War or Engagement - Options for Dealing with North Korea Remarks to Genron NPO
Tokyo, Japan
September 12, 2003
Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones (Former State Departmnt Official in Change of North Korea)
Introduction
I very much appreciate your coming early in the morning, and for the invitation to speak to you today. Also, I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my personal views. In Tokyo this week I had several meetings with government officials to compare my experiences dealing with the North Koreans from 1992 until very recently, both as a US diplomat as well a member of Mercy Corps, the American humanitarian organization.
Let me begin by saying I had the pleasure of having a very frank exchange with Mr. Tamaguchi in July just after I had been involved in a discussion with unnamed US official sources. These sources made it very clear that North Korea appears to be very close to assembling and quite possibly testing a nuclear weapon. This was somewhat shocking news.
I would like to emphasize, first of all, that Ambassador Galluchi and the rest of us who negotiated with North Korea in 1993 and in 1994 did not create the present problem. In Washington, the Bush Administration is always blaming the negotiations of 1993 and 1994 for today's problems with North Korea. I would say actually that, by negotiating with North Korea, by maintaining the support of Japan and South Korea, we did succeed, at least briefly, in halting the North Korean nuclear program. Our success was not complete. However, I would suggest that the effort certainly did not increase tensions nor did it lead to war. Instead, it prevented war.
Unfortunately now, and I still believe that despite the Six Party Talks recently held in Beijing, we remain in one of the most dangerous situations since 1950 to 1953 when we had the first Korean war. Why would I say this? I am not trying to be outrageous or dramatic, but I think that if North Korea proceeds with developing nuclear weapons and successfully testing them, they will change the balance of power in Northeast Asia. They will be in the position to single handedly threaten peace, not only in this region but elsewhere in the world.
Source of the Problem
Thus it is in our common interest to halt their ambition for a nuclear program. It is in our common interest to preserve peace, not just the status quo, but peace in North East Asia. The problem is not whether we should punish North Korea. Rather, it is how do we build peace. When I look at the situation, I said don't blame me and the others who negotiated the Agreed Framework. I place the responsibility for the current situation on the sons of two very prominent, previously powerful politicians, Kim II Sung`s son Kim Jong II and former President Bush`s son, President Bush.
Both these men belong to the post-Korean war generation. They represent a new generation of leaders who have not suffered from war, and they do not fully appreciate the consequences of not pursuing diplomacy. I would also suggest that both have a political weakness. As you know, the only reason that Kim Jong II has power is because he inherited it from his father. He accomplished nothing significant by himself. He was a playboy and had no real experience in international affairs. He therefore must prove, not to us but to the powerful North Korean generals such as Jo Myong Rok, that he can stand up to the American imperialists". His father stood up to the Japanese and established his reputation based upon his anti-imperialism campaign.
I think we now see Kim Jong II pursuing a similar anti-imperialism campaign to preserve his kingdom. This means we have to understand that this fellow is not incompetent. Instead, he is very insecure and this potentially could make him dangerous as to how far he will go to maintain the support of his generals. If he appears to bow to Washington or to President Bush, it is conceivable that he would risk loosing the support of his generals. Therefore, at all costs, he must maintain a rigid, hard, and consistent stance toward the United States.
Unfortunately, President Bush has some similar patterns in his behavior. As you know, the only reason he became president was because the US Supreme Court, not the American people, put him in power. The popular vote clearly was not in his favor. And I think that ever since, he has been trying to prove to the American people not only that he should be president, but also that he is just as good as his father. This too makes him defensive. I think what appears to be arrogance is actually insecurity. If you look behind Bush's smile, the confident look and so forth, again we see an insecure man who is attempting to use power as a way to assert his priorities. This too makes him potentially dangerous because if he senses that his position is threatened next year in the presidential elections, he too may take some drastic measures contrary to the interest of US allies in East Asia and Europe.
Washington's Adjusted Posture
I am pleased to say that there appears to have been a positive shift in Washington last week on September 5. First I would like to describe that and then explain the characteristics of this shift. Just before I left Washington, there was a so-called background briefing by a high ranking State Department official. Fortunately that transcript has been released. The ranking official spoke at length with several newspapers, Asahi, Yomiuri and so forth. I think his remarks have been accurately reported here in your press.
The day after this briefing, Secretary of State Powell confirmed that there has been an important shift in US policy regarding North Korea. Instead of emphasizing punishment of North Korea, refusing to negotiate, or refusing concessions, Secretary of State Powell expressed confidence that now the Bush administration will adopt a more flexible, moderate posture that emphasizes a step by step, diplomatic process aimed at bringing North Korea in line with the international community. Also fortunately, in my view, the Secretary of State has confirmed that the US is willing to work with Tokyo and Seoul, possibly Beijing, to design security assurances. That's a very substantial change. The Secretary of State said that the United States is willing to give North Korea the kind of assurances that it wants, and that will make it feel comfortable.
When I saw these reports, at first I thought, Oh, good!," but then I thought, Oh, let's step back a bit. Is this a temporary tactical shift or is this a long-term strategic shift?" I decided it is a temporary tactical shift. Basically, I think Bush has decided, at least temporarily, to put diplomacy in front of his military option. Looking down the road into the future, when might he shift back to his previous strategy? How long will he allow diplomacy the opportunity to deal with the North Korean situation? How long does Secretary of State Powell, State Deputy Secretary Armitage, Assistant Secretary Kelly, have to solve the North Korea problem? I would suggest six months, at most, much less time if North Korea tests a nuclear weapon. But at least we have maybe six to eight months.
Then I asked myself why the Bush administration made such a shift. Is it because of the Six Party Talks? Is it because of pressure from Beijing, or fear of North Korea? Here, as you might expect, the answer is complicated. Everyday, if you sit in Washington and watch your television or open a newspaper, in the past four weeks there has been a complete reversal in terms of the pubic attitude toward President Bush. The shift from positive to negative has been stunning.
Blunders
I will give you an example. My wife is very unhappy with Mr. Bush because our youngest daughter made a serious mistake. As a graduate student, she joined the US army reserve to receive a scholarship. Then she was called to active duty this past April. Her mother told her not to go to the army. My daughter is a law respecting citizen and, since April, she has been in very intensive training to prepare to be a civil affairs specialist to co-ordinate humanitarian activities, possibly between Japanese and Americans, in Iraq. Right now, fortunately, she is in Fort Lewis in Washington state waiting for boots. She is a small woman (her mother is Korean). But the US army does not have boots that fit her. The US army suggested she put some paper in the toes of the boots and go. I jokingly suggested that she not worry. Once in Iraq, if you still don't have boots, look for the Japanese self-defense forces. They can loan you some boots. I was joking, of course, but our daughter will soon be in Iraq.
My daughter is just one of thousands of young Americans who have been called to active duty in the US Army to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like my daughter, their education, work and family life have been disrupted. Sadly, the number of casualties, both wounded and dead, among US soldiers in Iraq, continues to increase. These developments are angering thousands of Americans, especially since they do not understand the reasons for this situation. Nor do they have any idea how long it will be before their lives can return to normal.
What Bush has done, I think, is make a series of serious political errors. It began early this summer with the credibility problem regarding the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq invasion allegations of weapons of mass destruction. For the American people, this was not so serious. This is a problem that concerns primarily the journalist community, not most Americans, so I think this problem will gradually go away. But when the American casualty figures in Iraq continue to climb, and when the American people find out that the Bush Administration has not been revealing how many American soldiers are being wounded, this creates a very serious credibility problem.
In addition, as you know, the US economy continues to encounter difficult problems. Yet the Bush administration has refused to reveal how much it thinks it would cost to accomplish the reconstruction of Iraq. This is a pocket book issue that concerns all Americans. On Sunday night (September 8), just before I left Washington D.C., I think President Bush made yet another blunder. In his speech to the American people on national television, he estimated for the first time that it will cost another eighty six billion dollars to rebuild Iraq. Before his speech, we had expected to hear sixty five billion dollars. The additional amount was not explained.
What happened the next day created an even bigger political problem. The defense department announced that all tours of duty for US military personnel in Iraq would be extended. That outraged tens of thousands of American mothers, fathers, husbands and the wives. So he has now created for himself a political fire storm that he has to put out.
President Bush does not need another crisis. For him, his first priority is Iraq. However, the US economy has forced him to pay increasing attention to that problem. He is trying to put North Korea on the back burner, that is make it a lower priority issue for his administration. Therefore, it is better for him to shift from the rigid stances embodied in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and military option to a diplomatic, moderate stance. This will, at least temporarily, give him time to deal with and possibly solve the other priority political issues of Iraq and the US economy.
If, however, after 4-6 months or after 2 or 3 more rounds of the Six Party Talks, there is no positive sign from North Korea that it will end its nuclear programs, then I think we could see a return to an assertive US strategy that accents PSI and the so-called military option. At that time, President Bush will most likely be attempting to use the Korean situation to promote his own presidency. In American politics, it is always very popular to be the commander in chief -- to have the American flag behind you. The American people will immediately jump up to support the president if they feel he is defending them. We saw this after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Draw A Red Line?
North Korean leader Kim Jong II, unfortunately, could convince President Bush to give up diplomacy and instead implement his military option by testing a nuclear weapon sometime in the next 4-6 months. The US intelligence community appears convinced of this possibility. Such an agreement among intelligence agencies is very unusual in Washington because the US intelligence community is very complicated. I have participated in such meetings while serving in the State Department. You have many agencies such as the CIA or Central Intelligence Agency, the DIA or Defense Intelligence Agency, etc. Despite their usually different views, they have essentially come to the conclusion that North Korea has acquired all the technology it needs, primarily from Pakistan, to conduct a nuclear test underground. My hope is that North Korea will not do so.
My recommendation, while I have been in Tokyo, is that the time has arrived for the five participants of the Six Party Talks (China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States) tell the sixth party, North Korea, that there is a red line it must not cross. It must not test a nuclear weapon while engaged in diplomatic negotiations. Failure to do this, I think, could lead Kim Jong II to assume that there is no red line. He has all the time he needs to make and to test nuclear weapons. I think this would create a very dangerous situation.
In 1994, frankly speaking, the Clinton Administration, urged by Secretary of Defense Perry and supported by Ambassador Galluchi, drew a red line. The US told Kang Sok Chu, North Korea's chief negotiator, in a letter, which I faxed to him, that North Korea must not remove the nuclear fuel rods from its reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. The next day, there was a cartoon in the New York Times with a caption that read, Clinton gets tough on North Korea and sends a fax".
We did not reveal the content of the letter to the public, but essentially we told the North Koreans; If you start to reprocess the nuclear spent fuel rods, you could cause a war. We will go to the United Nations and seek economic sanctions." Earlier, North Korea had declared that it would consider as an act of war any effort by the United States to win approval of UN sanctions. Quietly, China indicated that it would neither approve nor oppose UN sanctions. Rather it would abstain if the issue came before the UN Security Council for a vote. For the United States, this was a green light to seek UN sanctions, and the UN Security Council would have approved economic sanctions. Tokyo would have fully supported the implementation of such sanctions because the UN had approved them. North Korea responded publicly by declaring that this would lead to war.
The Clinton Administration answered fine, we are ready for war. While former President Carter was meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang in June 1994, the White House prepared a plan to send 260,000 more troops to Japan and to South Korea. The Clinton Administration really did have a red line, and it did prepare for a war against North Korea.
I believe that this red line," more than President Carter's visit, prevented war on the Korean Peninsula in 1994. The red line convinced Kim Il Sung and his generals that North Korea had too much to loose from continuing his nuclear program. They knew they could not win a war against the United States. Only then did they decide to resume negotiations. President Carter's visit to Pyongyang was of value because it gave Kim Il Sung a face saving way out of this situation.
I think if diplomacy is going to work for the Bush Administration, it too must have its stick. We cannot only speak softly. But do not use the stick, and do not just wave it. Instead, just put it on the negotiating table and tell Kim Jong II not to test nuclear weapons. Why risk this? I think that once North Korea tests a nuclear weapon, and if it works, Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear capability.
Trust or Change North Korea?
I also say that we cannot trust North Korea. They have broken all their promises. What we have to do is change them. We have to begin changing them by first erasing the reasons why they want nuclear weapons. This means we should start with security assurances and aim for a peace treaty. In exchange for this, North Korea must dismantle its nuclear programs and allow inspections.
Ultimately, no matter what agreement we might make with North Korea, we are going to have to change North Korean society. A few days ago I was on the American television's Public Broadcast System news hour. They always put me on to argue with the neo-conservatives who support the Bush Administration. One fellow looked at me and said, You were one of the guys who was nice to the North Koreans. You always smiled and shook hands with them, and participated in making the Agreed Framework." I answered, No, no! We made peace. We didn't make war." He replied. But you failed." I said, Let's be honest. North Korea is never going to surrender their weapons. No country in history has done that unless you defeat them in war."
We don't want war. That is what President Bush's has told us. For America, war is relatively cheap. But war in Northeast Asia will have a terrible price, not only for the people on the Korean peninsular, but for all the people in the region, including Japan. In 1993 and 1994, North Korea did not have the ballistic capability that it now has. I am sure that if we have a war, all the communities near American bases in Japan and South Korea will be priority targets. This is the first problem.
Secondly, what will happen to the international economic situation? I remember in 1994 how many telephone calls I got everyday from businessmen and stock brokers who asked when we would have negotiations so there could be peace. The stock markets in the United States and East Asia declined until the US-North Korea negotiations resumed in July 1994.
Japan's economy is one of the most dynamic in the world. Just the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula could cause severe damage to all the economies of Northeast Asia. There would be profoundly negative economic implications around the world. The North Koreans know this. All they have to do is threaten to test their ballistic missiles and test their nuclear weapons in the hope of warning their foe and making them back off.
I am saying this in the hope that the situation does not get this bad. Let's not allow the North Koreans to have such an option. We need to draw a red line to tell them clearly not to escalate to the point of testing their nuclear weapons. Yes, we will negotiate, I believe. Yes, we can reach an agreement with North Korea, I believe. But we should not put our faith in North Korea's implementation of any agreement. Then what do we do?
Engagement's Promise
I would suggest that we pursue the models of our engagement with the Soviet Union and China. When I began studying Asia in the 1960s, China was the big, red, ugly, dangerous dragon. In the US, we were taught that it was spreading communism. Then came ping pong" diplomacy in 1972. All of a sudden, the American people fell in love with China. We turned 180 degrees in the exact opposite direction. Ever since, even though China remains a dictatorship with a horrendous human rights record and massive arsenal weapons of mass destruction, we, the United States and Japan have engaged it in commerce. Today, if you go to China, it is profoundly different than it was 10 years ago. The change began slowly, in a kind of silly way with McDonald's hamburger restaurants and so forth. I can remember when capitalism in Beijing in 1992 meant selling small items arranged on a piece of cloth spread out on a side walk. Now China's economy is a booming capitalist economy. China does not want war because it cannot afford war. It wants peace so it can continue to pursue prosperity.
The Soviet Union has had a similar experience. It was the conservative, anti-communist, pro-capitalist Reagan Administration that engaged the communist Soviets. The Reagan Administration had extensive disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. These eventually led Reagan's successor, the first President Bush, to begin providing Moscow large amounts of aid and financial compensation in exchange for Russia's destruction of its nuclear arsenal. As Russia destroyed its weapons of mass destruction, it reformed its economy by converting it from a military dominated communist to a civilian oriented capitalist system.
This kind of commercial and diplomatic engagement has radically altered communist societies. Ultimately, I suggest that we face similar options regarding North Korea. We can either forcefully disarm North Korea by making war, or we can engage North Korea the same way we did with the Soviet Union and China. I hope that the Six Party Talks have at least paused the escalation of tensions between the United States and North Korea. I hope they can shift the emphasis away from confrontation and towards negotiation. Given enough time, North Koreans and Americans can again sit down and quietly come to some reasonable understanding. Otherwise, I assure you, if Kim Jong II does test his nuclear weapons, we will be on an inevitable track to a second Korean war.
This is a rather pessimistic forecast, but I think we need to be realistic. If we continue to kick the can down the road," as they say in Washington when delaying action regarding a problem, and ignore the possible outcome of doing nothing, we will sell ourselves short. North Koreans, meanwhile, will continue to have the initiative.
By the way, I must say that one thing the Bush Administration has finally learnt is to be sensitive to Japan's concerns. You know that Bush is coming to Tokyo soon. I can assure you that he is not coming to sightsee. He is coming to shop. On his wish list are money and soldiers for Iraq, so please be careful.
Questions and Answers
Participants:
Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones (KQ)
Takashi Anzai (TA)
Akira Iriyama (AI)
Takatoshi Kato(TK)
Manabu Matsuda (MM)
Tomohiko Taniguchi (TT)
TT You said that you have to draw a red line and convince Kim Jong II that there is a red line. The question can be how can you do that? Because you have already had the Six Party Talks, you have already had the negotiations between the US and North Korea, so there have been many opportunities for the US to tell them that there is a red line. But so far it seems that Kim Jong II has not listened to you. There were voices from the US and other parties. So how can you do that? That is one question. Also, after the Six Party Talks, Kim Jong II made it clear that he would not be interested in getting engaged in the Six Party Talks because it is attempted to contain the North Korean regime. That's what Kin Jong Il said after the talks. So the second question of mine is there going to be possible that the talk to be held again?
KQ I think it is actually essential that we use the Six Party Talks format as a way to draw the red line. We have time now until the next round of Six Party Talks for small diplomatic meetings. I am pleased to say that such meetings are already underway. You won't see them mentioned in the headlines, but that is where the real work is being done. In these meetings, China must take the lead and it must agree that there has to be a red line. We have to tell North Korea that there must not be any nuclear tests. The US, Japan, and South Korea should immediately support such a position, Moscow as well. I think that is one way. The US cannot unilaterally draw the red line.
It is time to isolate the North Koreans. Flexibility in the Bush Administration's position could prevent it from becoming isolated at the Six Party Talks. This almost happened during the Six Party Talks in August because of the Bush Administration's very strong, adamant posture. By shifting to a more flexible stance, China, Moscow, Tokyo and Seoul could align themselves with the US. Then it would be Pyongyang that must demonstrate flexibility and a positive response to the US offer to pursue a step by step process. This also gives the five parties the opportunity to tell the North Koreans, Yes, we will deal with you, but only if you don't cross this red line."
Secondly, I don't know everything. I was meeting last night with a member of Japan's delegation to the Six Party Talks. We laughed that North Koreans don't know how to speak Korean. I don't know where they learnt their Korean, but they never write a sentence that anybody can understand.
It reminds me of the English that we used to write in the US government as instructions for a US negotiating team. The State Department and the Defense Department always contradicted each other. If the State Department wrote a very clear sentence, it then had to send it to the Defense Department for review. After many changes, it went to the White House. By the time you finished, you had mumble jumble, mah mah hooh hooh as you say in Chinese. Nobody could make sense out of the final version. But that is what you give to your chief delegate as instructions and tell him, Here read this, don't ask questions, don't change anything, just read it to the North Koreans." I am sure that's the way that the North Korean bureaucracy works, don't think, here are your orders, just follow them.
In Beijing, North Korea's chief delegate confused everyone at the end of the Six Party Talks regarding North Korea's position about future talks by reading his instructions to the press at the airport just before he departed for Pyongyang. Unfortunately, the BBC, the first news service to publish the statement, missed the first clause of the first sentence. The first clause of the North Korean statement began, If the US does not give up its hostile policy, we will do blah blah blah and so forth. By the time you get to the end of the long, rambling sentence, you have forgotten the precondition. Since then, China's Xinhua news service has published a clarification. The North Koreans also have published a clarification.
I also believe North Korea's claim that it will not return to the Six Party Talks is a tactic. We used to describe this tactic as being, They want sugar." Whenever you have a meeting with them, they want a cup of coffee -- not just one cup of coffee and not just hot coffee. They want it with lots of sugar. So you give them three sugars. But they can be very nasty and not even say thank you. Instead, they say, Why don't you give us more sugar?" That's what I think they are doing now. They are being nasty, they are telling South Korea and Beijing, Look, you want us to come to the next Six Party Talks, well first we want more sugar." Very quietly, I am sure, there will be more Chinese oil and South Korean food aid quietly going to North Korea before the next Six Party Talk. It's one of their negotiation tactics.
TT I will raise another question that is a follow-up of the first question of mine. I understand that we have to isolate North Korea by telling them that there has to be a clear red line. But I am still puzzled whether or not the five parties have enough bargaining tool in order for North Koreans to get convinced that they have to obey to these requests. What kind of bargaining chips do we have?
KQ I think that this is one of the positive aspects of the Six Party Talks. It prevents North Korea from doing its traditional running around using one country against the other. That's why it is so important in the case of the red line that we present a united front. There cannot be any cracks or different perspectives or anything.
There has to be one simple statement issued by China. Why China? China is the host of the Six Party Talks and also is the largest economic supporter of North Korea. Then, immediately afterward, all the other capitals should come out and say that they support the Chinese initiative. There would be no way for Pyongyang to reject it. If the US takes the lead, right away Moscow and Beijing will hear Pyongyang wining that the United States is threatening it. If the Chinese are really sincere about this process, and if they really want to perform an international service, then they need to play the international diplomacy game according to international rules. This means that you sit down, stop talking quietly to North Korea via a back channel. Instead, you publicly tell them where the line has been drawn. China can say to North Korea that this is a diplomatic process, here we have drawn the red line and if you go outside the line, you have broken the rules of diplomacy and you lose.
TT Are you still carrying the State DepartmentsÙ
KQ No, I assure you I don't work for the State Department. I have been invited to Seoul by some of my former colleagues in the South Korean government, some people who are still there. They said, look would you come talk to us about US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Why me? Because I used to be a college professor and I have gray hair.
TK You mentioned that Kim Jong II is an insecure person. He is similar to the President Bush in some respect. My question is how can he sell these ideas to the military of North Korea? That is tough sell.
KQ That is a very good question. North Korea does have politics, it has bureaucratic politics. It is not just one simple decision. Kim Jong II must convince his seniors the generals that his decision is the right course. He has to have convincing reasons for his decisions. Like I said earlier, he cannot appear to be bowing to US pressure or bowing to President Bush. Bush cannot bow to Kim Jong II either. We have to have a carefully designed, face saving device here.
I think this is a benefit of the Six Party Talks. If Kim Jong II faces the international community, and all the countries are telling him the same thing, he can then do what his father did which is adjust his position. Actually President Carter did not accomplish any negotiations. He was not authorized to negotiate anything. I was with Ambassador Galluchi when he emphasized this to Carter. At the time, Clinton was in France in early June, 1994. Clinton told Carter that he was not to negotiation, that he was a messenger. Carter agreed.
What happened? Carter gave Kim II Sung the opportunity not to bow to Washington, but instead to tell his generals that the Americans have sent me respect. They have sent me their former president. I must show some response. It was a very Asian, traditional type of exchange, almost like the Japanese concept of Omiyage. I really think that Washington needs to understand that when dealing with North Korea, we are dealing in an Asian society.
Kim Jong II is going to have to give his bureaucracy, his party and army, a good reason for cooperating with Washington. For North Korea, this means, security assurances. That's exactly what the North Koreans wanted in June 1993. The North Korean Foreign Ministry at that time told us to provide security assurances so that they could then tell the North Korean army to relax. This is what we need to do now. I think Secretary of State Powell, as a former general, can fully understand this. Also as a bureaucrat now, he knows that he has to have a good reason to sell President Bush.
It's very important that international press begin viewing the context of all of this in a more Asian setting. Its not a tennis match, its not a case of which country lost the most, which country won the most, this is not a game. This is a very dangerous situation. It's not 5 against 1 or what have you. Let's look at this in terms of whether we moving towards peace or towards war? What will move us towards peace? What in Pyongyang will help the moderates increase their leverage so that they can move Kim Jong II.
So far, the Bush Administration, especially Mr. Bolton, has been very helpful to the hard line generals in Pyongyang. Every time Mr. Bolton says something nasty, I can see the North Korean generals saying, Hello Mr. Kim Jong Il! The Americans are threatening you and did you see what they said?" What can Kim Jong II say? He cannot deny it. Security assurances are what he needs, not Washington's criticism.
TK If I were North Korean general, I must say that security assurances are just an agreement on paper. It would be much better for us to develop our own nuclear capabilities, delivering missiles and so on. That makes North Korea uninvadable.
KQ Already, at this time, the US government has provided security guarantees to Pyongyang since August 27th. There are 30 American soldiers in North Korea now, in the northeast corner of the country, looking for the remains of American marines who died during the Korean War. That has been going on since 1996. I helped to start this program, and spent two summers with the US recovery teams. Whenever US soldiers are in North Korea, the North Korean army officers say, Ah, security guarantees, the American imperialists will not attack us when their soldiers are here." All of this is very low profile. It is done under a humanitarian label, but it is very successful.
When Secretary Powell and the five parties are ready to present a joint declaration of security guarantees, it has to be in writing. There is already discussion about whether it should be in the form of a Congressional resolution or some other form.
I think the important thing is that there are Americans inside North Korea. This is where humanitarian organizations come in. This is why, after I retired from State Department, I worked with humanitarian organizations because I knew that if we had Americans living in North Korea, the North Koreans would feel much more secure. We need to back security guarantees with humanitarian aid and that would put Americans back into North Korea. We need to get the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, back into North Korea. The North Koreans recognized that we could see through the IAEA and our humanitarian organizations what was happening in their society because we had our eyes in their society. They said that this is fine. In this way, both we and they could know that neither side was preparing a surprise attack on the other side.
TT As a matter of accuracy, the number of Americans in North Korea is 30?
KQ That you had better check, I think it is 30. There are 2 groups now, one working in Unsan and another group working near the Chosen Reservoir. These teams will come out on September 27th and a second pair of teams will go in and remain there until October 27th. During this 60 day window, we have the opportunity for Six Party Talks. If you noticed, the Six Party Talks started the same day that the US soldiers arrived in Pyongyang, on August 27th. The expectation is that the second round of Six Party Talks will conclude just before the last team of US soldiers leave. You will not find this written anywhere. All I can say is that it is from reliable sources. Actions do speak louder than words and we have to back our words with some kind of action.
TT In your opinion, maybe comes from the impression of the President Roh Moo Hyun, how he was elected? How do you think he can manage?
KQ I was in Seoul three weeks ago. I was very surprised that President Roh Moo Hyun`s popularity was so low. I thought that public support for engagement with North Korea would also be low, but I was amazed to find out that even the most conservative journalists and government officials support the engagement policy towards North Korea. According to South Korean polls, support for engagement stands between 70-80%. A reason for Roh Moo Hyun's low popularity is, I think, are the inflated expectations on the part of the young people who were responsible for electing him. Korea is a maturing democracy. It is not yet at the level of sophistication that Japan has achieved. So in South Korea, they still experience wild swings in the popularity of their presidents. Some of these young Koreans thought that all they had to do was to elect one guy and South Korea's problems would be solved. I think that now these young Koreans are going through a process of adjusting their idealistic expectations to more realistic ones.
Meanwhile, President Roh has to improve his performance. He failed in his summit with Bush. You could see this would happen during his trip to Washington, D.C. He left his footsteps in the New York Times and Washington Times, by saying in press interview that, I`m going to be tough with Bush, I`m going to tell Bush Ù" But when he got to Washington, it was a completely different story. During the brief Bush-Roh summit at the White House about 20 journalists, mostly from Japan and Korea, were present. All of them later agreed that Roh kept bowing to Bush during their meeting in the President Bush's office. The reporters claimed that they could see this through the window. The Korean embassy later explained that Roh was just showing respect." But if you are the president of an Asian country, you don't go to Washington and bow. So when Roh got back home, there was a huge protest. The people asked why he bowed to Bush. Roh's performance is lacking, but I think there is still some hope for his presidency.
There is another fundamental problem in South Korea right now. Like I was saying before, we went from fearing and hating the big red Chinese dragon to falling in love with China and everything Chinese. I think South Koreans are now going through a similar phase. Until 1998, in South Korea you could not watch North Korean TV. You couldn't say anything good about North Korea. Then after Kim Dae Jung came to power, the situation underwent a complete reversal. Now, as soon as a South Korea goes to North Korea, they immediately become a Korean specialists. They immediately claim that they can achieve peace. They have false expectations about what is possible with North Korea. Korean emotions are out of balance and I think we need to appreciate that, and understand why this is so.
At the same time, when you talk to their government officials, they understand that the current South Korean views of North Korea present a political management problem. They hope that the Six Party Talks will help stabilize the Korean public's mood and make expectations more realistic. South Korea officials say we will tell the public that South Korea's policy needs to be coordinated with Tokyo and Washington, which they hope will help them manage and calm Koreans' expectations regarding North Korea. Otherwise, if we have an agreement among four nations (Tokyo, Washington, Beijing and Moscow) regarding the red line, but then Seoul comes out and says no to the idea, this will cause very serious damage to the diplomatic process. That's what they need to understand in Seoul.
I have recently had several hours of discussions with South Korean officials them. I am impressed at how , over the past three weeks, South Korea's diplomats have flown to Moscow and Washington twice regarding the next round of Six Party Talks. Also, the South Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs is here now in Tokyo and there is very intense coordination of activities going on regarding the Six Party Talks..
I will go tomorrow to Seoul, and I was there three weeks ago. As you know, the political situation there is chaotic. The number of scandals involving former government officials and politicians is shocking. This has really shaken the country. Voters had put their faith into the party that Kim Dae-jung formed and that Roh Moo-hyon now heads. They promised to end corruption, but now their party is consumed by corruption. On my previous visit to Seoul, I had attempted to make appointments with several politicians, and I hope I will be able to meet some politicians while I am there this time. This may not be possible because the political situation is so chaotic.
It appears to me that the Korean government is trying to focus the public's attention away from the internal onto the international situation. While in Seoul, I will have several quiet seminars with young government officials to try to help them understand the reality of North Korea. They need to see that this it is not a paradise and, if you spent two days in Pyongyang, you don't become a Korea specialist. You have to get out of the capital to see the people's suffering.
TT We have been having this sort of discussions in order for us to come up with a set of long-term strategies for Japan's future. Japan is going to have to deal with other Asian countries. That's why it is called the Asian Strategy Committee. Could I ask you to tell us what your scenarios are going to be, looking at the surrounding parameters of Japan in the time frame of 25 years perhaps, or a little shorter, at 10-20 years. Korean peninsular has always in history been a ground where interested parties, Russian, China, Japan, the US, are coming to confuse the situation. What kind of scenario should Japan have based upon your long experiences in these countries, Japan, Korea, China and other Asian countries?
KQ That's a profound challenge and I will cautiously endeavor to respond. Maybe the best way to respond is to offer you the best and worst case scenarios.
I am not good at predictions. Let me go back to December 1963 when I first came to Japan. I didn't know anything about Japan except that during World War II my father had been a prisoner in a Japanese prison camp in the South Pacific. I had been raised not to appreciate Japanese. I spent 2 weeks traveling in Japan in 1964 and I was fascinated. I could never have envisioned then that Japan could become a world power, but now Japan is a world power. I went on to Korea, Christmas eve 1963, I got off the plane near Seoul. At the time, I was a US army soldier. A sign at the airport read, Welcome to freedom's frontier." I thought it should have read, Welcome to the end of the world." I never could have envisioned South Korea as a dynamic commercial international player, but that is what it has become.
The best case scenario that I might come up with now is that we do achieve, hopefully in the next 5 years, peace in Northeast Asia. The absolute essential requirement for this would be a united Korean peninsular. Maybe we will not have a united Korean government, but at least we could have peaceful coexistence. It also would mean that we would have to have a change in the balance of power in Northeast Asia. China is on the rise. Japan has already risen from the ashes of World War II. Maybe Japan's economic bubble has burst, and maybe Japan will continue to have some economic problems, but I think the world perception of Japan is that it is a steady, reliable and mature world leader. I don't see Japan rising much further, nor declining. I think Japan is in a very stable situation. On the Korean Peninsula, imbalances persist between South and North Korea, both politically and economically. This is why the situation is so unstable. If we can first create a stable and equal economic situation between the two Korea's, that will tend to foster a reduction in military tension. This is a prerequisite for stable co-existence between the two Koreas.
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TT What about the US?
KQ Frankly, I don't think that US power is declining that much in East Asia. Actually, the US has been profoundly successful in this region. Again, when I arrived here, the US dominated Asia, militarily and economically, technologically and so forth. Then Japan exploded technologically and commercially. Now it is China that is doing the same. I think the new balance of power that is emerging will be a healthy one in which the US will play less a dominating role and more a subdued partnership. This will require that the Bush Administration recognize the benefits of such a situation and allow for a true partnership to develop with Japan. This will be better for the long term.
The US should not intend to preserve its perceived military or economic domination of the region. A little bit of humility will go a long way. Once a true partnership has developed between the US and Japan, and I think we are moving in that direction, then it will be possible to place greater confidence in our relationship with China.
By the way, I don't think ultimately that the Six Party Talks will be completely successful, but I think they can be a stepping stone to a durable peace. Before this can be realized, the region must undergo significantly more change.
I would hope that in 5 to 10 years we will have a new balance of power in East Asia. No longer will the United States dominate the region. Instead, the US-Japan partnership will share influence in the region with China, and coexistence between the two Koreas will stabilize the Korean peninsula. Only diplomatic and commercial engagement can nurture this new order.
The new order will require the equivalent of a new Marshall Plan" to for North Korea to draw it into the international community and promote North Korea's prosperity so that it no longer wishes to risk war. Give North Korea more economic benefits and they will no longer resist being drawn into becoming a responsible member of the international community. So lets give ourselves another 5 to 10 years to accomplish this. This is the best case scenario.
The worst case scenario could come much sooner. If diplomacy fails in the next 6-8 months and we do not see a diplomatic solution, and we do see North Korea test nuclear weapons, the balance of power in Northeast Asia will shift abruptly in a negative manner. North Korea will become a very arrogant enemy because it has a nuclear capability. We can either have a horrendous nuclear arms race in which Japan has to face the dilemma of whether to become a nuclear power or remain non-nuclear. We could have very serious strains in the US-South Korea relationship as South Korea attempts to decide whether to lean towards Pyongyang or Tokyo and Washington. Given the current situation, I think Seoul could very well lean away from the US. It is already leaning towards Beijing.
Old patterns are re-emerging. I think China's ambition for hegemony over East Asia has to be restrained, especially if North Korea goes nuclear, I think we should not put our trust in China alone to manage North Korea. This could restore the old alignment in East Asia that once pitted Beijing and Moscow against Washington and Tokyo. If Tokyo were to go nuclear out of self defense, again we will have strains in all the relationships in the region. A chaotic situation could ensue in East Asia.
These changes could materialize as early as next summer. That's why I think its imperative to face these possibilities now, to realize their potential consequences and then focus on trying to pursue the best case scenario.
Reflecting further on the Six Party Talks, I am uncertain about China. If China really wants a nuclear free Korean peninsular, it should be acting now. It should not be so cautious and gentle with Pyongyang. Nor should Beijing try to use the US and Japan as the bad guys in its dealings with Pyongyang. China, it seems to me, in the Six Party Talks is playing what we call the good cop and bad cop" game. While they are telling Pyongyang that they are the good cop, they warn Pyongyang that if it does not cooperate with Beijing, Pyongyang will have to deal with the bad cops," in Washington and Tokyo. That kind of game has to stop and the Chinese need to say either they are with Washington and Tokyo, or not. I am not alone in this regard. Rather, I am reflecting the views I have acquired from friends in your government and in Washington there is a shared concern about China.
TT If you can possibly try to see the situation from Beijing's perspective, what sort of problems does North Korea really pose to Beijing? They are talking about problems such as the number of the population that is about 100,000 escaping from North Korea illegally living in China. That is exacerbating the job opportunities in China. But other than that, strategically speaking, what worries Beijing most, what concerns does it have?
KQ I have been to the China-Korean border four times, and have spent at least fours months there working with NGOs beginning in 1998. I last went there with Japanese friends in the summer of 2001. I did a lot of talking to Chinese government officials.
China strikes me as very much preoccupied right now with getting rich. I am not saying this in a negative way. Economic development is priority one. South Korea contributes technology and investment to China, so China is very comfortable with South Korea. However, the problem, of course, is North Korea. It is an irritant. The Chinese are very uncomfortable with this neighbor. People in China say that Kim Jong II is rattling his neighbors and trying to get Washington's attention using nuclear weapons.
I think Pyongyang has a problem with Beijing. Beijing has been preoccupied with its own economic development and its trade with South Korea and Japan. I don't think the Chinese know how to deal with North Korea or want to deal with it unilaterally. Only very reluctantly did China step in to the current nuclear impasse on behalf of the international community.
Some years ago, I met a Chinese delegation at the Pyongyang airport when I was with one of the first US army officers to go back into North Korea since the Korean War. The Chinese official came up to me and said You! You brought the US army back into North Korea, Don't do that. You don't understand. In one forest there can only be one tiger. South Korea is your forest so you Americans can stay there. North Korea is China's forest, so you stay out." I asked if this involved military strategy, but he said no, it is a matter of pride. He said that the Chinese had seen the Americans come closer and closer. Drawing an imaginary line on the table, he said this is our border, stay out.
According to China's official Xinhua news service, Beijing published a letter that China's leader reportedly sent to Kim Jong Il. The Chinese leader told his North Korean counterpart that China wishes to help Pyongyang because it does not want the Americans in its forest," in other words in North Korea. This is very traditional thinking. But there must be something else here. I think the Chinese are trying to use the US and Japan to influence North Korea. This is fine, but they should not just expect us to do all the work. If North Korea in fact has a nuclear weapon, and if Beijing believes that it's interests are best served by leaning towards Pyongyang, then the US and Japan could find themselves in a very difficult and confrontational mode with China. I don't completely trust the Chinese, not yet. Trust is developing, but we have not yet achieved full mutual trust.
AI You mention that Bush comes to Tokyo next month and not just for sightseeing. What will be his expectations?
KQ I can see the policy papers now being written because we already wrote them before. I think that every time the American President comes to Japan, the agenda is always the same. You Japan are a good ally. We the United States want to maintain our alliance, etcÙ But, by the way, the burden is very hard on us and we need your help! I see Bush coming because there is a great misunderstanding in Washington that the Japanese economic bubble really didn't burst. It is amazing that there are still people in Washington, especially on the conservative side, who think that all they have to do is come and embarrass the Japanese into giving the US government support in the form of money. Or, before I came to Tokyo this time, in Washington we had a lot of discussion about Japan's role in Iraq. I was arguing with some Americans, based upon my visit to Tokyo in July, that the US should not push Japan for more money for Iraq. Prime Minister Koizumi visited Bush in Texas earlier this year. There he had a Texas barbeque with Bush who gave him a cowboy hat and boots. Koizumi pledged to help the US in Iraq.
I think Bush is coming to Tokyo this time with probably two pairs of boots and two cowboy hats for Koizumi. He wants Japan to send several thousand combat troops to Iraq. Not just combat troops, but also engineers and medical personnel because this will enable Bush to turn to Europe and show what Japan is contributing. Bush can then say to France and Germany, We Americans are sorry about having insulted you regarding Iraq, but look, Japan is helping us. Shouldn't you help us too?" This, in my view, is an unrealistic expectation by Washington that will take years to erase.
TK In Japan, according to media, the Self Defense Agency is thinking of sending army engineers up to 1,000?
KQ I have heard very severe criticism from some Japanese officials regarding the sending of Japanese forces to Iraq. I was surprised because they are saying that Japan's Self Defense Forces' first responsibility is to defend Japan, not to help Bush get out of political trouble. So I think that Bush should be very aware of the political climate here. Of course Koizumi will maintain the presidency of his party, but then you have the Diet's Lower House election. Bush should not ask for too much. He must be sensitive to Japan's domestic politics because you don't want to be burned by the Tony Blair problems. Koizumi must really be cautious. So I am urging my Japanese friends to be very frank with the Americans. Don't let them keep believing that Japan is a bottomless pocket full of cash.
AI May I go back to the red line issue? Is there any advice, most we can do is the economic sanctions?
KQ Regarding North Korea, I think my concern is that the next phase will not be economic sanctions but PSI which means Proliferation Security Initiative. Already that initiative is fully accepted by the Japanese government. Japan is the first country to implement it, primarily in the form of inspecting North Korean ships coming into Japanese ports. The next phase, which is already fully planned, will be for Japan to essentially disrupt North Korean trade. This is an intermediary step between the diplomacy of the Six Party Talks and possible future economic sanctions.
Consultations regarding this are well under way, not only within your own government but also between Washington, Australia and other participating nations. My concern with this approach is that, if we are negotiating with North Korea, and at the same time there is an escalation of PSI, the hardliners in Pyongyang will use this to claim that we are being two faced." While claiming to be engaged in diplomacy, we simultaneously are threatening to disrupt their commercial trade. Pyongyang's hard liners will argue that they cannot trust us, and call for an end of dialogue.
In July, I asked some friends here in Tokyo what would happen in the event that a North Korean navel vessel fired on the Japanese while implementing PSI, where do we go from there? That's when we shift abruptly. I think the Bush Administration is using economic sanctions to deflect attention away from PSI because I don't think the UN will approve of economic sanctions. Secondly, economic sanctions for 50 years have failed to influence North Korea. Thirdly, the North Koreans have already said that they will consider such steps as an act of war. We need to be concerned about the possible consequences of PSI, not only its implementation.
AI If the war was taking place in Iraq, we have some reasons to believe that the US is not willing to nor is capable of invading North Korea right way.
KQ I worry because I think Kim Jong II is not thinking that US military is overextended, or that the prospects for a surprise attack are declining. My concern is the possibility of an accident. When you put a million and a half highly armed and hostile soldiers opposite each other on the small Korean peninsular, then add the inflammatory remarks of Mr. Bolton or some North Korean outrageous remark, the situation is already set to explode. There would be no warning, nor a slow burning process. That's the problem, and that's why I asked the Japan Defense Agency if it would risk an accidental conflict.
The US and North Korea both are engaging in provocative moves. The US is doing this using intelligence flights that go right up to the North Korean air space. We saw in March that the North Koreans attempted to force a US airplane to land. This was provocative. Fortunately nothing happened, but if you work inside the US government, you know that many of these incidents don't get reported and that the odds are that, when political tensions are high, even though nobody wants a war, you can have an accidental war.
That's why PSI, although highly reasoned, is potentially dangerous. When you are sitting in your capital thinking about it, it is not dangerous. But when you get out there on the ocean or on the ground, men can lose control of their machines. In December 1994, we thought relations with North Korea were perfect, but then bang! A US army helicopter flew into North Korean air space and a North Korean soldier, under orders, shot it down. We immediately had a very dangerous situation. In July 1996, I was in Pyongyang and a fellow from the North Korean Foreign Ministry came to me -- this was not reported in the press -- and he said that there was a serious exchange of fire between North and South Koreans over the de-militarized zone. He asked me to please call the US embassy in Seoul. I asked how can you call Seoul from Pyongyang? So what I literally did was call Washington's State Department operations center. They then connected me to the US embassy in Seoul, but unbelievably the US embassy hung up. They thought I was some crazy guy. I finally was able to make the telephone call and to deliver the message that the North Koreans would stop if the South Koreans would do the same. Fortunately the North Koreans then backed down. I wrote a very detailed report and faxed it to the State Department, but never got a response.
These kinds of things happen routinely on the Korean Peninsula. Right now, if there is such an incident, the British or the Swedes would be the channel of communication because they have diplomatic missions in Pyongyang. But if they are out of the office or if their telephone doesn't work, who knows what could happen. I just don't like the odds. The odds now just don't favor rational action. Instead, they favor irrational accidents.
AI Is it true that North Korea believes the assurance for not being invaded by the US?
KQ I don't think so, I think the North Korean generals believe, just like the American generals have long believed, that the best policy is deterrence. But I think that politicians everywhere do not put full trust in deterrence. That's why we have had, in recent years, movement away from deterrence beginning with the Soviet Union and the US, and then China and so forth. Deterrence is a very dangerous game. The North Koreans, I think, don't understand the full potential of a nuclear explosion.
In South Korea, no one was allowed to see a picture, even on television, of a nuclear explosion until 1986 when the US embassy brought into Korea a movie from the US and showed it in the US Cultural Center library. The South Korean government was outraged. The US purpose was to show young Korean college students what could happen in the event of a nuclear explosion. The South Korean government banned the film out of fear of the public reaction. They did not want the South Korean people to know the possible consequences of a nuclear war. At the time, the US was maintaining nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsular. President Bush in 1991 withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from around the world, including Korea. That is why Kim Il Sung responded to South Korea's invitation to jointly declare the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
I think that the North Korean military now has put too much faith in technology, especially nuclear technology. They don't know the danger this technology poses. You here in Japan, of course, know about that nuclear weapons are not the solution to anything. They are only the road to grief.
TT But what is important is not necessarily what the generals think, it is what Kim Jong II himself thinks.
KQ I go back to my earlier comment about Kim Jong Il being uncertain of himself. Whenever you see Kim Jong Il, there is a general with him. These generals are older than him. They are his fathers oldest colleagues. So he puts great faith in listening to what they say. Every time I talked to North Korean military officers, they convinced me that they really believe their own propaganda. They believe they defeated the Japanese imperial army single handedly. They do not claim that they did it. Rather, they claimed that Kim II Sung did it. They also think that they can single handedly defeat the American imperialists".
Of course, inside the North Korean system, if you disagree you are a bad boy. There is no gray area. Either you are with or against them. You don't see anybody disagree with the North Korean army.
The US and North Korean armies have had terrible arguments. If you want to get in an argument, take a US army officer to North Korea and sit down and try to have a calm sensible discussion. It's impossible. The American soldiers get angry and the North Koreans get angry. Before you know it, they are ready to go to war.
I really think that the North Korean generals believe their own propaganda, that if they have nuclear weapons, they believe that they have found an ultimate solution to their security problem. This is why they keep coming back to building nuclear weapons. For 15 years, the world has been telling them no, give up such weapons. Kim II Sung overruled his generals. I think he understood that there was more benefit from international commerce than from nuclear power. But his generals still do not think this way.
TT I have another question, if I may, that's about Japan's policy towards North Korea. It looks as if Japan is pursuing its policy towards North Korea totally separately from Japan's policy towards the UN. But seen from Washington, I think the two are intertwined in terms of proliferation. North Korea is selling to Pakistan and so on, and Mr. Bolton is very much concerned about this, not necessarily about North Korea's nuclear built up only. In that sense, I think Japan's scope has to be broadened to include these intertwining elements overriding North Korea and Iraq. Could you tell us how the picture looks like in the eyes of people like Mr. Bolton?
War or Engagement - Options for Dealing with North Korea Remarks to Genron NPO