Nongovernmental diplomacy is taking on increasing importance in addressing the issues in the volatile East Asia, especially Japan's worsening relations with its two neighbors - China and South Korea, according to two up-and-coming scholars.

However, any civil-society diplomatic initiatives, which engage business executives, scholars, journalists and NPO leaders, among others, carry the risk of being "absorbed" into government-to-government maneuvering," warned the scholars.

Nonetheless, the two scholars expressed hopes that "civil-society" diplomacy, or "nongovernmental" one, will argument conventional governmental diplomacy, which does not work sell in settling interstate conflicts involving territorial disputes,

The scholars are Makoto Kawashima, an associate professor at the University of Tokyo and a senior researcher at the Institute for International Policy Studies, and Ken Jimbo, an associate professor at the Faculty of Policy Management, the Department of Policy Management, Keio University.

They made these remarks during a discussion on the role of nongovernmental diplomacy, which was moderated by Yasushi Kudo, representative of The Genron NPO.

Referring to the close linkage between domestic politics and diplomacy, Jimbo welcomed the birth of the second Abe Cabinet in December last year and the ensuing likelihood that Prime Minister Abe would stay in power for the coming three years.

"The recovery of stability in domestic politics, which ensures continuity of diplomatic policy, should be taken as Japan's asset in conducting diplomacy," he said.

Kawashima basically shared Jimbo's view and added that the new Chinese leadership led by President Xi Jinping is still gripped by instability in domestic politics, raising doubts about the efficacy of diplomatic efforts through official channels between Japan and China.

To the question by Kudo about the positive impact of the growing signs of Japan's economic pickup under the influence of "Abenomics" and the International Olympic Committee's choice of Tokyo as the host city of the 2020 Summer Olympics, Jimbo and Kawakami shared a view that many foreign governments will be much motivated by these positive signs to make serious diplomatic deals with Japan.

"At the same time, there is no denying the fact that the relative decline in Japan's strength is becoming a trend in medium- and long terms, as Japan is no longer the world's second largest economy and Japan-U.S. relations are not so solid as they were in the past," observed Jimbo. "In other words, Japan is regarded by others as nothing but one of the multiple players in Asia, not as the most reliable Japan."

Kawashima is a little more optimistic. "Japan is keeping the relative advantage. It remains as the world's third largest economy and it excels in technology," he said.

"The upcoming seven years (till the 2020 Olympics) will provide Japan a major opportunity in that Japan will be constantly getting international attention in many respects, including the relations with China, South Korea and other emerging countries, the problem of the contaminated water leaking from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant, and the controversy over "views on historical issues." If Japan could succeed in aptly projecting its new national identity and images, the 21st century would turn out to be a big chance for Japan," Kawashima noted.

On the question of Japan-China relations that remain at an impasse over the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute, Jimbo said he is not optimistic about the prospects for an early materialization of a summit meeting between the top leaders of both countries. "China insists Japan should recognize the existence of territorial dispute over the Senkakus, as well as the acceptance of the Chinese proposal, made in early 1970s, to shelve up the territorial issue for future solution," he said.

"It is obvious that Beijing is setting these as the conditions for the scheduling of Abe's summit conference with Xi. On the other hand, Japan categorically denies the presence of territorial dispute over the Senkaku islets. In the meantime, Tokyo and Beijing are now exploring, overtly and covertly, any practical ways to reach mutual concessions in a way not to lose faces of both sides," Jimbo observed.

Kawashima said that the definition of the words "shelving-up" differs largely between the 1970s and today. "In the 1970s, China proposed the shelving of the Senkaku issue on the premise that Japan had effective control over the islets. Today, China is using the same words to mean that both countries should exercise their respective sovereignty over the islands on an equal footing. This means that both governments permit the entry of other country's official vessels into the waters near the disputed islets," he said.

"If China recognizes Japan's effective control as a premise for any settlement of the territorial issue, there could develop some leeway for Japan to make concessions. At this moment, however, both sides show no signs of making compromises on this matter," Kawashima said.

In this context, Jimbo proposed that top political leaders of both countries regard the Senkaku dispute not as a top-priority issue from a broader perspective of Japan-China relations. "If this is not easy, they should take a different agenda-setting approach. For instance, they could share an identical view on the theory that it is mutually beneficial to maintain the status quo as the best of bad situation, and agree to advance to a next agenda," Jimbo said.

Kawakami said that he senses some signs of changes in the attitude of the Chinese side. "By putting the Senkaku dispute aside, China is seemingly ready to deal with Japan on some other matters. For instance, China is seeking Japan's cooperation in resuming the Six-Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear threat, as well as the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) involving Japan, China and South Korea," he said.

"China seems fully poised to advance economic exchanges with Japan proactively, not to mention of exchanges on environmental issues. There could be a likelihood that any improvements in relations at other turfs could eventually throw a cordon around the territorial dispute itself in the future," Kawashima added.

Excerpts of their remarks on other issues follow.

Crisis preventive measures

Kawashima: Any government would not immediately wage a war in the wake of an accidental incident. But it is likely to happen that the public sentiment in each county could get heated to the extent of forcing the government to resort to war. To put it the other way around, it is imperative to establish a framework to contain any repercussions from an incident, or to prevent such an incident from developing into an outburst of nationalism with the media inflaming such a sentiment. The moment when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred on July 7, 1937, then top leaders of China and Japan hardly thought this incident would usher in the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. We should learn a lesson from the history.

Role of nongovernmental sector in diplomacy

Jimbo: Needless to say, the importance of governmental diplomacy, in particular that of summit diplomacy should not be underestimated. At the same time, attention should be paid to the opinion of Japan's business community deeply involved in business in China. Their attitude toward China could remain poles apart from the prevailing conservative "zero-sum" one. As silent but major stakeholders, the voices of Japanese business organizations, investors in China and businesses expanding their sales networks in China should be brought to the fore in the media and other venues for open dialogue.

Kawashima: When it comes to the role of nongovernmental sector, we must be fully cautious about the possibility of public opinion leading government policy to undesirable directions. Regarding exchanges with the nongovernmental sector in China, one big question is whether China really has the "private-sector" in the true sense of the words. Many Chinese organizations are either affiliated with the government or the communist party. A vast majority of the so-called private-sector exchanges between Japan and China since the end of the last have never been "private" in essence. Therefore, private-sector or nongovernmental groups should be extremely cautious so that their engagement in exchanges with China would not be incorporated in the framework of government-to-government confrontation.

Toward Track 1.5 Diplomacy

Jimbo: Since the early 1990s (after the end of the Cold War era) up to today, various diplomatic initiatives called "Track 2 Diplomacy" were booming in the Asia/Pacific region. These moves were also called "nongovernmental diplomacy" and "civil-society diplomacy" in which scholars and experts were mingled up with politicians and bureaucrats to engage in policy discussions. Those initiatives helped promote confidence-building prior to the launch of government-to-government negotiations, or to provide expert views for solution of disputes, thereby leading to the formation of a multilateral approach to the security architecture in the region. It is high time that we had explored the possibility of initiating the similar process in Northeast Asia. In order to facilitate moves toward the establishment of such a process, it is imperative to conduct serious debates on important issues that cannot be squarely discussed at official channels, as well as to seek participation of important organizations and key persons. This kind of nongovernmental diplomacy should be defined as "Track 1.5 Diplomacy," a bridge to link the government with civil society.

Kawashima: As shown by a recent Genron NPO survey, an increasing number of Japanese are becoming more conscious of the Senkaku issue than before as their own problem and as a problem that has the potential of affecting their own livelihoods. The survey has made them "stakeholders" in the Senkaku dispute. There is a chance that the same phenomenon could occur in China, thereby bringing to the fore the "common ground" for Japanese and Chinese stakeholders and the shared recognition of "common interests" among them.