political leaders’ actions.

Japanese’ negative impressions of South Korea were mainly due to “Continued criticism of Japan over historical issues” (75.3%), which continues to be the most popular reason since last year (74.6%). The second most chosen reason was “Conflicts over the possession of Takeshima” (39.9%), which also came in second last year (36.5%). The notable change this year was the big decrease in percentage of those who chose “Disapproval of South Korean political leaders’ actions.” The number dropped from 28.1% of last year to 17.9%.

On the other hand, the South Koreans’ negative impressions of Japan were mainly due to Japan’s “Lack of remorse for historical invasions” (76.3%), which was also the most popular answer to this questionnaire last year (74.0%). Over 70%(70.1% to be exact, 69.3% last year) of South Korean respondents also chose “Territorial disputes.” The number of people who chose these two issues was far more than those who chose the others, just like the result of last year. The notable change this year was the same as seen in Japanese respondents—the political leaders of the other country have better impression on them compared to last year. The percentage of those who chose “Disapproval of Japanese political leaders’ actions” as the reason dropped from 24.7% last year to 14.6%. However, “Actions (Tatemae) aren’t necessarily followed by true feelings (Hon’ne)” was more popular with the result of 24.2% this year (up from 16.7% last year).

As far as the reasons of positive impressions go, 51.2% of Japanese respondents chose “Interest in South Korean TV dramas and music,” which was the top reason last year as well (51.7%). This trend has been observed in our past surveys.

The Korean respondents chose “Integrity and kindness of people” the most as the reason why they had positive impressions of Japanese people. Almost 70% (69.8% to be exact) of them chose that as the reason this year, which has increased since last year (63.9%). 48.8% of them chose “Developed country with high level of life” as one of the reasons this year (49.4% last year). The change seen this year was the nearly doubled percentage of the people who chose “Same republican country” as the reason—up from last year’s 8.9% to 17.7%.
【Figure 2  Reasons for Negative Impressions】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=446)

- Continued criticism of Japan over historical issues: 75.3% (2015), 74.6% (2016)
- Conflicts over possession of Takeshima (Dokdo): 39.9% (2015), 36.5% (2016)
- Incomprehensible patriotic behavior and ideas: 16.1% (2015), 13.0% (2016)
- Too emotional: 22.6% (2015), 19.1% (2016)
- Impression of leaning more towards China: 1.8% (2015), 0.8% (2016)
- Disapproval of South Korean politicians’ actions: 17.9% (2015), 16.5% (2016)
- Others: 4.0% (2015), 2.9% (2016)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=616)

- Lack of remorse for historical invasions of South Korea: 76.3% (2015), 74.0% (2016)
- Continuing territorial disputes over Dokdo: 79.1% (2015), 69.3% (2016)
- Discrimination against Koreans born and raised in Japan: 10.2% (2015), 4.1% (2016)
- Actions (tatemae) aren’t necessarily followed by true feelings (hon’ne): 24.2% (2015), 16.7% (2016)
- Impression of purposely gaining more military power: 3.2% (2015), 1.6% (2016)
- Disapproval of Japanese politicians’ actions: 14.6% (2015), 24.7% (2016)
- Others: 0.6% (2015), 1.9% (2016)

【Figure 3  Reasons for Positive Impressions】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=291)

- Developed country with high level of life: 48.8% (2015), 49.4% (2016)
- Same republican country: 23.0% (2015), 23.9% (2016)
- South Koreans are serious, hard-working, and positive: 16.5% (2015), 15.1% (2016)
- Interest in South Korean culture such as TV dramas and music: 10.5% (2015), 9.3% (2016)
- Cheap and impressive products of South Korea: 11.3% (2015), 9.3% (2016)
- Others: 3.9% (2015), 1.1% (2016)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=215)

- Developed country with high level of life: 48.6% (2015), 49.4% (2016)
- Same republican country: 23.0% (2015), 23.9% (2016)
- Integrity and kindness of people: 11.5% (2015), 10.9% (2016)
- Interest in Japanese culture: 10.3% (2015), 9.5% (2016)
- High quality of products made in Japan: 27.2% (2015), 23.7% (2016)
- Others: 0.9% (2015), 0.3% (2016)
1-3. Recognition of Current National Sentiments toward Each Other

Approximately 60% of both the Japanese and South Korean respondents consider the current state of national sentiments toward one another as “undesirable” or “problematic.” However, such responds were less than those of the year before.

26.3% (29.0% last year) of Japanese respondents recognized the current worsening national sentiments between the two countries as “Undesirable and concerning.” Furthermore, 36.8% (38.8% last year) of them answered that it was a “Problematic situation that needed to be resolved”. Together, over 60% (63.1% to be exact) of the Japanese regarded the current state of national sentiments as a problem, although the percentage dropped from 67.8% of last year.

21.8% (26.4% last year) of South Korean respondents regarded the current state of national sentiments as “Undesirable and concerning,” while 37.0% (40.8% last year) felt that it was a “Problematic situation that needed to be resolved.” This means almost 60% (58.8% to be exact) of the South Koreans consider that there is an issue that needed attention, but the percentage dropped just like it did for Japan from 67.2% of last year.

On the other hand, despite that less than 10% of the Japanese perceived that the current state of national sentiments were “Natural and understandable,” more than 30% of the South Koreans felt that way. Those who found the situation “Natural and understandable” in South Korea went up from 28.1% of the respondents to 34.3% this year.

【Figure 4  Recognition of Current National Sentiments】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=291)  Public Opinion in South Korea (N=215)
2. Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries

2-1. Understanding of the Social/Political Systems of One Another’s Countries

About half of Japanese respondents consider the current South Korea’s social/political systems are “Ethnicism,” while about half of South Korean respondents consider Japanese counterparts are “Militarism.” However, less of them find this way compared to last year.

In terms of current social/political systems of South Korea, 48.1% of the Japanese considered that they were “Ethnicism,” showing decrease from the result of last year (55.7%). 30.2% of the respondents considered them to be “Nationalism,” which also decreased from last year (38.6%). Those who considered them to be “Militarism” came in third with 28.9%, which went up from 23.5% last year. 23.0% of them viewed South Korean social/political systems as “Democracy,” which increased by 9% since last year.

On the other hand, 49.6% of the South Koreans considered that the current social/political systems of Japan were “Militarism.” This is less than last year’s result of 56.9%, however, militaristic impression of Japan continues to be the strongest for them since our first survey conducted four years ago. The second largest group this year was “Nationalism” (36.5%, last year was 34.3%). Previously, “Capitalism” came in second with 38.9%, however, it ended up in fourth with 32.1% this year.

At the same time, 24.7% of the South Koreans considered Japanese social/political systems to be “Hegemonism,” which was a rather big drop from the last year’s result of 34.3%. Those who considered them to be “Great power chauvinism” were also much less than the result of last year, dropping from 26.5% to 20.5%. On the other hand, 8.5% of them answered that they were “Pacifism” this year, which was doubled compared to the result of last year (4.2%).

Approximately 20% (20.7% to be precise) of them viewed Japanese social/political systems to be “Democracy,” which was similar last year’s result (22.2%).
【Figure 5  Perception of Social/Political Systems of the Other Country】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

- Pacifism: 9.9% (2016), 6.6% (2015)
- Nationalism: 38.6% (2016), 30.2% (2015)
- Ethnicism: 55.7% (2016), 48.1% (2015)
- Democracy: 23.0% (2016), 14.0% (2015)
- Militarism: 23.5% (2016), 19.9% (2015)
- Capitalism: 20.6% (2016), 6.1% (2015)
- Liberalism: 5.7% (2016), 5.4% (2015)
- Great Power Favoritism: 3.6% (2016), 5.4% (2015)
- Hegemonism: 2.7% (2016), 8.5% (2015)
- Socialism/Communism: 5.1% (2016), 1.4% (2015)
- Others: 0.5% (2016), 0.3% (2015)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- Pacifism: 4.2% (2016), 8.5% (2015)
- Nationalism: 36.5% (2016), 34.3% (2015)
- Ethnicism: 32.6% (2016), 31.5% (2015)
- Militarism: 49.6% (2016), 56.3% (2015)
- International Cooperation: 4.0% (2016), 6.1% (2015)
- Capitalism: 32.1% (2016), 38.9% (2015)
- Liberalism: 8.8% (2016), 15.0% (2015)
- Great Power Favoritism: 23.0% (2016), 23.5% (2015)
- Hegemonism: 1.9% (2016), 2.7% (2015)
- Socialism/Communism: 18.2% (2016), 3.4% (2015)
- Others: 0.3% (2016), 11.2% (2015)
- No Response: 0.0% (2016), 0.3% (2015)
3. Perception of Present and Future Japan-South Korea Relations

3-1. How They View Current and Future Japan-South Korea Relations

Even though 50% of the Japanese and over 60% of the South Koreans consider the current state of Japan-South Korea relations to be “Bad,” the percentage has dropped compared to the results of last two years. However, more of them consider that the relationship “Will not change” compared to last year.

50.9% of the Japanese considered that current Japan-South Korea relations were “Bad” (total of those who answered “Extremely bad” and “Relatively bad,” the same definition applies below), showing that more Japanese respondents thought that the relationship was on the good side this year compared to the previous results of 73.8% (2014) and 65.4% (2015). The same trend was seen in the results of South Korea. Although it continues to be relatively high, 62.3% of the South Koreans considered that the current Japan-South Korea relations were “Bad” this year, which still was over 15% less than the results of 77.8% (2014) and 78.3% (2015).

As far as the future prospects for Japan-South Korea relations are concerned, 49.0% of the Japanese (41.4% last year) and 52.1% of the South Koreans (45.9% last year) expressed that the current state of relations “Will not change,” meaning that more Japanese and South Korean respondents believed that they would remain status quo than they did last year. However, there were also increases in both Japanese (to 22.7% from 21.9% last year) and South Koreans (to 23.3% from 19.0% last year) who believed that the relationship “Will improve” (including the ones who answered “Will probably improve”). Additionally, the percentage of those who believed that the relationship “Will get worse” (including “Will probably get worse”) dropped for both the Japanese (to 9.9% from 12.1% last year) and the South Koreans (to 18.5% from 28.4% last year). Therefore, results show that more of the both nationals hoped that the relationship would get better.
【Figure 6  View on Current State of Japan-South Korea Relations】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

- Extremely good / Relatively good: 73.8% (2016), 50.9% (2015)
- Neither good nor bad: 28.8% (2016), 5.8% (2015)
- Extremely bad / Relatively bad: 0.4% (2016), 0.0% (2015)
- No response: 0.0% (2016), 0.0% (2015)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- Extremely good / Relatively good: 4.3% (2016), 2.6% (2015)
- Neither good nor bad: 33.5% (2016), 19.2% (2015)
- Extremely bad / Relatively bad: 62.3% (2016), 78.3% (2015)
- No response: 0.0% (2016), 0.0% (2015)

【Figure 7  View on Future Japan-South Korea Relations】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

- "Will improve" / "will probably improve": 22.7% (2016), 19.0% (2015)
- Will not change: 21.9% (2016), 18.0% (2015)
- "Will get worse" / "Will probably get worse": 9.9% (2016), 12.1% (2015)
- Neither / Don't know: 18.0% (2016), 0.3% (2015)
- No response: 0.4% (2016), 0.0% (2015)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- "Will improve" / "will probably improve": 23.3% (2016), 19.0% (2015)
- Will not change: 52.1% (2016), 45.9% (2015)
- "Will get worse" / "Will probably get worse": 18.5% (2016), 28.4% (2015)
- Neither / Don't know: 6.1% (2016), 6.6% (2015)
- No response: 0.0% (2016), 0.0% (2015)
3-2. What Should Be Done In Order to Improve the Japan-South Korea Relations?

South Korean respondents find significance in resolving comfort women issues and historical and territorial disputes, however, Japanese respondents also think that state-level dialogues, building trust and more interactions of people will improve the relations. Little South Korean respondents believe that resolving North Korea's nuclear issues will help.

Slightly less than half of the Japanese respondents (46.5%) answered that “Resolving historical disputes” would improve bilateral relations, followed by “Resolving territorial disputes over Takeshima (Dokdo)” with 39.0%, “Resolving comfort women issue” with 29.6%, and “Increasing cultural exchange opportunities such as sightseeing among the people” with 27.6%.

South Korean respondents, on the other hand, chose “Resolving territorial disputes over Takeshima (Dokdo)” most the result of 81.1%, followed by “Resolving comfort women issue” with 75.7% and “Resolving historical disputes” with 74.9%. The result of these three stood out against the others in South Korea.

19.5% of the Japanese believed that “Cooperation in resolving North Korea's nuclear issues” would help improve the relationship as well, however, only 7.0% of the South Koreans felt the same. It shows that few South Korean respondents think of it as a resolution to better the relationship between Japan and South Korea.

【Figure 8 Things to be Done to Better Japan-South Korea Relations】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)
Public Opinion in Korea (N=1010)
3-3. How Both Nationals View the Significance of the Japan-South Korea Relations

Over 60% of the Japanese and over 80% of the South Koreans consider the Japan-South Korea relationship to be “Important,” same as last year.

62.7% of the Japanese respondents regarded Japan-South Korea relations as “Important” (including those who answered “Relatively important,” same definition applies below). It was 65.3% last year. On the other hand, over 80%(86.9% to be precise) of South Korean respondents thought the same, and this year’s result was similar to that of the year before (87.4%).

Only 13.9% of the Japanese (15.7% last year) and 9.6% of the South Koreans (9.1% last year) considered Japan-South Korea relations as “Unimportant” (including those who answered “Relatively unimportant”). Therefore, both the Japanese and South Korean are well aware of the importance of bilateral relations.

【Figure 9  Current Recognition of the Importance of Japan-South Korea relations】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Important or Relatively important</th>
<th>Unimportant or Relatively unimportant</th>
<th>Neither/Not sure</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
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<td>Japan 2016</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan 2015</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea 2016</td>
<td>86.9%</td>
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<td>3.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea 2015</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3-4. “Importance” and “Sense of Affinity” of Japan-South Korea Relations Compared to China

Over 40% of Japanese and 50% of South Koreans respondents consider that relations with China are as important as Japan-South Korea relations. 35.1% of the South Koreans think that South Korea-China relations are more important, which decreased from 44.8% of last year.

As far as sense of affinity goes, almost 40% of Japanese respondents feel more affinity to South Korea than China. South Korean respondents, on the other hand, feel more affinity to China than Japan—over 30% responded so, and only about 10% chose Japan over China.

In terms of the importance of Japan-South Korea relations in comparison to those with China, 45.6% of Japanese respondents (49.1% last year) felt that “Both are equally important.” This was the most popular opinion among them.

Meanwhile, over half of South Korean respondents (56.8% to be exact, 46.6% last year) also viewed Japan-South Korea relations were equally important to relations with China. Last year, over 40% (44.8% to be precise) of them answered that “South Korea-China relations are more important,” and that was close in number with those who answered “Both are equally important.” This year, however, only 35.1% of the South Koreans viewed that South Korea-China relations were more important.

When asked which country they felt more affinity to, 38.2% of Japanese respondents answered that they felt more affinity to South Korea than China, and it increased from 31.0% of previous year. 34.5% answered that they felt no affinity to either South Korea or China, which came in second. That was the most popular answer last year supported by 34.5% of the respondents, but it ended up in second this year.

However, 34.2% of the South Korean respondents felt more affinity to China. Even though it went down from 41.0% of last year, it still was the most popular response. Only 12.8% (11.1% last year) of them felt more affinity to Japan.
【Figure 10  Importance of Japan-South Korea Relations Compared to Relations with China】

Public Opinion in Japan  (N=1000)

- Japan-South Korea relations are more important
  - 45.6%
  - 49.1%
- Relations with China are more important
  - 21.2%
  - 25.1%
- Both are equally important
  - 24.6%
  - 15.0%
- Neither / Not sure
  - 0.3%
  - 0.2%
- No response
  - 0.0%

Public Opinion in South Korea  (N=1010)

- Japan-South Korea relations are more important
  - 3.8%
  - 5.0%
- Relations with China are more important
  - 35.1%
  - 44.8%
- Both are equally important
  - 56.8%
  - 46.6%
- Neither / Not sure
  - 4.3%
  - 3.7%
- No response
  - 0.0%
  - 0.0%

【Figure 11  Affinity Toward One Another’s Countries and Toward China】

Public Opinion in Japan  (N=1000)

- More affinity felt toward Japan/South Korea
  - 31.0%
  - 34.6%
- More affinity felt toward China
  - 5.1%
  - 6.5%
- Equal affinity felt toward both
  - 7.6%
  - 11.3%
- No affinity felt toward either of them
  - 31.6%
  - 34.6%
- Neither / Not sure
  - 0.3%
  - 0.0%
- No response
  - 0.0%

Public Opinion in South Korea  (N=1010)

- More affinity felt toward Japan/South Korea
  - 11.1%
  - 12.8%
- More affinity felt toward China
  - 41.0%
  - 34.2%
- Equal affinity felt toward both
  - 13.7%
  - 12.8%
- No affinity felt toward either of them
  - 30.4%
  - 23.4%
- Neither / Not sure
  - 16.0%
  - 5.5%
- No response
  - 0.0%
  - 0.0%
3-5. Important Country for the Future of Japan or South Korea

They view “the United States” as the most important country for the future in Japan. Meanwhile, South Korean respondents believe that “China” is more important for their future than “the United States,” which is an allied nation with them.

65.9% of Japanese respondents chose “the United States” (in alliance with Japan) when asked which country or region of the world Japan should keep good relationship with for the future. The second most popular choice was “China”, but the percentage was much lower than that of US—only 8.0%.

On the other side, “China” came in first in South Korea with the result of 47.1%. “The United States,” which also is in alliance with South Korea, ended up in second with 39.8%.

Those who answered “South Korea” in this questionnaire in Japan were only 1.7% of them. Likewise, a mere 2.6% of the South Koreans considered Japan was the most important for their future.

【Figure 12  Country or Region of Importance for the Future of Their Own Country】
4. Private Exchanges

4-1. Interest in Visitation to the Other Country

Approximately 40% of Japanese respondents showed interest in visiting South Korea and about 60% of South Korean respondents did in visiting Japan, both showing increase in interest since last year.

42.2% of Japanese respondents answered that they were interested in visiting South Korea, showing increase in interest since last year (40.7%). South Korean side showed increase in interest as well—63.8% (59.2% last year) responded that they were interested in visiting Japan. However, there was an increase in number for those who did not want to visit the other country in both Japan and South Korea. 36.3% (35.9% last year) of the Japanese and 30.0% (31.0% last year) of the South Koreans answered that they did not want to visit the other country, meaning 3 out of 10 people in both countries did not want to visit the other country.

As for the reason why they want to visit, Japanese respondents chose “Nature and sightseeing” (59.5%), “Shopping” (55.5%), followed by “Historical and cultural heritage” (40.3%). On the other side, “Nature and sightseeing” was by far the most popular among the South Korean respondents with the result of 79.2%.

【Figure 13   Do You Hope to Visit the Other Country?】

Public Opinion in Japan  (N=1000)   Public Opinion in South Korea  (N=1010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Perceptions of Historical Issues

5-1. View on Historical Issues in Japan and South Korea

Optimistic view on historical issues is seen more this year from both Japanese and South Korean respondents since more of them think that “Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relationship improves.”

When asked about Japan-South Korea relations and the impact of historical issues on them, 30.2% of Japanese respondents thought that the “Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relationship improves.” The percentage went up more than 10%, from 19.3% last year. Meanwhile, 28.1% (35.1% last year) of them answered that “It is difficult to resolve the historical issues even if bilateral relationship improves.” Overall, it shows an increase of optimistic view in Japan on this matter. In the previous surveys conducted the last 3 years more respondents answered that it was difficult to resolve the historical issues between the two countries. This year the result was overturned by the people who believed that the relationship would get better as the historical issues got resolved.

On the other hand, 42.8% of the South Korean respondents believed that “Bilateral relationship will not improve if the historical issues are not resolved.” This was the most popular response among them, but the number went down by nearly 10% from the last year’s result of 52.5%. In contrast, those who answered that “The historical issues will gradually be resolved as the bilateral relationship improves” went from 20.9% last year to 32.9% this year.

When questioned about specific historical issues that needed to be resolved for a better relationship between the two countries, 59.9% (52.5% last year) chose “Anti-Japan education and the contents of their textbooks,” followed by “South Koreans’ aggressive anti-Japan acts over historical issues” with 53.6% (52.1% last year).

Most of them in South Korea chose “The depiction of history in Japanese textbooks” with 71.9% (76.0% last year) in response to the same question. Next was “Perception of comfort women issue in Japan” with 59.7%, however, the number significantly dropped from 69.8% from last year. Those who answered “Japan’s lack of remorse or apology for historical issues” also notably decreased from 59.6% last year to 42.4% this year.
Figure 14: Bilateral Relations and Historical Issues

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

- Bilateral relations will not improve if historical issues are not resolved:
  - 2016: 21.9%
  - 2015: 27.1%
- Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relations improve:
  - 2016: 30.2%
  - 2015: 19.3%
- It is difficult to resolve historical issues even if bilateral relations improve:
  - 2016: 28.1%
  - 2015: 19.7%
- Neither/Not sure:
  - 2016: 35.1%
  - 2015: 18.1%
- No response:
  - 2016: 0.1%
  - 2015: 0.4%

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- Bilateral relations will not improve if historical issues are not resolved:
  - 2016: 21.9%
  - 2015: 30.2%
- Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relations improve:
  - 2016: 19.7%
  - 2015: 18.1%
- It is difficult to resolve historical issues even if bilateral relations improve:
  - 2016: 42.8%
  - 2015: 52.5%
- Neither/Not sure:
  - 2016: 0.4%
  - 2015: 0.0%
- No response:
  - 2016: 0.4%
  - 2015: 0.0%
【Figure 15  Problems to be Resolved in Historical Issues between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan  （N=1000）

- Japan’s perception of its invasions of South Korea
- The depiction of history in Japanese textbooks
- Reparations by Japan for WWII and forced labor etc.
- Perception of comfort women issue in Japan
- Japanese politicians’ remarks on South Korea
- Information of South Korea broadcasted by Japanese media
- Japan’s lack of apology or remorse for historical events
- Anti-Japan education and the contents of their textbooks used in South Korea
- South Korean politicians’ remarks on Japan
- Information of Japan broadcasted by South Korean media
- South Koreans’ aggressive anti-Japan acts over historical issues
- There are no more major issues to be resolved
- Others
- Not sure
- No response

Public Opinion in South Korea  （N=1010）

- Japan’s perception of its invasions of South Korea
- The depiction of history in Japanese textbooks
- Reparations by Japan for WWII and forced labor etc.
- Perception of comfort women issue in Japan
- Japanese politicians’ remarks on South Korea
- Information of South Korea broadcasted by Japanese media
- Japan’s lack of apology or remorse for historical events
- Anti-Japan education and the contents of their textbooks used in Japan
- South Korean politicians’ remarks on Japan
- Information of Japan broadcasted by South Korean media
- South Koreans’ aggressive anti-Japan acts over historical issues
- There are no more major issues to be resolved
- Others
- Not sure
- No response
5-2. The View on the Agreement Made on Comfort Women Issue Between Japan and South Korea

Nearly half of Japanese respondents found significance in the reached agreement on the matter. However, nearly 40% of the South Korean respondents did not, and that was more than the ones who said they did.

Foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea announced that the two countries reached a final and irreversible agreement on comfort women issue at the meeting held in December, 2015. In the agreement, Japanese government promised to financially support former comfort women. In response to this, 47.9% of the Japanese respondents answered that they found significance in the agreement made (total of those who said “Very significant” and “Significant to certain degree,” same definition applies below). This was far more than those who answered that they did not find significance (total of those who answered “Insignificant” and “Not too significant”, same definition applies below), which was 20.9%.

The result was opposite in South Korea—almost 40% (37.6% to be exact) believed that the agreement was not significant, which was far more than those who said that it was (28.1%).

【Figure 16 Significance of the Agreement Reached on Comfort Women Issue】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

A Very significant
B Significant to certain degree
C Neither significant nor insignificant
D Not too significant
E Insignificant
F No response
6. Diplomatic Relations

6-1. The Opinions on the Agenda Discussed at Japan-South Korea-China Summit

Both Japanese and South Korean respondents chose “North Korea’s nuclear issues” and “Various points that will improve Japan-China-South Korea relations” as desired topics discussed at the summit meeting. However, “Historical issues” and “Building trust between the country heads” were not as popular answers in Japan (supported by less than 20%) as they were in South Korea (supported by more than 40%).

They are planning to hold a Japan-South Korea-China summit meeting this fall. When asked what topics they would like to be discussed at the meeting, Japanese respondents chose “North Korea’s nuclear issues” the most with 44.7%, followed by “Various points that will improve Japan-China-South Korea relations” with 37.6%. These two answers were well supported by South Korean respondents as well--38.4% of them also chose “North Korea’s nuclear issues” and 34.4% of them chose “Various points that will improve Japan-China-South Korea relations.”

On the other hand, the most popular answer among the South Korean respondents was “Historical issues” with 44.0%. However, the same answer was supported only by 17.2% of Japanese, meaning that less than 2 out of 10 people considered it as an important topic at the summit meeting. “Building trust between the country heads” came in second with 42.6% in South Korea, however, it ended up with only 15.6% in Japan. “Territorial disputes in East Asia” was supported by 12.0% of them in Japan, but only 5.0% in South Korea did the same.

【Figure 17 Topics to be Discussed at Japan-South Korea-China Summit】
6-2. Impressions of the Other Country Head

Slight improvement is seen since last year in the impression of President Geun-Hye Park among Japanese respondents. However, almost 80% of the South Korean respondents continue to have a bad impression of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

36.6% of Japanese respondents said that they had a “Very bad” or “Relatively bad” impression of President Geun-Hye Park, which was the most popular answer. However, this was still a big improvement compared to last year’s result of 48.3%. Despite the decrease in people having bad image on President Park, only 6.7% (5.2% last year) answered that they had “Very good” or “Relatively good” impression of her, which did not even reach 10%. Her impression has not taken a favorable turn just yet.

Meanwhile, 79.4% of South Korean respondents said that they had a “Very bad” or “Relatively bad” impression of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which was a very minimal improvement from last year’s result of 80.5%. The percentage nearly doubled since last year for those who had a “Very good” or “Relatively good” impression on him, but the result was only 4.1% (2.1% last year).

【Figure 18  What Impression Do You Have on the Country Head of the Other Country? 】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tr>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2016

Copyright(c) 2016 The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute  All Rights Reserved.
Most of the respondents from Japan and South Korea expect that North and South Korea will still remain the status quo 10 years later, however, more of them fear that the conflict between them will intensify.

40.2% (42.1% last year) of Japanese respondents expected that North and South Korea would still remain the status quo 10 years later, making it the most popular opinion on this questionnaire. However, there was small increase in those who feared that the conflicts between them would intensify, with percentage going up from 13.5% last year to 18.4% this year.

South Korean respondents also expected that their own country would maintain the status quo with North Korea the most, which was supported by 44.0% of them. It went up by 9% compared to last year’s result of 35.0%. One the other hand, there was a decrease in those who answered that the two countries would move forward to reunification. The percentage went down since last year from 27.6% to 22.1%. At the same time, 15.4% (up from 10.6% last year) expected that the conflicts between North and South Korea would intensify.

【Figure 19  The Status of Korean Peninsula 10 Years Later】
Nearly 60% of South Korean respondents suggested that the US Army stay in South Korea even after peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. Approximately 40% of Japanese respondents answered the same, however, nearly 30% of them were not sure whether US Army should stay in South Korea or not.

58.5% (57.3% last year) of South Korean respondents found it “Necessary” (including “Relatively necessary,” same definition applies below) for the US Army to remain in South Korea even after peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. The percentage went up to 36.5% from 31.0% last year among those who thought that the US Army was “Unnecessary” (including “Relatively unnecessary,” same definition applies below), but that is still quite low considering almost 60% of the respondents said otherwise.

On the other hand, almost 40% (39.5% to be exact, 44.6% last year) of Japanese respondents agreed that the US Army was “Necessary” in South Korea even after reunification. This was more than those who chose “Unnecessary” (31.0%, 28.4% last year). Nearly 30% (29.3% to be exact, 28.4% last year) of them were “Not sure” whether they should remain in South Korea or not.

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

【Figure 20  Is It Necessary for the US Army to Stay in South Korea after Reunification?】
8. Security Issues in East Asia

8-1. Roles of the US Military Bases in Each Country

More Japanese respondents expect the US Army in Japan to hold out against China, which was one of the biggest differences between them and South Korean respondents.

When questioned about the expectations they had for the US Army stationed in Japan, 51.9% of Japanese respondents chose “Defending Japan,” which came in first. Almost 30% of them also chose “Maintaining peace in entire East Asia” (35.5%) and “Holding out against China” (29.3%).

On the other hand, 64.5% of South Korean respondents chose “Contribution to maintaining peace in Korean Peninsula,” which was much higher than the results of other choices. Less than 30% of them expected “Maintaining peace in entire East Asia” (28.8% to be precise), and only 16.9% expected “Holding out against China” of the US Army stationed in South Korea.

【Figure 21  Expectations of US Military Bases in Japan / South Korea】
8-2. Military Threat and Possible Armed Conflicts among the Two Countries

Even though the percentage dropped more than 20%, almost 40% of South Korean respondents still regard “Japan” as a military threat to them. Japanese respondents find “North Korea,” “China” and “Russia” more threatening to them compared to last year. On the other hand, more than 60% of Japanese respondents believe that there will be no armed conflicts between Japan and South Korea in the future, whereas nearly 40% of South Koreans recognize the possibility soon or later, same as the last year’s result.

Japanese respondents chose “North Korea” as the biggest military threat to Japan. The percentage of those who chose “North Korea” went up from 71.6% to over 80% this year (80.4% to be exact). Following “North Korea” was “China” with 72.8% (up from 64.3% last year). For those who named “Russia” also significantly increased to 50.0% from 36.0% last year. Only 16.9% of them regarded “South Korea” as a military threat, which still increased from 11.2% last year.

Likewise, Korean respondents chose “North Korea” the most with the result of 83.4% (also 83.4% last year). Nearly 40% (37.7% to be exact, 58.1% last year) of them chose “Japan”, which came in second place. Although the percentage went down by more than 20% for “Japan”, “North Korea” took the first place and “Japan” took the second, which was the same order as the last year’s result. The result of “Japan” is similar to that of “China” (36.0%, 36.8% last year).

When asked why they felt military threat from Japan, 60.1% of South Korean respondents chose “Japan claiming control over Dokdo (Takeshima),” making it the most popular reason. This was followed by “Gray area in Japanese politics in regard of war responsibility” (48.6%) and “Existing tendency of leaning to right in certain Japanese politics.” (42.0%).

Regarding possibility of military conflicts between Japan and South Korea, more than 60% (65.8% to be exact) of Japanese respondents did not expect them in the future. That was almost the same as the last year’s result of 65.7%. A small number of Japanese respondents expected military conflicts between the two countries within a few years (0.4%, 0.7% last year) or eventually (7.7%, 8.1% last year), meaning less than 10% (8.1% to be exact) of them believed that Japan and South Korea would face a military conflict soon or later.

Meanwhile, 48.8% (46.2% last year) of South Korean respondents did not expect military conflicts with Japan either, making it the most popular response. Nevertheless, almost 40% (37.7% to be exact) of them believed that the two countries would face military conflicts within a few years (4.5%, 5.3% last year) or eventually (33.2%, 32.5% last year).
【Figure 22  Countries and Areas Perceived as Military Threat】

Public Opinion in Japan （N=1000）

- South Korea: 72.9%
- China: 64.3%
- North Korea: 80.4%
- Russia: 50.0%
- India: 8.6%
- Middle East: 16.4%
- The United States: 16.4%
- EU: 9.8%
- Others: 7.4%
- No country poses a military threat: 6.0%
- No response: 3.4%

Public Opinion in South Korea （N=1010）

- Japan: 37.7%
- China: 36.0%
- North Korea: 83.4%
- Russia: 4.9%
- India: 1.4%
- Middle East: 4.2%
- The United States: 7.0%
- EU: 0.0%
- Others: 0.0%
- No country poses a military threat: 0.0%
- No response: 0.0%

【Figure 23  Will a Military Confrontation Occur Between Japan and South Korea?】

Public Opinion in Japan （N=1000）

- Will occur within a few years: 0.4%
- Will occur eventually: 7.7%
- Will not occur: 65.8%
- Not sure: 26.1%
- No response: 0.2%

Public Opinion in South Korea （N=1010）

- Will occur within a few years: 4.5%
- Will occur eventually: 33.2%
- Will not occur: 48.8%
- Not sure: 13.6%
- No response: 0.0%
8-3. Resolution of Territorial Disputes

More Japanese respondents consider “Taking the matter to International Court of Justice” as a solution but more South Korean respondents think that a peaceful agreement can be reached “through conversation between Japan and South Korea.” However, 16.0% of the South Korean respondents suggest that they should take “actual control” of the territory.

More Japanese respondents chose “Taking the matter to International Court of Justice” as resolution of territorial disputes in East Asia with the result of 31.4% (38.8% last year). The second most popular was reaching an agreement peacefully “Through conversation between Japan and South Korea” with 21.5% (the same percentage as last year).

On the other hand, 39.6% (33.4% last year) of South Korean respondents chose reaching an agreement peacefully “Through conversation between Japan and South Korea,” making it the most selected answer this year. “Taking the matter to International Court of Justice” came in second with 19.0% (25.0% last year). However, 16.0% (17.9% last year) believed that they should resort to “Taking actual control and rejecting intervention from other countries.”

【Figure 24 How to Resolve the Territorial Disputes】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)</th>
<th>Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taking the matter to International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Through conversation between Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Through dialogue involving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neighboring nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taking actual control and rejecting</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>intervention from other countries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Giving priority on melioration of</td>
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<tr>
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<td>matter on hold</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8-4 Possession of Nuclear Weapons—Agree or Disagree?

Over 80% of Japanese respondents are against Japan and South Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, whereas nearly 60% of South Korean respondents supported possessing nuclear weapons themselves.

80.3% of Japanese respondents were against Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons. 82.2% of them in South Korea answered the same. However, 59.0% of them in South Korea thought that South Korea should hold nuclear weapons, which was much more than those who said that they should not (36.1%).

【Figure 25 Should Japan Possess Nuclear Weapons?】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) — Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

【Figure 26 Should South Korea Possess Nuclear Weapons?】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) — Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
Approximately 60% of both Japanese and South Korean respondents consider that Northeast Asia will be more unstable in terms of security once Donald Trump becomes the president of the United States.

42.4% of Japanese respondents expressed that there would be “No influence” on security of Northeast Asia if Hilary Clinton became the president of the United States after the presidential election in November, 2016. Less than 20% (18.8% to be exact) believed that it would stabilize Northeast Asia if Ms. Clinton would be chosen.

South Korean respondents’ most popular answer was also “No influence” (39.8%) if Ms. Clinton became the president. Almost 40% (37.8% to be precise) of them, on the other hand, considered that it would stabilize Northeast Asia if she won the election.

In contrast, approximately 60% of both Japanese and South Korean respondents (60.9% for the Japanese and 56.4% for the South Koreans to be exact) believed that Northeast Asia would be more unstable once Donald Trump became the president of the United States.

【Figure 27 United States Presidential Election and Influence on Security of Northeast Asia】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
9. Economic Relations of Japan and South Korea

9-1. Economic Relations of the Two Countries

More Japanese and South Korean respondents find it beneficial for their own country that the other country’s economy grows, than those who do not.

52.4% (49.5% last year) of Japanese respondents believed that growth of South Korean economy was “Beneficial and essential” to Japan (including the ones who said that it was “Relatively beneficial and essential,” same definition applies below). This means more than half of them found some benefit in the growth of South Korea in terms of economy.

44.6% (46.6% last year) of South Korean respondents also considered that it was “Beneficial and essential” to them if Japanese economy developed. This was more than those who answered that “Growth of Japanese economy was a threat to South Korea” (37.6%, 37.0% last year).

【Figure 28 Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan  （N=1000）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agree with A</th>
<th>Tend to agree with A</th>
<th>Tend to agree with B</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public Opinion in South Korea  （N=1010）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agree with A</th>
<th>Tend to agree with A</th>
<th>Tend to agree with B</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Economic growth in South Korea is both beneficial and necessary for Japan.

B Economic growth in South Korea is a threat to Japan.
9-2. The Countries or Regions of Significance in Terms of Economic Relations

77.3% of Japanese respondents chose “the United States” as the most important country or region for Japanese economy, followed by “China” with 63.0%. “ASEAN,” “South Korea,” “EU” and “India” were also supported by approximately 30% of them. On the other hand, “China” was the most important for South Korean respondents, chosen by more than 80% of them. Next was “the United States” (68.3%), followed by “Japan” (36.9%). These three countries were clearly more important than the other countries for the South Koreans.

When asked which country was the most important for the benefit of their own country's economy, 77.3% of Japanese respondents chose “the United States.” That was much higher than the result of “China,” which was 63.0%. However, about 30% of them also considered “ASEAN” countries (34.8%), “South Korea” (32.2%), “EU” (32.2%), and “India” (28.6%) as important countries for Japanese economy.

On the other hand, 81.1% of South Korean respondents agreed that “China” was the most important country for South Korean economy. “The United States” came in second with 68.3%, meaning that “China” beat “the United States” by more than 10%. While 36.9% of them also chose “Japan,” only approximately 10% of them chose other nations or regions.

【Figure 29 Countries and Regions of Importance for Their Own Country】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>The United States</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>ASEAN Nations</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9-3. Opinions on South Korea’s Joining AIIB

Over 60% of South Korean respondents support South Korea’s joining AIIB. However, less than 10% of Japanese respondents support that. More than 60% of them are not sure what to make of it.

64.8% of South Korean respondents “Support” (total of those who “Strongly support” or “Relatively support,” same definition applies below) South Korea’s participation in AIIB, despite the fact that their government decided to join against the request of the United States. Those who “Support” it is much more than those who do not—only 13.9% of them “Oppose” it (total of those who “Strongly support” it or “Relatively support” it, same definition applies below).

63.9% of Japanese respondents, on the other hand, are “Not sure” about the situation. 28.0% of them oppose it and 7.9% “Support” it.

【Figure 30 Opinions on South Korea’s Joining AIIB】
10. Media Coverage and Public Opinion on the Internet

10-1. Are Media Reports Objective and Fair in Japan and South Korea?

More Japanese respondents are not sure if Japanese media reports on Japan-South Korea relations are objective and fair. Meanwhile, nearly 60% of South Korean respondents feel that South Korean media reports on Japan-South Korea relations are not objective or fair.

When asked if they thought Japanese media reports on Japan-South Korea relations were objective and fair, 51.4% (43.0% last year) of Japanese respondents answered that they could not judge it, or were not sure about it. This was the most popular response among them. 27.0% (28.2% last year) of them considered that their media reports were not objective and fair, which came in second. This was more than those who answered that their media reports were objective and fair (21.3%).

Nearly 60% (58.9% to be precise, 51.7% last year) of South Korean respondents expressed that they did not think South Korean media reports were objective or fair. Meanwhile, less than 20% (18.1% to be precise, 26.5% last year) of them believed that their media reports were objective and fair.

【Figure 31 Are Media Reports of Japan and South Korea Objective and Fair in Your Country?】
10-2. Does Public Opinion on the Internet Appropriately Reflect People’s View?

Over 40% of Japanese and 60% of South Korean respondents feel that the Internet did not appropriately reflect the actual view of people.

42.0% (42.9% last year) of Japanese respondents consider that the public opinion on the Internet “Does not appropriately reflect actual view of people” (including those who answered that it “Less appropriately reflects actual view of people,” same definition applies below). While over 40% of them questioned the credibility of them, nearly half of the respondents (48.3% to be exact, 45.3% last year) chose “Neither/not sure.”

On the other hand, slightly over 60% (60.1% to be exact) of South Korean respondents feel that the Internet “Does not appropriately reflect actual view of people.” It went up from 51.2% of last year. In contrast, the percentage went down from 35.2% last year to 22.1% for those who considered that the Internet “ Appropriately reflects actual view of people.”

【Figure 32 Does Public Opinion on the Internet Reflect People’s View?】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)  Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

- 60% 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60%
- Appropriately reflects actual view of people
- Less appropriately reflects actual view of people
- Does not appropriately reflect actual view of people
- Neither/not sure
- No response

2016 2015 2016 2015

0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
11-1. Degree of Direct Interaction of Japanese and South Korean people

Approximately 20% of Japanese and 30% of South Korean respondents have visited the other country before. There is 3% increase of the South Koreans who have visited Japan. Over 70% of the Japanese and over 80% of the South Koreans have no acquaintances from the other country.

22.7% (26.0% last year) of Japanese respondents said that they had previously visited South Korea, while 29.4% (26.0% last year) of South Korean respondents said that they had been to Japan before. The number of South Koreans who have visited Japan has been going up every year since the first survey four year ago.

Meanwhile, 74.8% (75.7% last year) of Japanese respondents and 85.9% (88.2% last year) of Korean respondents did not have any acquaintances from the other country, showing a very low degree of direct interaction between the two nationals.

【Figure 33  “Have You Ever Visited the Other Country?”】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)

【Figure 34  “Do You Have Acquaintances in the Other Country?”】

Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000) Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)
11-2. Interest in the Other Country and the Information Source

More than 90% of both Japanese and South Korean respondents answered that they gained information of the other country through news media of their own country, especially through television. More than 40% of the South Koreans also gained information of Japan from their TV dramas as well as from their family and friends’ experiences.

Over 90% of both Japanese and South Korean respondents said that they obtained the other country’s information through their domestic “News media,” especially television (92.1% for Japan, 93.7% for South Korean to be precise). More than 40% of the South Koreans also chose “South Korean TV dramas, documentaries and movies” (46.8%) as the source of information, as well as “Experiences of family, friends and acquaintances” (45.1%).

【Figure 35: Information Source of the Other Country and Japan-South Korea Relations】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Opinion in Japan (N=1000)</th>
<th>Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%</td>
<td>0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation with South Korean people</td>
<td>Conversation with Japanese people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to South Korea</td>
<td>Visits to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese news media</td>
<td>South Korean news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese books (including textbooks)</td>
<td>South Korean books (including textbooks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese TV dramas, documentaries and films</td>
<td>South Korean TV drama, documentaries and films</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean news media</td>
<td>Japanese news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean books</td>
<td>Japanese books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean music</td>
<td>Japanese music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean &quot;anime&quot;</td>
<td>Japanese &quot;anime&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean TV dramas, documentaries and films</td>
<td>Japanese TV drama, documentaries and films</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate between leading figures in Japan</td>
<td>Debate between leading figures in South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experiences of family, friends and acquaintances</td>
<td>Experiences of family, friends and acquaintances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2016                                2015

3.8%                                0.1%
4.7%                                2.4%
2.0%                                5.7%
92.1%                                94.3%
4.7%                                2.4%
20%                                  20%
40%                                  40%
60%                                  60%
80%                                  80%
100%                                 100%
<Please send all inquiries about this survey to the address below>

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